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This thesis analyses the making of West German policy towards the Portuguese 
dictatorship during the governments led by Willy Brandt and Marcelo Caetano, from 
1968 until the dictatorship’s downfall on 25 April 1974. This case study sheds new light 
on the interaction between the Cold War and colonial politics, particularly on the 
multilateral dimension of the process of Portuguese resistance to decolonisation.  
Although the starting point is the bilateral relationship between the Federal 
Republic of Germany and Portugal, this thesis takes a multifaceted approach to the 
topic. It examines the role of various external and internal forces pushing for change 
and continuity in Bonn’s policy towards Lisbon. Research demonstrates that not only 
did that policy become a contentious issue internationally, it also polarised West 
Germany’s society, parliament and different sections of Bonn’s social-liberal coalition 
government. Taking this into account, my work covers the diplomatic, economic and 
military areas of the relations between the two states. It also addresses the parallel ties 
between the German Social-Democratic Party and the opposition to the dictatorship, 
including the Portuguese socialists and the African liberation movements.  
The thesis argues that, despite many impulses and pressures to assertively 
confront the Portuguese dictatorship’s refusal to decolonise and democratise, West 
German policy towards the Caetano regime remained essentially cooperative, even if 
becoming increasingly ambiguous over time. That option reflected the geopolitical and 
conceptual contradictions between adopting a more aggressive policy towards Portugal 
and defending Bonn’s contemporary policy of rapprochement with Eastern Europe 
(neue Ostpolitik). Thus this thesis illustrates the interconnectedness between the global 







“Whoever uses the term ‘colony’ in front of the Portuguese to refer to their 
overseas provinces commits a serious and potentially insulting error of 
form. It is not appropriate to describe Portugal as a dictatorship and it is 
offensive to voice it in front of the Portuguese. The Portuguese form of 
government is adapted to fit the needs of the country and it gives personal 
freedom and legal security to the individual citizen. Portugal’s standard of 
living is substantially more modest than that of the Federal Republic. The 
wages and salaries of the Portuguese are far lower than the corresponding 
German ones; nevertheless the people in Portugal are generally content and 
happy.”  
 
Pamphlet handed out by the ZdVP to the German troops stationed in Portugal 
(quoted from “Gewisse traditionelle Eigentümlichkeiten”, Der Spiegel, 05.10.1970, Nr.41, p.26) 
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  Behind the making of West German policy towards the Portuguese dictatorship 
between 1968 and 1974 lies the story of how the emblematic social-democratic 
governments led by Chancellor Willy Brandt came to deal with Western Europe’s 
oldest authoritarian state and most persistent colonial empire. This story reflects a key 
intersection of contemporary history: while acknowledging that decolonisation was the 
defining event of international relations during the second half of the twentieth century, 
we cannot ignore the role of the Cold War in shaping these relations, including the 
decolonising process itself. The competition between the Western and Eastern geo-
ideological blocs provided the framework for the African emancipation from colonial 
rule, but also for European quests to perpetuate colonialism. This thesis addresses the 
interaction between these phenomena by examining the policy of a regime whose very 
being was inextricably linked to the Cold War, the Federal Republic Germany (FRG), 
towards a regime whose existence was grounded on the principle of resistance to 
decolonisation, the Portuguese Estado Novo dictatorship. 
This introductory chapter outlines the framework and methodology of the thesis. 
The first section briefly sketches out the FRG’s and Portugal’s policy orientations 
during the early Cold War years in order to set up the specific political landscape behind 
their relationship. The chapter then situates my research within the relevant 
historiography and discusses the available primary sources used to examine that 
relationship, before clarifying the thesis’ rationale and structure.  
 
 
1. Background: The dynamics of transformation 
The years from 1968 to 1974 were marked by a widespread pursuit of new 
approaches to old conflicts. In 1968, just as the ‘Prague Spring’ and the Vietnamese Tet 
Offensive defied the international hegemony of the superpowers, a wave of domestic 
challenges to the established order swept both sides of the ‘iron curtain’, as well as the 
‘Third World’. The rise of mass media facilitated an outburst of protest movements 
against local and global manifestations of capitalism, imperialism and colonialism.1 
Images of the Nigerian-Biafran war shocked public opinion in Western societies and 
                                                
1 For an overview of these 1968 dynamics, see Fink, Carole, Gassert, Philipp and Junker, Detlef (eds.). 




gave rise to a surge of humanitarian activism.2 In Africa, the frustration over the 
shortcomings of a non-aligned approach to eliminating the colonial residues in the 
continent encouraged the increasing appropriation of Cold War rivalries.3 By contrast, 
during this period the United States of America (USA) and the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics (USSR) sought to bring relief to decades of escalating tension between them 
through détente – an array of negotiations and treaties recognising each other’s 
‘interests’. Initiatives such as the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT), the Mutual 
and Balanced Force Reductions talks (MBFR) and the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) raised hopes for a more peaceful future. In turn, the 
collapse of the Bretton Woods monetary system in 1971 and the oil price shock of 1973 
ushered the end of almost thirty years of Western European economic prosperity. By 
1974, the Zeitgeist was consumed by a pervasive atmosphere of ‘crisis’.4 In this context, 
the Federal Republic of Germany and Portugal underwent their own processes of 
transformation. In order to understand that transformation, it is necessary to track their 
evolution in the previous decades. 
Since the foundation of the FRG, in 1949, its foreign policy was firmly oriented 
towards Western integration. This option reflected the wish for Western European 
cohesion and the rigid anticommunist stance of the first governments in Bonn, headed 
by the conservative Christian sister parties CDU/CSU under Chancellor Konrad 
Adenauer (CDU), who stayed in power until 1963, often in coalition with the liberal 
party FDP. Adenauer’s governments embraced international projects such as the 
Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC, later OECD) and the 
European Economic Community (EEC) in their quest for regaining external credibility 
and greater political sovereignty. Having been granted from the victor powers the right 
to remilitarise, in 1955 Bonn joined the North-Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).5 
The path of multilateralism allowed the federal authorities to expand their restricted 
                                                
2 Morgan, Michael Cotey. 2010. «The Seventies and the Rebirth of Human Rights» In The Shock of the 
Global: the 1970s in Perspective, Ferguson, Niall (ed.). Cambridge (Massachusetts): Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, pp.243-244. 
3 Westad, Odd Arne. 2005. The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our 
Times, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.207-218. 
4 For a discussion of the ‘crisis’ environment of the 1970s, see Ferguson, Niall (ed.). 2010. The Shock of 
the Global: the 1970s in Perspective, Cambridge (Massachusetts): Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press. 
5 For a more detailed overview of this period, see Hacke, Christian. 2003. Die Aussenpolitik der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Von Konrad Adenauer bis Gerhard Schröder, Berlin: Ullstein, pp.63-83; 
Haftendorn, Helga. 2006 (A). Coming of Age: German Foreign Policy Since 1945, Lanham: Rowman & 
Littlefield, pp.9-56; Schöllgen, Gregor. 2004. Die Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: von 
den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart, Munich: Beck, (3rd edition), pp.18-41. 
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political range of action by incorporating the FRG’s interests into the Western Bloc so 
that its allies could accept them as their own.6 Westernisation, however, was not 
consensual domestically, as in the 1950s the social-democratic opposition party SPD 
regarded this move as an obstacle to German reunification.7 
Bonn’s foreign policy then could not be dissociated from the fact that Cold War 
geopolitics had not just led to the partitioning of Europe, but of Germany itself. 
Claiming to be the sole representative of the German nation, under Adenauer the FRG 
assertively sought to isolate its Eastern counterpart, the communist German Democratic 
Republic (GDR). This tactic took shape under the ‘Hallstein doctrine’, which stipulated 
that Bonn would not establish and maintain diplomatic ties with any state that 
recognised de jure East Germany, with the exception of the USSR.8 Tension reached a 
peak with the diplomatic crisis of 1958-1962, when Moscow demanded the withdrawal 
of Western troops from Berlin and East German forces erected the wall which cemented 
the division of that city. Concerned, the federal authorities began to feel the need to 
adopt a more flexible strategy towards the Soviet Bloc.9 This tendency evolved during 
the chancellorship of Ludwig Erhard (CDU), from 1963 until 1966, and particularly 
during the subsequent CDU/CSU-SPD coalition government. The latter, known as the 
‘Grand Coalition’, was led by Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger (CDU) and had the 
SPD’s Chairman Willy Brandt as Vice-Chancellor and Minister at the Foreign Office 
(Auswärtiges Amt – AA). While not yet formally abandoning the Hallstein doctrine, the 
Grand Coalition nonetheless established diplomatic relations with Romania and 
Yugoslavia and began to lay the groundwork for a more engaged relationship with the 
Eastern Bloc.10 
Just as the FRG’s foreign policy was tied to the concept of a divided nation, 
Portugal saw itself as a nation under threat of amputation. The identity of the right-wing 
Estado Novo dictatorship, in place since 1933, relied heavily on the idea of a 
pluricontinental empire.11 More than mere economic necessity, the governments in 
Lisbon portrayed colonialism as a historical imperative by invoking Portugal’s 
‘civilising mission’. They also argued that the geopolitical presence projected by the 
                                                
6 Haftendorn (2006A), p.6. 
7 Haftendorn (2006A), p.41; Schöllgen (2004), pp.21-23. 
8 Hacke (2003), pp.83-89; Haftendorn (2006A), pp.32-40; Schöllgen (2004), pp.42-47. 
9 Schöllgen (2004), pp.52-67. 
10 Haftendorn (2006A),pp.157-160; Schöllgen (2004), pp.79-100. 
11 This notion of empire included the Indian colonies Goa, Daman and Diu (all of them annexed by India 
in 1961), the Eastern colonies East-Timor and Macao and the African colonies Angola, Mozambique, 
Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde and São Tomé and Príncipe. 
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empire served to secure the independence of the small Portuguese metropolis from the 
larger European states, particularly Spain. In the aftermath of World War II, the 
regime’s founder and leader, the President of the Council of Ministers (Prime Minister) 
António de Oliveira Salazar, perceived colonial rule as threatened by the new world 
order, namely by the rhetoric of the USA and USSR, as well as the UN Charter. After a 
constitutional amendment in 1951, Salazar’s regime no longer officially acknowledged 
that it possessed colonies, but merely ‘overseas provinces’, which were considered to be 
part of Portugal’s ‘single and indivisible state’. Lisbon claimed that Portugal’s 
relationship with its empire contained an element of ‘originality’, rooted in 500 years of 
shared history and a vocation for inter-racial harmony (luso-tropicalismo), which set it 
apart from other European powers. As liberation wars broke out, first in Angola (1961) 
and later also in Guinea-Bissau (1963) and Mozambique (1964), the regime framed the 
conflicts as part of the global Cold War. Because the main liberation movements 
displayed Marxist leanings and connections – namely Angola’s MPLA, Mozambique’s 
FRELIMO and Guinea-Bissau’s and Cape Verde’s PAIGC – Lisbon portrayed 
Portuguese military actions as defensive responses to attacks perpetrated by Soviet-
backed ‘terrorists’.12 
Regardless of Salazar’s distrust of the USA and of the contentious status of 
Portuguese colonialism, the dictatorship successfully integrated into the Western Bloc. 
Portugal emerged from World War II in a more positive light than Spain’s similar 
regime, due to Lisbon’s collaboration with the allied forces during the war, despite 
Portugal’s neutral status.13 Moreover, in its reluctance to decolonise Lisbon did not 
differ significantly from the behaviour of other colonial powers.14 Thus, although 
Portugal’s first application for membership in the UN, endorsed by the West, was 
                                                
12 For an analysis of the theoretical postulates behind Lisbon’s colonial policy, see Rosas, Fernando. 
1995.  Estado Novo, Império e Ideologia Imperial.  Revista de História das Ideias, vol.17, pp.19-32 and 
Udokang, Okon. 1982. Portuguese African Policy and the Colonial Liberation Movement. Nigerian 
Journal of International Affairs, vol.8, nr.2, pp.97-124. For an overview of the Portuguese decolonising 
conflicts, including Lisbon’s diplomatic strategy, see Macqueen, Norrie. 1997. The Decolonization of 
Portuguese Africa: Metropolitan Revolution and the Dissolution of Empire, London: Longman. Pinto, 
António Costa. 2001. O Fim do Império Português: a Cena Internacional, a Guerra Colonial, e a 
Descolonização, 1961-1975, Lisbon: Livros Horizonte and Thomas, Martin. 2008. «Contrasting Patterns 
of Decolonization: Belgian and Portuguese Africa». In Crises of Empire: Decolonization and Europe’s 
Imperial States, 1918-1975, Thomas, Martin, Moore, Bob and Butler, L.J. (eds.). London: Hodder 
Education, pp.393-410. 
13 Pinto (2001), p.14. 
14 For the European prospects of imperial reassertion in the post-WWII world order, see Darwin, John. 
2001. «Diplomacy and Decolonization». In International Diplomacy and Colonial Retreat, Fedorowich, 
Kent and Thomas, Martin (eds.). London: Frank Cass Publishers,  pp.14-16. 
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vetoed by Moscow in 194615, the dictatorship managed to enter the organisation in 1955 
as part of a pack of countries brought in by the USA. Washington also recruited 
Portugal to be an original member of NATO in 1949 due to its strategic location in 
Europe and, especially, because of the Lajes airbase on the Portuguese Azores 
archipelago situated in mid-Atlantic.16 Portugal’s integration was not only political and 
military, but also economic, as the country joined Western multilateral markets and 
institutions, including the European Free Trade Association (EFTA).17 Even in the 
1960s, when Lisbon’s resistance to decolonisation eventually became a counter-cyclical 
phenomenon, Portugal – unlike what Salazar claimed in his famous 1965 speech – did 
not stand “proudly alone”.18 Lisbon notably maintained solid, if careful, relations with 
three permanent members of the UN Security Council – USA, France, and the United 
Kingdom (UK) – which regularly vetoed or abstained in UN resolutions directed against 
the dictatorship.19 
The development of diplomatic ties between West Germany and Portugal was a 
gradual process, with the initial steps dating back to the FRG’s earliest years. One of 
the most significant aspects in bringing the two states closer together was the geo-
strategic disposition of the Cold War. The FRG, on the north-eastern front of Western 
Europe, and Portugal, in the southwest, occupied symmetrical and therefore 
complementary positions in the Western defence strategy.20 This connection grew 
stronger as the Bonn regime joined NATO, a move which had found in Portugal one of 
its first great supporters, with Lisbon highlighting the importance of a strong West 
Germany to block the possibility of Soviet expansion. In turn, Konrad Adenauer openly 
stated his own admiration for the leadership skills of António Salazar, who, like him, 
was a devout catholic and staunch anticommunist. The relations between the two states 
                                                
15 Oliveira, Pedro A. 2007. Os Despojos da Aliança: A Grã-Bretanha e a Questão colonial Portuguesa 
1945-1975, Lisbon: Edições Tinta-da-China, pp.50-51. 
16 Pinto (2001), pp.14-15; During the Cold War, an estimated 75% of all military air traffic between the 
United States, Europe and the Middle East went through the Lajes airbase – Schneidman, Witney W. 
2004. Washington and the Fall of Portugal’s Colonial Empire, Dallas: University Press of America, p.30. 
17 Besides being a founding member of OEEC and OECD, Portugal also became a member of the 
International Monetary Fund (1960) and of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (1962). – Neves, 
João César das. 1996. «Portuguese Post-war Growth: a Global Approach». In Economic Growth in 
Europe since 1945, Crafts, Nicholas and Toniolo, Gianni (eds.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
p.340. 
18 Quoted from Nogueira, Franco A. 2000 (B). Salazar, O Último Combate (1964-1970), (vol. VI), Porto: 
Editora Civilização, p.8. 
19 Macqueen (1997), p.56. 
20 As Armando Marques Guedes points out in his forward to Fonseca, Ana Mónica. 2007. A Força das 
Armas: o Apoio da República Federal da Alemanha ao Estado Novo (1958-1968), Lisbon: Ministério dos 
Negócios Estrangeiros, p.11. 
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grew friendlier, and in 1956 West German and Portuguese authorities upgraded their 
respective legations to embassies.21 
Yet it was only in the late 1950s/early 1960s that a sharp shift in Lisbon’s foreign 
strategy and Bonn’s reconstruction of the FRG’s military might brought about a serious 
strengthening of  their relationship. By then Portugal’s two most powerful allies – the 
UK and the USA – were progressively distancing themselves from the Portuguese 
imperial project. This led the dictatorship to seek alternative alliances that would secure 
its colonial designs at a time when the winds of decolonisation were blowing through 
Sub-Saharan Africa. Thus, quietly but surely, Lisbon reinforced its relations with 
France and West Germany. Bonn quickly proved itself a valuable partner, providing 
Lisbon with military materiel used in the colonial wars in exchange for a fall-back 
rearguard in Portugal in case of an attack from the East.22 For the CDU/CSU-led 
governments of the time, this was an acceptable strategic position, if not an 
unproblematic one. In general Bonn looked at the colonies’ path to autonomy with 
sympathy, not least because the notion of self-determination lay at the heart of the 
‘German unification question’ itself. Nevertheless, the FRG also placed great 
importance on cooperation with its European allies, including the colonial powers. 
During the French-Algerian colonial war (1954-1962), for example, Bonn had 
reiterated its loyalty to France; thus by the time the first conflicts broke out in Angola, 
the precedent had already been set.23 The FRG worried that if Portugal felt a lack of 
support from its Western allies, it might leave the Atlantic Alliance, costing NATO the 
crucial Lajes air base. Moreover, Bonn, fitting with its CDU/CSU pragmatic hard-line 
worldview, feared that Portugal’s loss of the empire would mean the downfall of 
Salazar’s dictatorship. This might allow for Communism to rise in Portugal and to 
spread to Spain, which would mean a pro-Soviet Iberian Peninsula.24 Bonn’s classic 
‘adenauerite’ outlook of foreign affairs was however soon to be taken by the 
transformative thrust of the late 1960s. 
Although building on the work of its predecessor, the FRG government which 
came to power as a result of the 28 September 1969 elections brought a new approach to 
                                                
21 Fonseca (2007), pp.23-34; Schroers, Thomas. 1998. Die Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland: die Entwicklung der Beziehungen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland zur Portugiesischen 
Republik 1949-1976, Hamburg: Universität der Bunderswehr Hamburg, Phd thesis, pp.23-32. 
22 Telo, António José. 1994. As Guerras de África e a Mudança nos Apoios Internacionais de Portugal. 
Revista História das Ideias, vol.16, pp.347-369. 
23 Engel, Ulf. 2000. Die Afrikapolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1949-1999: Rollen und 
Identitäten, Leipzig: LIT, pp.230-232. 
24 Fonseca (2007), pp.142-156. 
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the Cold War in general and to the ‘German question’ in particular.25 The SPD and 
FDP – holding a majority in parliament (Bundestag) together – formed a coalition 
government on 21 October, with Willy Brandt as chancellor and the FDP’s Chairman 
Walter Scheel as vice-chancellor and foreign minister. The basis for their agreement 
was the pursuit of a new Eastern policy (neue Ostpolitik).26 Its conceptual origins 
stretched back at least to the Berlin Crisis, which had been witnessed first-hand by neue 
Ostpolitik’s main architects: then-Mayor of West Berlin Willy Brandt and his press 
officer Egon Bahr. They presented peaceful coexistence as the first step for settling 
divergences with the FRG’s Eastern counterpart. According to the stated principle of 
‘change through rapprochement’ (Wandel durch Annäherung), West German political 
engagement with the East would influence the latter. Therefore, neue Ostpolitik 
appeared not as a mere acceptance of the status quo, but as an attempt to overcome it by 
promoting gradual transformation in the GDR and a stable security system in Europe 
where unification could eventually take place.27 The emphasis on stability has led 
critics to challenge the progressive character of this policy, accused of economically 
propping up East Germany28 and of reinforcing, rather than transcending, the structures 
of the Cold War.29 In practice, neue Ostpolitik translated into a series of treaties 
normalising Bonn’s relations with the USSR30, Poland31, Czechoslovakia32 and, 
notably, the GDR33, earning Willy Brandt the Nobel Peace Prize in 1971. The 
negotiations carried out by Walter Scheel and, above all, by Egon Bahr, whom Brandt 
brought in as undersecretary of state of the Chancellery, relied heavily on the goodwill 
of the FRG’s main Western allies USA, UK and France, not least because of their 
victor-power authority over the status of Berlin.34 Nevertheless, neue Ostpolitik 
                                                
25 For a comparative analysis between the programme of Kiesinger’s government and this one, see 
Dannenberg, Julia von. 2008. The Foundations of Ostpolitik: The Making of the Moscow Treaty between 
West Germany and the USSR, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.67-130. 
26 Haftendorn (2006A), pp.160-163; Schöllgen (2004), pp.100-103. 
27 Niedhart, Gottfried. 2004. Ostpolitik: Phases, Short-Term Objectives, and Grand Design. GHI Bulletin 
Supplement, 1, pp.118-136. 
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Georges-Henri, Szabo, Stephen F. and Wells Jr., Samuel F. (eds.), Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson 
Centre Press, pp.209-227. 
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remained an autonomous process with specific regional goals, even if coinciding with 
the evolution of superpower rapprochement and détente.35 
y 1974.37 
                                                
As central and all encompassing as neue Ostpolitik appeared to be, the coalition’s 
multifaceted agenda embraced other dimensions. Bonn expanded its international 
development assistance programmes and participated in the North-South dialogue 
initiatives, where it stressed the role of aid in securing peace.36 Because the Third 
World countries formed the largest voting group in the UN General Assembly, relations 
with those countries were of great importance, particularly in terms of enabling both 
German states to join the UN on 18 September 1973. The FRG also remained an active 
member in NATO as well as in the EEC, the enlargement of which (to Denmark, 
Ireland and the UK) Bonn supported wholeheartedly. At home, the government had to 
contend with rising social unrest and political friction. During its first years, the 
coalition was in a precarious position in the Bundestag, as several MPs switched party 
and joined CDU, mostly in protest against neue Ostpolitik. The government barely 
defeated a vote of no-confidence in April 1972 and it agreed to face new elections on 19 
November, which it won after a polarising campaign largely focused on Bonn’s foreign 
policy. The chancellor’s popularity plummeted in 1973 amid political scandals. Most 
prominently, Brandt’s personal assistant Günter Guillaume was uncovered as a spy for 
the GDR, leading Brandt to resign on 6 Ma
In Portugal, the impulse for transformation bore the banner of ‘evolution within 
continuity’ (evolução na continuidade), articulated by Marcelo Caetano, who took over 
from a hospitalised Salazar on 27 September 1968. For decades, Caetano had informally 
headed a marginalised strand within the regime (marcelismo) which defended economic 
modernisation, federalisation of the colonial system and a loosening of the repressive 
state apparatus. Thus, the new prime minister brought forth widespread expectations of 
serious change in Lisbon. His first year in power, known as the ‘marcelist spring’, saw 
the softening, by the regime’s standards, of censorship and police despotism. The 
legislative elections on 26 October 1969 – less fraudulent than usual, but hardly free – 
allowed a ‘liberal wing’ into the parliament, with a progressive agenda, if not much 
35 Sarotte, Mary Elise. 2008. «The Frailties of Grand Strategies: A Comparison of Détente and 
Ostpolitik». In Nixon in the World: American Foreign Relations, 1969-1977, Logevall, Fredrik and 
Preston, Andrew (eds.). New York: Oxford University Press, pp.146-163. 
36 Lorenzini, Sara. 2009. Globalising Ostpolitik. Cold War History, vol.IX (2), May, p.232. 
37 Hacke (2003), pp.188-194; Marshall, Barbara.  1997. Willy Brandt: A Political Biography, 
Basingstoke: Macmillan, pp.77-96; Sassoon, Donald. 1996. One Hundred Years of Socialism: the West 




actual power. A technocratic faction within the government promoted industrialisation 
and a closer proximity to the EEC, ushering in a trade agreement with the Common 
Market in July 1972. However, Caetano did not truly part with the authoritarian 
structures and ideology set by his predecessor, as evident in his 1971 constitutional 
revision. Although considered too radical by the regime’s more conservative faction – 
the ‘ultras’ – the limits of Caetano’s reformism frustrated the hopes for Portugal’s 
democratisation, or at least meaningful liberalisation. Whether those limits derived from 
personal political conviction, from concern over social disorder due to popular 
discontent with the colonial wars, or simply from Caetano’s unwillingness to fully 
challenge the powerful ‘ultras’, remains the subject of academic dispute. Regardless, 
what became the dictatorship’s closing period was marked by the withdrawal of 
marcelismo's most tolerant initiatives and by a massive wave of repression up to 1974.38 
That marcelismo was fundamentally undermined by its inability to achieve a 
political solution for the colonial conflict is less contested, despite persistent debate over 
Caetano’s actual long-term intentions for the empire. He certainly rejected 
decolonisation in the foreseeable future, even if he shifted the official paradigm away 
from esoteric justifications and chose to emphasise practical arguments, i.e. Portugal’s 
alleged role in protecting and developing its colonised ‘multiracial’ societies. The 
constitutional revision introduced the principle of ‘participatory and progressive 
autonomy’ for the overseas provinces, which did not imply giving up the rule over those 
territories, just granting them more relative administrative power. The pro-colonial far-
right saw this step as an opening up of a path towards eventual independence, while the 
anti-colonialist critics regarded it as a superficial adjustment designed to safeguard the 
imperial system.39 In the face of a growing international backlash, Portugal’s diplomatic 
strategy focused on traditional allies, including Brazil, Spain, France and West 
Germany, as well as the UK and USA, where conservative parties had just returned to 
power. Aware that these countries would not openly support Lisbon’s unpopular 
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position, the dictatorship tried to at least prevent them from acting directly against it, 
while simultaneously seeking discrete material assistance for its colonial warfare. The 
Portuguese suffered their harsher military defeats in Guinea-Bissau, which unilaterally 
declared independence in September 1973.40 The dissatisfaction with the regime, 
particularly with the African wars, reached sections of the Portuguese armed forces. On 
25 April 1974, a left-wing military coup in Portugal spurred the Carnation Revolution, 
which brought down the Estado Novo dictatorship and paved the way for 
decolonisation.41 
 The faces of the diplomatic actors were themselves renewed during this period. 
Walter Scheel had no previous experience in the Auswärtiges Amt.42 In Portugal, the 
old-school ‘salazarist’ Alberto Franco Nogueira served as foreign minister under 
Caetano, but he left office after the 1969 elections, becoming one of the main voices of 
the ‘ultras’. Caetano took over foreign affairs until the end of the year and on 15 
January he invited his 37-year old former student Rui Patrício to head the Foreign 
Ministry.43 At embassy level, the situation was more convoluted. The FRG had three 
ambassadors assigned to Lisbon during the Caetano years44, namely Herbert Müller-
Rorschach, who returned to Germany in February 1969 due to an investigation accusing 
him of involvement in the Holocaust45, Hans Schmidt-Horix46, who committed suicide 
on 30 November 197047, and lastly Ehrenfried von Holleben.48 The Portuguese 
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Embassy in Bonn49 saw great rotation as well, but with less tragic undertones. The role 
of extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador belonged to Manuel Homem de Mello 
until his retirement in 1971,50 João de Freitas Cruz until his promotion to political 
director at the Foreign Ministry in September 197351 and subsequently to Vasco 
Futscher Pereira.52 This frantic circulation of diplomatic agents was counterbalanced by 
each country’s overall stable vision of foreign policy. 
The making of the FRG’s policy towards the Portuguese dictatorship during this 
period can only be understood in light of the key political projects in Bonn and Lisbon, 
although they should not confine the analysis. The leaderships of Willy Brandt and 
Marcelo Caetano were closely associated with long-running marginal strands within 
each regime, reflecting a yearning for transformation, tempered with a devotion to 
stability. The fact that both responded to concerns over the perceived integrity of their 
nations conditioned the interaction between the two states. However, just as Brandt’s 
vision did not limit itself to neue Ostpolitik and marcelismo did not limit itself to the 
‘colonial question’, West German-Portuguese relations were not shaped merely by those 
two political designs, nor indeed merely by Brandt and Caetano. As this thesis 
demonstrates, those relations were tied into a much more complex tapestry of social and 
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2. Literature review 
 Bonn’s policy towards the Caetano regime has received little attention from 
scholars so far; the literature is fragmented and insufficiently conceptualised. General 
works on German Cold War foreign policy have largely neglected this dimension of the 
FRG’s external relations.53 Similarly, the historiography of Portuguese international 
resistance to decolonisation has touched on West Germany’s role rather sparingly.54 
There was very little academic dialogue among the scholars who did engage with it, 
particularly between those working in Germany and those working in Portugal. A 
number of them contributed decisively to shed light on this topic, but attempts to 
explore its significance beyond German and Portuguese politics were shallow and rare. 
Portuguese research has tended to focus on the elements of discontinuity 
between Brandt’s governments and their predecessors. António José Telo’s noteworthy 
1996 article on Germany’s historical role within Europe included four sections 
dedicated to the neue Ostpolitik era, one of which specifically dealt with Bonn’s 
relations with Portugal in that period. Telo discussed how under Brandt the FRG 
massively reduced German-Portuguese military cooperation and, crucially, its arms 
sales to Lisbon. He blamed this reduction chiefly on NATO’s shift of defence strategy, 
which rendered Portugal much less relevant for the FRG’s security designs. Ignoring the 
inner workings of the federal government55, Telo perceived simultaneous erosion in the 
political relations between the two states, due to the SPD’s support for the Portuguese 
socialist opposition.56 In a later piece he claimed that Bonn found it more difficult to 
support Portugal during this period because the public’s condemnation of the colonial 
wars constrained the policy of the democratically elected German government and 
because neue Ostpolitik implied “an improvement in the [FRG’s] relations with the 
African movements or at least greater sensibility in that regard”.57 The notion that the 
FRG’s relationship with Portugal suffered a drastic setback fit into Telo’s systemic 
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interpretation, according to which the downfall of the Portuguese empire resulted from 
Portugal’s maladjustment to the surrounding international structure.58 
 This portrayal of the Caetano era as a time of intrinsic tension between Bonn 
and Lisbon has remained unchallenged in Portuguese historiography. Pedro Aires 
Oliveira, who wrote the most wide-ranging recent works on Caetano’s foreign policy, 
has suggested that under Brandt the West German authorities felt the need to claim a 
more ethical profile for the FRG’s foreign policy by keeping their distance from the 
Portuguese colonial system.59 Even Ana Mónica Fonseca’s 2005 Master’s dissertation 
about West German support for the Lisbon dictatorship, which was much more aware of 
German studies and sources than the previous examples, only addressed the period from 
1958 until 1968, before Willy Brandt became chancellor.60 Her more recent work has 
focused on the period after the downfall of the Caetano regime.61 Because Portuguese 
research did not thoroughly scrutinise Bonn’s policy towards marcelismo, it tended 
towards a superficial interpretation of events, with no clear distinction either between 
different stages or between the various German players. 
Conversely, West German research has emphasised the continuity of a friendly 
policy towards the Portuguese dictatorship during Brandt’s chancellorship, even if 
acknowledging a degree of ambiguity. Henning von Löwis of Menar, who as a scholar 
in 1971 had defended a Realpolitik-based approach towards the dictatorship62, became a 
specialist in this topic.63 His 1979 PhD thesis about Lisbon’s foreign policy from 1945 
until 197364 devoted a sizeable section to Portugal’s relations with West Germany. 
Although recognising that during the Brandt era some in the SPD away from the ruling 
circle developed a “parallel foreign policy” in support of the opposition to the 
dictatorship65, Menar postulated that little changed in the official bilateral relationship 
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with Lisbon.66 Thomas Schroers, whose 1998 PhD thesis focused on the FRG’s 
relations with Portugal from 1949 until 197667, included a chapter about the Brandt 
years which touched upon a large number of important aspects, adding much detail to 
Menar’s findings. Schroers claimed that Brandt’s governments gradually sought to 
publicly dissociate Bonn from the Caetano regime, but that this remained an artificial 
process, because of Bonn’s reluctance to defy Portugal as a NATO ally.68 Schroers has 
undertaken the most extensive research so far on this topic and raised valid points. Yet 
he neither consulted Portuguese sources for the chapter, nor was he able to access the 
federal government’s papers of the Brandt era. Consequently, Schroers did not fully 
unravel the complexities of Bonn’s policy-making process during this period. 
 The FRG’s policy towards Portugal also caught the interest of the West German 
movement of solidarity with the African liberation struggle in the early 1970s. An 
influential author who substantially researched, theorised and published about the issue 
was Eduardo de Sousa Ferreira, a Portuguese economist exiled in the FRG at the time. 
Ferreira’s Marxist analysis of the FRG’s economic interests in the Portuguese colonies 
provided a thought-provoking first draft of history about the link between colonialism 
and German-Portuguese economic relations.69 This critique proved particularly 
appealing to German scholars close to the dependency theory school, such as political 
scientist Rainer Tetzlaff70, and that interest carried on into the early aftermath of 
decolonisation. Together with Helmut Bley, Tetzlaff edited in 1978 a seminal work on 
the development of Bonn’s African policy, which manifestly sought to promote a more 
progressive attitude towards African affairs.71 A chapter in that book written by 
Gerhard Grohs, who had himself participated in the solidarity movement72, focused on 
past German-Portuguese relations as an example of a disastrous policy. Grohs’ essay 
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reproduced the criticism articulated by the movement earlier in the decade, accusing the 
federal government of having cynically backed Lisbon’s colonial praxis in order to 
safeguard West German economic interests in the Portuguese territories, as well as 
military cooperation with Portugal and in NATO.73 Over the following years, this 
politicised current of scholarship neglected the Portuguese case in order to concentrate 
chiefly on Namibia74, where the colonial conflict lasted until 1989. The neglect 
persisted well into the 1990s, even though the image of Bonn’s former role as backer of 
Portuguese colonialism retained resonance abroad, as illustrated by the work of 
Nigerian historian Bolade Eyinla.75 In 2000, Ulf Engel sought to move the study of 
Bonn’s African policy beyond structuralist interpretations through a historical analysis 
based on empirical constructivism. Less influenced by the early 1970s’ solidarity 
movement than by the recent evolution of the field, Engel seriously downplayed 
Portugal’s importance in the history of Bonn’s relations with Africa.76 
Ramifications of the FRG’s involvement with the Portuguese colonial crisis 
cropped up in related areas of research. Michael van Lay’s 1981 study about the 
Church’s role in conflicts of decolonisation, particularly in Mozambique, devoted a 
section to the actions of the West German clergy.77 In 2002, João Tavares published his 
thesis about the Portuguese military industry during the colonial wars, which examined 
at length the dictatorship’s cooperation with the German authorities, although saying 
remarkably little about the Willy Brandt period.78 Dalila Mateus’ 2004 book about the 
Portuguese political police in Africa during the colonial wars included a brief section on 
cases of cooperation between that police and the German secret services, most of them 
occurring in the early 1970s.79 
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Finally, a few areas of German-Portuguese relations have benefited from in-depth 
research. In 1975, Keith Middlemas published a wide-ranging study about the Cahora 
Bassa dam, built in Mozambique between 1968 and 1975 with the participation of West 
German companies and state credit guarantees.80 Despite a few inaccuracies, 
Middlemas’ book remains the definitive work on the political, financial and logistical 
dimensions of that enterprise, complemented by more recent interesting contributions 
from Luís Alves81, Allen Isaacman and Chris Sneddon.82 Manuel de Matos’ 1977 PhD 
thesis – researched and submitted in the FRG – sought to assess how the West German 
public perceived Portugal from 1961 until 1975, based mostly on contemporary press 
and questionnaires.83 This topic was revisited in 1994 by Hans-Ulrich Thamer.84 In 
2002, Artur Pais traced back the origins and evolution of the Beja airbase, in southern 
Portugal, which Lisbon began leasing to the FRG’s Air Force in the 1960s.85 The SPD’s 
parallel relations with the Portuguese socialists during the dictatorship were examined 
by Thomas Kreyssig in 199086 and, with more critical insight, by Antonio Muñoz 
Sánchez in 2007.87 
 This thesis brings together all the previous strands from the existing individual 
works. Not only does it re-contextualise the earlier findings and interpretations within 
my specific research, but it re-contextualises them within the broader historiography. 
Research on the final period of the Portuguese empire, which had traditionally been 
quite generalist88, has over the last decade shifted its focus towards bilateral case 
studies.89 Although using a bilateral case study as a starting point, this thesis pushes 
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those thematic boundaries by carefully framing its subject in a multilateral context. In 
order to do this, it takes advantage of research done on the Caetano regime’s relations 
with other states, most notably with its main allies the USA90, the UK91 and France92. 
Similarly, this work contributes to the ever expanding scholarship on Willy Brandt’s 
foreign policy.93 Specifically, it fits in with the recent shift to investigate the 
international ramifications of neue Ostpolitik beyond Eastern Europe94 and how that 
policy reflected into other areas of Bonn’s foreign affairs – as Sara Lorenzini has 
recently done in examining Bonn’s policy in Africa against the background of the new 
eastern approach.95 
Ultimately, this research aims to widen our understanding of the intersection 
between the Cold War and decolonisation politics. Historians have already established 
that the Cold War conflict compromised Washington’s initial disposition towards 
decolonisation in certain instances by creating a community of interests among the USA 
and the European colonial powers.96 This thesis demonstrates that a variation of that 
phenomenon is reflected in West Germany’s policy towards Portugal. Shifting these 
two states from secondary actors to protagonists, I explore how they perceived and 
manipulated the Cold War tensions beyond their direct interactions with the 
superpowers, namely in their dealings with each other. Although I concentrate on 
Bonn’s perspective, my analysis incorporates sources from different countries, 
acknowledges the agency on both sides and explores the mindset behind the various 
social and political forces involved. Through the adoption of a ‘multiarchival’, 
‘multipolar’ and ‘multicultural’ approach, this research contributes to the expanding 
field of the ‘new Cold War history’.97 It answers Tony Smith’s call for ‘pericentrism’ in 
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97 As defined by Odd Arne Westad in Westad, Odd Arne. 2000. «Introduction: Reviewing the Cold War». 




Cold War studies by assessing the role of seemingly peripheral players in containing 
and expanding wider international trends.98 
 
 
3. Primary Sources 
Besides delving into the relevant academic literature, this research made 
extensive use of primary sources. The bulk of my sources came from the archives of the 
German and Portuguese foreign ministries, situated in Berlin (PAAA)99 and Lisbon 
(AHD-MNE), which disclosed internal memos as well as press clippings and dispatches 
from their embassies. The military archives in Freiburg (BA-MA) and Lisbon (AHM) 
and the archive of the Portuguese Air Force in Alfragide (AHFA) in turn allowed access 
to the material from the Armed Forces and the ministries of defence, including treaties 
and minutes from the German military mission assigned to Portugal. The German 
federal archive in Koblenz (BAK) disclosed documents from several cabinets, including 
the Federal Ministry of Economics and the Chancellery. The Bundestag’s archive in 
Berlin (PA) provided reports from relevant parliamentary commissions. The Portuguese 
national archival centre in Lisbon granted me access to the files from the archive of the 
political police (IAN/TT/PIDE-DGS) and correspondence taken from the archive of 
Prime Minister Marcelo Caetano (IAN/TT/AMC), with specific authorisation from his 
family. 
In order to determine the international and domestic context around Bonn’s 
foreign policy, thorough research was undertaken at a number of peripheral archives. 
Special attention was given to key allies of both the FRG and Portugal, which were 
particularly drawn in to the relationship between those states. Insight into the position of 
France, the UK and USA was gained from the following archives: presidential archives 
of France (CHAN/APR) and archive of the Ministère des Affaires étrangères (AD/MAE) 
in Paris, the British National Archives (TNA) in London, and the US National Archives 
(NARA-AAD), with significant material available online. The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 
in Bonn, disclosed material from the SPD party leadership (AdsD/SPD-PV) and from 
the Willy Brandt collection (AdsD/WBA), which included dispatches from the SPD’s 
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International Department. The Amílcar Cabral Information and Documentation Centre 
(CIDAC), in Lisbon, permitted access to material pertaining to the activities of the 
liberation movements, the Portuguese oppositionists and the German solidarity activists. 
Selective readings from contemporary books and periodicals supplied further data 
and, crucially, helped me gain an impression of the historical environment surrounding 
the events. For example, the newspaper of the activist group Aktion 3.Welt (iz3w), 
which was at the forefront of the solidarity movement, provided first-hand accounts of 
the activists’ strategies and internal conflicts. The German African Society’s magazine 
Afrika heute covered and fostered West German discussion on Portuguese colonialism. 
The Dutch Angola Comité published Facts & Reports (F&R), a biweekly collection of 
reprinted articles about the West’s role in southern African affairs, taken from an 
impressive selection of international outlets, including several African newspapers. In a 
different field, a biweekly bulletin by the Portuguese-German Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry, Informações, listed the main ventures and commercial transactions 
between the FRG and Portugal, contained articles about Bonn’s and Lisbon’s economic 
strategies and followed the evolution of their foreign economic relations. The latter in 
particular is a rich and reliable source which surprisingly has not been used by 
historians of this topic before. 
Memoirs helped fill in gaps in the documents and provided valuable insight into 
the perspectives of key actors involved in West German-Portuguese relations during this 
period. My use of these sources took into account that recollection-driven narratives 
tend to reformulate history retroactively to fit specific political and/or personal stories. 
For example, the SPD’s ties to the clandestine Portuguese socialist movement have been 
presented as much tighter by the movement’s historical leader Mário Soares100 than by 
the movement’s dissident Rui Mateus.101 A small number of interviews conducted by 
the author provided further first-person accounts. Given the abundance of written source 
material, the oral history component of my research was restricted to a minor 
complementary role. Rui Patrício102 and Mário Soares103 developed points from their 
published interviews and most other conversations essentially revolved around the 
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alternative foreign policy of the SPD-linked Friedrich Ebert Foundation, thus 
complementing the limited material disclosed by the foundation itself.104 
 
 
4. Conceptual approach 
The starting point for the analysis of these various sources was the notion of 
‘continuity/discontinuity’ in Bonn’s policy towards Lisbon during the Caetano 
governments. In this context, ‘continuity’ meant the maintenance of a friendly 
relationship with the Portuguese dictatorship. ‘Discontinuity’ meant the pursuit of a 
confrontational strategy, either by isolating Portugal or by actively pressuring Lisbon to 
change its colonial policy. 
Historians are sharply divided in their views. German-based research has stressed 
the underlying continuity of Bonn’s goodwill towards the dictatorship. This applies both 
to the realist school, which has tended to emphasise the German pragmatic security 
rationale behind the amicable relations, and to the Africanists, who have emphasised – 
critically – the role of economic considerations. By contrast, Portuguese research has 
focused on perceived elements of discontinuity, conveying an image of decrease in 
Bonn’s goodwill, due to the German public’s pressure and that of the international 
community. Thus, while the former assumed that the international system was 
favourable to continuity, the latter assumed the opposite. When ideology was factored 
in at all, each side regarded it as a force of discontinuity, supposedly because of the 
SPD’s rapprochement with the Eastern Bloc and Third World, as well as its solidarity 
with the Portuguese socialists. For the German strand, however, the ideological aspect 
was not enough to counter the FRG’s interest-driven agenda. 
 This discrepancy derived from the reference points inherent in the terms 
‘continuity/discontinuity’, which were not always made explicit. Portuguese scholars 
privileged a comparison with the period of strong military and diplomatic German-
Portuguese cooperation of the early 1960s. They hence concluded that Bonn was 
comparatively less disposed to cooperate during the Brandt years than during a time 
when the federal government had leaned closer to Lisbon’s conservative values. For the 
                                                
104 These included interviews with the foundation’s liaison to the Portuguese socialists Elke Sabiel de 
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time, namely Maria da Luz Moita (11.09.2010), Jorge Veludo (14.09.2010) and the already mentioned 
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West German historians, the point of comparison was how far Bonn could have – or 
should have – caved in to the ideological pressure to confront Lisbon. This strand 
concluded that the position of Brandt’s governments was comparatively less 
confrontational than what the anti-colonialist movement, including the SPD’s left wing, 
demanded. While both perspectives have provided valuable insights, the latter allowed 
for a more historically nuanced interpretation by recognising that Bonn was subjected to 
contradictory impulses. Yet explaining the causes of policy simply as the triumph of 
materialist interests over ideology created a reductionist understanding of a multifaceted 
process. 
 With that in mind, the premise of this thesis is that Bonn’s policy towards the 
Caetano dictatorship was the result of the clash between multiple external and internal 
forces pushing for continuity and discontinuity. This work therefore analyses the impact 
of those forces and how each of them, whether materialist or ideological, varied in scale 
and timing. The timeframe begins in September 1968, when Marcelo Caetano became 
prime minister, and stops on 25 April 1974, when his regime was overturned. This 
allows us to cover the evolution of policy since the final year of the Grand Coalition, 
with Willy Brandt as foreign minister, and throughout the two subsequent Brandt-led 
governments. 
In order to convey the significance of each specific facet of the topic, the 
chapters and sub-chapters that follow are organised thematically, and they progressively 
zoom into the core of Bonn’s policy. The interconnectedness of the various dimensions 
therefore becomes clearer as each section explores the consequences of the previous 
ones. The first two chapters address the international and domestic pressures which the 
Bonn government was faced with, i.e. the pressure from forces outside of the West 
German legislative and executive bodies. These chapters introduce the external 
discourse about West German-Portuguese relations and explain how far it translated 
into active forms of pressure. The following three chapters examine the responses to 
that pressure within the parliament and government, as well as its practical effect on the 
relations with Lisbon. Each of them focuses on a key area of the relations, respectively 
their economic, military and diplomatic elements. Finally, the last chapter explores the 
parallel relations between the SPD and the opposition to the Lisbon regime, which was 
the ultimate product of Bonn’s strategy. The conclusion puts these various aspects into 
perspective. Its purpose is not to measure mathematically whether more forces of 
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continuity or discontinuity prevailed, but to explain the historical meaning of their 
confrontation. 
Specifically, this work argues that the West German policy towards the 
Portuguese dictatorship between 1968 and 1974 was ambiguous but unbalanced: it was 
essentially a policy of continuity, even if it contained elements of discontinuity. The 
main reason for this ambiguity was the tension between the policy that Bonn envisioned 
towards the Cold War in Europe and the policy that various forces envisioned towards 
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 Although greatly overshadowed by neue Ostpolitik, Bonn’s policy towards the 
Caetano regime was nonetheless subjected to considerable external scrutiny. In order to 
illustrate this phenomenon, this chapter assesses the ways in which Bonn saw its policy 
portrayed by various international agents. Following an order of increasing proximity to 
the FRG’s political sphere, the chapter demonstrates that those portrayals evolved into 
attempts to pressure, or at least steer, the West German course of action. The first part 
focuses on the postcolonial and resolutely anti-colonialist nations of Africa, which were 
by far the main outside force seeking to transform Bonn’s relationship with Portugal. 
This part contains three sections, each corresponding to a moment with a different 
predominant strand of discourse about Bonn’s policy, ordered chronologically. The 
second part focuses on the northern world, where considerations about West German 
policy were more strongly intertwined with the Cold War in Europe. This part is 
divided into two sections. One section considers the limited challenge posed to Bonn by 
the fact that states from different European geopolitical blocs echoed the African anti-
colonialist cause. The other section tackles the role of the FRG’s closest common allies 
with Portugal – France, the UK and USA. Without yet fully exploring the West German 
strategy, the latter section examines these three allies’ reactions to Bonn’s attempt to 
develop a joint approach to the Portuguese issue. Thus this chapter analyses how the 
FRG’s policy fit into the global dynamics of the time and how, in turn, such dynamics 
expanded the policy’s significance much beyond the bilateral relations with Portugal. 
 
 
I. THE AFRICAN WORLD 
1. The origins of the Portuguese-African conundrum 
 Although international indignation over the Lisbon regime escalated during the 
late 1960s/early 1970s, it was hardly a new phenomenon. Even before Portuguese 
troops had begun fighting in the bush, the dictatorship had already been battling for its 
empire in the diplomatic arena, particularly since Portugal had joined the United 
Nations in 1955.105 In the recurrent debates, no-one would condemn Lisbon’s policy as 
passionately as those countries which had only recently attained their own 
                                                
105 Although a degree of controversy stretched even further back. – Telo, António José. 1994. As Guerras 
de África e a Mudança nos Apoios Internacionais de Portugal. Revista História das Ideias, vol.16, p.353. 
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independence. Criticism had thus been strongly reinforced in 1960, when the African 
nations had become the largest geographical group represented in the UN General 
Assembly. That December, the Assembly had adopted the ‘Declaration on the Granting 
of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples’, known as Resolution 1514. The 
outbreak of the colonial wars in the following years had made the issue all the more 
pertinent, leading to increasingly harsh resolutions directed against the Salazar 
dictatorship on the part of the Special Committee on Decolonisation, the General 
Assembly and even the Security Council.106 As explained, Lisbon had come to 
emphasise the alleged ‘multiracial’ sensibilities of its imperial project and to present the 
colonial conflict as a manifestation of the Cold War. Portuguese diplomacy had also 
furthered the relations with the white-ruled African regimes of South Africa and 
Rhodesia, while attempting to influence or to overthrow the governments of African 
states supportive of the liberation movements.107 
For West Germany, which had been supplying equipment used by the 
Portuguese troops from the start, the Afro-Portuguese friction represented a serious 
hazard.108 Throughout the 1960s, the FRG had relied on its positive image in Africa to 
promote both economic expansion and the isolation of East Germany. Bonn had 
successfully established widespread diplomatic ties with the postcolonial states and had 
heavily backed them with development aid. The federal governments had then 
employed the Hallstein doctrine as a type of ‘political blackmail’ by threatening to cut 
off economic assistance to any state which granted de jure recognition to the GDR. In 
turn, some African leaders had learned to take advantage of the inter-German 
competition: they would swing towards East and West Germany, or at least threaten to 
do so, in order to ensure better deals for their countries.109 By the end of the decade, 
then-Foreign Minister Willy Brandt had redefined the priority of the FRG’s African 
policy (Afrikapolitik) as that of gathering support behind neue Ostpolitik. He now 
argued that détente in Europe would free up German resources for use in development 
aid for African states and hence deserved those states’ endorsement.110 
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Crucially, Brandt’s new guidelines of Afrikapolitik, announced in the spring of 
1968, failed to adequately respond to African concerns regarding the endurance of 
racism and colonial domination in southern Africa: namely in the Portuguese territories, 
in the unrecognised state of Rhodesia, and in the apartheid system of South Africa, 
including colonised Namibia. Although Brandt spoke of support for the Africans’ right 
to self-determination, he also explicitly claimed that the FRG had no intention of 
disturbing its trading relations either in the case of the Portuguese colonies or in the – 
much more lucrative – case of South Africa.111 Following a recommendation from the 
UN Security Council, Bonn agreed to officially implement sanctions against Rhodesia, 
but not very thoroughly.112 Furthermore, 1968 saw the adjudication to the international 
consortium Zamco of the construction of the Cahora Bassa hydroelectric dam in 
Mozambique, designed to supply most of its electricity to South Africa.113 Zamco 
included five West German companies114 operating with Bonn’s credit guarantees, as 
well as three French115, one Swedish116, one Italian117 and three South African firms118, 
working together with several Portuguese groups.119 Even more than the mounting 
evidence of the FRG’s material contribution to the colonial wars, the Cahora Bassa 
project shook Bonn’s carefully constructed image in Africa. The dam came to represent 
Portugal’s commitment to its empire at a time when other imperial powers had largely 
completed their processes of decolonisation and soon became a global target of anti-
colonialist criticism. The situation for the FRG was slightly aggravated by the role of 
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West German banks and investors in financing a similar hydroelectric project in the 
Cunene River Basin in Angola.120 
West German increasingly high-profile entanglements with African regimes 
under white minority rule coincided with the outcry against those regimes by the 
members of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). Although hardly a novel 
cause121, this outcry reached a peak during this period. It was famously expressed in the 
‘Manifesto on Southern Africa’, issued by the leaders of thirteen east and central 
African states122 in Lusaka on 16 April 1969 and subsequently ratified by the OAU in 
September and by the UN on 20 November of the same year.123 The Manifesto rejected 
a racialist interpretation of the cause of African liberation, expressing a refusal to 
“accept that any individual or group has any right to govern any other group of sane 
adults, without their consent”. The signatories thus called for other countries to join in 
on the effort to convince the regimes under minority rule to commit to putting an end to 
apartheid and colonialism. The text read both as a pacifist plea and as an ultimatum, 
hinting that Africa, unless there was some positive change on this matter, would put all 
of its support behind a more violent approach to liberation. Despite the firm tone, 
however, the Lusaka Manifesto displayed important signs of openness, even stating that 
“if changed circumstances were to make [peaceful progress] possible in the future, we 
would urge our brothers in the resistance movements to use peaceful methods of 
struggle even at the cost of some compromise on the timing of change”.124 
The Manifesto addressed the issue of external support to Lisbon although 
without naming specific countries. It pointed out the contrast between the Portuguese 
actions in Africa and the democratic values which Lisbon’s main allies – such as the 
FRG – professed to defend. In this way, it sought to distance the colonial conflict from 
the Cold War connotation which the Portuguese dictatorship insisted on attaching to the 
liberation struggle: 
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 “Portugal, as a European State, has naturally its own allies in the context of the 
ideological conflict between West and East. However, in our context, the effect of 
this is that Portugal is enabled to use her resources to pursue the most heinous war 
and degradation of man in Africa. The present Manifesto must therefore lay bare the 
fact that the inhuman commitment of Portugal in Africa and her ruthless subjugation 
of the people of Mozambique, Angola and the so-called Portuguese Guinea, is not 
only irrelevant to the ideological conflict of power-politics, but it is also 
diametrically opposed to the policies, the philosophies and the doctrines practised by 
her allies in the conduct of their own affairs at home. The peoples of Mozambique, 
Angola and Portuguese Guinea are not interested in communism or capitalism; they 
are interested in their freedom.” 125 
 
The African appeal was as much directed to Portugal’s allies, as to Portugal 
itself. Encouraged by Marcelo Caetano’s reformist reputation, in early 1969 both the 
Senegalese leader Léopold Senghor and the Congolese leader Mobutu sent Lisbon 
friendly proposals for partial decolonisation.126 Moreover, after talking to the OAU’s 
representative in the United Nations, an informer told the Portuguese Mission to the 
UN that the African group had decided to present the Lusaka Manifesto in the General 
Assembly in mid-October 1969 with the underlying goal of influencing the domestic 
situation in Portugal, where elections were looming on 26 October. According to this 
informer, the OAU, inspired by the news coverage of the campaign, believed that it 
could encourage those political forces in Portugal – even within the government – who 
supported the self-determination of the colonies.127 Lisbon frustrated those expectations 
less than a month after the elections. The Portuguese delegate in the UN voted against 
the adoption of the Lusaka Manifesto by the UN General Assembly in November, 
although he insisted that Portugal shared many of the stated pacifist and anti-racist 
views.128 
The aftermath of the Lusaka Manifesto was characterised by the coexistence of 
two different strands of African discourse on liberation: a moderate one, willing to 
engage in a constructive dialogue with Portugal – as well as with South Africa –, and a 
more militant one, emphasising the need for violent action. Such a distinction was 
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admittedly sometimes quite blurred, since even the more restrained faction directly 
supported the struggle of the liberation movements. Nevertheless, as will be shown, 
these two strands marked diverging approaches to conflict resolution in particular and 
to the Cold War dynamics in general. The two African positions also came to envisage 
distinct roles for West Germany in this matter: the first one accepted the FRG as a 
potentially useful ally and the second portrayed it exclusively as an enemy of the 
African cause.  
 
 
2. The quest for a dialogue policy 
Like Lisbon, Bonn was closely monitored by the African leaders. The 
governments of Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda and Tanzanian President Julius 
Nyerere – two emblematic figures of the moderate strand – were outspoken critics of 
the West German ties to Portuguese colonialism. Zambia, being geographically 
entrenched between Angola, Mozambique and Rhodesia, was particularly sensitive to 
the FRG’s economic engagement in those territories. So much so, in fact, that when a 
West German undersecretary had visited copper-rich Zambia in 1968 with the purpose 
of arranging a guarantee of German investment, political issues had complicated the 
negotiations. Kaunda’s government had demanded that Bonn take back the financial 
cover for the construction of the Cahora Bassa dam, as well as cease any remaining 
business with Rhodesia and South Africa.129 As for Nyerere, he had an uneasy 
relationship with the FRG since Bonn had temporarily cut off military and economic 
aid to his country in 1964, when the semi-autonomous government of Zanzibar (part of 
the United Nation of Tanzania) had recognised East Germany.130 Thus Tanzania – itself 
once a colony of Imperial Germany – became an acute observer of any further 
inconsistencies in Bonn’s supposedly aid-oriented African policy, including the FRG’s 
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role in supplying Portugal with military equipment which Lisbon used in the colonial 
wars.131 
Criticism of West Germany became increasingly widespread in early 1970, 
following the decision by Swedish firm ASEA to retreat from Zamco the previous 
September. That decision had ostensibly been motivated by the pressure exerted by 
Swedish public opinion and the Stockholm government, which had feared that Zamco 
might infringe sanctions against Rhodesia.132 Not only did this situation set a precedent 
which the African leaders were keen to see repeated, it pulled the FRG further into the 
spotlight because the West German firm Siemens agreed to take over ASEA’s part in the 
hydroelectric scheme. Verbal attacks against West German participation in the Cahora 
Bassa project multiplied across the African press, with Nigerian and Tanzanian 
newspapers at the forefront of the critique. Kenya’s Foreign Minister Njoroge Mungai 
authoritatively raised the issue with the West German Minister for Economic 
Cooperation Erhard Eppler during the latter’s trip to his country and the OAU’s 
Secretary-General Boubacar Diallo Telli confronted the West German Ambassador in 
Addis Ababa on 26 February, the eve of the fourteenth meeting of the OAU’s Council 
of Ministers. In an aggressive tone, Dialo Telli told the ambassador that Bonn had to 
choose between its friendship with the African states and its involvement in the Cahora 
Bassa project. At the OAU ministerial meeting (27 February-06 March), the 
participants approved a resolution against the dam, which – based on reports by the 
Mozambican liberation movement FRELIMO – included specific references to West 
Germany’s role in the enterprise.133 
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Despite this harshening of the African critique, Willy Brandt’s reputation earned 
the FGR government some initial goodwill, just like Caetano’s had the previous year. 
FRELIMO reached out to the recently elected chancellor in the form of a letter handed 
to Minister Erhard Eppler during his trip to Tanzania in April 1970. Its authors claimed 
to “believe that if [men] act wrongly it may be because they do not know the truth” and 
therefore the letter sought to ‘inform’ Brandt of the FRG’s role in Portugal’s African 
policy. It vividly summed up its point: 
 
“Mr. Chancellor, your country is in the forefront of the countries who [sic] support 
Portuguese colonialism. With weapons, soldiers, technical assistance, investments. 
And this, obviously, makes the relations between our people and your Government 
particularly distant and difficult. Distant – because, who can measure the distance 
from where the aircraft come that drop the bombs and the people upon whom they 
fall? Difficult – because it is that precisely – the marking or origins of the 
weapons, aircraft, ammunition – the only knowledge our people have of Western 
Germany. A more recent phase has shown us a less militaristic but equally 
repulsive aspect of your country, through the names of your companies which 
come to participate in the colonialist projects. Your Excellency, it is not by chance 
that your country is today condemned by the totality of the African countries 
represented by the OAU itself.”134 
  
FRELIMO‘s letter went on to condemn in greater detail – if not always 
accurately135 – the participation of German firms in the Cahora Bassa enterprise, as 
well as West Germany’s material aid to the Portuguese military. The text, which 
accentuated the disparity between Bonn’s behaviour and the principles of social-
democracy, strongly appealed to Willy Brandt to radically change the FRG’s friendly 
policy towards Portugal.136 
The letter resonated within Brandt’s Chancellery (Bundeskanzleramt). The Head 
of the Bundeskanzleramt’s Department for Foreign Affairs Per Fischer scrutinised 
FRELIMO‘s accusations and reassessed the weaknesses of Bonn’s Afrikapolitik in a 
long memo of 8 May 1970. According to Per Fischer, serious damage to West 
Germany’s credibility in Africa was being caused by the discrepancy between Bonn’s 
                                                
134 A copy of the letter can be found, for example, in BAK, B136/2992. 




stated convictions – right to self-determination, condemnation of racism – and the 
country’s economic praxis – trading with and investing in racist and colonialist 
regimes. Fischer lamented bitterly that this type of accusation was raised with greater 
severity against the democratic states than against the communist ones. Yet he 
acknowledged that Bonn’s official stance in favour of a “peaceful evolution towards 
race equality” in the region seemed unreliable given that the white minority 
governments were not taking any steps in that direction. Indeed, the African efforts to 
work out peaceful solutions, such as the Lusaka Manifesto, had been weakened by “a 
lukewarm reaction from our side and a tough “no” from the side of the [African white 
ruled] regimes”. Moreover, the issue of the FRG’s military assistance to Portugal could 
not be argued away. Fischer recognised that even though Bonn requested Lisbon not to 
use German military materiel overseas, both Germans and Africans were aware that the 
dictatorship was indeed fighting its colonial wars with equipment acquired from the 
FRG.137 
An almost simultaneous sign of African openness to collaborate with Bonn 
resulted from Kenneth Kaunda’s visit to the FRG from 27 April to 6 May 1970. This 
visit marked the beginning of a rapprochement between Zambia and West Germany138 
which translated into a closer dialogue about Bonn’s policy towards Lisbon. Although 
the Zambian and German leaders did not discuss that policy in their meeting, a week 
later Kaunda sent Willy Brandt a letter and a memorandum with his views on the 
subject. In this correspondence, written in a polite and tactful tone, the Zambian 
President complemented the idealism of the Lusaka Manifesto with a set of practical 
arguments and suggestions. He proposed that Bonn might stress “to the Portuguese 
authorities the futility of pursuing the present costly policy”, as well as “the dangers of 
being entangled with the [racial] problems of South Africa whose situation is entirely 
different from their own”. Regarding Cahora Bassa, Kaunda explained that the 
“considered view of the Zambian Government” was that the dam was an “excuse for 
[Portugal’s] continued and increased commitment of her troops in Mozambique” and an 
opportunity for South Africa “to extend her economic and military influence as far 
                                                
137 BAK, B136/2992, Memo from the Bundeskanzleramt, 08.05.1970. 
138 Kaunda and Brandt pledged “their resolve to deepen and expand co-operation between their two 
countries” – PAAA, B34/757, Joint Communiqué on the visit of the President of the Republic of Zambia 
to the Federal Republic of Germany. 
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north as possible”.139 Moreover, not only did Kaunda ask for the FRG to attempt to 
limit “the supply of arms available to Portugal for use in the liberation wars”, he also 
suggested “giving more political and moral support to the [African] nationalists” in the 
Portuguese colonies. His final request to Brandt was for the FRG to “consider 
impressing upon her western allies that Angola’s and Mozambique’s independence, and 
the unity and strength of the African Continent as a whole [were] all in the West’s 
economic, political and strategic interest”.140 
 The African strategy, however, was not yet coordinated enough to effectively 
press the chancellor. A Bundeskanzleramt memo of 16 June 1970 downplayed the 
threat of Cahora Bassa for the FRG’s individual ties to Africa. It stated that, with the 
exception of Zambia, recently no other African government had addressed the matter in 
their bilateral relations with Bonn. Even the Tanzanian authorities had neglected to 
raise the issue during Minister Eppler’s visit in April. Furthermore, the Malawian 
regime had publicly declared its support for the dam project, claiming that its country 
could benefit from the import of cheaper energy.141 Willy Brandt thus chose to stay the 
course. He asked the Ministerpräsident of North Rhine-Westphalia Heinz Kühn, who 
was scheduled to make a trip to Zambia in late August, to personally deliver his reply to 
Kenneth Kaunda. Brandt’s letter included an aide mémoire with the federal 
government’s justifications for the FRG’s continuous involvement with Portugal and 
with Cahora Bassa. The document highlighted the importance for the FRG of 
separating between politics and economics, adding that Bonn had already committed 
itself to giving credit guarantees to Zamco – a commitment it could now not go back 
on. Regarding the military materiel supplied to Lisbon, the chancellor explained that an 
end-use clause supposedly ensured that the materiel could only be used in Europe.142 
Heinz Kühn agreed to deliver the letter, but he almost did not hand over the aide 
mémoire, as he considered it a misstep: according to him, nobody would “fall for” the 
memorandum’s claim that the German weapons delivered to Portugal were restricted to 
the European mainland.143 
                                                
139 Kaunda’s memo also listed more technical complaints about the dam, including the possibility of 
floods in Zambian territory derived from the project. 
140 BAK, B136/2992, Letter from Kenneth Kaunda to Willy Brandt, 02.05.1970. 
141 BAK, B136/2992, Memo from the Bundeskanzleramt, 16.06.1970; The Malawian regime, which was 
highly dependent on Mozambican routes, had a secret understanding with Lisbon to lobby against African 
anti-Portuguese activism. – Oliveira (2004), p.319. 
142 BAK, B136/2992, Letter from Willy Brandt to Kenneth Kaunda (no date). 
143 BAK, B136/2992, Memo from the Bundeskanzleramt,12.08.1970; Dispatch from the AA,08.09.1970. 
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By the late summer of 1970, the African lobby was turning into a political force 
which Bonn’s foreign policy could no longer dismiss. Kenneth Kaunda became 
chairman both of the OAU and of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). He presided 
over an OAU summit in Addis Ababa (1-3 September), which featured strong criticism 
of West Germany for allegedly selling arms to South Africa and for supporting the 
Portuguese colonial wars. One week later, Kaunda hosted a NAM summit in Lusaka (8-
10 September), in which fifty-four states took part, representing close to half of the 
UN’s total membership. As Willy Brandt explained to Indonesian President Suharto on 
the eve of the summit, this NAM meeting was the cause of serious apprehension among 
the West German authorities. Bonn feared that the Third World, in a misguided effort 
to support European détente, would choose to recognise the GDR en masse even before 
the inter-German negotiations were fully settled. Brandt was also worried about the 
possibility that, as had happened in Addis Ababa, the event would serve as a forum for 
claims of West German support for racism and colonialism.144 As it turned out, the 
Lusaka summit, which had a marked anti-Western tone, did focus mainly on the 
problems of southern Africa. Because Bonn had by then issued an emphatic denial of 
the allegations of arms trade with South Africa, it was not singled out in any resolution. 
Yet the FRG was still listed as one of the Western powers held accountable for 
sustaining Portuguese colonial rule in the region.145 
The summits made Bonn reassess the importance of its contacts with Kenneth 
Kaunda. The Auswärtiges Amt concluded that the African states were a more confident 
and united body than before, able to orchestrate a powerful diplomatic offensive. 
According to the AA’s Sub-Saharan Africa Department, after the end of the Nigerian-
Biafran war earlier that year, the OAU states’ focus had now shifted to southern 
Africa.146 While acknowledging the implications of this shift for the FRG’s image, the 
Auswärtiges Amt’s internal documents also reflected confidence in Bonn’s relations 
with Kaunda. The AA regarded the Zambian President as a sincere and moderate 
politician who during his visit to West Germany had come to personally trust Willy 
Brandt. It helped that Kaunda had steadily refused to have Zambia recognise the GDR, 
despite the pressure of his party’s more radical wing. Significantly, he had also agreed 
                                                
144 AAPD 1970, Doc.419, 07.09.1970. 
145 PAAA, B34/757, Memo from the Auswärtiges Amt, 12.10.1970. 
146 PAAA, B34/757, Memo from the Auswärtiges Amt, 22.09.1970. 
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to withhold the ‘German question’ from the discussions at the Lusaka NAM summit.147 
Similarly, Heinz Kühn’s report about his talks with the Zambian President portrayed 
him as a pacifist who was neither a communist nor a western pawn and who feared that 
western cooperation with colonialism (e.g. Cahora Bassa) would push the African 
struggle towards radicalisation and communism. Kühn explained that Kaunda was 
proposing to mediate between the Portuguese authorities and the liberation movements 
in order to achieve a step-by-step decolonisation at the negotiating table rather than on 
the battlefield.148 For Bonn, Kaunda suddenly seemed like the perfect ally. Therefore, 
when he requested an OAU meeting with Brandt in order to clarify the accusations 
against the FRG raised at the Addis Ababa summit, the federal authorities were quick to 
accept.149 
On 15 October 1970, an OAU delegation met with Brandt for two hours in 
Bonn.150 As agreed prior to the meeting, the conversation focused on Cahora Bassa and 
on the FRG’s bilateral military cooperation with South Africa and Portugal. The 
Africans asked Brandt to side with them against Portuguese colonialism, framing their 
position as “a fight against fascism”. They argued that the Mozambican dam was an 
attempt to reinforce the Portuguese presence in the region and that to support the dam 
project was to support the perpetuation of that presence. By contrast, sacrificing a few 
economic interests in southern Africa would be a small price for Bonn to pay compared 
to the risk of alienating the rest of the continent – “300 Million Africans are ultimately 
a better market than the few Europeans in Africa”. Willy Brandt, while very friendly to 
the African delegation, did not agree to any economic or military concessions. The 
chancellor denied any military cooperation with South Africa, and he justified the 
cooperation with Portugal through the partnership in NATO, which he described as a 
“non-ideological organisation”. Brandt essentially repeated the arguments from his 
August’s aide mémoire, including the reference to the end-use clause, stating that Bonn 
would welcome any information on specific cases where the clause might have been 
violated. In turn, Kaunda once again asked for support for the liberation movements, 
reminding his German interlocutors that so far the nationalists had only received 
                                                
147 PAAA, B34/757, Memo from the Auswärtiges Amt, 10.09.1970. 
148 BAK, B136/2992, Bericht über eine Projektreise der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung... 
149 PAAA, B34/757, Memo from the Auswärtiges Amt, 10.09.1970. 
150 Kaunda’s delegation included the Foreign Ministers from Zambia, Algeria, Cameroons and Kenya, as 
well as Mali’s Employment Minister and the OAU’s Secretary-General Diallo Telli. On the German side, 
there were Ministers Scheel, Eppler and Ehmke, as well as Undersecretaries of State Sohn and von Braun. 
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support from the Soviet Bloc.151 This appeal reflected the dual strategy of the African 
rhetoric at this point. While the Lusaka Manifesto clearly distinguished the colonial 
wars from the Cold War, its spokesmen took advantage of the East-West competition 
when presenting their case. They pointed out that the West’s current position, more 
than harming Western material interests in the continent, was actually furthering the 
prestige, and subsequent influence, of the Eastern bloc, which had a more committed 
anti-colonialist attitude. As phrased by Kaunda, this sounded less like a threat than like 
a concerned warning. 
Kenneth Kaunda appeared extremely pleased with the talks, especially when 
looking back on them after his subsequent disappointing trips to the UK and to the 
USA.152 His display of joyfulness in Bonn was criticised by the Tanzanian press, 
because the meeting with Brandt did not seem to have produced any visible results.153 
Indeed, the Zambian President had even apparently accepted the end-use clause excuse 
despite the fact that – as the British Embassy in Lisbon pointed out at the time – “he 
knew as well as anyone else that the standard aircraft used by the Portuguese in Africa 
was the [German] Dornier 27”.154 Yet Kaunda’s enthusiasm reflected more than the 
fraternal environment in which the Germans had received him. During the visit to the 
FRG, Kaunda was discreetly informed by Bonn’s Minister for Special Affairs Horst 
Ehmke that, having met with Marcelo Caetano on 4 October, he believed that the 
Portuguese leader was willing to hold talks with Zambia.155 This development 
promised to finally reward the African pursuit of a policy of dialogue. That the FRG 
government was involved in the process carried a symbolic undertone, as the West 
German ambassador to the UN explained to Diallo Telli shortly after the trip: 
                                                
 
“I retorted to [Telli] that we Germans faced a problem of human dignity as well, 
because 17 million of our countrymen must live under a regime which was 
imposed upon them and under foreign occupation. [We] had therefore a 
particularly true understanding of the African worries and difficulties. 
151 PAAA, B34/757, Annotation on the Conversation between Chancellor Brandt and President Kaunda, 
19.10.1970. 
152 PAAA, B34/757, Dispatch from the FRG’s Embassy in Lusaka, 23.10.1970. 
153 PAAA, B34/757, Dispatch from the FRG’s Embassy in Dar es Salaam, 28.10.1970. 
154 TNA, FCO45/509, Dispatch from the British Embassy in Lisbon, 20.10.1970. 
155 PAAA, B26/445, Letter from Willy Brandt to Marcelo Caetano, 31.10.1970. 
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[Nevertheless], out of realistic considerations, we are coming to an arrangement 
with those who commit evil against our people.”156 
  
By late 1970, the influence of the African lobby had become clear, but so had its 
limitations. The OAU had been able to gather great publicity around its anti-Cahora 
Bassa campaign, particularly through Kaunda’s diplomatic demarches in Europe.157 
The Italian firm SAE had ostensibly also left the project in May, after the Rome 
government had withdrawn its credit guarantees.158 On 14 December 1970, the UN 
General Assembly added a paragraph condemning the Cahora Bassa and Cunene 
projects to its annual resolution about the “activities of foreign economic and other 
interests which are impeding the implementation of [Resolution 1514]”.159 Similarly, 
that day the Assembly’s annual resolution on the “territories under Portuguese 
administration” gained an explicit request for all governments to cease their 
involvement with the two dam projects and “to take all necessary measures to prevent 
the participation therein of any companies or individuals under their jurisdiction”.160 
The fact that the General Assembly would go on to repeat both appeals annually, in a 
frustrated tone161, attested to their ineffectiveness. This failure to interrupt the two 
controversial hydroelectric schemes, coupled with the breakdown of Ehmke’s 
backchannel to Caetano – as will be discussed in detail in Chapter 5 – set the stage for 
the intensification of the African critique. 
 
 
3. The intensification of the critique 
The intensification of the African critique against the FRG was not simply an 
expression of the discouraging attempts to cooperate with Bonn regarding Portuguese 
colonial rule. Lisbon’s actions in the region exacerbated the tension between Portugal 
and the African states, feeding the more militant strand of African discourse. On the 
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48 
 
night of 22/23 November 1970, naval and military units of the Portuguese armed forces 
invaded Guinea-Conakry via Guinea-Bissau. Together with mercenaries and exiles 
from the Conakry regime, they released local political prisoners and Portuguese POWs 
and destroyed bases and naval assets of the Guinean/Cape Verdean liberation 
movement PAIGC. The operation – Operação Mar Verde – also unsuccessfully tried to 
stage a coup d’état in Conakry in order to place a Portuguese-friendly regime in 
power.162 Although Lisbon denied any responsibility for the attack, referring to it as an 
internal Guinean revolt, Portugal could not avoid international uproar. While the first 
UN Security Council resolution about this event, on 23 November, only vaguely 
demanded the “immediate withdrawal of all external armed forces and mercenaries” 
from Guinea-Conakry, a second resolution, on 8 December, expressly condemned the 
Portuguese authorities. The latter, approved with four abstentions (France, the UK, 
USA and Spain) urged “all states to refrain from providing the Government of Portugal 
with any military and material assistance enabling it to continue its repressive actions 
against the peoples of the Territories under its domination and against independent 
African States”.163 Regardless, over the following years the Portuguese troops 
continued to stage interventions into the territories of their African neighbours.164 
Lisbon accused those states of harbouring military bases for the liberation movements, 
thus presenting Portugal’s actions as part of a defensive war against aggressions 
coming from outside its borders.165 Lisbon also imposed an embargo against Zambia, in 
retaliation for the death of five prisoners of the Mozambican movement COREMO in 
Zambian territory.166 
West Germany was caught up in this process of escalation from the start. In the 
UN and in the OAU – where Secretary-General Diallo Telli was himself from Guinea-
Conakry – the blame for the November 1970 attack rubbed off on NATO countries 
collectively but the FRG suffered more than any of Portugal’s other allies.167 Guinean 
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President Ahmed Sékou Touré demanded the immediate replacement of the FRG’s 
ambassador in Conakry, who was formally charged with complicity in the preparation 
and execution of the invasion.168 The German community in Guinea-Conakry – more 
than one hundred people, mostly development workers – was expelled from the country 
before the end of the year. Two German citizens were sentenced to forced labour for 
life, one of whom, Hermann Seibold, died in prison shortly afterwards.169 
The relations between Guinea-Conakry and the FRG quickly deteriorated. A 
public trial in Conakry reinforced the accusation that the West German authorities had 
been involved in the Operação Mar Verde, an accusation which Bonn vigorously 
denied.170 On 29 January 1971, the Guinean government finally broke off diplomatic 
relations with West Germany. Conakry published a comprehensive 6,000 word ‘white 
paper’ about the Portuguese aggression, including charges against the FRG and against 
the surviving German prisoner, brewery manager Adolf Marx. The federal government 
issued its own detailed counter-report in July 1971, written by the expelled Ambassador 
Dr. Lankes.171 In the report, Lankes categorized the evidence for the charges as either 
“self-contradictory”172, “obviously absurd”173, “ludicrous”174, “in poor taste”175 or 
“irrelevant and too clearly indicative of [its] source”176, i.e. East Germany. Lankes 
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Guinea Affair. 
172 Hermann Seibold appeared to be in two different cities when the invasion occurred. 
173 “Confession” by Adolf Marx that he had been “instructed to kill Sékou Touré by giving him poisoned 
beer.”. 
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176 Hermann Seibold, an ex-SS-Sturmbannführer, now with the Christian Organization of Youth Villages, 
and his colleagues at the Kankan Crafts Centre were accused of having kidnapped the wife of a GDR 
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claimed that the GDR had prepared an intensive misinformation campaign, which had 
fed on Sékou Touré’s pre-existing anti-FRG prejudices.177 Moreover, according to 
Lanke’s report, the Guinean President had sought to take advantage of the solidarity of 
the African continent after the invasion, seizing the opportunity to mobilise Africa in 
favour of a radical and violent approach to the liberation of the Portuguese territories. 
Lankes held that Conakry, with support from the GDR, had fabricated the link between 
the FRG and the Operação Mar Verde in an effort to demonstrate a potential threat of 
African ‘recolonisation’ by the “imperialistic forces allied with Portugal”. The report 
concluded: 
 
“In making use of these fabrications or allowing himself to be deceived by them, 
Sékou Touré got entangled in a deplorable intrigue which led to the breach of a 
longstanding friendship between [our] two countries. He shattered what many 
unselfish and idealistic helpers had been willing to build up. Nobody can relieve 
the Guinea Government of its responsibility for this development.” 178 
 
 Significantly, the allies of the Portuguese government seemed to dismiss its 
responsibility, which further enflamed Africa’s anti-Western outrage. NATO scheduled 
a ministerial meeting to take place in Lisbon (3-4 June 1971) for the first time in more 
than twenty years.179 President Kaunda, who continued to defend a Western-inclusive 
African strategy, expressed great concern about the damage this meeting, coupled with 
the Guinea crisis, were causing to the FRG’s image in the region.180 The OAU 
Liberation Committee publicly condemned the decision to hold the meeting in Lisbon 
and presented it as proof of NATO’s endorsement of the Portuguese regime. Diallo 
Telli described the event as “an insult to Africa”.181 
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These embarrassing episodes were certainly not enough to fully eclipse the 
FRG’s political capital on the African continent. Not only did West Germany have very 
strong trade relations with many African states182, each of the parties in the Bundestag 
backed important philanthropic institutions specifically concerned with the Third 
World.183 In fact, Bonn was one of the leading international donors of aid, as well as 
one of its main advocates.184 West German diplomacy achieved furthermore some 
important successes. After the OAU summit of 21-23 June 1971, again in Addis Ababa, 
the AA celebrated the fact that for the first time in a long time “we were not accused of 
alleged arms transfers to South Africa”, even if one of the resolutions still accused all 
NATO powers of supporting Portugal.185 Initiatives such as Foreign Minister Walter 
Scheel’s tour around Africa186 between 14 and 23 October of that year – fortuitously 
coinciding with the announcement of Willy Brandt’s Nobel Peace Prize – helped 
promote neue Ostpolitik as a policy of peace and thus gather African diplomatic support 
for Bonn.187 Notably, Kenneth Kaunda and Julius Nyerere discretely abandoned the 
campaign against the Cahora Bassa dam, in order not to disturb the FRG’s détente 
policy in Europe.188 Bonn’s contacts with Kaunda remained particularly close189 and he 
agreed to plead in favour of the German prisoner in Conakry.190 In turn, when Rhodesia 
closed its Zambian border in January 1973, Bonn – at Kaunda’s request – intervened 
with the Portuguese government to allow the use of the Angolan Benguela Railway as 
an alternative route for the Zambian copper traffic.191 
Yet Zambia’s political weight receded after Kaunda concluded his OAU 
mandate, in the spring of 1971, and so did the ‘Lusaka Manifesto’s’ spirit of 
compromise. That year, eastern and central African countries reassessed the 
Manifesto’s position through the ‘Mogadishu Declaration’, which concluded that the 
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regimes under white minority rule had rejected the offer to negotiate and so the only 
solution left was to support the armed struggle.192 The mainstream of the African 
discourse was moving Eastwards, as African elites acknowledged the inability of ‘third 
worldism’ to prevent neo-colonial forms of domination or even, in the Portuguese case, 
to formally dismantle the centuries-old empire.193 Simultaneously, communist China 
gained prestige in the region by backing the construction of local infrastructure, not to 
mention backing the liberation movements themselves.194 This was the scenario the 
moderate African leaders had warned the West about. These leaders, in fact, grew very 
worried about the radicalisation of the African liberation struggle. In Senegal, which 
shared borders with both Guinea-Bissau and Guinea-Conakry, Léopold Senghor was 
notoriously distrustful of the pro-Soviet Sékou Touré195 and feared the latter’s 
influence over an independent Bissau.196 On 7 March 1973, Nyerere confessed to a 
German delegation that he was displeased with the scale of illegal weapons being 
smuggled into Tanzania to support FRELIMO, even if he would not do anything about 
it out of fear of undermining his image of African solidarity.197  
                                                
Against this background, Bonn struggled to overcome the stigma of its relations 
with the Portuguese dictatorship. Although after 1971 the federal authorities heavily 
limited the military materiel they provided to Lisbon198, the leaders of the liberation 
movements did not cease to point to Portugal’s use of German weapons overseas.199 
Furthermore, West German mercenaries were rumoured to be training Portuguese 
troops in Guinea-Bissau for operations against Conakry.200 At the 1972 NATO spring 
ministerial meeting (30-31 May), Walter Scheel complained to Foreign Minister Rui 
192 Chapter “The Legacy of the Front-Line States”, in Cilliers, Jakkie. 1999. Building Security in Southern 
Africa: An Update on the Evolving Architecture, Monograph nr.43, Southern African Development 
Community [accessed through http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/monographs/no43/Contents.html on 
01.08.2011]. 
193 For a broader look at the rise and fall of the Third World movement, see Westad, Odd Arne. 2005. The 
Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, pp.96-109; 207-218. 
194 AAPD 1973, Doc.23, 23.01.1973; Afrika heute, November 1971, pp.458-462. 
195 He once claimed that Sékou Touré had only “intervals of lucidity”. – AAPD 1971, Doc.29, 25.01.1971 
196 This fear led Senghor to actively seek to mediate an agreement between the Portuguese authorities and 
the PAIGC. – Oliveira (2004), p.320; Macqueen, Norrie.  1999. Portugal’s First Domino: 
‘Pluricontinentalism’ and Colonial War in Guiné-Bissau, 1963-1974. Contemporary European History 
vol.8, nr.2, pp.217-228. 
197 PAAA, B34/859, Dispatch from the FRG’s Embassy in Lusaka, 22.03.1972; AdsD/SPD-PV, 
Internationale Abteilung III, 11159, Dispatch from Siegfried Bangert, 23.07.1973. 
198 As discussed on chapter 4 of this dissertation. 
199 For example, Frankfurter Neue Presse, 07.08.1973, in F&R,01.09.1973. 
200 Rui Patrício assured Walter Scheel that there was no truth to this rumour in June 1971 – AAPD 1971, 
Doc.197, 05.06.1971 (footnote). 
53 
 
Patrício that for Africa no country had a greater association with Portugal than the 
FRG.201 
The biggest test came in 1973, with the West German application to join the 
United Nations Organisation. Earlier in the year, the Auswärtiges Amt became 
concerned over the possibility of widespread African opposition to the FRG’s 
application, in retaliation for its relationship with Portugal. The visit of a FRELIMO 
delegation in Bonn during the summer, at the invitation of the SPD’s Commission for 
International Relations, raised African expectations of a change in the FRG’s policy 
towards Lisbon. However, these expectations were quickly deflated when the Bonn 
government denied any intention of altering its policy. The result was a wave of 
indignation, all over Africa, against the federal authorities, accused of “speaking with 
both sides of the mouth”. To compensate, the AA went to great lengths to woo the UN’s 
Chairman of the Special Committee on Apartheid, the Nigerian Edwin Ogebe Ogbu, 
who visited Bonn from 25 to 28 August.202 In the end, the symbolic importance of the 
application spoke louder than Lisbon’s damage and Africa gave Germany – and thus 
the peace process – its blessing. The FRG, together with its eastern counterpart, was 
successfully admitted to the United Nations on 18 September 1973 under Resolution 
3050. The only ones to speak against the resolution were the representatives from Israel 
– who firmly opposed the entry of the GDR – and from Guinea-Conakry, who 
denounced Bonn’s ties to the “Portuguese torturers”. Ultimately, however, Conakry 




II. THE NORTHERN WORLD 
1. The challenge of European anti-colonialism 
Whether primarily moved by geo-strategic opportunism or genuine solidarity – 
not to mention ideological affinity – some European governments and social 
movements supported the cause of the African liberation movements and sought to 
isolate the Caetano dictatorship. In this ‘migration’ northwards, the anti-colonialist 
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discourse was reshaped by the ideas and political aims of its European champions. 
However, many of them did not prove willing to compromise their own relations with 
the FRG government for the sake of the anti-colonialist cause. Therefore, unlike the 




1.1. The eastern version 
 While the Soviet Union, and indeed the Soviet Bloc as a whole, consistently 
spoke out for African self-determination, its rhetoric in regard to West Germany was 
more malleable. In September 1969, the USSR supported a UN motion to extend the 
sanctions against Rhodesia to include the regimes of South Africa and Portugal. 
Defending the proposal in the UN Security Council, the Soviet delegate spoke 
extensively about the FRG’s trade with these three countries, naming Bonn as one of 
the main allies “of the fascist and racist cliques” of southern Africa.204 Yet this event 
took place just before the SPD-FDP coalition came to power. Once Bonn’s policy of 
rapprochement with the USSR was firmly set in motion, Moscow toned down its 
traditional propagandistic portrayal of the FRG as a hub of neo-Nazism and 
revanchism.205 Significantly, neue Ostpolitik coincided with a Soviet reappraisal of its 
commitment to the liberation struggle in light of détente.206 One Soviet strand argued 
that Moscow should prioritise détente with the West, which, through superpower 
pacification and disarmament, could actually create conditions favourable for the 
liberation struggle.207 At the 1971 Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union, Secretary-General Leonid Brezhnev enhanced this orientation with a more 
dogmatic reasoning. He referred to the national liberation movement as an ally of the 
world revolutionary process, yet subordinate to the vanguard of that process, i.e. the 
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communist movement. Thus the priority, according to Brezhnev, was to ensure 
peaceful conditions for the construction of communism in the USSR. 208 
In the long run, however, the East-West rapprochement also paradoxically 
encouraged Moscow’s renewed concern with the Third World’s perception of the 
USSR. After all, once stability had been achieved in Europe, the competition between 
capitalism and socialism would have to take place somewhere else. This perspective 
was enhanced by the Soviet Union’s geo-ideological competition with China over 
influence among revolutionary Africa.209 Therefore, as the West German Embassy in 
Moscow passively acknowledged, there was little chance of Bonn ever coming to an 
understanding with the Soviets over Portugal. The Embassy described Lisbon’s colonial 
policy as “a favourite object of Soviet propaganda”, which was allowing Moscow to 
easily increase the USSR’s popularity in Africa. According to the German diplomats, 
for Moscow the possible negative effects of criticising Lisbon were minimal, since the 
Soviet Union had no relations – or relevant trade – with Portugal.210 It could thus 
accuse Western economic interests of single-handedly supporting Portuguese 
colonialism. On 7 February 1973, the leading Soviet newspaper Pravda featured a 
strongly worded article on this topic, leading the FRG’s embassy to remark to the AA in 
a resigned tone that, for the first time in a long while, several West German examples 
were expressly mentioned.211 
Of all the states in the Soviet Bloc, the most vocal critic of West German-
Portuguese relations was the one which did not even have a voice in the UN until 1973: 
East Germany. Virtually locked out of Africa by the Hallstein doctrine, East Berlin 
found in the FRG’s ties to Portugal and South Africa a chance to break this blockade. 
From the mid-1960s, the GDR’s Foreign Ministry prepared a large-scale propaganda 
effort expressing the notion that, having learned from Germany’s fascist past, East 
Germany was unequivocally anti-colonialist and anti-racist. In contrast, the propaganda 
argued that the FRG supported regimes under white minority rule and thus signalled the 
revival of German racist imperialism in the West. Through this juxtaposition, East 
Germany sought to simultaneously gain prestige – and thus diplomatic recognition – 
and justify its own rivalry with Bonn on an international level. Thus the GDR 
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distributed documentation denouncing the FRG’s links to Lisbon and Pretoria through a 
combination of accurate facts intermingled with circumstantial evidence.212 
For Bonn, the East German strategy had the double inconvenience of 
discrediting the FRG and fuelling the influence of the GDR. By the early 1970s, East 
Berlin had finally broken its isolation in Africa – even if it had only managed to be 
recognised by a handful of left-wing regimes.213 The most visible product of its efforts 
was the Conakry affair. Immediately after the Portuguese attack in November 1970 – in 
which the GDR ambassador in Guinea had been killed – East Berlin launched a 
ferocious campaign in the East German press linking Bonn to the Portuguese raid. It 
also engaged in an elaborate intelligence offensive, supplying Conakry with 
incriminating documents from the Auswärtiges Amt, which the West German 
authorities claimed were forgeries. Thus the GDR greatly contributed to shaping the 
narrative presented by President Sékou Touré, promoting an escalation of the tension 
between Conakry and Bonn which culminated in the breakdown of diplomatic 
relations.214 Although not all of East Berlin’s initiatives were that successful215, West 
German Foreign Minister Walter Scheel soon acknowledged the central role played by 
the Portuguese colonial question in allowing the GDR, as well as China and the USSR, 
to advance their positions in Africa.216 
If there was pressure for Bonn to distance itself from Lisbon, therefore, it was a 
product of the FRG’s continuing rivalry with the communist countries, not of its 
reconciliation with the East. Contrary to the customary interpretation in Portuguese 
historiography217, neue Ostpolitik did not encourage a West German estrangement with 
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Portugal. Even though the Eastern states involved in rapprochement with FRG loudly 
championed the African cause at the international fora – particularly the USSR and the 
GDR – they did not make any related demands in their bilateral negotiations with 
Bonn.218 Thus there was no direct linkage between the FRG’s relationship with 
Portugal and the West German détente with Eastern Europe, just like there was no spill-
over from this rapprochement into Portugal’s own relations with the Eastern Bloc.219 
Indeed, from a purely tactical point of view, those communist countries had little to 
gain from settling Africa’s dispute with the West, since this dispute was actually 
helpful to them in infiltrating the African continent. The impact of the Conakry 
invasion had even enabled the Soviet navy to move into the Guinean coast, following 
Sékou Touré’s request for protection.220 
Consequently, the Eastern European leaderships most willing to collaborate 
with Bonn on the Portuguese problem were those with the more autonomous foreign 
policies. Such was the case of the Romanian Nicolae Ceauşescu, renowned for defying 
his neighbours’ foreign policy guidelines.221 Apart from the USSR, Romania was the 
only country in the Soviet Bloc whose diplomatic ties to the FRG stretched back to 
before the SPD-FDP coalition. It therefore became a close partner of Bonn during the 
preparatory phase of the CSCE.222 Conversely, not only did the Bucharest government 
display little sympathy for the Portuguese regime223, it tried to position itself in the 
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forefront of the supporters of the southern African liberation struggle.224 In his quest to 
further that struggle, on 29 June 1973, the Romanian leader privately urged Willy 
Brandt and Hans-Jürgen Wischnewski – a member of the SPD’s Executive – to support 
the African rebels and to persuade Lisbon to change its colonial policy. Thus, at a time 
when Moscow and East Berlin were capitalising on Bonn’s eroding prestige in Africa, 
Ceauşescu, in a typically counter-cyclical move, sought to recruit the West German 
social-democrats to join the anti-colonialist movement. He even warned the chancellor 
that the SPD’s position on this matter was likely to reflect on Bonn’s future relations 
with the African territories after their inevitable decolonisation.225 
Yugoslavia, which had split from the Soviet Bloc in 1948, was an even more 
extreme case. Under the leadership of President Josip Brotz Tito, the Belgrade 
government stoutly backed Africa’s anti-colonial outcry with political and financial 
assistance.226 Having become an important patron of the national liberation struggle in 
the Portuguese territories, Belgrade helped promote unofficial contacts between the 
SPD and the Angolan movement MPLA.227 Yet, just like the Soviets, the Yugoslav 
authorities, who had resumed diplomatic relations with Bonn in 1968, were also keen to 
expand their own cooperation with the FRG. Indeed, this spirit of conciliation was 
particularly fomented by the personal bond between Tito and Brandt.228 The result was 
paradoxical. On the one hand, Tito’s regime accused the NATO powers of sustaining 
Portuguese colonialism and repeatedly called for UN measures to prevent international 
political, military and economic support of Lisbon’s colonial policies.229 On the other 
hand, at the 1970 NAM conference in Lusaka, Yugoslavia successfully lobbied against 
Zambia’s proposal for a resolution that would specifically attack the German 
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participation in Cahora Bassa. During the discussion, Tito even made use of an aide-
mémoire with facts and arguments supplied by Bonn.230  
 
 
1.2. The western version 
 On the western side of the ‘iron curtain’, the loudest voices to address the 
FRG’s policy towards the Portuguese dictatorship belonged to non-governmental 
agents. Before the West German President Gustav Heinemann visited the Netherlands 
in November 1969, about thirty Dutch youth organisations wrote to him denouncing the 
construction of warships for the Portuguese Navy in Hamburg and unsuccessfully tried 
to arrange a meeting with him. The Dutch activist group Angola Comité repeatedly 
wrote about this and other issues to the Bonn government, parliamentary factions and to 
their respective party executives. It also convinced the Dutch television company VARA 
to investigate and report on the issue.231 The activists published extensive material 
about the FRG’s military supplies to Portugal232 and, in 1972, their petition accusing 
Bonn of lying about those supplies made it as far as the UN Special Committee on 
Decolonisation.233 Criticism emerged in other countries too, albeit more sporadically 
but sometimes to great symbolic effect. In December 1971, while Willy Brandt was 
accepting the Nobel Peace Prize at the University of Oslo, Norwegian protesters 
distributed pamphlets in front of the building condemning the FRG’s military and 
economic ties to the colonial wars, together with chants of “No to West German 
imperialism in Africa”.234 The British Catholic priest Adrian Hastings sent shockwaves 
through the international community in July 1973 with an article in the UK newspaper 
The Times exposing a massacre of 400 Mozambicans, including women and children, 
committed by Portuguese troops in the village of Wiriyamu the previous December. 
Although Lisbon denied the existence of the massacre and even of any village named 
Wiriyamu, the episode turned into a public relations disaster for the Caetano regime.235 
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In an extended book about the case, published in January 1974, Hastings vehemently 
singled out the dictatorship’s West German ally: 
 
 “More and more western European, especially German, investment is going into 
Portuguese Africa, and the greater part of the military equipment used by the 
Portuguese comes from Germany. In permitting the continuance of this monstrous 
trade Willy Brandt is, curious as it may seem, showing himself to be a successor to 
Adolf Hitler – insofar as he is effectively supporting the regime which more than 
any other today carries on the Nazi tradition, and at the expense of Africa. He is, of 
course, inheriting a policy of the Christian Democrats and one protective of the 
interests of German capitalism. In continuing it, he may have a greater effective 
responsibility for the maintenance of Portuguese tyranny in Africa today than any 
other man.” 236 
 
 The book received much publicity via the European mass media237 and 
Hastings’ remarks about Brandt certainly did not go unnoticed in the West German 
press.238 
Because of institutional and diplomatic loyalty, the Western governments were 
less ready to point the finger at Bonn, or even Lisbon, although they felt somewhat 
uncomfortable in regard to their Portuguese ally. Portugal may have been one of 
NATO’s founding members but the dictatorship had always had little affinity with the 
ideological principles of the Preamble of the North-Atlantic Treaty. Indeed, Salazar had 
been reluctant to join the Atlantic Alliance in the first place, having failed to convince 
his partners to extend the invitation to Spain’s Franco regime and to broaden the 
Alliance’s defence area to include the Portuguese colonies. Nevertheless, Salazar had 
ultimately recognised that NATO membership could still prove useful to the protection 
of the empire and so Lisbon had joined the group. To be sure, Salazar continued to 
advocate incorporating Africa, or at least the Cape Verde archipelago, in the NATO’s 
defence area.239 Portugal’s controversial status had less to do with originally having 
been the only non-democratic regime in the alliance – others followed, most notably 
Greece’s Regime of the Colonels (1967-1974) – than with the fact that it had begun 
using the organisation’s materiel to fight the African liberation movements. Throughout 
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the 1960s, the recurring accusations in the UN regarding NATO’s alleged support for 
the Portuguese in the colonial wars had bred a general sense of embarrassment. Norway 
and Canada had briefly drafted proposals to expel Lisbon from the alliance, but overall 
Portugal’s position in NATO had remained remarkably stable, without any serious 
threat of exclusion.240 
Nevertheless, a few European governments displayed great determination to 
combat Portuguese colonialism. The predominantly social-democratic governments of 
Norway and Denmark, like that of neutral Sweden, publicly expressed their support for 
the liberation movements of southern Africa. Through those movements, they 
channelled economic and humanitarian aid – particularly in the field of education – to 
the peoples in the Portuguese territories.241 The Norwegian authorities accepted a 
request from the OAU to hold a large conference in Oslo on 9-14 April 1973 in support 
of the victims of colonialism and apartheid. Furthermore, the Scandinavian states 
maintained throughout this period total embargos on weapons and military exports to 
the Portuguese dictatorship, despite the fact that Norway and Denmark, like Portugal, 
were NATO allies. The Bonn government was well-informed of its northern 
neighbours’ policies towards the Caetano regime.242 
The Netherlands went through a radical transition. Throughout the 1960s, the 
official position of the state – itself a colonial power – had been far from critical of 
Portugal. The conservative Foreign Minister Joseph Luns, in office from 1952 until 
1971, was notoriously pro-Portuguese.243 However, in the late 1960s a fiercely anti-
colonialist movement emerged in Dutch society, of which one of the most active faces 
was the aforementioned Angola Comité. This group, which had strong ties to the 
liberation movements, organised a series of large-scale solidarity campaigns, most 
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notably the 1972 boycott of Angolan coffee.244 It also managed to have a progressive 
impact on the agenda of the opposition labour party PvdA, stirring up a debate within 
the party about the possibility of the Netherlands withdrawing from NATO if Portugal 
was not excluded from the organisation. In February 1970, the parliament voted for 
changing the country’s complacent attitude in the UN to a more critical voting 
pattern.245 Moreover, like the Scandinavian states, the Dutch government began 
providing aid to the liberation movements.246 As a member of the EEC, the Netherlands 
was also involved in the negotiations for Portugal’s trade agreement with the Common 
Market, which for Hague became a hot topic domestically. The Dutch trade union 
confederations demanded that the parliament decline the trade agreement unless it 
included concessions regarding Lisbon’s domestic and colonial policies.247 In April 
1972, Portuguese Foreign Minister Patrício’s trip to Hague to discuss the agreement 
was organised in secrecy and only after much hesitation by the Dutch authorities, who 
feared uproar in the capital.248 The anti-colonialist strand found greater expression in 
May 1973, with the formation of a coalition government headed by Joop den Uyl, of 
the PvdA. He appointed Max van der Stoel to the Foreign Ministry with an outspoken 
agenda of firmly challenging Portugal and Greece within NATO.249 Shortly after 
coming to power, den Uyl and van der Stoel met with Willy Brandt and Walter Scheel 
and made clear their intentions to raise the pressure on those two dictatorships.250 
Although the mix of solidarity with Africa and concern with domestic and 
international public opinion was not an entirely new phenomenon among Lisbon’s 
allies, the tension within NATO reached a peak in the early 1970s. This was mostly a 
result of the Portuguese aggression against Guinea-Conakry, which had raised the level 
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of African criticism to unprecedented levels.251 As a consequence, NATO had become 
a stage of confrontation between conflicting approaches to the Portuguese regime, 
pushing Bonn to pick a side. In 1970, just as the UN Security Council was preparing its 
second resolution on the Conakry incident, delegations from NATO member-states had 
gathered for their annual winter meeting (3-4 December). Although the location of the 
next gathering – Lisbon – was randomly chosen, its implication was not overlooked by 
the foreign ministers from Canada, Norway and Denmark, who questioned the 
appropriateness of meeting in Portugal. In turn, Rui Patrício, urged by Marcelo 
Caetano, insisted on keeping the location choice. Thus, instead of discussing the SALT 
and MBFR talks as scheduled, the delegates spent almost two days debating the city of 
the next meeting. Patrício argued that what was at stake was not the Portuguese African 
policy, but NATO’s willingness to cave in to external pressure. According to him, there 
would always be controversies – today the Portuguese dictatorship, tomorrow the 
Greek – and showing weakness and lack of cohesion could destroy the organisation. 
After an intervention by Secretary-General Manlio Brosio, most foreign ministers, 
including Walter Scheel, agreed to stick to the initial location.252 
The episode set the pattern for future disputes. A few Western powers continued 
to campaign to isolate the Caetano regime within NATO, but their efforts never 
materialised into meaningful practical change. On 22 April 1971, the Norwegian 
parliament (Storting) urged Foreign Minister Andreas Zeier Cappelen to address the 
issue of Portugal’s colonial policy at the Lisbon meeting. Walter Scheel and several of 
his other colleagues desperately begged him not to do it, but Cappelen went ahead with 
his speech anyway. Despite an aggressive reply from Rui Patrício, this time Secretary-
General Brosio managed to prevent the argument from dominating the event.253 
Cappelen reaffirmed his opposition to Portugal’s policy at the next ministerial session, 
on 9-10 December 1971. As he put it to the Storting the following month, his actions 
sought not only to pressure Lisbon but also to show the Africans that the Atlantic 
Alliance per se was not supportive of the Portuguese behaviour overseas.254 By 1973, 
there seemed to be an understanding among Portugal’s critics to keep their 
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interventions low-key, in order not to disrupt the proceedings.255 Nevertheless, the anti-
colonialist campaign gained further momentum at the various fora due to Dutch 
Foreign Minister van der Stoel256, who in early 1974 prepared to extend his campaign 
to the EEC framework.257 Ironically, one of the most sympathetic figures towards 
Portugal within NATO was actually a Dutch ex-Foreign Minister – Joseph Luns, who 
in October 1971 had replaced Manlio Brosio as the Alliance’s Secretary-General.258 
 
 
2. In search of a partner among Portugal’s closest allies 
 France, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, the three post-
WWII occupying powers of West German territories which had ushered in the creation 
of the FRG, had developed multiple networks of coordination with Bonn and among 
themselves over the years. These networks were especially active during the early 
1970s, not just because of the trio’s attention to neue Ostpolitik but because of their 
involvement in the process of European détente, and in particular in the CSCE. 259 Like 
the FRG, these three powers were entangled with the Portuguese dictatorship and to 
some extent they all suffered a backlash because of Lisbon’s colonial policy. Despite 
Bonn’s exchange of ideas with the members of this selective club, however, their 




Since the beginning of the colonial wars, Paris had become the Portuguese 
dictatorship’s most unashamedly loyal ally. This situation had emerged out of a mix of 
traditional friendship and reciprocity for Lisbon’s political support during the (all too 
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similar) French-Algerian conflict. The Portuguese cause had become an instrument of 
President Charles de Gaulle’s quest to reaffirm Paris’ autonomy from Washington, 
since it had allowed de Gaulle to present himself as the great defender of Western 
European solidarity. Thus throughout the 1960s France had systematically abstained on 
UN resolutions directed against Lisbon’s colonialism, and it had made important 
material contributions to the Portuguese wars. Moreover, three French firms 
participated in Zamco, the consortium carrying out the Cahora Bassa enterprise.260 Yet 
this complicity with Lisbon a limited impact on France’s image in the Third World. By 
contrast with the Algerian case, Paris had ably managed the process of decolonisation 
in sub-Saharan Africa and had established successful post-colonial ties with the 
moderate African states.261 In general the francophone African countries, with which 
France had closer economic relations, were not as vocal against the French-Portuguese 
collaboration as their Anglophone counterparts.262 Therefore, although conservative 
President Georges Pompidou – who replaced de Gaulle in June 1969 – could not ignore 
the rising anti-Portuguese critique, he did not see any urgent need to significantly 
depart from his predecessor’s policy towards Portugal. 
The German and French authorities studied each other’s case. In its revaluation 
of Afrikapolitik in May 1970, the Bundeskanzleramt’s Department for Foreign Affairs 
looked towards France as a successful role-model for the FRG’s relations with the 
Third World.263 Similarly, Paris observed with interest the attitude of the West German 
authorities in dealing with their controversial relationship with Lisbon.264 Initially, the 
main link between the two states’ policies towards the Caetano regime was the Cahora 
Bassa project. Recognising their interdependence, Rui Patrício simultaneously called 
Walter Scheel and his French counterpart Maurice Schumann to one side during the 
1970 NATO spring ministerial meeting (26-27 May).  Patrício got them to assure him 
that their governments would not withdraw support for the project, like the Swedish 
and Italians had done.265 On 3 July, away from Portuguese ears, Brandt and Pompidou 
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had a heart-to-heart about the contentious nature of the dam in their respective countries 
and Pompidou confirmed that the French would stand “firm as a rock” by the project.266 
As the African pressure mounted, the Auswärtiges Amt sought to take advantage 
of Paris’ and Bonn’s analogous situation. In September 1970, the AA approached its 
French colleagues about their availability to join forces in order to promote a détente 
between Lisbon and the African states267. However, the French Foreign Ministry at the 
Quai d’Orsay was convinced that any outside intervention risked complicating matters 
and thus delaying, rather than speeding up, a solution to the conflict. It considered that 
“the problem of the Portuguese presence in Africa should be solved by Portugal 
itself”.268 Consequently, the German Embassy in Paris was quickly informed that the 
Quai d’Orsay regarded the idea of a French-German demarche as premature, preferring 
to wait for President Kaunda to define how far the African campaign was willing to 
go.269  
The controversial invasion of Guinea-Conakry in November produced 
contradictory results in Paris’ stance. Pompidou’s tone mixed the defeatism of someone 
who had seen this story before – in the case of Algeria – with the resignation of 
someone who understood the deluded stubbornness of a colonial power. Meeting with 
Patrício on 22 January 1971, Pompidou announced that from now on France would be 
more reserved in its military shipments to Portugal, so as not to further provoke the 
Africans. Yet he also assured Patrício that, despite disagreement over the Portuguese 
policy, Paris would continue to show goodwill towards Lisbon.270 Four days later, 
Pompidou shared with Willy Brandt his doubts about the short-term chances for a 
positive evolution of the colonial situation, despite Caetano’s policy of ‘progressive 
autonomy’. The French president argued that such evolution could only result in 
decolonisation, which the Portuguese military and administrative elites did not seem 
ready to accept.271 For now Pompidou was willing to let Lisbon sort out its own path in 
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Africa.272 At a parallel meeting between the French and German foreign ministers, 
however, Maurice Schumann showed himself shaken out of his previous laissez faire 
attitude by the events in Conakry. This time, Schumann told Scheel that he would 
welcome a plan to jointly approach Lisbon in order to promote an Afro-Portuguese 
détente, perhaps through Paris’ privileged contacts with the francophone Léopold 
Senghor. The two ministers raised the possibility of discussing the Portuguese colonial 
problem within the EEC in an effort to coordinate the positions of the member states.273 
Indeed, the EEC ended up becoming the framework for Bonn’s and Paris’ most 
productive collaboration. A directive from 19 November 1970 by the EEC Council of 
Ministers – at the time under German presidency – had already assigned the 
ambassadors of the six EEC countries in Lisbon to compare notes at joint meetings, but 
this had been postponed due to the suicide of the West German Ambassador Schmidt-
Horix at the end of month.274 The background to this directive had been the current 
application for Portugal – its European territory – to be granted associate status with the 
Common Market in order to minimise the adverse effects of the UK’s and Denmark’s 
imminent transition from EFTA to the EEC.275 The French Ambassador Jacques Tiné 
revived the initiative the following spring, during France’s presidency of the Council. 
Yet Tiné soon found himself at odds with the benevolent outlook on marcelismo 
expressed by the recently arrived German Ambassador Ehrenfried von Holleben. On 
occasion of the first meeting, on 17 June 1971, Tiné considered that, out of all the 
ambassadors from the EEC countries, von Holleben was the “most optimistic, as well 
as the one who gives the most credit to [Caetano]”. Only the Italian chargé d’affaires, 
who was temporarily replacing the ambassador, shared similar, if less passionate, views 
to von Holleben. By contrast, the Belgian ambassador was particularly cynical towards 
any prospects of evolution in Lisbon’s policy.276 In the second meeting, on 30 August, 
von Holleben introduced his thesis that offering the Portuguese “the most favourable 
conditions” for their association with the EEC was the only way to avoid Lisbon’s drift 
into isolationism. He noted that the credibility of the more progressive and pro-
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European forces of the Portuguese regime was at stake and argued that undermining 
their efforts would strengthen the position of the conservative Africa-oriented faction. 
At the time, Tiné took issue with this interpretation, claiming that von Holleben was 
underestimating Portugal’s dependency on Europe.277 However, the French ambassador 
came to appreciate his colleague’s reasoning. Writing to Paris in April 1972, Tiné 
resolutely defended the need to accommodate and support the Portuguese demands in 
the EEC association negotiations. His arguments were now a perfect match with von 
Holleben’s.278 
The French and German stances were crucial in what turned out to be very 
intense negotiations. Lisbon’s diplomats had known from the beginning that the EEC 
states were unlikely to accept any compromises beyond a trade agreement similar to 
that being negotiated with other EFTA members at the time. They had only made the 
application for associate status in the hope of raising the level of the negotiations’ 
starting point as they sought to achieve greater economic concessions than Spain’s own 
1970 trade agreement with the Common Market.279 In particular, Portugal pressed to 
have its processed agricultural goods given the same export benefits as the industrial 
goods.280 Although France was less forthcoming than the FRG, due to conflicting 
economic interests281, the former nevertheless endorsed the Portuguese side.282 At 
Caetano’s request, Pompidou personally intervened when the negotiations seemed to be 
blocked and helped reach a consensus.283 While the mere concession of an agreement 
might have been assured by the context of the EEC’s wider realignment, the support of 
these two leading powers was necessary in order to obtain a satisfactory result for 
Portugal, since the dictatorship did not have either economic leverage or political 
sympathy from the other member states.284 The final agreement, signed on 22 July 
1972, although not fully satisfying Lisbon’s demands285, was still considered a success 
by the Portuguese political elites.286 In practice, the Franco-German axis succeeded in 
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assisting the Portuguese economy, while never following up on the idea of a direct 
intervention concerning the colonial question.287  
 
 
2.2. The UK  
 The United Kingdom had even stronger historical ties to Portugal than France 
did. In the case of England, those ties dated as far back as 1373. That the Anglo-
Portuguese Alliance had survived for so long indicates both parties’ instrumental – and 
selective – use of it. Indeed, one of the driving forces of the Alliance had been Lisbon’s 
reliance on Britain to secure the protection of the vast Portuguese empire. The UK’s 
unwillingness to continue to fulfil that role, evidenced since the 1950s, had led to a 
relative estrangement in the relations between the two.288 Yet even during a period of 
decreasing political and economic collusion, the weight of the Alliance’s legacy had 
prevented any meaningful rupture. Furthermore, Caetano’s rise to power in 1968 raised 
positive expectations in the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). Edward 
Heath’s Conservative government, in power since June 1970, initially embraced the 
FCO’s outlook.289 
After the first negative response from the Quai d’Orsay, in the autumn of 1970 
the Auswärtiges Amt turned to the FCO in the quest for a multilateral mediation 
between Portugal and the African states, perhaps even through NATO.290 On 6 
October, the AA’s Undersecretary of State Sigismund von Braun discussed the idea 
with British Foreign Secretary Alec Douglas-Home and the FCO’s Undersecretary of 
State Denis Greenhill, in London. The British advocated a hard stance against the 
OAU’s campaign, in order to prevent it from escalating into trade embargos on 
Portugal and South Africa, which could affect Western – and particularly British – 
economic interests. As for talking to Lisbon about the Portuguese colonial policy, 
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although London was not totally opposed to the idea, Greenhill warned von Braun that 
previous British governments had already attempted this in the past, without success.291 
It was hardly an enthusiastic endorsement of the German suggestion. The FCO’s 
scepticism was rooted in the fear of endangering what little progress Marcelo Caetano’s 
reform policies might achieve. As FCO’s Assistant Undersecretary of State Stanley 
Fingland put it: “The Portuguese [Government] would not necessarily react sensibly if 
they thought their allies were ganging up on them; and the Salazarist Old Guard might 
seize the opportunity to attempt a counter-reformation”.292 Therefore, when a delegate 
of the German Embassy in London once again brought up the AA’s proposal for 
concerted action, on 4 November 1970, the FCO rejected it once more.293 
                                                
Like Paris, London nevertheless began to recognise the need to talk to Lisbon 
following the Conakry episode. The UK dreaded similar Portuguese ventures against 
other African governments harbouring anti-Portuguese guerrilla movements, such as 
Commonwealth members Zambia and Tanzania. Douglas-Home admitted that “our 
representations would have a greater impact if they were preceded by an independent 
German demarche”.294 Thus the FCO began contemplating the option of “encouraging 
the Germans to exert some refined diplomatic pressure on the Portuguese [vis-à-vis] 
their African policies”. This essentially meant discreet German-Portuguese bilateral 
contacts, in opposition to a multilateral offensive in NATO. The FCO refused to go 
through NATO, not just because the organisation had “enough problems already”, but 
because London did to not wish to “embarrass the progressive elements in Portugal at a 
particularly delicate period for Portuguese internal politics”.295 
By the time the British next talked to the Germans, however, the latter were 
already exploring a new tactic. When Prime Minister Edward Heath visited Bonn on 5-
6 April 1971, Willy Brandt proposed an arrangement to provide joint military 
assistance to Portugal, as well as to the other two controversial states in the Atlantic 
Alliance: Greece and Turkey, where a coup d'état had occurred in March. Brandt sought 
to diffuse Bonn’s image of ‘immoral’ arms supplier by multilateralising the process. He 
argued that they could implement such a programme through NATO’s Military 
Committee but not through the Council, since the Scandinavians would certainly 
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oppose it. Heath replied that he would consider such a scheme involving Greece and 
Turkey, but that “Portugal was an embarrassment to the British government for political 
reasons”. In fact, London ended up rejecting the entire plan. Britain did not wish to 
agitate the Dutch, the Danes and the Norwegians any more than it wished to agitate the 
Portuguese.296 
The British authorities struggled to decipher the FRG’s apparently erratic 
approach to the Portuguese problem in particular and its African relations in general. In 
January 1972, a dispatch from the British Embassy in Bonn stated: 
 
“Germany is perhaps fortunate in that, even in her imperial days, she never felt 
either the duty to carry the white man’s burden which inspired British colonialists, 
or the need to undertake a mission civilisatrice like the French. Nor are any of her 
ex-colonies still in the hands of “kith and kin”. The Germans’ approach to relations 
with the Third World is therefore less emotional, and less cluttered by 
complications of an imperial past, than is ours or that of the French. Their relations 
with the Third World are likely in the future therefore to be based far more on a 
cool calculation of their own interests, primarily though not exclusively on the 
economic field.” 297 
 
However, an internal memo of the FCO shortly afterwards revised the 
statement, claiming that “German policy towards Africa is particularly prone to a sort 
of schizophrenia […] between what one might describe as the pragmatists and the 
ideologists”. The ‘pragmatists’, which included Minister of Economics Karl Schiller 
and Foreign Minister Walter Scheel, looked at Africa “very much in the narrow terms 
of the Federal Republic’s economic and, secondly, political interest”. The ‘ideologists’, 
headed by Minister for Economic Cooperation Erhard Eppler, were invested in 
“supporting the more “progressive” regimes in black Africa and in opposing white 
racialists even at the cost of German business interests”. For the British, it was not clear 
which school of thought had greater influence in government policy, but they conceded 
that “on major issues, it is probably usually the pragmatists [who win]; on minor issues, 
concessions are often made to ideologists”.298  
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Because of Portugal’s role in the FRG’s African affairs, the aforementioned 
inconsistency, as the British were finding out, contaminated West Germany’s policy 
towards Lisbon. Since the Bonn government did not manage to overcome its own inner 
divisions, naturally it also failed to coordinate a demarche with other countries. What 
was really missing, as a memo from the FCO’s Southern European Department 
postulated, was a concerted Western policy pressing the Portuguese to withdraw from 
Africa, either via political or economic boycott, or via financial inducements by the 
EEC. The same document hinted that, on the British side, the lack of commitment to 
such an effort did not merely derive from worries about the impact which a hasty 
withdrawal from the colonies would have in Portugal. A crucial concern was the 
unpredictable consequences of such an action in the colonies themselves. Although 
recognising that the “liability which Portugal’s continued colonial presence in Africa 
represents to British and Western interests needs no spelling out”, the memo stated that 
an “independent Angola and Mozambique – either white-supremacist or anti-Western – 
could be liabilities of a different kind”.299 
Still, London continued to compare notes with Bonn, even though British 
resistance to adopting a multilateral strategy to deal with the Portuguese problem 
persisted. After a two year interruption, in 1972 the AA and the FCO reactivated their 
longstanding practice of holding annual bilateral talks specifically about southern 
Africa.300 The Portuguese territories, of course, were a recurrent topic, even if hardly 
the only one. In the session of 23 February 1972, the two delegations compared 
strategies to prevent their arms from being used in the colonial wars.301 In the meeting 
of 26 April 1973, the Germans explained that the Portuguese question was “perhaps the 
main problem” for the FRG’s African policy, displaying a very pessimistic view of the 
situation. When they mentioned the possibility of the Bundestag pressuring the Brandt 
government to discuss the issue within NATO, the FCO assured them that no pressure 
of the sort was expected in the UK, where there was “much less steam behind anti-
Portuguese feeling than behind opposition to apartheid”.302  
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This prediction was soon proven inaccurate. Marcelo Caetano’s high-profile 
visit to London in July 1973, shortly after The Times had broken out the Wiriyamu 
massacre story, was the target of massive street demonstrations and heated debate in the 
press, as well as in the House of Commons. The notion of British participation in a 
concerted multilateral offensive against Portugal gained an unprecedented thrust with 
the Labour Party’s victory in the parliamentary elections of 28 February 1974. Labour 
leader Harold Wilson had developed much stricter views on the Portuguese issue since 
his last tenure as prime minister, which had ended four years before. His party’s 
electoral programme proposed the cancellation of Portugal’s trade agreement with the 
European Common Market – which the UK had joined the previous year – and 
Lisbon’s exclusion from future agreements with the EEC until the regime’s 
democratisation, as well as the dictatorship’s suspension from NATO. The programme 
also promised to support the liberation movements and to restrict British investments in 
and arms sales to Portugal. During its brief six weeks in power before Caetano’s 
downfall, however, the British government’s only meaningful initiative regarding the 
Portuguese colonial question was the holding of secret talks in London between 
representatives of the PAIGC and Portuguese authorities. This initiative had been 
prepared by Heath’s government, which in early 1974 had discerned signs of openness 
from Marcelo Caetano regarding a political solution to the wars, at least in the specific 
case of Guinea-Bissau, where the Portuguese military situation was at its worst. 
Although the meeting was ultimately unproductive, the British were the closest to 
mediating a settlement between the Africans and the Portuguese. 303 They did not invite 




 In contrast to France’s consistent support for Lisbon and to the UK’s generally 
mild attitude, the USA’s policy towards Portugal – and specifically towards the colonial 
question – had been much more convoluted. Relations between Lisbon and Washington 
had reached their lowest point in 1961/1962, when President John F. Kennedy had 
pursued an active pro-African anti-colonialist agenda until Lisbon escalated the threat 
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to refuse American access to the Azores Lajes airbase.304 The Lyndon Johnson 
administration had adopted a posture of ‘benign neutrality’ towards Lisbon, while 
trying to convince the dictatorship to accept self-determination in the colonies. In turn, 
Republican President Richard Nixon, who came to power in 1969, dismissed the geo-
strategic relevance of the African question, withdrawing any remaining support for the 
African nationalists and embracing Portugal’s position.305 National Security Adviser 
Henry Kissinger formalised this policy-line as soon as 15 August 1969, with the 
National Security Study Memorandum 39 (NSSM 39). This document, which 
effectively shaped Washington’s strategy for southern Africa for the next few years, 
laid out the following: 
 
“The Whites are here to stay and the only way that constructive change can come 
about is through them. There is no hope for the blacks to gain the political rights 
they seek through violence, which will only lead to chaos and increased 
opportunities for the communists.” 306 
 
 Bonn paid close attention to the evolution of Washington’s position, but initially 
the two states did not have a particularly collaborative working relation with regard to 
Portugal. Since early 1969, the German Embassy in Lisbon tried to assess any possible 
changes in the USA’s policy towards the dictatorship brought on by the new 
president.307 By late October 1970, German Ambassador Schmidt-Horix was able to 
inform the Auswärtiges Amt that Washington was indeed planning to reorient its policy 
by adopting a more favourable attitude towards Lisbon, though Schmidt-Horix had had 
to consult unofficial sources at the American Embassy to get this information. The 
Nixon administration preferred to confide in the Heath government – which at the time 
was preparing its own rapprochement with Lisbon – than in Willy Brandt’s.308 When 
Washington did approach the West German authorities, it only displayed specific short-
term goals. On 19 October 1970, the Secretary of the American Embassy in Bonn Mr. 
Spotts went to the AA to ask about Brandt’s recent talks with the OAU delegation, in 
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order to prepare for Kenneth Kaunda’s scheduled meeting with Nixon later that month. 
Spotts later tentatively shifted the conversation to the issue of Cahora Bassa. The 
American firm General Electric was interested in participating in the dam project and 
had heard that the Portuguese were not pleased with the German firms in Zamco, so 
Spotts wanted to know if those firms were at risk of losing their contract with 
Lisbon.309 The meeting was hardly the basis for a prolific partnership. 
 This initial lack of coordination over Portuguese affairs highlights the 
autonomous and proactive features of the FRG’s policy towards the Afro-Portuguese 
problem.310 Aware that the Nixon administration wished to keep a hands-off approach 
vis-à-vis the colonial question, the AA did not include Washington in its short-lived 
effort to organise an international demarche to promote détente in Africa.311 The 
independent attitude of the West German authorities reflected the political atmosphere 
of the time – since the late 1960s, Western European leaders and nations had been 
striving for emancipation from an all-encompassing American dominance, even when 
accepting their alliance with the USA in the context of the Western Bloc. Neue 
Ostpolitik, which was one of the strongest manifestations of this trend, had proven that 
Bonn could take the lead in articulating successful multilateral initiatives.312 
 In order to secure its efforts, however, the SPD-FDP coalition had from the start 
anchored its new Eastern policy in a strong Western policy via full commitment to the 
EEC and NATO. Regardless of whether or not the latter policy was just a tool to 
discredit Western fears of a German pull towards the East and possibly neutralism in 
return for Eastern concessions on the ‘German question’313, or whether perhaps the 
Western plus Eastern strategies formed parallel pillars in an overarching search for 
‘European social-democratisation’314, in practice the Western commitment did serve to 
validate neue Ostpolitik in the eyes of the FRG’s allies. Since the quadripartite 
agreement over Berlin required the endorsement of the former occupying powers, the 
West German government was concerned with gathering their support through a policy 
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of confidence building, particularly in the case of France and the USA.315 As a result of 
this strategy, although Washington was sceptical of Bonn’s leading role in European 
détente – especially Henry Kissinger, who feared both an upsurge of German 
nationalism and a weakening of Western unity – the Americans ended up backing the 
policy.316 The emphasis on bloc loyalty indirectly encouraged the FRG to safeguard its 
relations with the Lisbon dictatorship, yet it was usually Bonn and not Washington who 
explicitly brought the Portuguese problem into the West German-American 
relationship. Such was the case with the already mentioned West German proposal of 
channelling military aid to Lisbon (as well as to Athens and Ankara) through NATO, 
which was presented to – and vividly welcomed by – the Americans before being 
rejected by the British.317 
 In the same vein, as the international campaign against Lisbon expanded in the 
later period, a key Portugal-related concern for the FRG’s diplomacy was to enlist 
Washington in Bonn’s efforts to prevent the topic of Portugal from hijacking Western 
multilateral dynamics. In January 1973, the German Embassy in Washington signalled 
that Bonn could count on the USA to stand by Portugal, which was considered an 
important geo-strategic ally. According to the Embassy, while the American authorities 
did not approve of or formally support Portuguese colonial policy, they were willing to 
tolerate it even at the expense of some political difficulties in Africa.318 By then, 
however, those difficulties had begun to spread to Europe, as the Nixon administration 
found out while trying to rekindle Western European relations with the USA later that 
year. Washington wanted a NATO summit to be held during Nixon’s visit to the 
continent, but the AA’s Political Director Günther van Well advised the American 
Embassy in Bonn against the idea, warning that the Scandinavians and the Dutch might 
oppose the attendance of the Portuguese and Greek leaders.319 On 29 September, while 
brainstorming with Nixon and Kissinger about the Declaration on Atlantic Relations for 
NATO’s 25th birthday, Willy Brandt contributed: “I think we should not dwell too 
much on principles of democracy. If we take in too much of this, we get into a 
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discussion of Portugal, Greece, Turkey.” It was up to the American President to point 
out, shortly afterwards: “Yes, but there has to be some idealism. We can’t just talk 
hardware but we must find drafters who can put it in without antagonizing those who 
have none.”320 In the end, the Declaration did recall, in a single passage, that 
 
 “[NATO members] have proclaimed their dedication to the principles of 
democracy, respect for human rights, justice and social progress, which are the 
fruits of their shared spiritual heritage and they declare their intention to develop 
and deepen the application of these principles in their countries”.321 
 
By the time the Declaration was adopted, on 18-19 June 1974, the Caetano 




In the wider international context, the West German policy towards the Caetano 
regime gained considerable notoriety as a side effect of the backlash against Portuguese 
resistance to decolonisation. This phenomenon was inextricably tied to two important 
contemporary international dynamics. One of them was the rising tension between most 
independent African states and the remains of the white minority rule in their continent, 
including the Portuguese colonies. The other was the competition between the Eastern 
and the Western blocs for influence in the Third World. These two dynamics 
intersected as the former aggravated the African states’ relations with the Western allies 
of the ‘white-ruled’ regimes in the region, propelling African cooperation with the East 
in retaliation. Although by no means alone, the FRG’s policy towards Portugal was a 
catalyst as much as a fatality of this process. Because of the widespread portrayal of 
said policy as supporting Portuguese colonialism, Bonn faced several international 
appeals to discontinue it. 
The most fervent appeals came from Africa, triggered by solidarity with the 
colonised peoples and, in the case of the states that shared borders with colonies, by the 
spill-over from the wars. African leaders campaigned at all levels and in all areas of 
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high politics for Bonn to cancel its credit guarantees for the Cahora Bassa dam project 
in Mozambique, to cease the supply of German military materiel to Portugal which the 
latter used in their wars, and to support the liberation movements struggling against 
Portuguese colonial rule. While sharing these common elements, the African discourse 
was not uniform. A more moderate strand, best expressed by the 1969 Lusaka 
Manifesto and by Kenneth Kaunda’s 1970/1971 presidency of the OAU, was willing to 
engage in a constructive dialogue with Portugal. This strand sought to dissociate the 
cause of African liberation from Cold War politics, even if reminding the West that 
tolerance of colonialism was fuelling the Soviet Bloc’s influence in the continent. This 
faction, although critical of Bonn’s actions, regarded the West German government as a 
potential partner who could influence Lisbon. By contrast, the more militant strand of 
African criticism, of which the main voice was Guinean President Sékou Touré, 
displayed less lenience towards the colonial and neo-colonial powers. Acknowledging 
that the only path to Portuguese decolonisation was violence, not dialogue, this strand 
embraced the support given by the Eastern Bloc and framed the liberation struggle as a 
fight against Western imperialism. This strand, which radically condemned the FRG’s 
complicity with Lisbon, gained greater prominence in the aftermath of the Portuguese 
attack against Guinea-Conakry, in November 1970, following Conakry’s accusations of 
West German collaboration in the aggression. 
Apart from their emotional appeal to the democratic values which Bonn claimed 
to represent, the African states had some power of persuasion over West Germany due 
to their economic potential and, significantly, their influential role in the NAM. Despite 
the abandonment of the Hallstein doctrine, the FRG remained keen on ensuring as little 
diplomatic recognition of the GDR as possible, thus securing Bonn some leverage over 
East Berlin during the neue Ostpolitik negotiations. Furthermore, through its 
preponderant weight in the United Nations General Assembly, the African bloc could 
compromise West Germany’s desired admission to the UN, or any voting pertaining to 
German-related issues. On a more immediate level, Bonn witnessed in Conakry an 
extreme consequence of being associated with Portugal and what it perceived as a 
direct result of East German penetration in Africa. 
Indeed, if the Africans tried to use the Cold War geo-ideological competition to 
serve their cause, the Eastern Bloc states used the African cause to advance their own 
position in the Cold War. The USSR and its allies supported the liberation struggle 
politically and militarily, which in turn strengthened their influence in the Third World. 
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The critique of Bonn’s policy towards Portugal was a valuable propaganda tool against 
the West in general and the Atlantic Alliance in particular. It allowed the Soviet Union 
to accuse NATO’s key European member of sustaining imperialism, racism and 
fascism. The GDR made the most out of this strategy, basing a crucial part of its own 
African policy during this period on the sabotage of the FRG’s reputation. It thus 
managed to break the isolation to which the Hallstein doctrine had confined the country 
during the previous decade and a half. This offensive represented an especially strong 
pressure for Bonn to revise its policy, both because it undermined the FRG’s stand in 
Africa and because it enabled the expansion of its rival eastern counterpart. Conversely, 
Romania and the non-aligned Yugoslavia – two communist states which maintained 
relations with the West and which Bonn had recognised prior to neue Ostpolitik – 
proved eager to help Willy Brandt reach out to the liberation movements. 
Bonn’s image was compromised in the Western world as well. The campaigns 
of anti-colonialist activists such as the Dutch Angola Comité passionately denounced 
the FRG’s military and economic connections to Portuguese colonialism. At a 
governmental level, a different form of pressure emerged from the Scandinavian states 
and, gradually, from the Netherlands. Their governments openly supported the 
liberation movements and, notably, adopted a very critical stance regarding the Lisbon 
dictatorship. Their discourse about Portugal was both an echo of the African critique 
and an explicit reaction to that critique – a way to save the face of western institutions – 
as well as a response to domestic pressure groups. Yet the ensuing form of criticism, 
while keeping its anti-colonialist roots, also came to emphasise the authoritarian nature 
of the Portuguese regime at home. Thus Portugal, which was regularly paired with 
South Africa and Rhodesia as the ‘rotten apples’ of southern Africa, was now also 
paired with Greece and later Turkey as the ‘rotten apples’ of the Western alliance. 
Although the governments of the Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands did not 
direct their attacks at West Germany, they nevertheless exerted a type of peer pressure 
over Bonn. Not only did their governments belong to the same political family as Willy 
Brandt’s SPD, they brought the discussion to forums where the FRG participated – 
including NATO and later the EEC – forcing the Bonn government to take a side. 
The thrust of these various forms of pressure was partially offset by a number of 
international factors which provided the Bonn government with the confidence to 
continue its traditional policy towards Portugal. Given West Germany’s strong 
economic relations with Africa, as well as its substantial supply of development aid and 
80 
 
its engaged diplomatic strategy, Bonn insisted that it was still possible to salvage the 
FRG’s image on the African continent without openly confronting Lisbon. Crucially, 
this would enable the West German government to focus on the main aims of its 
foreign policy, i.e. neue Ostpolitik and European rapprochement. Indeed, while the 
Portuguese colonial question played a part in the Cold War competition, it had no place 
in the Cold War détente. In the early 1970s, the Soviet Union and its European allies 
were still regarding the rapprochement with the Western Bloc as a priority over their 
aspirations in the Third World. Therefore, despite their public antagonism towards the 
West over the Portuguese resistance to decolonisation, the eastern European countries 
left the issue out of their engagement policy with the FRG. Without linkage between 
European détente and the African wars, the Portuguese colonial problem did not 
threaten to hinder Bonn’s eastern policy, which consequently did not push Bonn to alter 
its bond with Lisbon. Likewise, it seemed unlikely that the Brandt government’s policy 
towards Portugal would expose the FRG to any serious reprisals from its partners 
within the Western Bloc. Although NATO became the stage of dispute over the West’s 
attitude vis-à-vis the Caetano regime, only a minority proved willing to defy the 
Portuguese dictatorship within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance. Even at the peak 
of Portugal’s international isolation, it cannot be said that the dictatorship was fully 
ostracised by the Western powers. In fact, the powerful French, British and American 
conservative governments during this period displayed a mostly lenient attitude towards 
the Caetano regime.  
More than simply enabling the continuation of Bonn’s tolerant policy towards 
Lisbon, these conditions actually actively discouraged the adoption of a more 
confrontational stance. On the one hand, the FRG could not count on the support of its 
common allies with Portugal for such a stance. In late 1970, when Bonn proposed to 
Paris and London a joint demarche to address the Afro-Portuguese tension, both 
rejected the idea. Although the Guinea-Conakry incident, with its disastrous 
consequences for the West, momentarily shook their convictions, the allies never 
agreed on a strategy to confront the Portuguese over their colonial problem. Their faith 
in Caetano’s professed reformism declined, but each feared that forcing the dictatorship 
to decolonise would be counterproductive. On the other hand, Bonn regarded the anti-
Portuguese crusade of the other smaller Western states as disruptive to NATO. This 
was an important consideration in the context of neue Ostpolitik, since the Brandt 
government sought to reassure its allies of its commitment to the Western Bloc via 
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Alliance loyalty. Therefore, not only did Bonn’s rapprochement with the East not strain 
the West German-Portuguese relations, it actually made Bonn less keen to confront 
Lisbon. 
In conclusion, the FRG’s policy towards the Portuguese dictatorship pitted 
different dimensions of Bonn’s foreign policy against each other. The continuation of 
friendly relations with Lisbon threatened the FRG’s position in Africa and in the UN, 
while undermining its advantageous diplomatic situation vis-à-vis the GDR. The 
discontinuation of those relations threatened the FRG’s strategy in the West and by 
implication in the East. Even within the Western Bloc, the option was not consensual, 
since the European governments ideologically closer to Bonn’s had aligned themselves, 
like some in their civil society, with Africa’s anti-colonialist cause. As we shall see, 
West Germany itself was not immune to the political and cultural appropriation of the 
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 The FRG’s behaviour towards Portugal was not only dictated by international 
pressures, but also crucially by corresponding domestic pressures. Moving from the 
edges of the public discourse to the mainstream, this chapter examines the challenge 
posed to Bonn by national agents outside the three largest parties in the executive and 
legislative bodies. It begins by explaining how fringe student activists and anti-
colonialist NGOs attacked the FRG’s Portuguese policy, giving it unprecedented 
visibility at home. The following sections look at the uneasy responses to this 
phenomenon by the West German business sector and the churches, two important 
groups in West German society which were implicated in the uproar. Finally, the 
chapter evaluates how these various strands shaped the significance of the Portuguese 
dictatorship in the FRG’s public sphere. As a whole, this chapter is a reflection of the 
social atmosphere in which Bonn made its policy towards Lisbon. 
 
 
1. The rise of the solidarity movement 
 Since the mid-1960s, the FRG had witnessed an upsurge in youth mobilisation, 
including a strong engagement with international affairs. University students had 
rebelled against the shortcomings of the educational system and against the 
conservative atmosphere of West German society and politics, where clerical anti-
communism was dominant and the Nazi past was still an un-mastered issue. By the end 
of the decade, student activism had become the most visible form of extra-
parliamentary opposition in the country, with students rallying around political causes 
like the rejection of the 1968 so-called ‘Emergency Acts’ which had allowed the 
government to restrict civil rights in emergency situations. Despite its roots in the West 
German context, this movement reflected a broader wave of similar movements across 
Western countries during this period. Significantly, the Vietnam War had served as 
catalyst to expose the US as an imperialist force in the students’ eyes and it had 
motivated an increasing commitment to international solidarity.322 
                                                




 The German student activists, who had embraced anti-colonialist ideals early 
on323, found special meaning in the cause of southern African liberation. Bonn’s 
involvement with Lisbon fuelled in the students a sense of responsibility for the 
situation, driving them to take action at home.324 The most active community in this 
regard belonged to the University of Heidelberg. Here Portuguese student Eduardo de 
Sousa Ferreira became a prominent theorist for the movement, due to his ground-
breaking analysis of the FRG’s economic ties to Portuguese colonialism.325 With a 
more utilitarian view, renowned activist Rudi Dutschke proposed using the “systematic 
exposure” of the German-Portuguese military ties to rally the masses against NATO, 
thus furthering the movement’s “anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist strategy”.326 In 
1969, the national student body and the Socialist German Student League (SDS) 
promoted an information campaign together with the MPLA, including collections of 
money and medicine. Students organised related teach-ins in various cities in an effort 
to mobilise both their colleagues and the local working classes. The cause reached 
nationwide consensus among the student community, even if activism remained mostly 
circumscribed to specialised branches.327 
The student movement also engaged in militant action. On the night of 30 
January 1969 a group of around 200 students in Cologne hurled stones at the 
Portuguese Consulate as part of a protest against contested foreign regimes.328 In late 
June 1970, the announcement of a meeting of World Bank executives with West 
German representatives in Heidelberg, supposedly to discuss the Cahora Bassa dam 
project, led to a hostile student demonstration with well over 1,000 participants in the 
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provincial university town. The resulting clashes with the police served as a pretext for 
the Land authorities of Baden-Württemberg to ban the local SDS section.329 The 
following week, a group of around 800 students marched in Hamburg protesting against 
that ban and reinforcing their opposition to Cahora Bassa. During the latter 
demonstration, rocks were thrown at the windows of an information centre for AEG – 
one of the companies involved in the Mozambican dam project – and at the Portuguese 
general-consulate.330 
The solidarity shown towards the southern African struggle and the wider Third 
World gradually expanded far beyond the student milieu. Significantly, people who had 
been involved in either government- or church-sponsored development work in Africa 
engaged in related activism upon their return to the FRG. The foundation in Freiburg in 
1968 of the seminal Third World-focused action group Aktion 3.Welt331 was followed 
by a proliferation of grassroots NGOs, which became increasingly professionalized. 
Moreover, political organisations recruited students who brought with them a passion 
for the cause of African liberation. The cause became particularly fashionable among 
the many Maoist splinter groups which filled the leftist microcosm of society at the 
time.332 West German anti-colonialist mobilisation reached unprecedented levels of 
intensity with a crusade against Cahora Bassa that appealed to activists within and 
outside the student movement, including voices from the scientific community.333 
Critics accused the dam of consolidating the Portuguese presence in Mozambique and 
of benefiting the neighbouring racist regimes of South Africa and Rhodesia. Although 
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inspired by the African calls for action334, the anti-Cahora Bassa protests developed a 
sharp national identity, as “West German Imperialism” was condemned.335 
While the campaign against the dam reached its first peak in 1970, the concern 
with Portuguese colonialism outlasted this initial outburst. Among the array of anti-
colonial groups created in the following period, the most prominent was the Deutsches 
Komitee für Angola, Guinea-Bissau und Mozambik (AGM-Komitee). Formed in Bonn 
on 4 June 1971, this Committee acted as a lobby that was well-connected to the policy-
making circles, given the participation of numerous SPD members of the Bundestag.336 
Besides producing new organisations, the long established German African Society337 – 
a conservative institution with a history of pro-Portuguese leaning338 was also equally 
drawn in by the momentum. During this period, the Society’s magazine Afrika heute 
became a forum for sympathisers of the liberation cause339. Although the main target of 
the mobilisation was the colonial dimension of the Portuguese regime, small scale 
activism addressed the repression within Portugal as well.340 
Aktion 3.Welt, after meeting with various organisations in late 1971, sought to 
unite the activities of the solidarity movement’s disparate forces. It proposed a 
collective campaign341 which would build up from April 1972 and culminate in a large-
                                                
334 In March 1970, the OAU had called “on all progressive people the world over to rise and condemn the 
actions of the governments of their countries involved in the execution of this diabolical project.” – OAU, 
“DECLARATION ON THE CABORA BASSA…” [http://www.africa-
union.org/official_documents/council%20of%20minsters%20meetings/com/tCoM_1970a.pdf on 
05.09.2011]. 
335 Middlemas, Kieth. 1975. Cabora Bassa – Engineering and Politics in Southern Africa, London: 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson. pp. 167-168; Verber, Jason. 2010. The Conundrum of Colonialism in Postwar 
Germany, University of Iowa: PhD dissertation, pp.72-73. 
336 Kössler/Melber (2002), pp.111,112; For the original manifesto of the AGM-Komitee, see Afrika 
heute,15.06.1971, p.254. 
337 Created in 1956, with the purpose of promoting research, cultural exchange and human relations 
between the FRG and Africa, the Deutsche Afrika-Gesellschaft had gained great prominence over the 
years. – Verber (2010), pp.61-62. 
338 In 1962, the Society’s first President, noted CDU politician Eugen Gerstenmaier, distanced himself 
from an article critical of Lisbon’s colonial policy which the organisation’s bulletin had published without 
his previous knowledge. Gerstenmaier quickly arranged for an article praising the Portuguese 
achievements in Africa to be published in the following issue. – Fonseca, Ana Mónica. 2007. A Força das 
Armas: o Apoio da República Federal da Alemanha ao Estado Novo (1958-1968), Lisbon: Ministério dos 
Negócios Estrangeiros, pp.148-150. 
339 This shift accentuated over time, but it was already quite clear by mid-1971, as stressed in an upset 
letter from Mário Pirelli, in Afrika heute,13.09.1971, pp.374-375. 
340 As part of a ‘Political Prisoners Week’ campaign, in mid-November 1971, an Amnesty International 
cell in Hamburg distributed fliers near Portugal’s General-Consulate demanding human rights for the 
Portuguese (AHD-MNE, PEA, M683, Pr.331, Dispatch from the Portuguese General-Consulate in 
Hamburg, 25.11.1971). 
341 Proposed actions included the preparation of comprehensive ‘black papers’ exposing the FRG’s 
connections to Portuguese colonialism, the publication of a book collection dedicated specifically to this 
topic, routine press conferences, critical seminars at schools, universities, churches and political parties, 
street performances, public debates and, ultimately, the construction of a mock-dam in front of the 
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scale event called ‘Portugal-Tribunal’, scheduled for July. Following the model of the 
1967 Russel Tribunal, which had held public hearings concerning the US intervention 
in Vietnam, the ‘Portugal-Tribunal’ would operate as a public trial without any formal 
legitimisation. Although both sides would theoretically be allowed to present their case, 
the stated aim was to create an “avalanche” of bad publicity about the colonial wars, as 
well as NATO’s and, particularly, the FRG’s perceived military, political and economic 
aid to the Portuguese. The initial plan suggested giving the press a “bite-sized 
‘spectacle’” designed to discredit the image of Portugal and its supporters within the 
FRG, while publicising the goals and methods of the liberation movements, i.e. 
“democratic organisations, construction of socialist states”. According to the promoters 
of the campaign, this would constitute the first step “to effectively influence the Bonn-
Lisbon relations”. The organisers sought to gain wide public support for their demands 
that the Bonn government stop arms deliveries to Portugal, cancel credit guarantees to 
the Cahora Bassa project, support the liberation movements, accept Portuguese 
deserters, and refuse any tax breaks or further guarantees for companies which did 
business with Portugal.342 
As soon as the Auswärtiges Amt found out about this plan, in January 1972, it 
determined that the ‘Portugal-Tribunal’ could endanger West Germany’s foreign 
interests. According to the first AA internal memo on this matter, not only were the 
protests likely to harm the FRG’s relations with Lisbon, they might also disrupt 
NATO’s spring ministerial meeting in Bonn (30-31 May) and possibly the Olympic 
Games in Munich that summer. Therefore, the memo proposed sabotaging the 
campaign, or at least minimising its impact, with the help of the Ministry of the 
Interior, the Head of the Chancellery and “suitable journalists”, who would be warned 
about the activists’ wish to manipulate the press.343 In line with this strategy, in late 
January Foreign Minister Walter Scheel warned Minister of the Interior Hans-Dietrich 
Genscher about the disruptive nature of the planned campaign. Scheel’s message spoke 
of the need to “consider opportune measures against the organisation of the ‘Tribunal’”, 
as well as “appropriate action for the protection of the Portuguese embassy and for an 
undisturbed running of the NATO ministerial meeting”. Its only concrete suggestion, 
                                                                                                                                            
Portuguese Embassy, as well as a protest where activists would handcuff themselves to the Embassy’s 
fences. 
342 PAAA, B26/445, Konzeption Portugal-Tribunal (leaflet); See also “Kongreß: Dokumentation 
verschiedener Konzeptionen”, iz3w,April/May 1973, pp.26-30. 
343 PAAA, B26/445, Memo of the AA, 21.01.1972. 
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however, was to coordinate with the local authorities in Bonn in order to ensure that the 
city’s largest meeting places would not be available for the ‘Tribunal’.344 
The AA’s efforts effectively slowed down the campaign’s momentum. The 
Ministry of the Interior was unable to outright forbid the event because, as Genscher 
reminded Scheel, it was intended as a peaceful public event in a closed space and, 
therefore, was safeguarded by the FRG’s Basic Law. Nevertheless, Bonn’s state 
authorities agreed to refuse the organisers access to the largest meeting places in the 
requested dates.345 Hoping to book the Beethovenhalle, Bonn’s most emblematic 
concert hall, the activists thus rescheduled the ‘Tribunal’ for the end of October 1972; 
but the local authorities prevented it once more.346 Despite having publicised the new 
date in the media347 and having already invited representatives of the liberation 
movements, in September the organisers announced a further postponement. By then, 
they had begun contemplating relocating the event to a more peripheral city.348 The 
final chosen date was 13/14 January 1973 and, instead of the Beethovenhalle, the 
gathering was moved to a more modest conference room on top of a Dortmund beer 
house.349 The German and the Portuguese foreign ministries each monitored the 
preparations, keeping contact with their respective national intelligence services.350 
Once the AA realised that some of the speakers from Africa were travelling via 
Belgium, it instructed the German Embassy in Brussels to refuse them the visas 
required to enter the FRG351, thus preventing them from attending the Congress.352 
The government’s interference apart, the activists had to overcome their own 
coordination problems. Associations from over 40 cities all over West Germany had 
joined the project, including development and solidarity NGOs, anti-racist and human 
rights working groups, local and international organisations specialised in southern 
Africa and in the Third World more broadly, information centres and political 
                                                
344 PAAA, B26/445, Dispatch from Walter Scheel to Hans-Dietrich Genscher, January 1972. 
345 PAAA, B26/445, Dispatch from Hans-Dietrich Genscher to Walter Scheel, 20.03.1972. 
346 PAAA, B26/445, Dispatch from the BMI to the AA, 04.05.1972. 
347 Süddeutsche Zeitung, 23.03.1972, in F&R,15.14.1972. 
348 PAAA, B26, Zwischenarchiv101.435, Bulletin from the Deutscher Informationsdienst, Nr.1346, 
September 1972. 
349 IAN/TT/PIDE-DGS, CI(2),Prc.11,vol.11,Serviços Alemães, Dispatch from the Portuguese Foreign 
Ministry to the DGS, 12.01.1973. 
350 PAAA, Zwischenarchiv101.435, Dispatch from the BMI to the AA, 08.01.1973; IAN/TT/PIDE-DGS, 
Pr.11, vol.11, CI(2),Serviços Alemães, Dispatch from the Portuguese Foreign Ministry to the 
DGS,12.01.1973. 
351 Namely FRELIMO’s Marcelino dos Santos and PAIGC’s Gil Fernandes – 
AA,Zwischenarchiv101.435, Dispatches from the AA, 12.01.1973 and 15.01.1973. 
352 “Solidarisierung im Interesse Afrikas”, Afrika heute, January1973, p.33. 
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committees, self-proclaimed socialists and communists, anti-imperialists and pacifists, 
progressive Catholics and Protestants, students, apprentices, conscientious objectors 
and even consumer activists.353 A series of preparatory meetings allowed continuous 
discussion over the campaign’s strategy, but the lack of a fixed forum undermined the 
decision process. One recurring object of contention was the ‘Tribunal’ itself, as many 
argued that the function of mobilising the masses should not belong to a centralised 
event but rather to the individual groups, locally. In July 1972, the activists agreed to 
replace the ‘Tribunal’ project with a ‘Congress for the Freedom of Angola, Guinea-
Bissau and Mozambique’. Yet by September, when they finally formed an organising 
committee – from now on called Organisationskomitee – there was still no consensus 
regarding the actual implications of this change. The Organisationskomitee, with 
delegates from six groups354, still placed the event’s focus on mobilising the general 
public and influencing the Bundestag.355  
Ultimately the Congress served as an outlet for the activists to express their 
outrage with the FRG’s business elite and government, as well as their solidarity with 
the liberation struggle in Africa and even in Vietnam. On Saturday 13 January 1973 
close to 1,000 protesters marched through Dortmund. Over 700 delegates from around 
80 different organisations attended the initial plenary session, split into six discussion 
groups356 in the local state library and reunited the following day to share their 
conclusions. The participants enthusiastically greeted MPLA’s António Neto and 
FRELIMO’s Armando Panguene, who spoke about the progress of their movements’ 
struggle, as well as Sietse Bosgra from the Dutch Angola Comité, who spoke about the 
successful civil campaigns to pressure the Netherlands’ government. The bulk of the 
discussion focused on Bonn’s policy towards Portugal.357 
Sectarianism undercut the resonance of the event. With the pretext of appearing 
as a united block and of avoiding scaring away average citizens, the 
                                                
353 For a preliminary list, see PAAA,B26,Zwischenarchiv101.435, Bulletin from the Deutscher 
Informationsdienst, Nr.1346, September 1972. 
354 Aktion Dritte Welt (Freiburg), AGM-Komitee (Bonn), AKAFRIK (Bielefeld), AIB (Marburg), 
Initiativkreis Freiheit für AGM (Nürnberg) and SDAJ Bundesvorstand (Dortmund). 
355 iz3w,April/May 1973, pp.27-28. 
356 Each focused on one of the following topics: “Portuguese colonialism”, “The national liberation 
struggle”, “South African imperialism in Africa”, “The role of West German imperialism and the NATO 
states”, “Church and colonialism” and “Tasks of the solidarity movement in the FRG”. 
357 AHD-MNE, PEA, M756, Pr.331, Telegram from the Portuguese Embassy in Bonn,16.01.1973; 
“Solidarisierung im Interesse Afrikas”, Afrika heute,January1973,pp.32-34; For a transcript of the 
resolutions and key speeches see CIDAC, BAC0290A/a, Dokumentation des Kongresses “Freiheit für 
Angola, Guinea-Bissao und Mozambique”. 
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Organisationskomitee polished the campaign’s terminology.358 Some activists accused 
the committee of leaning too closely to the party line of the German Communist Party 
DKP359 and of disregarding the movement’s internal debate.360 SPD MP Lenelotte von 
Bothmer, a founding member of the AGM-Komitee, left the Congress after not being 
allowed to intervene at a plenary session – an episode highlighted by the Portuguese 
Embassy in order to denounce the “radicalism” of the organisers.361 By contrast, Afrika 
heute’s correspondent claimed that “the feeling that this congress consisted of a strong 
lobby of left radical circles […] vanished after a glimpse at the list of participants”, 
stressing the event’s diversity.362 The more Third World-oriented organisations 
complained that the Congress’ direction had not been radical enough. They disapproved 
of the leading role taken by the forces closer to the DKP and lamented that the 
proceedings had focused too much on making a domestic political statement rather than 
on tackling what they perceived to be the root of the problem, i.e. the capitalist system 
itself.363 Although many groups agreed to continue working together on the platform 
established for the Congress364, they firmly rejected the Organisationskomitee’s request 
for a mandate to take public positions on other, unrelated political issues.365 Given the 
in-fighting surrounding the event, the Portuguese authorities concluded that the 
                                                
358 In an effort to avoid terms perceived as too polarising, it dropped the Congress’ original sub-heading 
“Against the FRG-Imperialism”. It also replaced the generally anti-capitalist rhetoric with a specifically 
anti-monopolist discourse. 
359 The DKP-linked youth organisation Sozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterjungend had joined the 
Committee on the basis of the group’s “organisational power”, much to the chagrin of differently oriented 
activist cells which had been involved in the campaign for much longer. 
360 This charge was aggravated by the Committee’s demand to approve all the Congress’ speakers, 
moderators, minute takers and on-site journalists beforehand. – iz3w,April/May 1973, pp.27-29. 
361 According to the Embassy’s informers, although every topic sparked heated discussion among the 
various trends, the most “moderate” proposals were overwhelmingly overruled by the “extremist 
elements” in the Congress. – AHD-MNE, PEA, M756, Pr.331,Telegram from the Portuguese Embassy in 
Bonn,16.01.1973. 
362 Afrika heute, January 1973, p.32. 
363 They were particularly disappointed with an open letter to Willy Brandt, which the Organising 
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decrying the Committee’s arrogant attitude, these activists criticised the option of essentially directing the 
Congress at the media and at the Chancellor, arguing that “in an anti-imperialist event, the ‘public’ cannot 
be Chancellor Brandt”. 
364 At a balance meeting held on 16/18 March 1973 in Königstein, the delegates of 21 groups voted to 
carry on, 16 voted against it and 3 abstained. 
365 CIDAC, BAC0290A/a, Newsletter from the Organising Committee (Gruppenrundbrief 8); 
iz3w,April/May 1973,pp.28-29; See also «Portugal-Kongreß und Perspektiven der “Dritte-Welt-
Gruppen”», in links: Sozialistische Zeitung,nr.41,February 1973,pp.5-7, summarised in Afrika heute, 
February 1973, p.47. 
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solidarity movement’s impetus was unlikely to expand beyond the circles already 
involved.366 
Although ideological quarrels continued to plague this movement367, it still 
spurred new forms of protest. In February 1973, the Organisationskomitee publicly 
called upon African states to block the FRG from joining the UN unless Bonn promised 
“in an unambiguous way to stop all arms deliveries to Portugal and South Africa”.368 
Activists across the country collected aid for the liberation movements369, while 
producing miscellaneous anti-colonialist material designed to inform and agitate, 
ranging from placards to exhibitions and theatre productions.370 They answered an 
appeal by the UN General Assembly to multiply their initiatives during the last week of 
May, designated ‘UN Week Against Colonialism and Apartheid’.371 That summer, the 
AGM-Komitee began a long effort to expose the authorisation given by the Bonn 
government for a deal between the German firm Josef Meissner and a Portuguese 
production plant for ammunition.372 Articles in Afrika heute – renamed Afrika heute, 
III. Welt in June 1973 – openly championed the liberation struggle, pushing particularly 
for the FRG’s recognition of Guinea-Bissau’s September declaration of 
independence.373 The activists also continued to campaign for the right of asylum of 
persecuted Portuguese objectors to military service.374 
 
                                                
366 The Portuguese Embassy in Bonn was well-informed about the content of the Königstein meeting. – 
IAN/TT/PIDE-DGS, Proc.11, vol.11, CI(2),Serviços Alemães, Dispatch from the Portuguese Foreign 
Ministry to the DGS,30.04.1973. 
367 In April 1974, after a solidarity conference in Oxford, FRELIMO’s representative Janet Mondlane 
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National Liberation in Southern Africa– Volume II: Solidarity and Assistance 1970-1974, Uppsala, 
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368 Daily News (Tanzania),06.02.1973, in F&R,03.03.1973. 
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the Theatermanufaktur, in Berlin, staged Peter Weiss’ classic Der Gesang vom Lusitanischen Popanz, 
about Angola.– CIDAC, BAC0290A/a, Gruppenrundbrief 8. 
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MPLA-PAIGC-FRELIMO, March 1974. 
372 Besides press releases, the AGM-Komitee wrote to the AA and, having received no reply, complained 
to the President of the FRG. – FAZ,01.03.1974, in F&R,30.03.1974. 
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Paech in Afrika heute,III.Welt, March 1974, pp.15-20. 
















“Only NATO keeps them upright” – The informationszentrum 3.welt accuses NATO and, particularly, 
the FRG of supplying weapons and aircraft used by Portugal in the colonial wars.375 
 
From the outset, the Portuguese colonial issue served as the gateway for wider 
political critique. Aktion 3.Welt’s initial proposal for the ‘Tribunal’ argued that the 
denunciation of the German companies’ influence over Bonn’s policy towards Portugal 
would increase the number of “‘doubters’ of the capitalist system”.376 In turn, the 
Organisationskomitee linked the condemnation of the companies exclusively to the 
struggle against ‘unregulated’ capitalism, in line with the DKP’s defence of state 
monopoly capitalism.377 Others framed the issue in the specific context of emerging 
neo-colonialism. For example, in an early leaflet promoting the campaign378, the 
influential New Left organisation Sozialistisches Büro Offenbach blamed the West’s 
tacit collusion with Portuguese colonialism on its wish for unrestricted access to 
Africa’s resources. It added that the “accusation against Portugal must become an 
accusation against a system of exploitation and oppression of the systematically 
underdeveloped ‘Third World’”, concluding that the Portuguese case would serve as an 
“example”.379 
                                                
375 iz3w, January 1974, pp.41,46. 
376 PAAA, B26/445, Konzeption Portugal-Tribunal (leaflet). 
377 According to the Congress’ flyer: “Solidarity means not only aid for the liberation movements 
themselves, but it is in the interest of [those] who [are] for democratic rights and against the companies’ 
uncontrolled exercise of power”. 
378 It was distributed on 29 January 1972, during a meeting of development action groups of the Ruhr 
region. – PAAA, B26/445, Dispatch from the Federal Ministry of the Interior to the AA, 04.05.1972 
379 PAAA, B26/445, Aufruf zum Portugal-Tribunal (leaflet). 
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While emphasising the solidarity with Africa, some of the activists’ rhetoric 
addressed specific domestic concerns as well. Firstly, they argued that a state “which 
oppresses and exploits other peoples will also steer its oppressive measures to the 
inside”, pointing out repressive tendencies of the West German state at home.380 
Moreover, they accused neo-colonialism of leading to the export of capital, the 
outsourcing of production plants and the strengthening of the arms industry. The first of 
these meant less capital would be invested at home “in the improvement of the living 
conditions and in the creation of new jobs”. The second point posed a problem by 
providing companies with an alternative work force – with fewer rights – in Africa, 
thus making the employers less vulnerable to industrial action taken by workers in the 
FRG. Finally, investment in the defence industry meant both less investment in the 
public interest and the mounting influence of the military-industrial complex, resulting 
in “the growing subordination of our needs to alleged military-industrial necessities”.381 
The latter points were designed to appeal to the working class, particularly the 
employees of German companies with businesses in southern Africa.382 
The government, which intercepted these appeals early on, grew suspicious of the 
solidarity movement. In the context of increasing social upheaval at the time, not to 
mention the violent attacks by the far-left extremist Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF), Bonn 
worried about any sources of disorder and conflict likely to unleash further violence.383 
Thus the Auswärtiges Amt expressed concern over the ‘Tribunal’ campaign’s 
willingness to cast “doubt on the social order” of the FRG and to spur cooperation 
among “radical groups”.384 Furthermore, the AA displayed little sympathy for the fact 
that the government-funded Afrika heute had become a vehicle for criticism against 
Bonn’s policy. Having first warned the German African Society about this discomfort 
in April 1972385, the AA substantially reduced the Society’s funding in May 1973386 
and even further by the end of that year.387 
                                                
380 These were expressed in the efforts to “bar the opposition from activities in the public sphere” and to 
“defame” some oppositionists by labelling them “terrorists”, as well as in the police shooting and hitting 
of unarmed protesters. 
381 PAAA, B26/445, Aufruf zum Portugal-Tribunal (leaflet). 
382  iz3w,April/May 1973, p.27. 
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Ultimately, although it was hardly an isolated phenomenon in Europe, local 
conditions determined the particular evolution of the West German solidarity 
movement. In comparison with the governments of the Netherlands and the 
Scandinavian countries, which were much more critical of Portugal and supportive of 
the liberation organisations, Bonn faced anti-colonialist activism embedded within a 
harsher more specific anti-governmental critique and, in turn, pursued a more 
repressive policy towards the protests. Moreover, the FRG stood in contrast to the UK, 
where the solidarity movement was a much more powerful social force.388 Yet British 
activism was heavily dominated by the issue of apartheid389, at least until Caetano’s 
controversial visit to London in 1973390, while the German protesters singled out 
Portuguese colonialism as a prominent topic much sooner, due to their country’s joint 
ventures with the Lisbon regime. 
 
 
2. The economic sector’s counter-attack 
Because the protests of the solidarity movement were as much about 
denouncing the FRG’s neo-colonialism as about denouncing Portugal’s colonialism per 
se, much of the friction directly involved the companies profiting from the German-
Portuguese relations, which of course were also under attack by the liberation 
movements themselves. The first clashes concerned the section of the industry 
responsible for the material earmarked to the colonial wars. On 4 April 1969, in a letter 
addressed to the shipyard Blohm & Voss in Hamburg, the MPLA demanded the 
termination of the construction of three corvettes ordered by the Portuguese Navy.391 
German student activists helped mobilise the workers to question their enterprise392 and 
the shipyard responded with a series of layoffs.393 On 13 October, a bomb exploded 
aboard a small vessel, berthed alongside one of the corvettes, severely damaging it.394 
A symbol of German collaboration with Portugal in the eyes of the solidarity 
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389 TNA, FCO65/1344,Anglo-German Talks on Africa,26.04.1973. 
390 Macqueen, Norrie and Oliveira, Pedro A.  2010. ‘Grocer Meets Butcher’. Marcello Caetano’s London 
Visit of 1973 and the Last Days of Portugal’s Estado Novo. Cold War History,  vol.10, nr.1, February 
pp.29-50. 
391 Bosgra/Krimpen (1972), p.47; Menar (1979), p.343. 
392 CIDAC, BAC0290A/a, Statement from the Angola-Group in Trikont. 
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movement, the shipyard became the subject of angry slogans in the local student 
demonstrations.395 
Firms with business interests in the Portuguese colonies formed the other natural 
target of indignation. In Angola’s case, the most prominent example was Krupp, which 
since the early 1960s had been investing in iron ore mining companies in the southern 
region of Cassinga.396 Through those investments, Krupp had effectively achieved 
control over the powerful consortium Companhia Mineira do Lobito and in practice 
managed most of the Angolan production and export of iron ore.397 Thus the firm 
became synonymous with the exploitation of Angolan resources, accentuated by the 
fact that the Cassinga mines were the key beneficiary of the controversial Cunene 
power plant plan.398 In 1972, the Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile 
(GRAE) further condemned Krupp for employing a private militia which supported the 
Portuguese in the war against the liberation movements. According to GRAE, that 
security force, consisting mostly of white and Congolese mercenaries, did not merely 
patrol the mines, but instead it systematically searched the region and tried to 
drastically eliminate the local guerrilla cells.399 This tense environment, however, did 
not discourage Krupp from publicly pursuing related business ventures. In March 1972, 
it announced an innovative project to pelletise the Cassinga iron ore output,400 and it 
made plans to expand its mineral schemes to Mozambique, hoping to take advantage of 
the energy produced by the Cahora Bassa dam.401 
 Yet it was the construction of the Cahora Bassa dam itself which brought about 
the most high-profile confrontations between the opposition to Portuguese colonialism 
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and the German private sector. FRELIMO fiercely condemned the enterprise, accusing 
it of being part of a Portuguese plan to install a million new settlers in that area and – 
through large-scale electricity export – draw South African support for the Portuguese 
presence in Mozambique.402 Thus the rebels soon labelled the project a primary target 
of guerrilla.403 After a few false starts, in 1971 the movement launched a persistent 
military campaign in the region.404 However, the ambushes only marginally affected the 
dam’s building work. Although FRELIMO’s troops sabotaged delivery routes, they did 
not raid the construction site directly, suggesting that, despite the inflamed rhetoric, 
their goal was to delay the works, rather than to effectively compromise the infra-
structure altogether.405 Still, the guerrilla put a serious psychological strain on the 
hundreds of German technicians406, while also achieving the strategic benefit of 
dispersing the Portuguese forces.407 As shown in the previous chapter, the battlefield of 
FRELIMO’s struggle also stretched into the international arena; and it engaged African 
leaders as well as European protesters. 
 At home, the German firms involved in Cahora Bassa defended the project 
unrelentingly against these protesters. Speaking for the group, in August 1970 Siemens 
stated that none of the German companies had any intention of breaching their 
contracts, arguing that, if they did so, either Mozambique would “remain at its current 
primitive level” or other international firms would build the dam anyway. The statement 
sought to further depoliticise the enterprise by invoking the industrialist rationale that 
“infra-structures such as dams and the related power-plants outlast all regimes and, in 
any case, contribute to lift the living standard of the whole population, not just a 
privileged layer”.408 This gesture did not discourage protests and boycotts.409 In May 
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1971, German activists who had acquired shares began to attend the shareholders 
meetings of Siemens, AEG, Hochtief and BBC.410 Despite police aid in blocking the 
entry of unauthorised persons411, the boards could not prevent critical shareholders from 
questioning the companies’ participation in Cahora Bassa in terms of safety, morality 
and the impact on their corporate image, particularly in Africa. The firms’ chairmen 
first refused to discuss the topic412 and then downplayed the controversy by providing 
misinformation413 and pointing out that the project had the Bonn government’s official 
backing.414 They hired public-relations firms to plead their case and suggested that the 
student leaders were financed by East Germany, before developing more nuanced 
tactics, including a careful dialogue with church groups in Bavaria and Berlin, where 
Siemens’ main factories were located.415 The companies also recruited the help of 
Lisbon’s propagandists to explain the dam’s merits to the German public.416 
The national industrial and trade lobbies stepped up to ensure the private 
sector’s autonomy from Bonn’s foreign policy considerations. The Federation of 
German Industries (BDI), the Federation of German Wholesale and Foreign Trade 
(BDGA) and the German Chamber of Industry and Commerce (DIHT) directly warned 
Willy Brandt against letting the dam’s controversial political nature affect the 
government’s commitment to the project. To do so, they argued, would undermine the 
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long-standing practice of basing export credit guarantees solely on economic criteria, 
which had so far allowed for the expansion of the FRG’s foreign investments and 
trade.417 DIHT’s president Otto Wolff von Amerongen, who was also the president of 
the German-Portuguese Society418, evoked his credentials as a pioneer businessman at 
the forefront of the trade dimension of neue Ostpolitik419 in order to point out the 
parallel between the two situations:  
 
 “I would regret it if, following the discussions surrounding the [Cahora] Bassa 
project, the separation between economy and politics, pursued until now, would 
be abandoned. Not only with regard to the trade with our eastern neighbours have 
I always advocated a separation of foreign trade and foreign policy in a well-
understood sense.” 420 
 
 While the employers’ associations sought to keep business with Portugal outside 
of the political sphere, the position of the workers’ associations was less 
straightforward. The West German unions had a history of strong relations with anti-
colonial movements stretching back to the 1950s421, but they found it easier to side with 
persecuted trade unionist opposition in Portugal422 than with the African nationalists in 
the colonies. Due to its dominant anti-communist line during this period, the German 
Trade Union Federation (DGB) was not inclined to endorse the Marxist-oriented 
liberation movements. Significantly, the DGB did not want to fuel accusations of 
collaborating with communism by its US counterpart, the AFL-CIO, which had already 
left the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions in protest against neue 
Ostpolitik.423 Yet not all shared this view. The official organ of the Industrial Union of 
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Metalworkers IG-Metall reported on the Wiriyamu massacre and demanded an end to 
the participation of German firms in Cahora Bassa. It sought to mobilise not just the 
union’s German workers, but also its thousands of Portuguese members.424 On 6 August 
1973, the union’s executive held talks with a FRELIMO delegation and subsequently 
publicly expressed solidarity with the Mozambican struggle, even if awkwardly 
lamenting the threat posed by the guerrilla to the German workers in Cahora Bassa.425 
 
 
3. The involvement of the German churches 
Like the trade unions, the West German churches proved to be susceptible to the 
expansion of the solidarity movement. As mentioned, among the students and 
development workers dedicated to the anti-colonial cause were numerous members of 
religious organisations. Notably, this trend echoed a newfound understanding for the 
liberation movements that was displayed by key international religious institutions, 
including the World Council of Churches (WCC)426 and, to a lesser extent, the Holy 
See.427 In this vein, the Synod of the Protestant Church in Germany (EKD) decided to 
channel DM 100,000 to the southern African nationalists through a special fund of the 
WCC’s program to combat racism in 1970.428 Gatherings such as the 1970 
Katholikentag in Trier and the 1971 ecumenical Pfingsttreffen in Augsburg passed 
resolutions urging the leaderships of the catholic and protestant churches to use their 
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influence to promote the independence of the Portuguese colonies.429 A symposium 
called by the WCC about the Angolan Cunene dam project, held in Arnoldshain in 
March 1972, produced a plan of action for the World Council of Churches. It 
recommended campaigns against firms profiting from the Cunene scheme and against 
any agreements between the EEC and Portugal, as well as a campaign to help draft 
resisters and deserters from the Portuguese army.430 
The large presence of religious associations within the solidarity movement 
prompted a strand of activism focused on causes related to churches. The 
Aktionskomitee Afrika (AKAFRIK), which consisted essentially of theology students, 
and a section of the FRG’s Collective of Priestly Groups gave their support to 
Portuguese clergymen persecuted by the Lisbon regime.431 The 1973 Dortmund 
Congress held a discussion panel on ‘Churches and Portuguese Colonialism’ and at the 
plenary assembly it approved four resolutions from that panel. These requested that the 
German churches aid the liberation movements and recognise them as the sole 
legitimate representatives of the population of the colonies. They also appealed for the 
Catholic community to promote the rescission of the Vatican’s 1940 concordat with 
Portugal. A case which gained considerable notoriety involved a group of Portuguese 
who had gone on hunger strike in Lisbon’s Rato Chapel to protest against the colonial 
wars before being forcibly removed by the political police. The Congress expressed 
solidarity with the group and it condemned the Bishop of Lisbon, who they believed 
had stood by the police action.432 
Besides supporting the African liberation movements, namely through financial 
and material aid433, Christian activists took part in the fight against West Germany’s 
ties to Portuguese colonialism. The German section of the Franco-German NGO Pax 
Christi participated in the 1970 mobilisation against Cahora Bassa434, which gained 
much visibility due to the commitment of the religious activists. Willy Brandt admitted 
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as much in July, when discussing with French President Pompidou the opinion of those 
who opposed the dam project: 
 
 “Among us, there is a force, not in the name [of the church], but under influence of 
the church, which mobilises the opinion and creates difficulties for us. They are not 
leftists, communists or Maoists, but a force which will perhaps make this affair 
similar to Biafra’s. The opinion is strongly influenced by the churches, by non-
radical yet moralising students. This opinion is currently forming.” 435 
 
While religious mobilisation represented a distinctive strand of activism, it was 
not an isolated one. It integrated and interacted with other strands of the solidarity 
movement. Various local Christian activist cells adhered to the ‘Portugal-Tribunal’ 
campaign.436 The Bielefeld cell of AKAFRIK was one of the original members of the 
Dortmund Congress’ Organisationskomitee and the German Catholic-Students 
Association (KDSE) joined the committee in March 1973. These groups contributed 
with their own initiatives to the May ‘UN Week’ campaign.437 Furthermore, a branch 
of the WCC commissioned Eduardo de Sousa Ferreira – who was not associated with 
any church – to study the FRG’s economic role in the Portuguese resistance to 
decolonisation.438 
 This enthusiasm did not reach all religious circles. Within the protestant current, 
the EKD Synod’s decision to channel funds to the African nationalist organisations had 
been far from unanimous439, even after the Synod had declared that the resolution 
involved “no acceptance of the use of violence”.440 While the Bishop of the Protestant 
Church of Westphalia publicly offered to fund social programs and scholarships for 
those organisations, the Protestant-Lutheran Church of Hanover asked for explicit 
guarantees that none of its contributions to the WCC would go to the anti-racism 
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program.441 Opposing the African guerrilla’s violent methods, most protestant 
leaderships ultimately refused to support the liberation movements. Instead, they 
engaged in earnest, if unproductive, talks with the German companies involved in 
southern Africa regarding the conditions of their African employees.442 
Similarly, within the German Catholic Church, the activists faced a reticent 
establishment. At a gathering of the West European sections of the Pontifical Council 
for Justice and Peace (Justitia et Pax) in October 1972, the German delegation was one 
of the few to abstain on a motion about the Portuguese colonies.443 In April 1973, when 
AKAFRIK asked all German catholic bishops to endorse the Dortmund Congress’ 
resolutions, the bishops either refused to take an official position or diplomatically 
defended the Vatican-Portugal relations. Bishop Heinrich Tenhumberg, from Münster, 
argued that Catholics who opposed the centralisation of the Church apparatus could not 
expect the Vatican to impose their own views towards Lisbon. The Chairman of the 
Episcopalian Conference Julius Döpfner expressed his confidence in “Portugal, which 
nobody can accuse of a racist policy”. According to Döpfner, Marcelo Caetano’s 
reforms could promote African self-determination, but the “terror” of the liberation 
movements was delaying the process.444 This position, seconded by other bishops, was 
in turn strongly criticised by the Association of Theologians at Universities of the 
FRG.445 Distressed with the students’ attitude, the Episcopalian Conference stopped 
funding the KDSE.446 
The conflicting postures of the religious solidarity groups and the ecclesiastical 
elites were further exposed when the Christian youth associations organised their most 
ambitious autonomous initiative, the ‘Angola-Sunday’. The associations prepared a 
compilation of informative material about the struggle against Portuguese colonialism 
and asked churches across the country to exhibit and distribute it in the congregations at 
the mass on Sunday, 23 September 1973. Although the event gained plenty of media 
attention, it did not fulfil all its potential. Accusing the prepared material of bias in 
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favour of the liberation movements, the institutional protestant and catholic leaderships 
refused to back the initiative and, in some cases, blatantly distanced themselves from it. 
For many bishops, it was not clear which party of the colonial conflict – which featured 
Christians on both sides – deserved their condemnation, nor was it certain that the 
Church should be compromised by openly siding with one party against the other.447 
The religious community was deeply fragmented. The confessional current 
displayed some sympathy for the Portuguese colonial policy, seen as a Christian 
antidote to African underdevelopment and to Communism.448 In turn, solidarity 
activists invoked a moral imperative to support the emancipation of the oppressed 
African people, based on their interpretation of the scripture and, in the Catholic case, 
of the cultural legacy of Vatican II. However, since the FRG’s main churches publicly 
objected to the use of violence, the majority opinion found it hard to endorse the 
liberation movements. In a parallel discussion, many clergymen claimed that the 
German churches should not pick a side on the Afro-Portuguese dispute, while others 
regarded the churches’ mission as extending beyond national borders, arguing that 
‘neutrality’ effectively implied an acceptance of the status quo. The Wiriyamu reports 
gave this debate an unprecedented public dimension throughout the summer of 1973. In 
September, the Joint Church Conference on Development Issues acknowledged that the 
German churches had disregarded the Portuguese colonial question for too long, but the 
Conference failed to agree on any concrete goals for the future. At Lisbon’s invitation, 
the FRG’s branch of Justitia et Pax sent two researchers to Angola and Mozambique 
the following month. Their report, based on the travels and meetings allowed by 
Lisbon449, mirrored the dictatorship’s rhetoric, presenting Portuguese rule in Africa as 
the only reasonable option for progress.450 In November, over a hundred religious and 
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non-religious intellectuals451, journalists and missionaries gathered at a colloquium in 
Bensberg about the churches’ role in promoting a solution for the colonial conflict, 
which encapsulated the striking disparity between these various strands.452 
The absence of a cohesive position limited the churches’ impact on the policy 
makers. Despite the activists’ efforts, southern African liberation did not become a 
wide-spread religious cause in West Germany, particularly not among the 
overwhelmingly conservative majority. Although some bishops committed themselves 
publicly, both for and against the cause, the governing bodies of the largest religious 
denominations did not adopt an official stance. It is noteworthy that the Dutch and, 
since 1973, the British and Belgian churches exerted coordinated pressure over the 
policy of their countries’ governments towards Portuguese colonialism. Bonn, however, 
did not have to face any similar large-scale religious lobby.453 
 
 
4. The Portuguese dictatorship in the FRG’s public sphere 
 Lenience towards the Lisbon regime had an inbuilt tradition in West German 
society and politics. Throughout the 1950s, Portugal had cultivated a sympathetic image 
in the FRG, particularly among the conservative circles, on the basis of its Christian 
values and anti-communist commitment. The press, displaying little interest in the 
country and mostly reproducing Portugal’s official representation, had typically 
portrayed António Salazar as a wise leader, who “against his will” headed a benign 
quasi-dictatorship, quite removed from the German fascist experience, with a non-racist 
type of colonialism.454 The pervasive indications of electoral fraud in Portugal’s 1958 
presidential elections and the outbreak of the colonial wars had begun to undermine this 
image, although coverage of Portuguese affairs had remained quite superficial. 
Criticism, even if becoming more frequent, had not entirely replaced the established 
indulgent outlook towards Lisbon.455 
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German-Portuguese relations entered the forefront of public debate as a 
domestic issue. In 1960, Federal Defence Minister Franz Josef Strauß had launched an 
ambitious project to build an airbase near the Portuguese city of Beja. As will be 
explained in chapter 4, after years of construction work and at an estimated cost of DM 
200 Million, the project had been suspended due to budget restrictions and because of 
logistical concerns. By 1968, the press had begun scrutinising the whole enterprise, 
from its questionable strategic relevance to its financial implications.456 The ‘Beja 
affair’ became a political weapon against those responsible for the venture, and it 
gained a particularly harsh coverage in Der Spiegel, which harboured long-standing 
animosity towards Strauß.457 In an exposé in August 1968, the base was described as a 
megalomaniac project which had been ill-conceived from the start.458 Over the 
following years, Der Spiegel ruthlessly denounced West German-Portuguese military 











“German soldiers in Portugal: The special leave is off the cards” – The Westfalen-Blatt mocks the 
abandonment of the Beja base.460 
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While it became increasingly hard for the dictatorship to preserve its usually 
low-key media profile during this period, the collateral damage for Bonn was still 
relatively limited. Although the more liberal-leaning newspapers presented a critical 
view of the Lisbon regime461, the topic of Bonn’s policy towards Portuguese 
colonialism did not fit into the dynamics of their infatuation with neue Ostpolitik and 
the hailing of Willy Brandt as a champion of ‘ethical’ foreign policy.462 A 1971 
editorial from Der Spiegel made a point of clarifying that the controversial Cahora 
Bassa dam was much more than an “unholy alliance” in which “Bonn’s social-
democrats stand by international industry giants, colonialists and racists”. Editor 
Siegfried Kogelfranz argued that, regardless of the Portuguese intentions, the progress 
generated by the dam – indeed, already being generated by the dam’s construction – 
would help Mozambican emancipation: 
 
 “These black workers who drive the heavy Caterpillars, Mercedes Unimogs and 
Steyr-Puch Haflingers are becoming race- and class-conscious; one can no longer 
send them back to the subculture of bush kraals or canister slums with impunity. 
This is yeast for a country where in 500 years of Portuguese colonialism literally 
nothing happened, where a mild stone-age status was the guarantor of colonialism 
well into the postcolonial era. [...] For a Mozambique, where one day the majority 
will rule – and the people of colour have [a majority] of about fifty to one – will 
stand differently with the dam than without it. The giant power plant would be a 
foundation for development, like so far only a few developing countries have.” 463 
 
In the more conservative media, German-Portuguese relations benefited from 
contemporary journalistic narratives even more. The aftermath of the failed Portuguese 
attack against Guinea-Conakry, with its disastrous consequences for the German 
volunteers in the region, became a lead story in early 1971, bringing the whole FRG 
development aid programme into question. Yet the focus of the story was not the 
invasion, just the reaction of Guinean President Sékou Touré, who was vilified with 
                                                
461 On 27 October 1969, the week after the SPD-FDP coalition took power, Der Spiegel published an 
extensive ruthless piece on the poor living conditions in Portugal and its colonies (“Ordnung auf Elend 
gebaut”, pp.134-142), which set the tone for its coverage over the following years. 
462 Zons, Achim. 1984. Das Denkmal: Bundeskanzler Willy Brandt und die Linksliberale Presse, Munich: 
Olzog Verlag, pp.37-52. 
463 “Beihilfe zum Mord oder Fortschritt”, Der Spiegel, 01.11.1971, pp.164,166. 
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accusations of “barbarism” and syphilitic dementia464 and turned into a symbol of the 
tyranny and ungratefulness of African socialism. Much of the public political debate 
was permeated by an anti-African attitude which allowed for the perpetuation of a 









The Rheinische Post blames development aid for the death of development worker Hermann Seibold at a 
Guinean prison, where he had been held for complicity with the Portuguese attack.466 
 
By contrast, the volunteer community, which was more directly affected by the 
Conakry episode, refused this simplistic interpretation of events.467 Indeed, feeling that 
the German news about the African problems had reached unbearable levels of 
distortion, in 1971 the solidarity activists created their autonomous information centre, 
the Informationsstelle Südliches Afrika. 468 It marked the start of what can be described 
as an all-out propaganda war with the Portuguese authorities. 
The dictatorship had its own networks in the FRG. These included the German-
Portuguese Society, created in 1964. The Society’s first president Otto Wolff von 
Amerongen – the president of DIHT – had spent much time in Portugal on business 
during WWII and had a self-professed admiration for Salazar. The manager was Dr. 
                                                
464 The former in Stuttgarter Zeitung,21.01.1971 and the latter in Christ und Welt,12.02.1971, as 
mentioned in Gerhard Groh’s media analysis “Der Fall Guinea in der deutschen Tagespresse”,Afrika 
heute,15.03.1971, pp.89-91. 
465 Ibid. 
466 Rheinische Post, 21.01.1971, in Afrika heute, 15.03.1971, p.91. 
467 In an interview on 1 March 1971, when asked about the risk faced by German development workers in 
Africa as exposed by the Conakry episode, a representative from the German Development Service 
answered: “One could also ask me how I had the courage to return to Europe when in Northern Ireland 
people are being shot and in Spain, Portugal and Greece numerous people are arrested without trial and 
tortured.” She went on to point out that it was unfair to single out the violence committed by black 
Africans in Guinea-Conakry while disregarding the violence committed by white people in the region, 
namely in South Africa and in the Portuguese colonies. – AHD, PEA, M683, Pr.331, Telegram from the 
Portuguese Embassy in Lisbon, 10.03.1971. 
468 Kössler/Melber (2002), p.112. 
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Manfred Zapp, a former Nazi press agent.469 Zapp’s office helped promote Lisbon’s 
official views in the FRG470 and alerted the Portuguese Embassy to possible 
scandals.471 Moreover, in July 1972 the embassy offered a first-class trip to Angola and 
Mozambique to Gerhard Kienbaum (an ex-FDP MP), who was not only a prominent 
businessman interested in working with the Portuguese in Mozambique after the 
construction of the Cahora Bassa dam, but also the main stockholder of the public 
relations firm Time.472 In 1973, Lisbon hired Time to denounce the Dortmund 
Congress’ anti-Portuguese character among the local press, news agencies and 
churches. The Embassy also arranged for two friendly journalists473 to attend the event, 
but they were expelled by the Organisationskomitee, which also rejected Time’s request 
to distribute “informative material” with the Portuguese view at the congress itself.474 
Aware of the steady deterioration of the dictatorship’s public image, the Portuguese 
authorities tried to make sure they always sent someone to argue their case on 
broadcasts hostile to Lisbon’s positions, preferably someone with no official link to the 
Embassy.475 
 The rising interest in Portugal also reached the FRG’s editorial world. After 
decades of mostly consigning the country to the realm of travel literature, in 1971 two 
publishers released extensive analytical essays aimed at explaining the Portuguese 
reality to the West German public.476 Fritz René Allemann’s book 8mal Portugal477 
ostensibly sought to give a balanced overview of the country’s various facets, including 
its political system, yet virtually excluding its colonial dimension. Relying chiefly on 
official and semi-official sources, the book displayed a melancholic version of 
Portuguese culture and history which occasionally veered rather close to Lisbon’s own 
                                                
469 Koj (1994), p.86; For von Amerongen’s background, see Thies (2005), p.395; For Zapp’s background, 
see also “Zapp Trapped”, Time Magazine, 24.03.1941  
[http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,884328,00.html on 20.07.2011]. 
470 See the articles on the Conakry invasion and on Cahora Bassa by Zapp’s public relations firm in Afrika 
heute,01.02.1971,p.41 and 15.05.1971, p.204. 
471 Zapp’s firm warned the Embassy about a potentially controversial trip to Lisbon by a German far-right 
politician.– AHD-MNE, PEA683, Pr.331,Telegrams from the Portuguese Embassy in Bonn,16.04.1971 
and 26.04.1971. 
472 AHD, PEA, M727, Pr.331, Telegrams from the Portuguese Embassy in Bonn, 10.06.1972 and 
06.07.1972. 
473 Referred to as Abetz and Sachse . 
474 IAN/TT/PIDE-DGS, Pr.11, vol.11, CI(2), Serviços Alemães, Dispatch from the Portuguese Foreign 
Ministry to the DGS,12.01.1973; AHD-MNE,PEA,M756,Pr.331,Telegram from the Portuguese Embassy 
in Bonn, 16.01.1973. 
475 AHD-MNE, PEA25/1974, 31/74, Pr.331,Telegram from the Portuguese Embassy in Bonn,26.03.1974 
476 The last effort on this scale had been Friedrich Sieburg’s 1937 Neues Portugal.– Allemann, Fritz 
René. 1971. 8 Mal Portugal, Munich: R. Piper & Co Verlag. p.8. 
477 Allemann himself was Swiss journalist, but his book was originally released by a Munich publisher. 
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self-portrayal, but tempered this tendency with brutal assessments of Portugal’s 
domestic repression and profound inequality.478 By contrast, Rudi Maslowski’s Der 
Skandal Portugal put greater emphasis on the material produced by the opposition in its 
examination of the dictatorship. Just as Allemann evoked the critical yet cooperative 
tone of the regime’s ‘liberal wing’, Maslowski channelled the indignation of the non-
parliamentary resistance. If the former work recognised the dictatorship’s authoritarian 
character, the latter not only considered it ‘fascist’, but claimed on the very first page 
that Salazar, “unlike Hitler and Mussolini, developed ‘silent’ fascism into 
perfection”.479 Although coming from opposite directions, both authors agreed that 
Marcelo Caetano had not yet ushered any deep changes to Portugal’s dictatorial and 
colonial system.480 
Several publications grew out of the resentment against the Lisbon regime. The 
churches’ engagement with Portuguese issues encouraged books about the role of 
religious institutions within the dictatorship.481 A translated and extended version of 
Mário Soares’ key political essay, 1972’s Le Portugal baillonné [Gagged Portugal], 
came out in October 1973, with the title Portugal: Rechtsdiktatur zwischen Europa und 
Kolonialismus [Portugal: A Right-Wing Dictatorship between Europe and 
Colonialism].482 Out of the hundreds of works about southern Africa released by the 
FRG’s solidarity movement, roughly half of the German-language ones concerned the 
Portuguese colonies.483 Conversely, in Pro und kontra Portugal, Joachim F. Kahl 
expressed an optimistic view of Portuguese colonialism; but his book was less an 
exception to the rising criticism than a reaction against it. The book condemned the left-
leaning confrontational discourse of the ‘Tribunal’ campaign, arguing that the 
Portuguese authorities were the most fit to forge a path to independence suited to the 
interests of the Angolan and Mozambican peoples. Kahl proposed a policy of friendly 
                                                
478 Allemann (1971). 
479 Maslowski, Rudi.  1971. Der Skandal Portugal. Land ohne Menschenrechte, Munich: Carl Hanser 
Verlag.  
480 “Salazarismus ohne Salazar”, Allemann (1971), pp.348-372; “Salazarismus mit Prothesen”, 
Maslowski (1971), pp.130-144. 
481 Renard, Ludwig. 1968. Salazar: Kirche und Staat in Portugal, Essen. Raske, Michael, et al. (ed.). 
1970.  Der Totalitäre Gottesstaat. Die Lage der Christen in Portugal, Spanien und im Baskenland: Eine 
Dokumentation, Dusseldorf: Patmos. 
482 Soares, Mário. 1973. Portugal: Rechtsdiktatur Zwischen Europa und Kolonialismus, Reinbek bei 
Hamburg: Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag. 
483 For an extensive list of relevant titles, see CIDAC, BAC0290A/a, ISSA, Informationsmaterial. 
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dialogue with Lisbon and invoked neue Ostpolitik as an example of how cooperation 
with problematic regimes could lead to positive outcomes.484 
The Portuguese colonial conundrum became the focus of intellectual debate. A 
key polemic sprung from an article in Afrika heute by Sociologist Gerhard Grohs in 
June 1971. Regarding the extreme poverty of Portugal and its colonies as the main 
obstacle to decolonisation, Grohs proposed Portugal’s integration in the EEC, coupled 
with a European ‘Marshall-Plan’, on the condition that the Portuguese would grant 
independence to the colonies and that their new African rulers would associate the 
territories to the Common Market.485 Left-wing scholars pointed out that Portugal’s 
economy, including the colonies, was already deeply entangled with the EEC. They 
thus challenged Grohs’ assumptions that Portugal would barter its empire for European 
integration, that Europe would pay without an economic return, and that the liberation 
movements would accept a form of Western neo-colonialism.486 As it was, Lisbon’s 
1972 trade agreement with the Common Market actually exposed the EEC to a new line 
of criticism. Not only did the agreement fail to live up to the organisation’s potential – 
as envisioned by Grohs – to be a bargaining tool for decolonisation, it was accused of 
economically sustaining the colonial wars through its tariff preferences to Portugal.487 
A similarly long-running discussion thread in the pages of Afrika heute concerned the 
FRG’s specific interests and responsibilities in Africa. This debate was not limited to 
the academic milieu, as it featured contributions from members of opposing wings of 
the Bundestag as well.488 
The concern with Portuguese colonialism expanded into the mainstream liberal-
leaning press, but at a much slower pace. Der Spiegel painted a devastating portrayal of 
the Portuguese territories489 and it repeatedly called attention to Lisbon’s repressive 
                                                
484 Kahl (1972). 
485 “Portugals Überseeterritorien in Afrika, die EWG und wir”,Afrika heute, 15.06.1971, pp.245-246; 
Grohs further explained his ideas in an interview in Afrika heute,01.11.1971, pp.444-445. 
486 Articles by Luck, Tetzlaff and Sousa Ferreira, in Afrika heute,15.09.1971, pp.392-393, December1971, 
pp.498-499 and March1972, pp.109-110. 
487 Articles by Annette Körner in Afrika heute, September 1973,pp.26-31, and October/November 
1973,pp.23-27; see also Guinée, Peter.  1974. Portugal, Afrika und die Europaeische Gemeinschaft, 
Bonn: Eduardo de Sousa Ferreira.  
488 This thread began in August 1972 and ran regularly until the end of the year. In January 1973, the 
discussion shifted specifically to the question of the FRG’s relations with the liberation movements. – 
Afrika heute. 
489 “Gefangen im Vorhof der Hölle”,Der Spiegel,01.11.1971,pp.152-162. 
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policies, in Africa as well as at home.490 Yet the colonial conflict itself, while not a 
completely new subject491, only became a regular feature in the magazine’s pages by 
mid-1973492 with the dissemination of evidence of the Portuguese troops’ cruel 
behaviour on the ground.493 Interest peaked after the British newspaper The Times 
denounced the Wiriyamu massacre, on 10 July 1973. The FRG’s papers enthusiastically 
embraced the story, which fuelled emotive condemnation of Portuguese colonialism, 
close attention to Caetano’s contested trip to the UK that month, and a frenetic research 
for leads to other, similar massacres. At the forefront of the coverage, the Frankfurter 
Rundschau and Der Spiegel unapologetically sided with the liberation movements, 













Wiriyamu massacre as the front page story in Der Spiegel, 13.08.1973 
 
                                                
490 “Ende einer Illusion”, Der Spiegel,25.05.1970,pp.118-120; “Vierte Front”, Der Spiegel,02.04.1971, 
pp.140-142; “Schwer zu erklären”,Der Spiegel,28.02.1972,pp.113-115; “Wie gelähmt”,Der 
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 Conversely, the conservative newspapers fully rejected any display of empathy 
towards Lisbon’s critics, whether African or German. In the aftermath of the Wiriyamu 
reports, the Rheinischer Merkur and the news agency Katholische Nachrichtenagentur 
closely followed the Portuguese line, denying the existence of a massacre and of 
Wiriyamu itself.495 The powerful Axel Springer media conglomerate’s papers, above all 
Die Welt, did the same. The Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) was more careful, 
but it nevertheless raised serious doubts about the credibility of the story’s sources.496 
The FAZ, whose reports from Guinea-Bissau had actually earned praise within the 
solidarity movement497, tended to portray the activists with suspicion because of their 
predominantly left-wing orientation.498 The Springer publishing group took that 
mistrust to a passionate extreme499, particularly during the ‘Angola-Sunday’ campaign. 
On 14 August, Die Welt dismissed the event’s organisers as Communists and asked how 
the German churches could “grant support to clandestine fighters who put in the fields 
of Angola and Mozambique landmines supplied by the Eastern Bloc”.500 Despite the 
counter-attack of a Frankfurter Rundschau journalist, who appealed to Christians 
disgusted with the fact that “bombs, napalm and defoliant are dropped from airplanes 
with the Cross of the Order of Christ”501, Die Welt’s article proved instrumental in the 
churches’ rejection of the ‘Angola-Sunday’ initiative.502 
 Against this dichotomous background, no episode did more to incite public 
debate about German-Portuguese relations than the visit of a FRELIMO delegation to 
Bonn in August 1973, at the invitation of the SPD’s Commission for International 
Relations. The conservative media defended the Lisbon regime and charged the SPD 
with support for a “terrorist organisation”503, a resonant charge in the context of RAF 
terrorism, not to mention the recent Palestinian attack at the 1972 Munich Olympics. 
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498 “Südafrika als Vorwand für den bundesdeutschen Klassenkampf”, FAZ,15.01.1973. 
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Their columnists emphasised the strategic importance of supporting Portugal against 
Communism.504 The SPD faced a mixed reaction from public opinion, which ranged 
from praise and encouragement by local unions and solidarity groups to accusations of 
NATO-treason by outraged citizens echoing the Springer press. The angrier letters sent 
to the party often contrasted the SPD-FRELIMO initiative with neue Ostpolitik, asking 
why the SPD was less critical of the Eastern European dictatorships than of the 
Portuguese one, i.e. if it was willing to openly support armed resistance against 

















Die Welt questions the SPD’s “unconditional loyalty” to NATO506 
 
 Portugal’s media exposure in the early 1970s took its toll on the dictatorship’s 
image, but in a limited way. Although the proliferation of news about the colonial wars 
affected the German public’s impression of the dictatorship negatively, there was still 
ample room for tolerance towards the Lisbon regime. Thus German-Portuguese 
relations became not only a more visible topic, but a polarising one.507 They did not, 
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however, become a decisive issue in Bonn’s relationship with the West German public. 
During the first years of the SPD-FDP coalition, Eastern policy dominated the political 
discussion, followed by the mounting inflation, the domestic reforms and the precarious 
balance of power in the Bundestag which translated into new elections in November 
1972. Even when the liberal press turned against the executive, during Brandt’s final 
year in power, its main indictments concerned domestic scandals and policies, not its 
policy towards Lisbon. The government was hence considerably less threatened by the 
growing public disenchantment towards Portugal than by the growing disenchantment 
towards the Eastern European regimes and, by extension, towards what had been the 




 On the domestic front, Willy Brandt’s governments had to contend with 
increasing commotion regarding the Portuguese dictatorship. This was not only a result 
of the notoriety of Portugal’s colonial wars, but of the high profile of the West German 
involvement with Lisbon’s colonial projects, most notably through the Cahora Bassa 
dam project.  
The leading force pushing for a change – or discontinuity – in Bonn’s Portugal-
policy was the grassroots-activist movement proclaiming solidarity with the African 
liberation struggle, which demanded support for the African nationalists and an end to 
the FRG’s military and economic ties to Portuguese colonialism. This splinter-
movement grew out of the late-1960s university student-driven extra-parliamentary 
opposition, where it served as a vehicle to channel the youth’s resentment towards 
capitalism and fascism, as well as imperialism in general and NATO in particular. The 
cause proved attractive to religious associations and to groups involved in development 
work which were critical of colonialism and neo-colonialism. They crucially helped the 
solidarity movement gain national attention in 1970, with the anti-Cahora Bassa 
mobilisation. Hence this movement survived the students’ loss of momentum at the 
beginning of the decade. It spilled over into intellectual circles, left-wing political 
organisations and factions of the SPD. Due to its broad appeal, the ‘solidarity cause’ 
became increasingly politicised, serving the rhetoric of competing ideological groups. 
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Moreover, a conscious attempt to recruit the working class led to the engagement of the 
trade unionist sector. 
Despite some effort at coordination, this social movement never became a 
cohesive unit. It combined various kinds of actions, from information campaigns to 
collection of aid for the African liberation groups, from political lobbying to local 
protests against the German firms involved with Portuguese colonialism. The 
movement’s most ambitious joint initiative was the aborted ‘Portugal-Tribunal’ 
campaign, which led to the ‘Congress for the Freedom of Angola, Mozambique and 
Guinea Bissau’ in Dortmund in January 1973. The latter event highlighted the 
movement’s internal strife, as the DKP forces in the Organisationskomitee tried to use 
the congress to enhance their own political clout, between the extreme left and the SPD, 
much to the frustration of both the more moderate and the more radical strands. 
 For the government, the West German solidarity movement was problematic on 
different levels. By openly challenging the government’s current policy towards 
Portugal and southern Africa, the movement encouraged strong criticism against the 
executive in Bonn, including from inside the ruling coalition’s electoral base. Given the 
aggressive nature of some of its actions and discourse, the federal authorities also 
tended to regard the activism of the solidarity movement as a threat to public order and 
as a source of political radicalisation. 
Debate among scholars and coverage by the mainstream media furthered the 
public’s awareness of Bonn’s policy towards Lisbon. As sympathisers and activists of 
the solidarity movement took over Afrika heute, the magazine of the German African 
Society, it became a key forum for debate about Portuguese colonialism and the FRG’s 
role in it. Prompted by the ‘Beja affair’ in the 1960s, the liberal press, particularly Der 
Spiegel, questioned the workings and rationale of the German-Portuguese military 
cooperation. It also frequently reported on Lisbon’s policies at home and in the 
colonies, partially as a consequence of the solidarity campaigns. The West German 
newspapers, however, only gave this topic consistent and widespread coverage in the 
summer of 1973, in the aftermath of the British press’ high-profile denunciation of the 
Wiriyamu massacre. Regardless, the more attention the media dedicated to the colonial 
conflict, the more it exposed the government’s related policy choices to public scrutiny. 
The crescendo of criticism against the FRG’s relations with the Portuguese 
dictatorship did not occur without significant resistance from sectors of West German 
society that defended a continuity of the cultivation of traditionally good relations with 
116 
 
Portugal. At the head of this resistance was the business sector, particularly the 
companies involved in the Cahora Bassa project. Targeted with physical violence and 
propaganda by the liberation movements and by those supporting solidarity activism, 
the firms retaliated in a hostile way. Their strategy was threefold: they forcefully 
confronted their critics at a local level, they issued their own counter-propaganda to the 
public, and they collectively lobbied the government to safeguard their relations with 
Portugal. As a consequence, the Chancellery came under pressure from powerful 
domestic industrial and trade federations, which did not wish to see private economy at 
the mercy of Bonn’s foreign policy. 
The ecclesiastical sector was divided, both at the base and at the top. Many 
theologians, students and congregations participated enthusiastically in the solidarity 
campaigns, including the organisation of the ‘Angola-Sunday’ in September 1973. 
However, these groups remained a minority within the religious community. For the 
most part, church leaderships, whether Protestant or Catholic, held a conservative 
position on the Portuguese colonial conflict, shaped by moral, political and diplomatic 
reservations. They exhibited an aversion to the violent and revolutionary behaviour of 
the liberation guerrilla and deposited their trust in the Portuguese regime. For the 
Catholic clergy, the situation was further complicated by the Vatican’s formal links 
with Portugal. Unable to agree on a coherent position, the religious institutions ended 
up expressing diffuse and even contradictory messages to the government and to the 
population. 
As this last case demonstrates, the opposition to the solidarity movement was 
not exclusively rooted in the desire to protect business interests. In part, it reflected a 
degree of sympathy for the Christian and anti-communist Lisbon regime, moulded by 
the fact that for decades the West German politicians and media had distinctly 
downplayed the authoritarian character of the dictatorship. Mostly, however, the 
reaction derived from a profoundly suspicious attitude towards the German solidarity 
movement and the African liberation organisations, because of their connotation with 
the revolutionary left. While these views were encouraged by Lisbon’s own propaganda 
machine in the FRG, they also reflected the endemic stance of the conservative media. 
Above all, the Springer press, which was very influential among large sections of 
public opinion, refused to break away from its default benevolent portrayal of the 
Lisbon regime and to tolerate any reversal of Bonn’s friendly policy towards Portugal. 
A recurring motif within the criticism of antagonistic stances vis-à-vis the Caetano 
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dictatorship consisted of variations of a comparison with neue Ostpolitik, i.e. a demand 
for consistency between Bonn’s policy towards Portugal and its rapprochement policy 
with Eastern Europe, particularly with the despised regime of East Germany. 
 In conclusion, the Portuguese dictatorship and colonialism became a 
recognisable, if hardly consensual, topic in the FRG. The demand for change in 
German-Portuguese relations began as a fringe cause and it progressively spread from 
the radical left into the more liberal and progressive ‘establishment’, reaching 
maximum impact by mid-1973. Although this position did not fully take over the 
mainstream, it became harder for the government to disregard the domestic impact of 
policy in this area. Nevertheless, the Afro-Portuguese problem never grew into a central 
political issue, with clear electoral repercussions, on par with neue Ostpolitik. Thus the 
federal government forged Bonn’s policy towards Lisbon with awareness that this was 
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  The increasingly controversial image of the Caetano dictatorship posed a 
challenge to the already mentioned formula of ‘separation between foreign trade 
(Außenwirtschaft) and foreign policy (Außenpolitik)’. This chapter analyses how Bonn 
faced that challenge, i.e. how the federal government handled different efforts to 
channel political agendas into the FRG’s policy towards the Lisbon regime in the 
economic field. The opening section explains how macroeconomic factors encouraged 
both Bonn and Lisbon to promote West German-Portuguese economic relations. The 
second section looks at the case of the Cahora Bassa project, whose political undertones 
Bonn tried to downplay but which became the focus of outside pressure by the critics of 
the enterprise (African leaders, West German protesters) and by those involved in it 
(Portugal, France, private sector). The third section examines how a group in the 
Bundestag and the FRG’s Embassy in Lisbon, influenced by the discussion among the 
Portuguese elites, developed a political reasoning to encourage support for Portugal’s 
rapprochement with Europe. The closing section focuses on the intra-governmental 
debate concerning the supply of development aid to the dictatorship, which primarily 
opposed the Ministry for Economic Cooperation to the Auswärtiges Amt. The chapter 
thus assesses how Bonn engaged with various forces pushing for economic continuity 




1. Reciprocity in West German-Portuguese economic relations 
 The late 1960s and early 1970s marked the culmination of almost thirty years of 
rapid and sustained economic growth in Western Europe. On the one hand, these final 
years saw the age of prosperity reach its peak, with an unprecedented level of 
productivity; on the other, the Western European economy was already developing 
symptoms of its transition towards a stage of slow growth and accelerating inflation, 
such as the exponential rise of prices and salaries. The collapse of the Bretton-Woods 
monetary system in 1971 resulted in an international monetary crisis which aggravated 
these earlier tendencies. The measures put into place by the European countries in an 
effort to contain inflation slowed down the economic expansion at the beginning of the 
decade, so less restrictive policies were adopted, leading in 1972 and 1973 to record 
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levels of economic growth and international trade. Yet capacity constraints – such as 
balance of payments disequilibrium – made it hard to sustain such a high growth rate. 
Furthermore, rampant inflation and the dramatic oil price shocks in late 1973 affected 
business confidence, resulting in near-stagnation in OECD countries in 1974.509 It was 
in this twilight of the ‘trentes glorieuses’ that the West German and Portuguese 
economies found unprecedented reciprocity. 
 West Germany, which over the previous twenty years had established a major 
position in the global economy, was reaching its zenith. Stimulated by the EEC 
Common Market and by the Deutsche Mark’s convertibility, the FRG lived the ‘golden 
era’ of its international commerce between 1959 and 1971, becoming the world’s 
biggest trading nation after the USA.510 Despite a short recession in 1966-1967, the 
FRG maintained a regular positive balance of payments and had a particularly high 
surplus between 1966 and 1969, with its competitors regularly pressing Bonn to 
revaluate its currency. At the time, Economics Minister Karl Schiller introduced a neo-
Keynesian economic strategy, based on the balance of the four key economic goals of 
full employment, steady growth, price stability and stable exchange rates – the so-
called ‘magic square’. This policy helped West Germany overcome the 1966-1967 
recession and reinvigorated its growth rate.511 When Willy Brandt became chancellor in 
1969, the most rapidly expanding companies of the FRG were using their machinery 
almost at full capacity and, unlike in other countries of Western Europe, employment 
was on the rise.512 
If the high foreign demand stimulated West German production, it also set its 
pace. In 1970, over a third of the growth of the FRG’s main industries was determined 
by exports513, which during this era consisted mostly of textiles, ironworks and 
chemical products, as well as automobiles, electric materials and several kinds of 
machinery.514 By 1974, 24.3% of all West German industrial production was directed 
                                                
509 For a broader analysis of European economy in the 1960s and the 1970s see Aldcroft, The European 
economy 1914-2000, London/New York, Routledge, 2001, pp.188-210. For a year-by-year analysis, see 
Relatório do Conselho de Administração do Banco de Portugal, 1968-1974. 
510 Braun, Hans-Joachim. 1989. The German Economy in the Twentieth Century, London: 
Routledge.pp.170-183. 
511 Sassoon, Donald. 1996. One Hundred Years of Socialism: the West European Left in the Twentieth 
Century, London: I.B. Tauris Publishers, pp.314-316. 
512 1.8% increase in 1969, Informações (CCILA), 15.02.1970. 
513 31.8% in the chemical industry, 36.1% in the iron and steel industry, 36.6% in the machinery and 
transports industry and 30.5% in the electronic industry – Abelshauser, Werner. 2004. Deutsche 
Wirtschaftsgeschichte seit 1945, Munich: CHBeck. p.265. 
514 Études économiques de l’OCDE : Allemagne Mai 1974, pp.28-31. 
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towards the international market and one in five jobs depended on exports.515 Thus for 
Bonn foreign trade played a central role – more than simply generating wealth, it 
helped sustain employment levels and allowed industry to use its full capacity even 
when domestic demand began to decrease.516 
 Like West Germany, Portugal was going through a phase of expanded economic 
growth – the most accelerated of its history. Pulled by the international economic 
dynamism, Portugal’s growth rate was impressive even by European standards. The 
country had been a member of the OEEC since 1948, but only the establishment of 
EFTA in 1960 had truly internationalised the Portuguese economy. Enjoying a special 
statute under Annexe G of the Stockholm Convention, the Lisbon dictatorship had 
benefited from the lowering of foreign trade barriers, while being allowed to maintain 
an exceptional degree of protectionism. The Portuguese economy had thus expanded 
rapidly since 1960 and reached its peak of expansion between 1965 and 1973 with 
yearly growth rates above 7% and an increase of Portuguese foreign trade of nearly 
10%. Notably, this period saw the transformation of the Portuguese sectorial structure, 
with the fall of agriculture as the main sector and the rise of industries and services, 
both in terms of capital and employment. This process spurred an industrialist class 
primarily oriented towards the European markets.517 
As in most areas, the period of marcelismo was marked by contradictory trends. 
Although Lisbon remained strongly interventionist in the economy518, there was a 
relative liberalisation promoted by the ‘modernist’ sections of the regime, i.e. the 
Europeanist industrialists, the parliamentary ‘liberal wing’ and the small technocratic 
faction which Marcelo Caetano had brought into his government in 1969. In this regard, 
Undersecretary of State for Industry Rogério Martins fought a controversial quest to 
end the dictatorship’s legal restrictions on industrial growth and competition. Against 
this background, the Caetano years integrated Portugal’s third development plan (Plano 
                                                
515 Ménudier, Henri. 1978. Willy Brandt e a Alemanha de Hoje – Entrevistas e Inquéritos 1969-1977, 
Lisbon: Edições Rolim. p.77. 
516 Études économiques de l’OCDE : Allemagne Mai 1974, p.5. 
517 Corkill, David. 2004. «O Desenvolvimento Económico Português no Fim do Estado Novo». In A 
Transição Falhada. O Marcelismo e o Fim do Estado Novo (1968-1974), Rosas, Fernando and Oliveira, 
Pedro A. (eds.). Lisbon: Editorial Notícias, pp.213-232; Lopes, José da Silva. 1996.  A Economia 
Portuguesa desde 1960, Lisbon: Gradiva. pp.43-61; Neves, João César das. 1996. «Portuguese Post-war 
Growth: a Global Approach». In Economic Growth in Europe since 1945, Crafts, Nicholas and Toniolo, 
Gianni (eds.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.339-342. 
518 Lisbon’s interventionism was of course very different from Bonn’s. The former tended towards state 
corporatism and the later towards liberal Keynesianism and Schumpeterianism. The two approaches are 
clearly distinguished in Lopes (1996), pp. 269-270. 
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de Fomento), which lasted from 1968 until 1973.519 The main goals of the plan were 
the acceleration of GDP growth, a more balanced redistribution of income and the 
correction of regional imbalances. These goals were to be achieved through the increase 
and diversification of Portuguese exports, but had to be coordinated with the colonial 
war effort, the stability of the currency (escudo) and the job market. Caetano’s 
governments tried to implement the plan by intervening directly in the industrial 
reorganisation and by promoting the diversification of activities, as well as the 
expansion of the financial system.520 
With the FRG’s economic expansion at its highest and Portugal going through a 
late industrialisation, the conditions were ripe for an intensification of economic 
dealings between the two states, although this process was much more important for 
Lisbon than for Bonn. By the time Willy Brandt took office, the FRG had taken over 
the UK’s traditional role as Portugal’s primary foreign supplier. In fact, if in 1968 the 
main origin of Portuguese imports was still the colonies (15.8%), after that the FRG 
was the country’s undisputed first supplier for the remaining years of the dictatorship. 
Thus, although West Germany remained the fourth main destination of Portuguese 
exports, considerably behind the first two – Portuguese colonies and the UK – and still 
far off the USA’s third position, it maintained a large weight on Portugal’s overall 
foreign trade throughout the Caetano era, representing over a fifth of that trade.521 In 
turn, Portugal’s role in West German foreign trade was much less significant, even 
taking into account the trade with the Portuguese colonies.522 In 1969, Portugal was the 
23rd destination of West German exports and the FRG’s 46th supplier, providing 0.5% 
of all the FRG’s imports.523 It became 24rd and 44th, respectively, in 1972.524 That year, 
West German exports to Angola and Mozambique – the colonies with the highest 
amount of trade with the FRG – represented merely 0.09% and 0.08%, respectively, of 
West Germany’s total exports.525 
                                                
519 The fourth Plano de Fomento, set to go from 1974 until 1979, was never put into motion, because of 
the regime’s downfall in April 1974. 
520 Lopes (1996), pp.267-288; Santos, Américo Ramos dos. 1990. «Abertura e Bloqueamento da 
Economia Portuguesa». In Portugal Contemporâneo vol V, Reis, António (ed.). Lisbon: Alfa, pp.109-150 
521 Estatísticas do Comércio Externo 1968-1974; see also ANNEX2/APPENDIX 1 at the end of chapter. 
522 See ANNEX2/APPENDICES 2 and 3 at the end of chapter. 
523 PAAA,B60/782b, Portugals Wirtschaft im Jahre 1969,16.09.1970. 
524 PAAA,B26/445, Politischer Jahresbericht 1973 über Portugal,14.08.1973. 
525 Ferreira, Eduardo de Sousa. 1975. Estruturas de dependência: as Relações Económicas de Angola e 
Moçambique com a RFA, Lisbon: Iniciativas Editoriais. p.32. 
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The strength of West German exports to Portugal during this era cannot be 
dissociated from the Portuguese industrial take-off. Among the FRG’s main exports to 
Portugal were motor vehicles, machine-tools, synthetic fibres and mill products, as well 
as investment goods.526 Equipment and machinery represented a substantial proportion 
of that trade527 and their export grew dynamically, especially in the beginning of this 
period.528 In 1970, as the total volume of trade between the FRG and Portugal rose by 
11.7%529, the export of West German machines to the country increased by 30.3%.530 
This export would continue to grow in subsequent years, even if in less spectacular 
fashion.531 The main products, by far, were textile machines and accessories532, 
followed by office and information technical material.533 The export of tractors and 
farm machines, after an initial boost, decreased drastically534, whereas machine-tools 
and machines for the food industry continued to increase at a steady pace.535 This 
evolution mirrored the rise of industry and services in Portugal, as well as the inability 
of Portuguese agriculture to keep up with the industrial boom. 
Commerce – and specifically Portugal’s endemic deficit in trade with the FRG – 
had been a motor of German-Portuguese cooperation from the start, but cooperation 
had faded in subsequent years. In the late 1950s, the federal government had agreed to 
help Lisbon reduce the country’s deficit by placing large orders with Portuguese 
industry and encouraging German tourism in Portugal. In this spirit, the two states had 
signed an Economic Cooperation Protocol in 1959.536 The following year 
representatives from banks, private companies and from the German and Portuguese 
governments had formed the German-Portuguese Mixed Commission for Economic 
                                                
526 PAAA, B26/444/445, Yearly reports from the FRG’s Embassy in Lisbon, 1969-1973. 
527 Machines represented 24.5% of all West German exports to Portugal in 1968, 20.6% in 1969, 22.6% 
in 1970, 25.4% in 1971 and 27.7% in 1972. – Informações (CCILA),15.07.1972 and 01.07.1973. 
528 Comparing the first semester of 1969 with the first semester of 1970, the following West German 
exports to Portugal registered an extraordinary increase: machine-tools (87%), machines for construction 
work (81%), machines for the rubber and plastic industry (21%), tractors (61%), farm machines (63%), 
lifting and transport machinery (58%), machines and accessories for the textile industry (100%) – 
Informações (CCILA), 15.12.1970. 
529 Metropolitan Portugal exported an extra 5.4% to West Germany and imported an extra 18.1% from the 
FRG than it had the previous year. – Informações (CCILA), 01.03.1971.  
530 Amounting to a total of DM 223.3 Million – Informações (CCILA), 01.08.1971. 
531 11.5% in 1971 and 16.6% in 1972 – Informações (CCILA), 15.07.1972 and 01.07.1973. 
532 DM 20.5 Million in 1969, DM 33.9 Million in 1970, DM 51.9 Million in 1971, DM 64 Million in 
1972 – In 1972, textile machines represented 22% of all West German machines delivered to Portugal and 
6.1% of all West German exports to Portugal. 
533 DM 15 Million in 1969, DM 20.7 Million in 1970, DM 19.7 Million in 1971. 
534 DM 6.7 Million in 1969, DM 10.5 Million in 1970, DM 3.5 Million in 1971. 
535 Informações (CCILA), 15.07.1972 and 01.07.1973. 
536 Fonseca, Ana Mónica. 2007. A Força das Armas: o Apoio da República Federal da Alemanha ao 
Estado Novo (1958-1968), Lisbon: Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros. pp.35-41. 
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Cooperation. One of the main aims of the Mixed Commission had been to promote 
German investment in Portugal, in order to compensate for Lisbon’s trade deficit with 
Bonn. In line with this, a second protocol, signed in 1961, had expressed Bonn’s 
commitment to endorsing the participation of West German companies in Portuguese 
projects and, as a result, the FRG had begun pumping public and private capital into 
Portugal. However, after two more meetings – in February 1961 and May 1962 – the 
Mixed Commission had drifted into limbo.537 Throughout the 1960s, Lisbon’s 
percentage in the whole of Bonn’s investments had remained quite small, with only a 
slight increase.538 The level of investments had not kept up with the rise in trade 
relations between the two countries and the consequent rise in Portugal’s deficit.539 By 
the end of the decade, the dictatorship’s exports to the FRG amounted to close to a fifth 
of its West German imports540 and the tendency was for the deficit to continue to 
escalate.541 In response, in 1969 Portuguese Undersecretary of State for Commerce 
Xavier Pintado publicly called for a closer analysis of the German market, renewing the 
interest in economic cooperation.542 
A key figure in the subsequent economic dialogue was José Pinto Leite, who 
became the President of the Portuguese-German Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
(CCILA) in early 1969. Pinto Leite visited the FRG in July/August and met with the 
managing director of the West German industrial federation BDI. They discussed ways 
in which to intensify the economic relationship between their two countries, agreeing 
that, in order to invite further investment, Lisbon ought to abolish the persistent 
remnants of its protectionism.543 Both mentioned the need to tighten contacts between 
economic agents so as to coordinate production and demand. In this regard, they 
addressed the possibility of reviving the neglected Mixed Commission.544 Later that 
year, Pinto Leite, who joined parliament as part of the ‘liberal wing’, headed the 
                                                
537 PAAA, B60/785, Documents from the German-Portuguese Mixed Commission for Economic 
Cooperation. 
538 In 1963, West German investments in Portugal represented 0.3% of the FRG’s total investments 
abroad and by 1969 this percentage had risen to 0.42% – Matos, Luís Salgado. 1973. Investimentos 
Estrangeiros em Portugal, Lisbon: Seara Nova. p.211; For a closer look at the evolution of these numbers 
see also Informações (CCILA), 15.11.1969. 
539 Between 1964 and 1968, West German exports to Portugal increased almost 50%, while their 
Portuguese imports decreased 6%. – Informações (CCILA), 05.11.1969. 
540 BA-MA,BW1/66542, Speech by Rogério Martins,28.01.1970. 
541 4,092 million Escudos in 1969, 5,171 million Escudos in 1970 (+26.3%), 6,316 million Escudos in 
1971 (+22.1%) – PAAA,B60/782b, Wirtschaftlicher Jahresbericht Portugal 1971, 20.07.1972. 
542 BAK, B102/288144, Dispatch from the FRG’s Embassy in Lisbon, 25.11.1969. 
543 CCILA often reinstated this position in its biweekly bulletin. See, for example, Informações (CCILA), 
15.11.1969. 
544 BAK,B102/288144, Memo from the Foreign Trade Department of the BMWi, 29.07.1969. 
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celebrations of the CCILA‘s 15th anniversary (10-15 November). This event was 
noteworthy for including a round-table discussion between members of Lisbon’s 
technocratic faction – including Xavier Pintado and Rogério Martins – and 
representatives of many German-Portuguese business enterprises for the first time.545 
Pinto Leite took the opportunity to once again push for a revival of the Mixed 
Commission.546 His proposal was welcomed by the federal authorities, who felt that the 
abandonment of the original commission had resulted not so much from an absence of 
German interest, but from a lack of Portuguese initiative. The Federal Ministry for 
Economics (BMWi) expressed confidence in the President of the CCILA to overcome 
this obstacle.547 
The BMWi’s keenness derived from the fact that in the field of investment 
interests, like in the field of foreign trade, there was a newfound potential for 
reciprocity between Bonn and Lisbon. In the aftermath of the recession of 1966-1967, 
the FRG’s high exports had resulted in a constant monetary influx which aggravated 
inflation. Bonn tried to counterbalance that tendency through the export of German 
capital, either as direct investments or credits.548 This issue gained considerable public 
attention in the first half of 1969, when the recently elected president of DIHT Otto 
Wolff von Amerongen demanded more support for German investments abroad. As a 
result, Finance Minister Franz Josef Strauß (CSU) presented a state plan facilitating 
those investments, mainly through tax relief.549 Portugal was in an advantageous 
position to benefit from this plan. Despite the dictatorship’s notoriously over-
complicated bureaucracy550, Portugal presented attractive opportunities for the FRG’s 
industry because of local raw materials and low production costs, derived from an 
abundant labour force, low salaries and low taxes. Not only did production sites in 
Portugal alleviate the problem of the lack of labour force in West Germany, they 
allowed a privileged access to the markets of Portugal and, more importantly, EFTA.551 
Investment was facilitated by the fact that in his last years Prime Minister António 
Salazar had begun easing the strict protectionism which had blocked international 
access to metropolitan Portugal and to its colonial territories. This process, which had 
                                                
545 BAK, B102/288144, Dispatch from the FRG’s Embassy in Lisbon, 25.11.1969. 
546 BAK,B102/288144, Dispatch from the FRG’s Embassy in Lisbon,05.11.1969. 
547 BAK,B102/288144, Memo from the BMWi, 17.11.1969. 
548 Ferreira (1975), pp.28-29. 
549 Informações (CCILA), 01.05.1969. 
550 BA-MA, BW1/66542, Speech by Rogério Martins,28.01.1970. 
551 Informações (CCILA),01.05.1969. 
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been chiefly a consequence of the need to finance the colonial wars, had also been 
encouraged by the industrial sector’s wish to work more closely with Europe.552 
The BMWi found in Rogério Martins a committed ally for the West German 
quest to export capital.553 The Portuguese Undersecretary of State visited the FRG at 
the invitation of the BMWi in January 1970 and discussed projects with several German 
companies554, as well as with the Deutsche Bank and the BDI. Upon his return to 
Lisbon, Martins declared that, as a result of these negotiations, German enterprises 
would invest DM 90 million555 in Portugal over the next couple of years and create 
eight to nine thousand new jobs.556 Thus West German investment in Portugal, which 
had totalled DM 67.8 million until 1969557, gained new momentum during marcelismo. 
In fact, the FRG became the most significant foreign investor in Portuguese industry558. 
The growth rate of its investments in Portugal was higher than West Germany’s 
average559, even if this still did not amount to more than 0.8% of the FRG’s overall 
investments in European countries.560 By 1973, the cumulated investment reached DM 
198 million561, making the FRG the third largest foreign investor in Portugal, after the 
                                                
552 Ferreira (1975), p.22. 
553 Curiously, Rogério Martins started off on the wrong foot. He intimidated German investors during the 
CCILA‘s 1969 anniversary celebrations with a harsh speech against the exploitative tendencies of foreign 
capitalism and the dangers of outside investments, which found an echo in the national press. His words, 
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Beziehungen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland zur Portugiesischen Republik 1949-1976, Hamburg: 
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USA and multinational conglomerates.562 Portuguese investments in West Germany 
were naturally much more modest, but they too accelerated during this period563. 
 
 
2. The controversy over Cahora Bassa 
The most sensitive area of Bonn’s economic relations with Lisbon was, 
unsurprisingly, the Portuguese colonial territory. Concerned over potential accusations 
of directly financing Lisbon’s colonialism, the federal authorities had decided as soon 
as colonial war had broken out in Angola, in 1961, to refrain from supporting projects 
in Portugal’s non-European territories, particularly in Africa.564 One important 
exception to this rule occurred during marcelismo, with the construction of the Cahora 
Bassa dam, situated in the basin of the Zambezi River in the Tete province of 
Mozambique. This hydroelectric dam, which was projected to be the third largest in the 
world, was part of an ambitious development plan for the region conceived in the late 
1950s by the Missão de Fomento e Povoamento do Zambeze (MFPZ), a department set 
up by the Portuguese Overseas Ministry to study possible uses for the Zambezi 
basin.565 Under the guise of a neutral infrastructure project, Cahora Bassa became a 
political force of nature. 
                                                
For Lisbon, the project had been political from the outset. Discussing it in the 
mid-1960s, the Portuguese ministers for economics and finance had opposed the 
megalomaniac enterprise for budgetary reasons, questioning the very principle of 
investing in Africa instead of focusing on the economic situation at home. By contrast, 
Minister for Overseas Joaquim da Silva Cunha and Foreign Minister Alberto Franco 
Nogueira had recognised political and strategic advantages in the project. Silva Cunha 
had presented Cahora Bassa as a way to prove to foreign critics that Portugal was not 
exploiting its colonies, but altruistically developing them as part of the national 
territory. The ultranationalist Franco Nogueira had looked at Cahora Bassa as a symbol 
of Portuguese prestige and might. He had also argued that engaging the international 
community in the scheme could increase foreign support for the Portuguese cause and 
562 PAAA, B26, Zwischenarchiv 101.436, Stand der deutsch-portugiesischen Wirtschaftsbeziehungen, 
17.09.1973. 
563 During the first semester of 1971, they rose from DM 5.8 Million to DM 10.8 Million (86.2% 
increase), amounting to 11% of Bonn’s investments in Portugal. – Informações (CCILA), 15.11.1971 
564 Fonseca (2007), p.189. 
565 For a comprehensive look at the origins of Cahora Bassa, see Middlemas, Kieth. 1975. Cabora Bassa 
– Engineering and Politics in Southern Africa, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. pp.9-40. 
128 
 
that the whole enterprise would promote cooperation with Portugal’s African ‘white 
neighbours’ Rhodesia and South Africa. After both ministerial factions had presented 
their cases, the final decision, as always, had been up to Prime Minister Salazar. He had 
given the green light to the project in 1966, after Lisbon had secured an agreement with 
South Africa’s electricity company ESCOM for the consumption of the energy 
produced by the dam. Because Mozambique could not consume more than 10% of the 
produced electricity, 90% was to be exported, which theoretically ensured that Cahora 
Bassa would pay for itself in the long run.566 
The choice to award the concession for the undertaking to the Zamco 
consortium – preferring it over the British-Italian Concassa and the American Cabora 
Bassa Builders567 – was the most politically convenient for the dictatorship. Zamco’s 
diverse background fitted with the regime’s policy of pluralizing economic relations, so 
that no specific country could gather so much influence as to challenge Lisbon’s control 
over its empire.568 Moreover, picking this consortium rewarded the FRG and France, 
the dictatorship’s main suppliers of armament, while simultaneously hinting at Lisbon’s 
hopes of eventual association with the Common Market. Indeed, Franco Nogueira’s 
Foreign Ministry proved set on using the dam project to gain leverage over its partners. 
In August 1968, the ministry instructed Portuguese Ambassador in Bonn Manuel 
Homem de Mello on how to approach the renegotiation of a series of military 
agreements with a hesitant federal government. According to the ministry’s line of 
argument, West German-Portuguese relations had to be understood as a whole, within 
which the context of military and political dimensions stretched beyond Europe. The 
ambassador was to explain to the Germans that the friendly relations between Lisbon 
and Bonn, as well as their communion of interests, had weighed in when the Cahora 
Bassa project had been awarded to Zamco. Yet the adjudication was provisional and in 
order for Lisbon to make it definitive, it required a level of assurance that West 
German-Portuguese relations would be stable and handled with a renewed spirit of 
German commitment. The ministry concluded by urging Homem de Mello to make 
those points “with utmost clarity yet maximum propriety” in order to make it clear “that 
                                                
566 Ibid.; see also Silva Cunha’s later speeches Cunha, Joaquim da Silva. 1969. Cabora-Bassa, uma 
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568 Ferreira (1975), p.24. 
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we wish to continue cooperating with the FRG […] but such cooperation cannot be 
one-directional”.569 
Nogueira’s tactics of fuzzy linkage coupled with Silva Cunha’s bargaining 
manoeuvres to create a convoluted contracting process. After the official tendering 
process of the Cahora Bassa project was complete, on 10 July 1968, discussions with 
Zamco to reach full agreement on the contractual terms stretched for over a year. At 
one point, Lisbon even reopened negotiations with the interested American firms. With 
its internationally diverse background, Zamco was an uncoordinated hybrid, a fact 
which Silva Cunha’s ministry exploited to its own advantage. Adding to the general 
confusion, when Marcelo Caetano first took office, he seemed uncertain about going 
ahead with Cahora Bassa. Caetano delayed the final ruling on the matter until after his 
trip to the African colonies in April 1969, but he ended up embracing the enterprise, 
signalling the continuity of Salazar’s imperial view. After a few more months of 
financial disputes, Zamco and the Portuguese government signed the final contract in 
September 1969, although the deal was not completely settled until the end of 1970.570 
 Within the West German Grand Coalition government, the decision to back the 
German sub-consortium of Zamco with export credit guarantees – known as Hermes 
cover – was economically-driven and fairly consensual. As early as January 1967, 
Chancellor Kiesinger had confirmed Bonn’s willingness to contribute with DM 250 
million in credit guarantees to secure the project.571 By October 1968, the pledge had 
risen to DM 380 million.572 Cahora Bassa represented a chance to export a great deal of 
capital, as well as to test a new technique of high voltage DC transmission developed 
by German research centres, thus giving the FRG’s electrical industry international 
recognition.573 In February 1969, Foreign Minister Willy Brandt was told by his 
Portuguese counterpart Franco Nogueira to regard Cahora Bassa as a political asset as 
much as an economic one. Sticking to his strategy of using Zamco to promote pan-
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130 
 
European complicity with Portugal, Nogueira insisted that Lisbon had given the 
Germans and the French the opportunity to set foot in southern Africa and show 
neighbouring countries that Europe’s influence in the region was not restricted to the 
British and their American allies.574 Yet showing that was exactly what Brandt was 
afraid of. Although his Auswärtiges Amt did not oppose Bonn’s involvement in Cahora 
Bassa, it requested that the FRG’s share would not exceed France’s and that on the 
surface Zamco would look like a French-led consortium.575 In September 1969, when 
the contract was finally signed after its tortuous renegotiations, the government-owned 
development bank Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW) provided DM 404.5 million in 
Hermes guarantees to cover the German participation in Cahora Bassa, just below the 
French DM 423 million.576 
 Even if the federal authorities had seen the dam’s potential for controversy, they 
underestimated its proportions. As the previous chapters demonstrated, the attempt to 
disguise the West German involvement in the enterprise proved fruitless in the context 
of public scrutiny generated by the intense African critique of Portuguese colonialism. 
The federal government nevertheless remained committed to the project, pragmatically 
admitting that as an extremely export-oriented country the FRG relied on foreign 
economic relations, including with politically controversial states. Bonn did not even 
immediately grasp the full implications of the anti-colonialist critique, reacting to the 
wave of African protests in early 1970 with little sensitivity. An internal memo from 
the Chancellery rationalised Bonn’s position by arguing as follows: “African states 
often reproach the former colonial powers for having done too little for Africa’s 
economic development. [Cahora] Bassa is an infrastructure project of general economic 
interest.”577  
The Bundeskanzleramt’s proposed responses to the rising African backlash 
generally followed two strands. One strand suggested removing any moral element 
from the enterprise: “It is not a case of public German development aid, but of the 
participation of German private companies within the framework of the free market 
economy”; according to the FRG’s “liberal constitution, the government has limited 
possibilities to influence the decisions of German companies”. The other strand 
revolved around variations of a developmentalist formula which ended up endorsing the 
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enterprise: “The federal government hopes that the realisation of the Cahora Bassa 
project proves advantageous to Mozambique’s industrial development and to the 
welfare of its inhabitants. It further hopes that the possibility of purchasing cheaper 
electrical energy will be a benefit for other African states.” 578  
Yet the Chancellery’s Department for Foreign Affairs soon realised that it was 
hard to defend the virtues of the hydroelectric scheme without appearing to defend 
Portuguese colonialism. In its reassessment of Afrikapolitik on 8 May 1970, the Head of 
the Department, Per Fischer, recognised that the “notion that economic returns would 
hold the African states in the Western collective passes by the reality of African 
emotionality”. Fischer explained that this was precisely the fallacy incurred by the 
South African, Rhodesian and Portuguese justificatory argument that the population 
under white minority rule lived in better material conditions than the one in 
neighbouring African states. According to Fischer, the cry of “better dead than a slave” 
was alive in Africa and so the West German attempt to justify the dam with talk of 
raising living standards was wholly inappropriate. Consequently, “the fact that the 
[Cahora] Bassa dam constitutes the biggest power station in Africa, surpassing the 
power of the Aswan dam [in Egypt, funded by the USSR], will serve us much less than 
the construction of the North Egyptian dam served the Soviet Union”. Regarding the 
distinction between private economic enterprises and public services, Fischer remarked 
that the Africans did not acknowledge such a distinction, adding that “we blur it 
anyway, as we declare the Hermes covers advantageous to developing countries to be a 
development policy service and simultaneously assign Hermes guarantees to 
commercial operations like the [Cahora] Bassa dam”.579 
The dam’s impact on the FRG’s relations with Africa was but one level of what 
was escalating into a multilayered political conundrum. The large campaign organised 
by the solidarity movement in West Germany made Cahora Bassa a domestic problem 
as well as an international one. Concerned about the dam’s impact on public opinion, 
Willy Brandt began to question the firmness of his stance, as he confessed to French 
President Georges Pompidou. Brandt did not, however, doubt the validity of the project 
itself, dismissing FRELIMO’s accusation that the dam was part of a plan to 
exponentially expand the number of white settlers in the region: “This idea is grotesque, 
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because where will the Portuguese take these two millions whites from?”.580 During 
this conversation, Pompidou reaffirmed France’s unshakeable commitment to Cahora 
Bassa, thus implicitly adding a further layer to the conundrum, since compromising the 
enterprise would necessarily undermine the interests of Bonn’s French allies.581 
Moreover, the same applied to Portugal: on 26 May 1970, the German Ambassador in 
Lisbon warned the AA that abandoning the Cahora Bassa project would formidably 
damage the West German-Portuguese relationship. According to Schmidt-Horix, such a 
step would weaken Marcelo Caetano’s government, which after initial hesitation had 
fully endorsed the dam, and it would provide the Portuguese far-right ‘ultras’ with 
arguments for a more isolationist policy. Schmidt-Horix predicted that Caetano’s 
downfall might give rise to a regime similar to the Greek Colonels’ dictatorship.582 
To aggravate matters, at stake was not just the question of abandoning the 
project. After the withdrawal of the Swedish firm ASEA the previous year, the German 
sub-consortium of Zamco had risked losing its share of the contract to the eager 
American General Electric. In order to secure it, the German companies had asked the 
KfW to cover at least an extra DM 140 million for the project.583 Thus Brandt found 
himself between protesters demanding a full retreat from Cahora Bassa and 
industrialists pushing for a stronger commitment. Two days before the final cabinet 
meeting on this matter, which took place on 30 July, the chancellor received alarmed 
individual messages from the presidents of the main industrial and trade federations 
expressing their utmost disapproval of any eventual ‘politicisation’ of the Hermes 
cover.584 
The federal authorities weighed their options politically as well as economically. 
On 15 July, the Auswärtiges Amt presented its recommendation for the maintenance of 
the credit guarantees, taking into consideration the fact that the French were doing the 
same.585 Six days later, the Bundeskanzleramt issued a note concluding that the FRG 
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could not afford to open an exception to its longstanding practice of separating politics 
from economic interests, nor could it be seen as breaching a previously established 
agreement.586 At the same time, it was hard to ignore the public backlash. Therefore, at 
the end of the month the government announced a compromise solution: it agreed to 
honour existing pledges, but refused to grant the additional credit guarantees. The 
German companies went to get the remaining financial cover from the South African 
authorities and from a consortium headed by the private Deutsche Bank.587  
Bonn was aware that such a decision was not enough to satisfy the critics of the 
dam. Thus, although Willy Brandt had been privy to the negotiating process leading up 
to Zamco’s guarantees from the onset588, he justified his government’s current position 
by blaming it on the legacy of that previous commitment. The chancellor explained to 
the OAU delegation later that year that the African opposition had come too late, as the 
government could not breach a signed contract. Brandt sought to use Germany’s Nazi 
past to his advantage, for once, by emphasising the FRG’s need to regain international 
credibility – he told Kaunda that it was little over 25 years ago that Germany had “a 
regime which did not keep its promises” and therefore Bonn needed to be very careful 
in keeping its word with firms and with its French partners.589 Future projects, however, 
were a different matter: as a result of this entire episode the federal authorities became 
more cautious about further enterprises in southern Africa.590 
 
 
3. The theory of Portugal’s rapprochement with Europe 
While Cahora Bassa represented the Africa-oriented side of the Portuguese 
economy, Bonn discerned a strong counter-current inclined to cooperate in a European 
context. In the summer of 1970, however, two events contributed to the reshaping of 
the features of this European cooperation. One was José Pinto Leite’s death in a 
helicopter accident in Guinea-Bissau on 25 July, which once again postponed the 
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Mixed Commission’s reactivation591. The other was Bonn’s refusal to raise the Hermes 
cover for the Cahora Bassa project. Although the Head of the Chancellery Horst Ehmke 
wrote to the President of BDI Fritz Berg reassuring him that Bonn’s commitment to the 
‘separation’ of foreign trade and foreign policy had not changed592, the German 
industrialists grew sceptical – much to the government’s concern.593 In September, 
during meetings for the reactivation of the Mixed Commission, the BDI made a point of 
highlighting that the private sector should be at the forefront of the proceedings.594 It 
soon implemented this vision: on 17 December 1970, the BDI committed itself to a 
practical intensification of cooperation with its Portuguese counterpart AIP and with 
CCILA, independent of an eventual formal re-establishment of the Mixed Commission. 
The associations decided to operate through task-forces directed at specific industries 
and, although they invited the public authorities to participate, the process was to be 
coordinated by these private agents.595 Thereafter neither Bonn nor Lisbon made any 
further attempts to revive the Mixed Commission.596 The issue sporadically came up 
within the BMWi, but the final position was that the scope of such a commission had 
been overtaken by the private initiative and by Portugal’s economic boom.597 
Just as the German industrialists were reinforcing the autonomous character of 
business coordination between the two states, however, a new link was forming 
between the Portuguese industrialists and a section of the FRG's political power. At the 
invitation of the BMWi, Director-General of AIP Mário Neves visited the FRG in late 
September 1970 and met with delegates from the three factions of the Bundestag to 
discuss the issue of Portugal’s economic rapprochement with Europe. As a result, the 
unofficial Committee for European and International Cooperation (KeiZ) – which 
included MPs from the three German parliamentary parties – decided to pay closer 
attention to the Portuguese case. In order to understand the local context the KeiZ made 
the first of its many trips organised by the AIP to Portugal between 13 and 21 March 
1971. The delegation visited the southern region of Alentejo and the industrialised area 
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in the north of the country, as well as Lisbon, and it reported its conclusions to the 
federal government.598 
The KeiZ’s report was able to distinguish three groups represented within 
Portugal’s single-party system. The “traditionalists/feudalists” (estimated 20-25% of the 
parliamentary seats) were headed by ex-Foreign Minister Franco Nogueira – who had 
left office in October 1969 – and were composed of military elites as well as 
landowners and other faces of Portugal’s ‘big capital’, including a few industrialists. 
This group – in practice, the ‘ultras’ – was the true successor to Salazar’s worldview 
and it opposed Caetano’s reforms as well as the notion of a Portuguese opening to 
Europe, preferring to capitalise on the economic potential of the colonial empire. The 
“national-conservative reformers” (20-25% of the seats) were a middle-of-the-road 
group which accepted some of the reforms, but was suspicious of actual 
democratisation. Finally, the “liberal-democrats” (around 50% of the seats) – in 
practice, the ‘modernists’ – were the basis for the reform efforts. They sought a 
democratic constitution, the general improvement of living standards through a modern 
economic and social policy, education reform, and Portugal’s rapprochement with the 
European community. Many of them regarded Caetano’s ‘participative and progressive 
autonomy’ formula for Africa as an intermediate stage before dissociation from the 
colonies – they did not believe in a “Portuguese unitary state with autonomous regions”, 
but they argued that the Portuguese mainland first needed to be economically 
strengthened and modernised so that it could “sustain the disengagement” and 
accommodate the returned settlers. Importantly, they rejected “abrupt changes” and 
“revolutionary situations” in either Portugal or its overseas territories, preferring to 
pursue their goals through the “consistent continuation of a decisive reform policy”. In 
turn, the non-parliamentary opposition was mostly bundled together as “communists-
anarchists, etc” and described as “not very strong numerically, but a well-trained group 
due to its long underground-existence”. The report speculated that if the formation of 
parties were permitted, the ones representing the ‘liberal-democrats’ “would surely 
achieve a big majority” in parliament.599 
Although the German committee claimed to have been scrupulously allowed to 
talk to representatives from all political strands, except for the “extremist forces”600, the 
                                                





report was clearly heavily influenced by the organisers of the trip, i.e. the ‘modernist’ 
sections of the Lisbon regime. The KeiZ estimated a large progressive base within the 
dictatorship: its definition of “liberal-democrats” extended much beyond the 
independent parliamentary ‘liberal wing’ – which was actually composed of only 19 
out of 130 MPs601 – and it admittedly included members of the dictatorship’s state-
party. Ultimately, the committee shared the ‘modernists’’ belief that they could change 
the system from within, as well as their faith that Caetano was inclined towards 
structural reform and only lacked the material and political conditions to undertake it. 
More than that, the KeiZ seemed to share their very liberal assumption that economic 
modernisation would automatically translate into political change. Thus the report’s 
recommendations ended up reproducing the ‘modernists’’ wishes for European 
economic support: “A determined support from the [FRG] – and naturally from the 
EEC – must encompass the areas of economic cooperation, targeted financial and 
technical assistance [and] educational endowment for executives but also for skilled 
workers.” In turn, the report discouraged the pursuit of “ideologised aid”, i.e. the 
imposition by Bonn of “democratic principles”. It argued that Portugal should be 
allowed to change by itself, postulating: “Interference from the outside would only 
disrupt the already initiated transformation in Portugal. This also applies to the problem 
of the ‘overseas provinces’.” 602 In other words, in order for support to work, it had to 
be unconditional:  
 
“Due to the unstable political base for the realisation of reform projects and due to 
the plain difficulties of clearing up traditions, engrained ideas and out-dated 
worldviews, Caetano’s government – to put it better, Caetano and his actual team, 
since the government is not completely uniform either – relies on quick visible 
success. If Portugal, instead of support, is to expect indifference or critique and 
hostility, this reform policy will fall apart. The reaction of the far-right and the 
inevitable actions of the far-left would create a situation in Portugal which would 
greatly worry the whole West.” 603 
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The KeiZ’s views were shared by the German Ambassador to Portugal, Ehrenfried 
von Holleben. Having arrived in Lisbon in early 1971, von Holleben began to report 
extensively about the ‘liberal wing’ and SEDES, an association with an exceptional 
degree of independence from the state, aimed at studying and promoting Portugal’s 
social and economic development.604 The ambassador became a passionate advocate of 
the strategy of welcoming Portugal into Europe in order to empower Caetano and the 
‘modernists’ against the ‘ultras’605, thus subscribing to the notion that Portugal’s 
rapprochement with Europe would be made at the expense of its African interests. Such 
a notion was certainly not a German invention, as it informed a lively debate within the 
dictatorship itself, namely between the more extreme Africa-oriented section and the 
more extreme Europe-oriented one.606 Notably, von Holleben did not just advocate this 
theory to his superiors in Bonn, but also to his colleague ambassadors in Lisbon.607 On 
5 November 1971, after talking to Rogério Martins, the ambassador complained to the 
AA, in his typically verbose and emphatic style, that the work of “Caetano and his 
progressive team” was not being sufficiently appreciated in Europe: “Every Portuguese 
with experience abroad, especially those who participate in international conferences, is 
still seen as an ‘abscess’ in the European world – like an ‘illness’, whose healing 
process one wishes is made visible in order to then be able to help.”608 
 The notion of promoting a rapprochement with Europe translated into practical 
steps in Bonn. Portugal’s application for associate status in the Common Market was 
publicly and privately endorsed, not only by von Holleben609, but also by Foreign 
Minister Walter Scheel610 and Minister for Economics Karl Schiller.611 Admittedly, 
this was not a major concession on Bonn’s part, since unlike some of its EEC partners 
the FRG’s northern European agriculture was not threatened by the Portuguese plum 
tomato; still, it was a political matter.612 Walter Scheel’s office even toyed with the idea 
of having the German Foreign Minister express in all privacy to his Portuguese 
counterpart his sincere wishes that Portugal’s economic development could speed up a 
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solution for the African question.613 Simultaneously, the KeiZ tightened its partnership 
with the AIP. Together, they organised a political-economic conference in Lisbon with 
presentations about development policies (6-10 October 1971).614 A second conference 
followed (5-9 April 1972), this time focusing on three key topics: ‘Enlargement of the 
European Community’, ‘Consequences/Solutions for the Portuguese Economy’ and 
‘Problems of Europe’s Competition Policy’.615 
Contrary to what this strand had theorised, after the EEC trade agreement was 
been signed on 22 July 1972, ‘ultra-colonialists’ like Franco Nogueira held ever more 
political power in Lisbon than the Europeanists. Indeed, in 1972 the main faces of the 
‘liberal wing’ resigned from parliament, disappointed with marcelismo, and each of the 
technocrats either voluntarily left the government or was forced out.616 As became 
evident, a Europe-oriented economy did not preclude an Africa-centred policy. For all 
the inflamed and bizarrely contradictory speeches by Franco Nogueira617, in practice his 
political wing had been strategically accepting the Europeanization of the Portuguese 
economy at least since the creation of EFTA in 1960.618 Indeed, by 1970 the EEC 
countries had already been buying 41.9% of Portugal’s exports and supplying 48.8% of 
its imports.619 European trade was thus clearly not an antidote to Lisbon’s colonial 
policy. On the contrary, it was its financial backer. 
Nevertheless, throughout this period delegations from the KeiZ and AIP 
continued to meet twice a year in either Lisbon or Bonn to debate the development of 
Portugal’s ties to the Common Market. These meetings were attended by MPs, 
industrialists, high officials and technical personnel from different public departments. 
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The KeiZ may not have achieved the political change in Lisbon it had desired, but it 
managed to promote an informal forum to discuss projects of cooperation which were 
beneficial for economic groups on both sides, effectively taking the place of the ill-
fated Mixed Commission.620 
 
 
4. The debate over development aid 
 The combination of the controversy over Cahora Bassa and the theory of 
Portugal’s rapprochement with Europe spurred a debate within the federal government 
which came to focus on the issue of development aid to the Portuguese dictatorship. 
Bonn’s foreign development aid policy (Entwicklungspolitik) was handled by the 
Ministry for Economic Cooperation (BMZ), which during this period was headed by 
Erhard Eppler, of the SPD’s left wing. Yet Entwicklungspolitik was also inextricably 
tied to foreign policy – it had traditionally embodied the ‘carrot’ in the ‘carrot and 
stick’ approach of the Hallstein doctrine621 – as well as to economic policy, since it 
promoted the export of capital. Credit decisions therefore had to be coordinated 
between the BMZ, the AA and the BMWi.622 Thus the topic of development aid exposed 
the views of each ministry regarding Bonn’s policy towards Lisbon. 
The federal government had been providing Lisbon with aid credits since 1961. 
That year, the Kreditanstalt fur Wiederaufbau had agreed to lend Portugal DM 150 
million, two thirds of which were to be invested in an irrigation plan in Alentejo.623 In 
1968 Kiesinger’s Grand Coalition government granted an extra DM 25 million in aid 
credits for the Alentejo irrigation plan and for a dam in Odivelas.624 In addition, Bonn 
provided around DM 4 million in technical aid.625 The DM 125 million financed a 
number of hydro-agrarian development schemes in Alentejo626, which were closely 
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followed by technical missions from the KfW.627 This dimension of Bonn’s policy 
became more complicated in 1969, when Lisbon requested credit for a new stage of the 
plan, including the construction of a dam in the Alqueva River. Having other budgetary 
priorities, the BMWi proved reluctant to finance the project. In December, a newly 
FDP-led Auswärtiges Amt, wishing to avoid any strain on the relations with Lisbon, 
decided not to inform the Portuguese authorities of this turn of events, telling them 
instead that a final decision would be taken later in the following year. The AA hoped to 
wait until the imminent approval of West German funding for a similar irrigation 
scheme in Spain, in order to then be able to convince the other ministries to accept 
Portugal’s request on the basis of Iberian parity.628 
Serious intra-governmental discussion on this issue ensued. On 24 June 1970, 
the Political Director of the BMZ Ulrich Börnstein wrote to the AA asking that 
Portuguese requests for additional aid credits be refused. The dispatch referred to both 
technical and political issues. Firstly, it argued that Portugal had reached a stage of 
economic development which did not justify Bonn’s aid. According to Börnstein, by 
being a member of the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC), Portugal 
should not even qualify as a developing nation. Secondly, the document argued that 
these credits would invite a critical reaction in the FRG’s public opinion. In this regard, 
Börnstein mentioned a recent backlash against Minister Eppler for – reluctantly – 
having subsidised the aforementioned irrigation scheme in Franco’s Spain, which had 
evidenced the high level of public scrutiny over Bonn’s development policy. Börnstein 
explained that in the case of Portugal, because of its colonialist status, the backlash over 
this aid would extend to the Third World. Just as in the case of Cahora Bassa, aid to 
Portugal could end up seriously undermining the credibility of Bonn’s 
Entwicklungspolitik.629 
The Ministry for Economics, which received a copy of the BMZ’s dispatch, was 
less authoritative. An internal memo of the BMWi listed the various arguments in 
support of funding the Alqueva plan. On the question of whether or not Portugal was a 
developing country, the memo noted that an OECD report from October 1969 did list it 
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as one of OECD’s “Developing Member Countries”.630 The memo pointed out that 
Portugal’s per capita income was low even by non-European standards, being lower 
than Chile’s and only slightly higher than Peru’s. Further arguments in favour of 
providing aid credits to Portugal included the promise of German-Portuguese economic 
cooperation dating back to the 1961 Protocol, the fact that stimulating the Portuguese 
economy would be beneficial for West German trade with the country, the FRG’s 
highly favourable credit balance with Portugal and Marcelo Caetano’s signs of 
openness and democratic reform.631 While in principle the BMWi was not opposed to 
providing aid to Portugal, however, it took into account the BMZ’s second point, 
regarding public opinion. Thus its cautious official position, stated on 28 July 1970, 
was that the granting of further aid was “not advisable under the current 
circumstances”.632 
By contrast, the Auswärtiges Amt challenged both arguments of the BMZ, which 
it considered to be solely motivated by ideological antipathy towards Lisbon’s colonial 
policy and type of regime. A memo from the AA’s Section for Foreign Trade, 
Development Policy and European Economic Integration quoted Otto von Bismarck, 
who in 1886 had remarked that the basis for foreign policy was not the “cosy interest” 
that other countries have “justice and fairness”. Prioritising instead what it interpreted 
as Bonn’s national interest, the section called a meeting of the ministry’s related 
departments and political sections for 29 July to try to come up with an official AA 
response. They were to take into account that financing the Alqueva plan would 
promote not just economic development, but social development as well, which would 
foster Caetano’s efforts towards Portugal’s liberalisation and its rapprochement with 
the EEC. Moreover, granting aid could help Bonn’s case in other economic 
negotiations, such as pending German assets seized by Portugal in the aftermath of 
WWII and Lisbon’s imminent decision on whether or not to adopt the PAL colour 
television system, developed in the FRG. Conversely, Lisbon – a NATO ally – would 
not comprehend Bonn’s refusal to grant credit to Portugal shortly after having granted it 
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to Spain. Because the Alqueva project, unlike Cahora Bassa, would take place in the 
Portuguese mainland, no comparable African protests were expected.633 
Further voices made the case for granting aid to Lisbon. Upon his visit to the 
FRG in September 1970, Director-General of AIP Mário Neves was invited by the 
BMWi to discuss Portugal’s development with representatives of the BMZ. Neves 
explained to them that the Portuguese economy still needed a stronger industrialisation 
in order to stabilise and reach European standards.634 Likewise the position of 
Ambassador von Holleben was not surprising. He noted that telling Lisbon that Bonn 
was unwilling to support the project just because of the protests against Cahora Bassa 
was not likely to generate much Portuguese sympathy. In turn, according to the 
ambassador, a West German contribution to the country’s economic and social 
development would strengthen Caetano’s social reforms, giving the prime minister 
leverage for further political undertakings.635 Meanwhile, the KeiZ agreed to lobby 
Lisbon’s request to the Bundestag and to the federal government, passing along 
information documents about the Alqueva scheme prepared by the Commercial Attaché 
of the Portuguese Embassy in Bonn.636 
For the dictatorship, the situation did not seem hopeless. In December 1970, the 
Portuguese Finance Ministry still argued that Lisbon should not even search for 
alternative external sponsors for the Alqueva project before assessing Bonn’s final 
position.637 The following year, the federal government gave a sign of goodwill by 
prolonging an agreement for the creation of a centre for experimentation and technical 
support to agriculture in Alentejo – originally signed in 1968 and set to expire on 6 
June 1971 – for an extra year and a half.638 In July, the KeiZ informed Caetano’s 
government that the conditions were favourable for a Portuguese request of a DM 220 
Million credit for the construction of the Alqueva dam.639 According to MP Erwin 
Lange (SPD) – who had headed the KeiZ’s delegation to Portugal earlier that year – 
ultimately the credit depended on “momentary political circumstances” – i.e. on the 
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pragmatic BMWi – not on Erhard Eppler’s attitude, since that minister had no veto 
power in the matter.640 
However, Eppler’s importance stretched beyond his formal power. The minister 
was gaining a reputation as an outspoken advocate for an assertive position against the 
Portuguese dictatorship. In an interview with the newspaper Schwäbisches Tagblatt of 
5 October 1970, he condemned NATO’s passive acceptance of Portuguese colonialism, 
asking “How much longer will the Portuguese tail still be allowed to wag with the 
NATO dog?”. 641 Eppler insisted on this point on 20 November, during an interview to 
the weekly Christ und Welt in which he declared:  
 
“With regards to the Portuguese colonies, my actual opinion is that the people 
from Mozambique or Angola have the same right to self-determination as we do. 
The Portuguese colonial policy is an anachronism whose disappearance is in the 
NATO countries’ best interest.” 642 
 
In fact, Erhard Eppler was in a complicated position himself. As Walter Scheel 
explained to the Portuguese Embassy, the main defiance did not necessarily come from 
the minister, but from the BMZ employees. Scheel – himself a former minister of the 
BMZ – commented that there had been a recent radicalisation of that institution, which 
was the cause of great concern for the AA.643 This was primarily the case with the 
volunteers of the BMZ-supervised German Development Service DED – the FRG’s 
version of the US Peace Corps. German development workers in the Third World were 
joining protests against local regimes and often condemning Bonn’s policy, which 
caused a headache for the FRG’s diplomats. Many of these workers returned home to 
form the activist ranks of the solidarity movement – as described on chapter 2 – while 
others campaigned from abroad.644 Eppler, who had initially embraced this 
politicisation as part of the SPD’s tactical – yet not necessarily cynical – effort to co-opt 
the disenfranchised German youth back into the SPD645, recognised the flipside of such 
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an intense ideological thrust. He insistently called for the DED to adopt a more 
balanced position towards world affairs – what he termed a ‘critical solidarity’. In 
October 1970, one of the volunteers wrote an open letter to the minister condemning 
this notion. She deemed regimes such as the Portuguese unworthy of solidarity, 
recalling that, like them, Adolf Hitler had also promoted development at the cost of 
human suffering. Hence the letter accused Bonn of unethical complicity:  
 
“[…] Personally, I want to give solidarity […] to the Africans forced to fight for 
their independence and self-determination. As an employee of the DED, as a 
German, however, I belong to a nation whose leaders help prevent just that, 
through the direct economic support (and indirectly also moral and military 
support) of the white, racist, colonialist and imperialist domination of southern 
Africa. […]”646 
 
 Erhard Eppler found himself reproducing the same ambiguity which marked 
Bonn’s overall policy towards Portugal. On the one hand, the minister admitted that, 
despite his provocative assertions, he was unwilling to endorse actual economic 
sanctions against Lisbon or the colonies. Eppler explained to a Tanzanian newspaper 
that a “country whose national product comprises 20 per cent exports cannot choose the 
countries to trade with from the point of view of whether their system is regarded as 
good or bad”.647 In his reply to the aforementioned letter, Eppler also made an analogy 
between the West German Portugal-policy and neue Ostpolitik:648 
 
“You are shocked that a government that calls for critical solidarity admits trade with 
South Africa, does not revoke the permit for [Cahora] Bassa, receives Suharto. 
Maybe I can further complete the record of this government’s sins, according to the 
moral criteria you establish. This government seeks an understanding with the 
countries that, two years ago, suffocated with their weapons a Czechoslovak effort 
towards socialism with a human dimension. It talks to those who order shooting at 
the wall of shame, in Berlin.”  
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On the other hand, Eppler used his limited power within the government to make 
political statements against Portuguese colonialism. In 1972, while renewing the law 
that ensured tax relief for investments in developing nations, the BMZ introduced an 
annex explicitly excluding investments in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau, as 
well as in Rhodesia and Namibia. The Portuguese ambassador in Bonn recognised that 
the practical effects of the annex would be insignificant for the Lisbon regime, given 
the very small amount of West German investments in the colonies, not to mention the 
fact that investments in metropolitan Portugal were to remain included in the law.649 
Nevertheless, the ambassador protested vehemently against what he considered to be 
the “discriminatory character” of the addendum. His demarches did not prevent the 
annex from going to the Bundestag, although they did convince the federal 
authorities650 to change the wording, if not the content. The final text did not name any 
specific regions, but stated that “territories outside Europe belonging to or dependent on 
European countries cannot be considered developing nations for the purposes of this 
law”. The annex gathered enough votes in the Bundestag, despite loud protests from the 
CSU opposition, which accused it of institutionalising the “global defamation 
campaign” against Cahora Bassa.651 
The peculiar Portuguese case made the Ministry for Economic Cooperation 
fight against the attribution of aid, while the self-professed realist AA pushed the virtues 
of development. Internally, the AA even admitted explicitly that it needed to make sure 
that someone from its staff with a background on Iberian agriculture was ensured a 
place at the inter-ministerial meetings; otherwise there was the risk that the BMZ could 
block any plans for Alentejo.652 Coming from different positions, both ministries 
agreed on the end-goal of Portuguese decolonisation. Yet while Eppler’s declarations 
suggested a confrontational stance against Lisbon, the AA made a clear distinction 
between the African territories and metropolitan Portugal, rationalising aid to the latter 
as part of a wider strategy. This view was typified by the First Secretary of the AA’s 
Department for Sub-Saharan Africa Peter Maier-Oswald in a long report of his trip to 
Angola and Mozambique in May 1972. Maier-Oswald acknowledged that West 
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German economic aid would contribute to the strengthening of Portugal and 
consequently also to the strengthening of the Portuguese position in the colonies. 
Nevertheless, he insisted that “it would be easier for an economically and politically 
strong Portugal to give up the overseas territories”, not the least because of Lisbon’s 
fear of being absorbed by Europe if it did not have a clear “separate identity”.653 
By 1973, the erosion of the dictatorship’s image in the FRG’s public sphere 
took its toll. Despite signs of openness on the German side, the request for funding for 
the Alqueva project, delayed for budgetary reasons654, had missed its window of 
opportunity. In April, the Federal Parliamentary State Secretary for Economics and the 
Head of the KeiZ explained to the leaders of AIP that, because of public opinion, the 
government and the parliamentary committee now found it considerably more difficult 
to defend Portuguese interests in that specific regard.655 Timing had worked against the 
AA´s plan of developing Portugal while staying away from the Portuguese empire: 
ironically, the federal government had given up on its support for the dam in Alentejo 




Bonn’s policy towards the Portuguese dictatorship in the economic field had both 
economic and political implications. While the federal government insisted that the 
latter should not interfere with the former, it could not fully prevent the former from 
interfering with the latter. 
The main political factor working against the FRG’s friendly economic relations 
with Portugal, i.e. promoting their discontinuity, was the controversial nature of the 
Portuguese dictatorship in public opinion, particularly its colonialist dimension. In no 
case was this more manifest than in the case of the construction of the Cahora Bassa 
dam in Mozambique, with West German state credit guarantees. FRELIMO’s 
successful mobilisation of African leaders and, crucially, West German protesters lent 
great force to the demand for the federal government to withdraw from the enterprise. 
While the campaign did not effectively achieve Bonn’s disengagement from Cahora 
Bassa, it prevented the federal authorities from extending further credit cover for the 
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project in the summer of 1970 and it discouraged them from pursuing similar ventures 
elsewhere. In particular the anti-Portuguese public mood discouraged the government 
from providing Lisbon with the requested credit to finance the Alqueva dam, in 
Alentejo. Although the BMWi was not fundamentally opposed to granting this credit, it 
caved in to concerns over the possible negative impact in public opinion. 
A second factor threatening Bonn’s policy towards the Lisbon dictatorship in 
the economic field was the determined anti-colonialist stance of the Ministry for 
Economic Cooperation, led by Erhard Eppler. The BMZ, which opposed providing 
development aid to Portugal, proved instrumental in convincing the more pragmatic 
BMWi not to fund the Alqueva project. In a noteworthy symbolic gesture, Eppler’s 
ministry also managed to remove tax benefits for eventual West German investments in 
the Portuguese colonies. Indeed, Minister Erhard Eppler became the main voice 
speaking against Lisbon from within the government, even if he was ultimately more 
pragmatic than some of the forces within the BMZ. 
These aspects did not seriously disturb West German-Portuguese economic 
relations, as a number of factors contributed to their continuity and even intensification. 
First and foremost was the fact that the two economies reached a high level of 
reciprocity during the Brandt/Caetano era, especially during the earlier years, taking 
advantage of the expansionist momentum both countries were going through at the time. 
The Portuguese industrialisation stimulated German exports – particularly of equipment 
and machinery – as well as business investments. It thus furthered the FRG’s exports 
industry, which was a major driving force of West German productivity, and allowed 
for a greater internationalisation of German capital. The latter aspect was of great 
importance for Bonn, since the FRG’s uneven balance of payments made it difficult to 
revaluate its capital. This German concern coupled with the Portuguese quest for 
liberalisation and modernisation led to a renewal of West German-Portuguese 
cooperation. Although technocrats like undersecretaries of state Rogério Martins and 
Xavier Pintado were a minority – and revealingly not granted the title of ‘minister’ – 
within the Caetano government, they were able to work together with the BMWi to 
boost both countries’ economies. From December 1970, however, government agents 
were mostly pushed aside by private industrial associations such as the BDI, CCILA and 
AIP. 
The AA and the BMWi certainly had economic considerations in mind, but direct 
interests in Portugal are not enough to explain Bonn’s cooperative stance against such a 
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turbulent background. Although their relationship was mutually beneficial, undoubtedly 
it was Lisbon who benefited the most. In fact, Portugal’s economic penetration of the 
FRG was not very significant, nor was its weight in West German trade as a whole. 
Therefore, while both countries had interest in a positive evolution of their economic 
relations, Portugal was clearly much more dependent on it. Despite this disproportional 
advantage, the FRG was not in a position to pressure the Caetano regime on political 
matters due to Bonn’s adherence to the principle of ‘separation’ between economy and 
foreign policy. Bonn backed up this adherence with multiple arguments. In a practical 
sense, this avoided creating a precedent; compromising economic relations with the 
Portuguese regime for political reasons could put into question the FRG’s economic 
relations with other, more lucrative, controversial regimes, which was a fearful scenario 
for a country with such a high level of dependency on foreign trade. Ideologically, the 
FDP and even the SPD respected the right of the private sector to pursue business with 
Portugal in the context of free market capitalism. Finally, in a more immediate political 
sense, the principle of backing profitable business ventures without passing judgment 
on the states where they took place was the backbone of the crucial economic dimension 
of neue Ostpolitik. 
While this principle played a decisive role in the controversy over Cahora Bassa, 
it was not the only factor to support Bonn’s continued commitment to the project. The 
federal government feared that breaching its initial agreement might hinder Bonn’s 
relations with the various parties involved in the enterprise. It might hinder Bonn’s 
relations with the companies and the business world in general by discrediting the 
reliability of the guarantees provided by the Hermes cover. It might hinder Bonn’s 
relations with Paris – an important West German ally, particularly in the context of the 
negotiations of the quadripartite agreement over Berlin. It might hinder relations with 
Lisbon, driving the Portuguese dictatorship into a more hard-line isolationist position. 
Tied to this last point was the theory that Portugal’s rapprochement with Europe 
would facilitate Lisbon’s disengagement from the colonies. According to this view, the 
strengthening of Portugal’s economy in a European context would empower the more 
progressive forces of the dictatorship, giving them leverage over the ‘ultras’ like Franco 
Nogueira, who insisted that Portugal’s priorities lay in Africa. Consequently, assisting 
Lisbon’s European policy was a roundabout way to challenge its African policy. 
Although not a completely innovative theory, this notion gained fervent advocates 
during the period, including the Bundestag’s Committee for European and International 
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Cooperation, the German Ambassador Ehrenfried von Holleben and the ‘modernist’ 
sections of the Portuguese dictatorship itself. The theory was particularly influential in 
the Auswärtiges Amt, which lobbied in favour of further development credit for 
Portugal and supported Lisbon in the negotiations leading up to the EEC trade 
agreement. However, because of the need to sell the European option to the Portuguese 
political elites, proponents of this theory argued that there should not be any explicit 
linkage between European support and Portuguese decolonisation. This position 
embodied the hope in Caetano’s reformism and in the influence of the ‘modernists’, as 
well as the idea that economic liberalisation would by itself be sufficient to promote 
political liberalisation. In other words, this group had argued itself into giving the 
Portuguese dictatorship the best economic advantages in exchange for as few clear 
political concessions and commitments as possible on the behalf of the Portuguese. 
In conclusion, while Bonn’s policy towards Lisbon in the economic field 
became a contentious matter within the FRG and even within the federal government, it 
was highly positive for Portugal. The German economic input supported Portugal’s 
industrial expansion and helped compensate the costs of the colonial wars.  The 
‘modernists’ obtained diplomatic support in their efforts to lead Portugal closer to the 
EEC. The ‘ultras’ secured Cahora Bassa, a huge colonialist enterprise. Rogério Martins 
gained a trade agreement; Franco Nogueira gained a dam. The dualist interpretation of 
Portuguese geopolitics according to which the strengthening of Lisbon’s interests in 
Europe would symmetrically weaken its Africanist tendencies misunderstood the 
complementary relation between Portugal’s European economy and African policy. 
Similarly, the assumption that it was possible to ‘separate’ economic relations from 
foreign policy with the Portuguese dictatorship disregarded the fact that Lisbon did not 
clearly distinguish between the two. Bonn therefore found it hard to separate economic 
cooperation with the dictatorship from Portuguese colonialism, just as it was finding it 
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 If the FRG’s economic relations with the Lisbon dictatorship carried with them 
political implications, this was even more pronounced in the case of military relations, 
especially given Portugal’s warfare in its colonies. With that in mind, this chapter 
examines Bonn’s attempts to disentangle its military links with Lisbon from Portugal’s 
actions in Africa. The chapter begins by explaining the historical background of the 
West German military entanglement with the Lisbon regime, in order to convey the 
precedents which informed the SPD-FDP coalition’s policy in this field. A second 
section focuses specifically on the significance of the Beja airbase used by the German 
armed forces in Portugal, which was by far the main legacy of the previous era. Taking 
into account the weight of these commitments, the chapter then examines how Bonn 
reassessed the ties between West German-Portuguese military cooperation and 
Portugal’s military activities in its African colonies, first with regard to the more 
‘direct’ ones – the supply of military equipment used in the wars – and then with regard 
to the more ‘indirect’ ties – mainly the reinforcement of Portuguese military industry. 
This chapter thus shows how far the Brandt governments went in terms of distancing 
the FRG from the inherited role of material backer of the colonial wars. 
 
 
1. West German-Portuguese military relations: from Adenauer to Brandt 
The FRG’s military relations with the Portuguese dictatorship were closely 
entwined with their membership in NATO. Not only did Article 3 of the North-Atlantic 
Treaty encourage military cooperation between member states, but NATO’s early 
strategy of ‘massive retaliation’ predetermined the deployment of nuclear weapons at 
the very beginning of a potential conflict with the Eastern Bloc. In this scenario, if war 
broke out, ‘Germany’ – at the heart of the Cold War divide – would likely be the centre 
stage. In the late 1950s, the fact that the GDR, armed with Soviet theatre nuclear 
missiles, could easily target the FRG’s logistical facilities encouraged Bonn to look for 
alternative locations outside West German territory for armaments storage and troop 
retreat staging areas. In case of war, the West German Armed Forces (Bundeswehr) 
would use this rearguard to recover and safely access material support coming from 
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overseas. Portugal appeared to be an ideal location for this plan, since it was, within 
continental Europe, the NATO country most distant from the Warsaw Pact.656 
If Bonn wanted to rebuild its military power and to establish a logistical 
rearguard for the eventuality of war, Lisbon was keen on modernising its outdated 
defence industry and obtaining financial support from West Germany. The first 
armament transactions between the two states were notably part of their concerted 
efforts to counterbalance the Portuguese trade deficit. In 1959, the Bonn government 
agreed to place orders of armaments and uniforms with Portugal worth millions of DM, 
thus stimulating the Portuguese arms and textile industries.657 What started out as an 
economic understanding, however, soon developed into a military accord. In January 
1960, Federal Minister for Defence Franz Josef Strauß signed in Lisbon an 
Administrative Convention defining the parameters of military cooperation between the 
two states. This agreement stipulated the reciprocal use of military facilities and the 
storage of German war equipment in Portugal, as well as the production and acquisition 
of military materiel of common interest. It also promoted mutual administrative support 
and the free exchange between the two defence ministries of new studies of material, 
technical and commercial interest for both countries. In addition, Strauß’ visit marked 
the creation of the German-Portuguese Military Mixed Commission (GPMMC), which 
would serve as a liaison body between the two governments in negotiations concerning 
military affairs.658 In line with Bonn’s intentions of preparing a strategic rearguard, the 
first German requests presented through the GPMMC on 29 March 1960 were for an 
airbase, a network of warehouses and the assurance of Portuguese medical assistance 
for the Bundeswehr in case of war. Over the following years, Lisbon and Bonn agreed 
to a number of joint projects in order to fulfil these requests, as West Germany helped 
finance the construction or readjustment of the required facilities in Portugal.659 
While the initial agreements between the two ministries of defence had been 
handled in absolute secrecy – even the Auswärtiges Amt was kept in the dark until late 
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1961660 – it became necessary to develop an elaborate operation to manage the various 
projects. Thus, in 1964, the FRG established a special military representation assigned 
to Portugal, the Zentrale deutsche Verbindungsstelle in Portugal (ZdVP). Its mission, in 
peacetime, was to plan and organise the logistics of the eventual supply chain of goods 
for the Bundeswehr and to ensure military readiness. Additionally, the ZdVP was meant 
to handle the transfers of military materiel between the German and the Portuguese 
Armed Forces. In wartime, the ZdVP Commando would be the highest authority of all 
Bundeswehr troops and administrative bodies stationed in Portugal, in charge of storing 
the goods coming from overseas and, if applicable, forwarding them to West Germany. 
A complimentary administrative branch of ZdVP was responsible for management, legal 
advice, contract negotiation, construction businesses and military economic cooperation 
with Portuguese offices and companies, as well as matters related to taxes and customs. 
In 1966, the ZdVP’s mission was extended to incorporate all Bundeswehr matters in 
Portugal, including the coordination of the military relations between the two states. 
Only three years after its inception, by 1967, the ZdVP was already employing 100 
persons.661 
For Lisbon the close military relations with the FRG played a significant role as 
well, particularly in the context of the dictatorship’s military activities in Africa, much 
to the chagrin of Bonn’s diplomats. Since the early 1960s, the FRG helped modernise 
Portugal’s defence industry with German planning, equipment and credit. Bonn also 
became Portugal’s biggest provider of military hardware, supplying practically all of the 
infantry armament used in the colonial wars, as well as several vehicles and military 
equipment.662 The Auswärtiges Amt opposed many of these deliveries from the outset, 
warning that they could damage West Germany’s international prestige, particularly in 
the Third World. However, Strauß and Adenauer, who both shared great personal 
sympathy for Salazar’s regime, considered support for the Lisbon dictatorship a 
preferable alternative to its possible weakening and the consequent rise of Iberian 
communism.663 In addition, military cooperation with Portugal was encouraged by the 
BMWi, because it furthered West German ambitions in the international aircraft 
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market.664 In turn, the governments under Ludwig Erhard and Kurt-Georg Kiesinger 
came to see the issue of military supplies as an increasingly political affair which could 
no longer be treated chiefly as a military-economic matter. In this vein, the Federal 
Ministry for Defence (BMVg), which had in the early years arranged the arms deals with 
the Salazar dictatorship with relative autonomy, came to rely more and more on 
authorisation from the AA which now carefully scrutinised Lisbon’s requests on a case 
by case basis.665 
More than this newfound watchfulness over arms sales, the Grand Coalition’s 
biggest blow to West German-Portuguese military cooperation was its decision to 
suspend or divest from most of Bonn’s military projects in Portugal. While this step 
might have signalled an early manifestation of the SPD’s critical stance towards the 
Portuguese colonial wars, the considerations behind it were markedly financial and 
strategic. On the former plane, the recession of 1966-1967 led to the reduction of the 
federal defence budget.666 On the latter, NATO, in response to the Warsaw Pacts’ 
increased military strength, had amended its defence strategy, replacing the doctrine of 
‘massive retaliation’ with one of ‘flexible response’. Under the new strategy – which 
dated back to 1961 – Eastern aggression would be met with an ‘appropriate level’ of 
response, instead of a full blown nuclear attack. Consequently, as many troops as 
possible were now needed at the front line in the earlier stages of the conflict. The idea 
of a logistical rearguard, which had been at the core of the West German-Portuguese 
cooperation, lost much of its appeal.667 
The blow was somewhat softened by NATO’s instability during this period, 
including the threat of imminent dissolution. The Atlantic Alliance underwent a crisis of 
its own with Charles de Gaulle’s 1966 decision to remove all French armed forces from 
NATO's integrated military command. In this context, the idea of replacing Portugal’s 
NATO membership with a bilateral military understanding with France became an 
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appealing option to Lisbon, particularly if NATO was seen as failing to support 
Portuguese interests in Africa. In Bonn’s perspective, however, this alternative 
presented a worrisome scenario, since it might cost the Atlantic Alliance the strategic 
Lajes Airbase.668 Portugal’s withdrawal might also sever NATO’s indirect connection 
with Spain, which was bound to Portugal by the Iberian Pact.669 These fears, together 
with the contracts and compromises already established between the two countries, 
helped secure a degree of military cooperation. In August 1968, one month before 
Caetano’s accession as prime minister, the Portuguese Ambassador in Bonn Manuel 
Homem de Mello stated his conviction that the AA, headed by Willy Brandt, had a 
“better understanding” of Portuguese African policy than it had three years before. 
Nevertheless, the ambassador noted the “mysterious” tone that characterised the latest 
German-Portuguese military cooperation agreements. They had been looked into by the 
Bundestag’s Defence Commission, but had not been validated in parliament, even 
though according to some jurists they should have been.670 This illustrates Bonn’s 
awareness of the controversial nature of its military relations with Lisbon, but it also 
shows that, for all the cutbacks on projects in Portugal, the Grand Coalition government 
remained determined to continue pursuing those relations. Indeed, Chancellor Kiesinger 
said as much during his visit to Portugal in October 1968.671 Later that year, on 26 
November and 5 December, ministers for defence Sá Viana Rebelo and Gerhard 
Schröder renewed the validity of the bilateral treaties between the two states. They did it 
one year prior to the original expiry date, in 1969, due to Bonn’s worry that the possible 
dissolution of NATO or Portugal’s withdrawal from the organisation might jeopardise 
the German-Portuguese bilateral agreements.672 
When Brandt became Chancellor, in October 1969, he showed no intention of 
giving up on the German-Portuguese military cooperation either. While clearly not as 
smooth as in the early 1960s, Bonn’s military relations with Lisbon were to remain 
friendly.673 By then, West Germany had invested too much in Portugal already and it 
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2. In the shadow of the ‘Beja affair’ 
One of the original 1960 Mixed Commission requests, the Beja airbase had been 
the most ambitious German project in Portugal. Defence Minister Strauß had conceived 
it as a fall-back base, which in times of peace could be used for aircraft repairs and 
flight instruction.674 Apart from being located far from the Cold War front line and 
forming a strategic axis with North America, Portugal had a number of other 
advantages: cheap labour, an average of 300 sunny days per year – which is ideal for 
flight training – and a thinly populated area near the Atlantic Ocean, in stark contrast 
with the crowded airspace over the populous West Germany.675  
Lisbon had ensured a good deal for itself. With the Base Accord signed on 16 
December 1960 by Franz Josef Strauß and his Portuguese counterpart Júlio Botelho 
Moniz, Lisbon had agreed to lease Airbase No.11, near the city of Beja, in Alentejo.676 
According to the President of the Portuguese Delegation to the GPMMC Admiral Sousa 
Uva, while the base represented another military target on Portuguese territory – in 
addition to the Lajes airbase – guaranteeing German involvement in Portugal’s anti-
aerial defence was compensation enough.677 The Bundeswehr had thus gained 
permission to use the base, as well as the buildings and facilities constructed within its 
limits, plus the roads and railways connected to the base. The German Air Force 
(Luftwaffe) had been permitted to train at supersonic speeds, but only in specific areas, 
agreed beforehand with the Portuguese authorities.  No shots were to be fired, nor any 
attack or defence devices to be dropped or bombs launched. The Accord had also stated 
that the base would remain under Portuguese sovereignty and the Bundeswehr’s troops 
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there would be submitted to Portuguese law.678 Significantly, in return for the facilities, 
the Bundeswehr had agreed to place a considerable amount of orders to the Portuguese 
military industry and to keep 10 beds available at the Hamburg-Wandsbeck Military 
Hospital specifically for Portuguese soldiers.679 
 Located 12km away from the city of Beja and about 2,000 km away from 
Germany, with an area of 600 ha, Bonn’s first airbase abroad had been an extravagant 
project. The Portuguese side had provided the necessary land and administrative and 
technical assistance regarding personnel and material, while the German side had 
handled the construction both technically and financially.680 The initial construction 
plans had included a 4 km jet runway, a 3.2 km runway for conventional flights, a 
control tower, 4 hangars and barracks for 100 pilots and about 400 soldiers. In order to 
accommodate all the expected military personnel (2,000), the technical and 
administrative personnel (800) and their respective families (2,500), German plans had 
also included a residential neighbourhood, a school, a hospital, two churches and leisure 
zones, as well as administrative buildings. Building work had begun in 1962 and it was 
still far from finished five years later, when the federal government ordered its 
suspension.681 
The project had been plagued by controversy. In addition to NATO’s new 
strategic concept and Bonn’s decision to decrease the federal defence budget, German 
authorities had failed to obtain a permit to fly regularly over Spanish territory.682 The 
Bundeswehr was therefore required to solicit authorisation from Madrid two weeks 
before each flight to Beja.683 To make matters worse, since 1966 de Gaulle’s new stance 
towards NATO created a similar predicament with France. This meant that if one of 
those two countries remained neutral in the case of war, West Germany would not be 
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allowed to fly military aircraft over them684, nullifying one of Beja’s main purposes.685 
By 1968, the Bundestag and public opinion were openly questioning the enterprise’s 
logistics and the planning mistakes of the federal authorities had gained the title of 
‘Beja affair’.686 In August 1968, the FDP parliamentary opposition started pressuring 
the government about its plans for the base.687 
When Caetano came to power, the tone of the German and international press 
was suggesting that Beja was now a burden which the federal government was 
desperately trying to get rid of. West Germany’s establishment of an alternative flight-
instruction arrangement with the USA seemed to confirm the most pessimistic 
interpretation.688 During 1968, Airbase No.11 had been practically deserted, with most 
buildings empty and an average of one flight per day.689 Yet while it is true that by then 
the German authorities were only interested in finishing the infrastructure that was 
already in its last stages of construction, they refused to abandon the project altogether. 
Bonn did not want to give Lisbon the impression that it was uncommitted to military 
cooperation with Portugal and thus willing to compromise future projects.690 Indeed, 
among the agreements signed in November/December 1968, Schröder and Sá Viana 
Rebelo renewed the Base Accord and regulated the status of the Bundeswehr in 
Portugal, the status of the Portuguese personnel and of the Portuguese firms involved in 
the maintenance and repair work in Airbase No.11.691 Set on making use of the base, 
even if on a much smaller scale than originally planned, the federal government looked 
for ways to take advantage of what had been constructed so far. The number of 
apartments already built exceeded the needs of the few German personnel stationed 
there at the time692, so they rented them to the Portuguese.693 Bonn also began looking 
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for other possible uses for the airbase’s empty industrial facilities, known as Zone III.694 
Moreover, an agreement with Lisbon on 14 and 22 May 1969 allowed civilian airlines 
from both countries – namely the German Lufthansa and the Portuguese TAP – to use 
the base for flight instruction.695 
To better understand Bonn’s insistence on the project, even after the logistical 
setbacks which had put its usefulness and applicability in question, it is vital to 
acknowledge the full scope of the Beja enterprise. Beja was a massive financial 
undertaking that the federal authorities somehow had to justify696, particularly as the 
liberal opposition was using the so-called ‘Beja affair’ as a political tool to attack 
members of the government, namely Strauß, Schröder and Kiesinger.697 From a 
strategic viewpoint, the base had not completely lost its relevance; with the heavy 
presence of the Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean, it made sense for NATO to develop a 
base for rapid deployment in the European southwest.698 Yet most of all, the whole 
project had become a symbol, an affirmation of West Germany’s military might which 
risked turning into a national embarrassment. In 1968, Der Spiegel quoted Ernst 
Wirmer, a head of department at the BMVg, referring to it as a “testimony to German 
grandeur”699. That almost exact phrase would be used three years later by Helmut 
Schmidt (SPD), Brandt’s first defence minister, in an interview with Die Welt.700 
Indeed, the SPD-FDP government did not go against this conception at first. As early as 
November 1969 it instructed the Luftwaffe to engage in conversations with the 
Portuguese Air Force (FAP) about the possibilities of intensifying use of the airbase. 
They soon began negotiations for the construction of a joint tactical air-ground fighter 
training range, which would maximise the base´s potential.701  
The prospects for the controversial enterprise thus seemed once more on the rise. 
While the negotiations for the construction of the training range were taking place, the 
Portuguese Ministry of Defence granted the Luftwaffe authorisation to use the Alcochete 
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range, 25km east of Lisbon. This authorisation was transitional, revocable and seriously 
constrained: the German aircraft only had access to the runways on a limited number of 
days, coordinated with the FAP, and were not allowed to use explosive or incendiary 
armament. Nevertheless, it was an exception to the explicit prohibition to shoot 
included in the 1960 Accord and it represented an important effort by the Portuguese 
authorities to improve German-Portuguese military relations.702 Having visited the site, 
the German Delegation to the GPMMC issued a positive report about Beja in March 
1970.703 Moreover, a projected American base in Spain reflected the Franco regime’s 
more cooperative stance towards NATO, opening the possibility for new negotiations 
regarding the Luftwaffe’s over-flight rights.704 Meanwhile, a study from March 1971 
indicates that Bonn continued to look for ways to take advantage of the industrial Zone 
III.705 In May 1971, the federal government announced that the BMVg now had a 
detailed programme for intensive use of the base. The first German F-104 jets were 
scheduled to fly to Portugal that very month.706 
Lufthansa and TAP, already training in Beja, were at last joined by the Luftwaffe. 
The German Air Force flew in fighter-bombers (Jagdbomber-) and light fighter-bomber 
wings (Leichte Kampfgeschwader), transport squadrons (Transportverbände) and 
dockyard groups (Werftgruppen) and used the base as a weapons training centre.707 
According to the rotation system, around 20 pilots of F-104 Starfighters, Fiat G-91 and 
Phantoms would go to Beja, spend a few weeks practicing shooting in Alcochete and 
then be replaced by the next group708. Transport Squadron 61 was flown in for an 
instruction programme to convert the Luftwaffe’s Noratlas pilots to the Transall C-160 
aircraft.709 An article from Der Tagesspiegel even speculated that the Portuguese 
airbase might also be used in the future to instruct pilots to fly new European-designed 
military aircraft, such as the Panavia 200, planned for release in 1976.710 Before the end 
of the year, Beja was supporting three to four thousand flights per month and had 721 
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soldiers and 81 civilian employees stationed there.711 It was much less than the original 
plans, but considerably more than during the previous years, even if the CDU/CSU 
opposition insisted that the base’s potential was being squandered.712 
                                                
The arrangement which had helped renew the FRG’s interest in Airbase No.11, 
however, was still too precarious for German needs. In September 1971, twelve 
delegates of the Bundestag’s Defence Commission visited the base to meet with 
Portuguese representatives for the purpose of finding new ways to improve its use.713 
The ZdVP took the opportunity to complain to them about Alcochete, where the 
coordination between Portuguese and German pilots was apparently problematic.714 Yet 
the negotiations for the new shooting range were not going easily either. Little progress 
had been made by the summer of 1972, when Ernst Wirmer – who had become 
President of the German Delegation to the GPMMC two years earlier – wrote to his 
Portuguese counterpart Vice-Admiral Armando de Roboredo e Silva requesting 
permission for the construction of the range.715 The Portuguese Delegation, the 
Portuguese Air Force and the Portuguese Embassy all expressed their willingness to 
comply with the German request, clearly using it as a sign of goodwill in the ongoing 
negotiations concerning the end-use clause on military equipment716, as discussed later 
in this chapter. Indeed, in early 1973 Bonn found further reasons to trust Lisbon’s 
commitment to the project, as the Alcochete range was scheduled to close down the 
following year and the FAP would need a replacement. Nevertheless, it was becoming 
apparent that there were inadequate geographical conditions to sustain the project. The 
federal authorities had requested a range of about 600 km2 in the vicinity of Beja, but 
the area did not seem capable of accommodating it, being too densely populated and 
crossed by railways and roads. The Portuguese side had alerted them of these practical 
obstacles, but emphasised the possibility of finding a narrower place which could serve 
the training purposes of the Luftwaffe.717 The German military believed that the 
711 PA, Ausschussdrucksache Nr. VI/117, Bericht über die Informationsreise einer Delegation des 
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enterprise would be feasible if only the Portuguese authorities were prepared to give up 
some roads and resettle a few people.718 
Without the new range, the Federal Air Force had little interest in Beja. The 
Bundeswehr was going through a difficult financial situation and Airbase No.11 did not 
seem to compensate for its high costs. The NATO range Decimomannu in Italy, already 
built and easily available to the Luftwaffe, presented a much more reliable alternative. 
This led the FRG to once again decrease its activities in Beja.719 In August 1973, when 
this announcement was made, Airbase No.11 had a total of 97 German soldiers and 86 
civilians (24 Bundeswehr officials, 62 local workers) stationed there 
permanently.720The reduction plan was to eventually discontinue training exercises for 
Starfighter and Fiat G-91 pilots, while other projects would remain, as would 
Lufthansa’s instruction programmes.721 The cut in personnel would not be drastic, as it 
would guarantee the presence of 84 soldiers and 79 civilians.722  
                                                
It was the closest Bonn came to actual disengagement. The federal government 
declared that it would be reducing its overall military investments in Portugal, 
decreasing them from DM 9 million to DM 6 million per year. The BMVg publicly 
stated that the main criteria for the decision were practical – inability to obtain the 
shooting range near Beja – and financial – until September 1971, Bonn had spent DM 
214.6 million in infrastructure in Portugal, including DM 144 million for the Airbase 
Nr.11 alone723 – and not a reaction to the Portuguese colonial policy.724 Official 
documents seem to confirm those priorities.725 Indeed, the mere fact that the the federal 
authorities refused to treat the act as political removed much of the political capital they 
could have gained from it. Nevertheless, the German conservative press accused the 
government of wasting Beja’s potential726 purely for ideological reasons.727 Bonn 
dissolved the ZdVP at the end of the year, transferring its tasks to the Defence Attaché 
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at the FRG’s Embassy in Lisbon, to the Luftwaffe command at Beja, to the division 
working with the aeronautical plant in Alverca and to the Bundeswehr Administration in 
West Germany.728 On 25 April 1974, there were about 500 Bundeswehr soldiers in 
Portugal: 400 had come for shooting practice and about 100 were stationed there.729 
 
3. The inescapable issue of military supplies 
The true price for the Beja airbase had always exceeded the one stipulated in the 
1960 Base Accord. From early on, Lisbon had made it clear that in return for West 
German use of the airbase the Portuguese expected a degree of compliance in terms of 
providing them with military hardware. That the hardware was destined to be used for 
colonial warfare was something the Germans had more or less awkwardly come to 
accept. Fearing an international backlash because of military sales to the dictatorship, in 
1962 the Auswärtiges Amt had asked the Portuguese for a formal assurance that the 
purchased materiel would not be used in the African wars. The dictatorship had agreed 
to declare that the materiel would remain in Portugal, which, as the Portuguese 
ambassador explained to the AA, allowed for multiple interpretations: Bonn could claim 
to believe that the materiel was restricted to Europe, while Lisbon would have enough 
leeway to argue that its ‘overseas provinces’ were included in the agreement, since 
according to the Portuguese Constitution they were part of the national territory. At the 
time, Bonn knowingly acquiesced, setting an important precedent.730 Over subsequent 
years the end-use clause (Endverbleibsklausel) on West German military sales had 
settled on the still rather vague – and ultimately disregarded – formulation: “German 
weapons and equipment supplied to Portugal in the spirit of reciprocity of the 15 
January 1960 Accord” were to be used “exclusively in Portugal and for purposes of 
defence within the framework of the North-Atlantic Pact”.731 
In this regard, aircraft and their uses deserve closer attention. Portugal used 
aircraft extensively in its African wars, due to the great distances that needed to be 
covered and the limited number of roads. The African liberation movements controlled 
much of the countryside, blocking surface transport in many areas, and some 
                                                
728 BA-MA, BW2/8456, Studie zur Frage der Umgliederung der Bw-Dienststellen in Portugal, 
25.07.1973. 
729 Matos (1977), pp.53-54. 
730 Fonseca (2007), pp.164-165. 
731 BA-MA, BW1/248536, Memo from the BMVg, 18.11.1971; SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute). 1971. The Arms Trade with the Third World, Uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksell. p.673 
164 
 
Portuguese military posts relied entirely on aerial supply.732 The FRG’s role had 
therefore been decisive: until 1969, Bonn sold or lent more than 200 aircraft to Lisbon, 
including 40 Fiat G-91, 70 T-6 Texan/Harvard, around 100 Dornier DO-27 and 11 to 15 
Noratlas, plus 10 helicopters.733 The last dispatch consisted of 30 DO-27, delivered to 
Portugal in July 1969734 to compensate for the reduction of German military projects in 
the previous years.735 Additionally, in May 1969 the federal government complied with 
the Portuguese request to extend the loan of the 70 T-6 and 60 of the DO-27 to the FAP 
for five more years.736 
 Together with the DO-27, the outdated Nord Noratlas aircraft was the most 
popular with the FAP. It was a tough aircraft, able to land on and take off from short 
runways and bad ground and to transport up to 7 tons of hardware or 45 men. The FAP 
used it for air supply in the three war zones and for dropping paratroops. Notably, 
several of these former German aircraft even retained their German paint-scheme, as 
well as the unit badge of the Luftwaffe Transport Wing LTG-62: a white elephant on a 
black disc.737 Given the German Air Force had a surplus of Noratlas after replacing 
them with the Transall, in July 1969 the Auswärtiges Amt, still under Willy Brandt, had 
approved the sale of 20 such aircraft to Portugal.738 In a meeting in September the 
Portuguese defence minister openly explained to the BMVg’s Undersecretary of State 
Karl-Günther von Hase Portugal’s need of 12 to 15 further Noratlas to transport people 
and materiel to the colonial wars and the need of spare parts for that type of aircraft.739 
Later that year, Bonn sold another 6 Noratlas to the FAP for the price of DM 100,000 
each under a contract from 20 October and an extra one under a contract from 5 
December.740 
The recently elected SPD-FDP coalition government did not change much 
initially. It was clear that the Portuguese dictatorship was not employing all the 
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purchased materiel solely for NATO’s defensive purposes, not the least because 
Portugal’s contribution to NATO was actually quite small.741 Indeed, an internal memo 
from the Chancellery of May 1970 clearly admitted that “we know from different 
sources that [the end-use] clause is not always strictly adhered to”, which placed Bonn 
in the awkward situation of “pointing out the end-use clause to the outside, while in 
silence we are aware of the violation of this clause by Portugal”. 742 Yet the federal 
government was trapped in a dilemma. On the one hand, fulfilling its agreements with 
Lisbon brought forth domestic and international criticism. On the other hand, Bonn 
depended on the goodwill of the Portuguese regime for the continued bilateral military 
cooperation, specifically regarding the use of Beja and Alcochete.743 The result was an 
ambiguous ad-hoc policy. The new AA, headed by Walter Scheel, told the BMVg that 
the authorisation for the Noratlas sales from July 1969, which had not been fully used, 
was no longer the basis for new deals.744 Nevertheless, the federal authorities sold 2 
Noratlas to Portugal in 1970, under a contract from 7 October, with the approval of 
Scheel’s Ministry.745 Moreover, on 9 September 1970 the BMVg proposed the sale of 3 
more Noratlas to Portugal. The Portuguese authorities showed interest in purchasing 
two, but their delay in answering meant that Bonn sold the planes to Greece instead.746 
The Portuguese government then asked for another two, for extraction of spare parts, 
and one was delivered in 1971.747 In addition, during this period the Luftwaffe and the 
Portuguese state-owned aeronautical plant OGMA signed several contracts for the 
delivery of thousands of Noratlas spare parts.748 The supply of spare parts was a way to 
circumvent the restrictions to the export of full aircraft.749 
 On top of the surplus hardware delivered by the Bundeswehr, the private sector 
played a significant role in transactions with Lisbon. The West German arms industry 
made around DM 170 million in sales to Portugal from 1959 until 1968750 and reached 
around DM 220 million in 1970.751 Portugal was the second biggest consumer of 
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German war materiel in 1970, and was surpassed only by the Netherlands. That year 
alone, Portugal contributed DM 58.1 million to the FRG’s armament industry, 
representing 14.9% of the industry’s DM 389 million total exports. In fact, during the 
first year of the Willy Brandt-led coalition government West Germany’s arms trade with 
the Portuguese dictatorship increased considerably: Portugal contributed 6½ times more 
to federal weapons exports in 1970 than in the previous year. The difference was 
brought about by the acquisition of three very expensive German corvettes, although 
Portugal also purchased machine guns, submachine guns and pump shotguns, as well as 
bullets and munitions.752 
 The three corvettes, built at the shipyard Blohm & Voss in Hamburg, did not go 
unnoticed. When they had been ordered, in April 1968, the BMWi had agreed to leave 
out the end-use clause.753 Bonn however reportedly delayed the construction of the 
ships, fearing their transfer to Africa.754 Indeed, the warships had been designed by a 
Portuguese naval engineer with the specific purpose of fulfilling the dictatorship’s needs 
in the colonies755 and – as the liberation movements and solidarity activists did not 
cease to point out – the Portuguese military press made no secret of this goal.756 When 
protests broke out in the yard, the Militärischer Abschirm Dienst – a federal military 
security department – was put in charge of its security.757 In the end Bonn allowed the 
delivery, seeing that it was an important economic enterprise for the FRG: these were 
the biggest warships built in West Germany since World War II.758 Portugal paid DM 
47.8 million, which represented 12.3% of total West German arms exports in 1970.759 
Although Bonn sought to convince OAU Chairman Kenneth Kaunda760 – and even 
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itself761  – that the warships only drew 3 meters of water and were therefore unsuitable 
for the Portuguese colonial territories, Lisbon transferred the first corvette – the 1,365 
ton João Coutinho – to Angola in May 1970762 and later assigned it to Mozambique.763 
The Portuguese Navy used it for several missions in Africa during the wars, as well as 
the other two corvettes built in Hamburg: the Jacinto Cândido and the General Pereira 
D’Eça.764 
As the blatant Portuguese use of German equipment in the colonial wars became 
a recurring source of controversy for the federal authorities, they did become more 
careful. In 1970, when Lisbon asked Bonn for 25 to 30 more DO-27 – mostly for 
extraction of spare parts – the federal government kept postponing the decision, wanting 
to wait at least until after Willy Brandt’s October meeting with the OAU delegation.765 
The Bundeswehr showed interest in selling its out-of-service aircraft: they were not 
airworthy, but the FAP, which had about 150 DO-27 at the time, could tear them apart 
and re-use their components.766 Nevertheless, on 23 December 1970 the AA officially 
blocked the delivery even of these out-of-service aircraft which were then sold to 
private German buyers instead.767  
By early 1971 Bonn clearly felt the need to finally tackle the problem, but it was 
uncertain about what to do, its priority being not so much to put an end to the military 
exports to Portugal as much as to save the FRG’s face in view of rising criticism. On 11 
January a spokesman for the federal government announced that Bonn had no intention 
of providing further military assistance to Lisbon768, but the statement was not fully 
backed up by the AA.769 In early April, Chancellor Brandt suggested to the British 
Prime Minister that they create a multilateral approach to provide military aid to the 
Lisbon dictatorship. His stated goal was to remove the issue of military exports to 
Portugal from the FRG’s domestic political front. The chancellor explained that this 
plan would allow the Germans to continue their military production, with the only 
difference being that Bonn would ship it to a different address, i.e. NATO, which in turn 
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would ship it to the Portuguese.770 London outright rejected this plan. According to the 
British Embassy in Bonn, even the Auswärtiges Amt had seemed sceptical of the idea, 
which had originated in the BMVg.771  
                                                
The government finally agreed on a set course during a meeting of the Federal 
Security Council (Budessicherheitsrat – BSR), an inter-ministerial committee772, on 28 
April 1971. The committee instructed the AA to negotiate a new clause with Lisbon 
which would state explicitly that German military equipment sold to the dictatorship 
could only be used in the NATO geographical area, specified in article 6 of the North-
Atlantic Treaty.773 Without this new clause, Bonn was not to deliver any more 
armament to Portugal, subjecting every export to the War Weapons Control Law or to 
the Foreign Trade Law. Despite the statement at the beginning of the year, in November 
Bonn informed the Portuguese ambassador that it was perfectly willing to continue its 
arms deliveries, as soon as Lisbon approved a satisfactory end-use clause.774 Although 
the measure clearly had the dictatorship’s controversial status in mind, the new status 
quo was coherent with Bonn’s overall strategy of distancing the FRG’s arms industry 
from areas of conflict.775 
Caetano’s dictatorship responded by insisting on the linkage with the rest of the 
military cooperation. It claimed that Bonn’s behaviour represented a departure from the 
spirit of the German-Portuguese Accord of 1960, considering the act improper for 
friendly relations. Lisbon kept reminding the federal authorities that the Portuguese side 
had exceeded its obligations with regard to the Alcochete range and expected similar 
consideration from the Germans.776 Thus the delegation of the Bundestag’s Defence 
Commission that visited Portugal in September 1971 – headed by MP Dr Friedrich 
Zimmermann (CSU) – returned to Germany convinced that the FRG, due to its interests 
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in Airbase No.11, could not afford to provoke a hostile attitude by the dictatorship. That 
very month, the BSR, at the request of the BMVg, agreed to the export to Portugal of a 
number of fuses for mortars and explosive artillery.777 In 1972, Defence Minister 
Helmut Schmidt wrote to the Auswärtiges Amt requesting further exceptions to the new 
policy, fearing complications in the negotiations for the Bundeswehr’s requested tactical 
shooting range near Beja. The AA replied that the government could not run the risk of 
German armament ending up in the Portuguese colonies, as it would contradict its 
previous statements to the parliament and to African leaders. Nevertheless, the 
Auswärtiges Amt was prepared to allow a few exports, under the previous clause, of 
materiel of untraceable origin.778 It also issued a detailed list of the Portuguese requests 
which Bonn was not willing to follow through on779, because the origin of the materiel 
was traceable or the price too indiscreet.780 
As indicated by the concern with keeping the materiel’s origin obscure and the 
deals low-profile, these exceptions were made with the awareness that no sale was safe 
without the new end-use clause. Indeed, by itself the BSR’s decision to review the old 
clause showed that the federal authorities at least suspected that the dictatorship was 
fighting in Africa with materiel acquired from Bonn. Moreover, a report from the 
FRG’s General-Consul in Lourenço Marques from October 1971 had even given a 
detailed description of the materiel used in the Portuguese military operations in 
Mozambique, including German-provided aircraft such as eleven Noratlas, thirteen Fiat 
G-91, around fifteen T-6 Texan/Harvard and ten DO-27, as well as the three corvettes 
built in Hamburg.781 In a meeting with West German President Gustav Heinemann later 
that year, the Portuguese ambassador acknowledged the situation, although stressing 
that the German armament in Africa was in small quantities and in conformity with the 
original end-use clause.782 
Lisbon tried out every trick in its book. Meeting with Walter Scheel on 1 June 
1972, Foreign Minister Rui Patrício made it clear that the federal authorities had to 
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solve the issue of the pending Portuguese requests before any negotiation about the new 
end-use clause could take place. Patrício insisted on the defensive nature of Portuguese 
warfare, the aim of which was to protect “Portugal’s African population” from attack by 
heavily armed militias. The Portuguese minister complained that the Eastern Bloc did 
not hesitate in arming Lisbon’s enemies and that Portugal would have been in a better 
position to fulfil its wishes if it “belonged to another alliance”.783 Although aware that 
the matter was mostly in the hands of the AA, the dictatorship also upped the pressure 
on the BMVg, both formally and informally. The Portuguese authorities contacted 
Undersecretary of State Günter Wetzel during his vacation in Portugal in the summer of 
1972. Days later, the newly appointed Minister for Defence Georg Leber (SPD) fired 
Wetzel for, among other things, meeting unofficially with Portuguese ministerial 
representatives, having thus disobeyed instructions from the AA.784 Wetzel’s 
replacement, Helmut Fingerhut, made his own visit to the country, in official capacity, 
in March 1973, and during his meeting with Portugal’s Defence Minister Sá Viana 
Rebelo, he was unsubtly reminded that the Portuguese war effort was also protecting 
German economic interests under attack, most notably at Cahora Bassa.785 
The Bundeswehr’s divestment in 1973 increased the urgency of solving the 
impasse, at the risk of further deteriorating German-Portuguese relations. Bonn did not 
want to compromise the remaining German military projects and facilities in Portugal. 
Therefore, the BSR prepared an alternative “lighter version” of the end-use clause, 
referring only to “spectacular armament” (ships, aircraft, tanks, missiles, etc), to be 
suggested in case the negotiations with the Portuguese proved inconclusive.786 In May, 
in order to create a good atmosphere in the talks, Undersecretary of State Fingerhut 
asked the AA to permit the delivery to Portugal of a small number of Walther pistols and 
respective spare parts, as well as two Noratlas aircraft.787 The Foreign Office authorized 
the sale of two old, barely airworthy Noratlas.788 
 These occasional exceptions, concerning essentially so-called ‘light armament’ 
weaponry, were hardly enough to satisfy Portuguese military needs. In August 1973, 
with the trade of war materiel having been mostly frozen for the previous two years, the 
dictatorship finally caved in. Lisbon attached the requested clause in an order for 
                                                
783 AAPBD 1972, Doc.157. 
784 Der Spiegel, Nr.30, 1972 (BA-MA, BW1/248536). 
785 BA-MA, BW1/248536, Minute of the meeting between Fingerhut and Sá Viana Rebelo, 23.03.1973. 
786 AAPBD 1973, Doc. 78. 
787 BA-MA, BW1/183516, Letter from Helmut Fingerhut, 22.05.1973. 
788 BA-MA, BW1/183516, Memo from the BMVg, 23.05.1972. 
171 
 
101,000 fuses for mortar grenades (DM 2 million), Fiat G-91 spare parts (DM 500,000) 
and 10 mortar simulators together with 2,000 training shells (DM 27,200) to German 
companies Diehl-Gruppe, Dornier and Dynamit-Nobel, respectively. The federal 
ministries for Defence, Economics and Foreign Affairs all approved the transaction.789 
Such compromise, however, did not fully rescue Bonn’s image. Despite the 
stalemate, the federal authorities had not been able to convince African public opinion 
that no German arms were being used in the Portuguese overseas territories.790 After all, 
if nothing else, those of pre-1971 vintage would still be around, not to mention the 
abundant G-3 automatic rifles, which, as explained below, were produced in Portugal 
with German license. It did not help that the Portuguese newspapers were not always 
discrete791 or that their German counterparts had an understandable interest in this topic. 
In a particularly embarrassing moment for Bonn, the West German press published 
photos of a fallen G-91 in Guinea-Bissau, with the Luftwaffe cross discernible under the 
FAP colours.792 On 22 July 1973, a group of 26 SPD MPs suggested that the FRG 
should impose a full military embargo on Portugal, i.e. also stop supplying even 
weapons tagged for NATO use. These MPs questioned Bonn’s ability to actually ensure 
that any German-provided military equipment would not be employed in the Portuguese 
colonies.793 Lisbon’s attitude was certainly unconvincing, as seen by Rui Patrício’s 
reaction to this proposal in a German television interview aired on 13 August. Although 
denying that Portugal was using any NATO resources in the wars, Patrício insisted on 
Lisbon’s right to arm itself by invoking images of violence in Europe: 
 
 “I ask if a campaign against the shipment of weapons to any government facing 
terrorist movements should be admissible. This would mean that England would also 
not be allowed to have weapons to defend itself from the Irish terrorists. Also any 
other European country where a similar problem could emerge tomorrow would not 
be allowed to have weapons for the protection of its population. We know that there 
is an organised campaign against Portugal and that some try to undermine our 
relations with our allies. It is a campaign with no moral or political authority 
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whatsoever. But maybe it also lacks a good slogan. I suggest the following: ‘Arm 
only the murderers’.” 794 
 
Although in the public domain the federal government stubbornly insisted that 
there was no evidence that Portugal was employing German weapons in the wars,795 the 
fact was that Bonn was not ready for a full military embargo. The BSR argued that such 
an initiative would contradict Article 3 of the North-Atlantic Treaty, which promoted 
support for the military defence of the NATO member states,796 even though other 
NATO members had already imposed embargos on Portugal.797 At the end of the day, 
even the Auswärtiges Amt, for all its concern over the FRG’s image abroad, felt that 
Portugal should not be pushed out of NATO, directly or indirectly. Not that the 
dictatorship’s military contribution to the Atlantic Alliance was very significant – after 
all, although it was in a process of intense militarisation798, the Lisbon regime was 
directing the vast majority of its resources to Africa. Nevertheless, as stressed by the 
AA’s Political Director Günther van Well in August 1973, Portugal served as bridge, 
both “geo-strategic” and “psychological”, between Europe and the USA. Van Well also 
recognised that excluding Portugal from NATO might open the way to questioning the 
status of the two other dictatorships in the organisation – Greece and Turkey – thus 
further compromising the stability of the Atlantic Alliance.799 
While sticking to its military relations with Lisbon, however, the SPD-FDP 
government made an effort to avoid taking any more risks than necessary. In 1974, 
when the Luftwaffe was set to release 50 to 60 airworthy Fiat G-91 R/3, Bonn ordered 
the Air Force not to sell the aircraft to any foreign country, fearing that they would end 
up in Portugal. Switzerland, for example, showed interest in the aircraft, but was not 
allowed to purchase them. The Portuguese company Alberto Maria Bravo & Filhos 
proposed purchasing the Fiats through the company Dornier, as spare parts, and then 
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reassembling them in Portugal, but by then neither Dornier nor the Portuguese 
authorities were willing to defy the Bonn government’s position.800 
 
 
4. The more ambiguous areas of cooperation 
Linked to the West German-Portuguese military relations – and to the Beja 
project in particular – were a number of more subtle ties to the Portuguese war effort, 
most notably in the field of military-industrial cooperation. Such was the case, for 
example, of Bonn’s collaboration with the Oficinas Gerais de Material Aeronáutico 
(OGMA), a Portuguese state-owned aeronautical plant in Alverca, about 20 km north of 
Lisbon. After a 1962 agreement between the Logistical Office of the German Air Force 
(Materialamt der Luftwaffe) and the OGMA, the FRG had supplied the plant with 
machines and technical equipment and paid for its expansion and modernisation. In 
return, the OGMA would perform periodic overhaul of German Noratlas aircraft, as well 
as the required repair work. More than the economic factor, the greatest advantage for 
Portugal had been the acquisition of know-how and machinery which, when not in 
service of the FRG’s demands, could serve the Portuguese Armed Forces.801 This 
aeronautical dimension of cooperation had been expanded in 1965, as the Bundeswehr 
had launched ‘Project Triton’. The project had aimed to build a large engine 
maintenance factory in Alverca that would manage the simultaneous overhaul of thirty 
Luftwaffe engines, namely twenty J79 for the Lockheed F-104G Starfighters and ten 
Rolls-Royce-Tyne for the Transall C-160.802 The federal government had suspended the 
enterprise in 1966 as part of that era’s general divestment803, but a ministers’ meeting in 
                                                
800 AHD-MNE, PEA M655 Pr.352, Document from Alberto Maria Bravo annotated by the Portuguese 
Undersecretary of State for Aeronautics; According to historian António José Telo, the dictatorship was 
not opposed to deliveries through third countries or similar cover-ups, but the Portuguese Foreign 
Ministry argued that this type of deal should be limited, since one single international exposé could 
endanger overall relations with West Germany. – Telo (1996A), pp.142,143; Based on the compiled lists 
of FAP aircraft, all the transactions during this period seem to be accounted for. – Cardoso (2000); Lopes, 
Mário Canongia. 2001. Os Aviões da Cruz de Cristo/The Airplanes of the Cross of Christ, Lisbon: 
Dinalivro. 
801 Tavares (2005), pp.62,63; BA-MA, BW1/66543, Speaking Notes of State Secretary Birkholz for the 
visit to OGMA/Alverca, 16.04.1971. 
802 BA-MA, BW1/66543, Memo from the BMVg, March 1971.  
803 While not as controversial as the Beja project, Triton nonetheless had its fair share of polemic due to 
the F-104 Starfighter’s notoriously high accident rate. (Schroers (1998), p.47). 
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November 1967 had decided to reactivate it, with a reduced scope, in return for 
Lisbon’s approval of the suspension of other German projects.804 
OGMA represented one of the most successful areas of German-Portuguese 
cooperation. The costs of the overhauls in Alverca were considerably lower than in 
West Germany, even when taking into account that the Portuguese needed twice the 
working hours compared to German plants.805 Thus in 1968 the FRG began developing 
a programme for the overhaul of Transall aircraft at the OGMA. An agreement signed 
on 26 November 1969806 determined that this would replace the Noratlas programme in 
two years. By 1970, the Portuguese aeronautical plant was doing up to six Noratlas 
periodical overhauls monthly, which totalled around 200,000 hours (72 aircraft x 2,500 
hours each overhaul, plus 300 hours of material preservation work). In January 1971, 
the OGMA did their last four Noratlas overhauls for the Luftwaffe and began 
overhauling the Transall. The BMVg was keen to not only maintain but even to increase 
the FRG’s cooperation with the OGMA.807 Indeed, an article from the Neue 
Hannoversche Presse from August 1973 estimated a yearly average of DM 500,000 
worth of Luftwaffe aircraft overhauls in Portugal during this period.808 
The Triton project was a different matter. In late 1968, together with the 
agreements about Beja, the two countries’ ministers for defence had signed an 
agreement securing the continuity of Triton. A few months later, however, the German 
Air Force had realised that the Portuguese had neither the know-how nor the technical 
personnel to fulfil their part of the contract. Lisbon asked for Luftwaffe specialists to 
help with the work and to instruct personnel, but the Bundeswehr which had a shortage 
of engine technicians refused. By 1971, the two enormous hangars, for which the 
federal government had paid DM 24 million, remained empty. Bonn was not willing to 
have any machines installed until it was certain that someone could operate them.809 
                                                
804 BA-MA, BW1/66542, Memo from the ZdVP, 16.07.1970; BA-MA, BW1/66543, Memo from the 
BMVg, March 1971. 
805 In 1968, the labour costs per hour in Alverca were DM 6, while in Germany they were around DM 25. 
The costs of flying the aircraft to Portugal were compensated by those aircraft being used for exercises in 
Beja. – PA, 5.Bundestag (5.), Ausschuss für Verteidigung, Ausschussdrucksache Nr.41, Bericht einer 
Delegation des Verteidigungsauschsses... 
806 The decision dates back to June, prior to the SPD-FDP coalition. 
807 The price of the overhauls rose to US$ 2 per hour in 1971. At this rate and without taking into account 
future inflation, West Germany would be paying the OGMA around US$ 166,400 in 1971, US$ 192,000 
(for 16 Transall overhauls) in 1972, US$ 240,000 (for 20 Transall overhauls) in 1973 and US$ 288,000 
(for 24 Transall overhauls) in 1974. – BA-MA, BW1/66543, Speaking Notes of State Secretary Birkholz 
for the visit to OGMA/Alverca, 16.04.1971. 
808 Neue Hannoversche Presse, 23.08.1973 (BA-MA, BW1/119773). 
809 Der Spiegel, 14.06.1971 (AHD-MNE, PEA M683 Pr331). 
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The BMVg suggested a private company, MTU (Motoren-Turbinen-Union, a joint 
venture of Daimler-Benz and MAN) to provide the technicians that Portugal required.810 
MTU began negotiations with Lisbon811 and proposed a budget of DM 49.3 million.812 
Under a provision with the Portuguese, DM 20 million of these expenses would be 
deducted through overhauls of German aircraft at the OGMA. Portugal would 
compensate further DM 18 million by providing free labour while the federal 
government and MTU would put up DM 6 million each. Lisbon, however, went back on 
this agreement and Bonn refused to give a more extended financial contribution.813 In 
addition, the creation of a joint venture between OGMA and MTU brought forth 
juridical questions that further complicated the process.814  
                                                
Economical constraints aside, West Germany’s attitude towards Triton did 
reveal some perseverance, as Bonn continued to work with Lisbon to come up with a 
solution for the empty facilities. By late 1971, the BMVg was considering telling Lisbon 
that there was no point in going on with the project.815 Yet Triton, at least since its 
reactivation, had acquired an underlying meaning. As Ministerialrat Karl-Heinz Backes 
explained to the Portuguese Delegation to the GPMMC, the FRG had enough overhaul 
capacity at home. Ultimately, Bonn was not interested in Triton because it needed it, but 
to prove its commitment to its cooperation with Portugal.816 The project was only 
officially abandoned with Bonn’s military reduction of 1973.817 
 Although the OGMA cooperated with the German private sector as well as with 
the Bundeswehr, the federal authorities were always involved to some degree. Such was 
the case with Lisbon’s attempt to replicate the Dornier DO-27, a type of German 
Liaison/Reconnaissance aircraft which the FAP flew extensively in Africa. The 
company Dornier-Werke had ceased production of the DO-27 in 1965 and a couple of 
years later the Portuguese dictatorship expressed its interest in reproducing this type of 
aircraft at the OGMA. In 1970, after negotiations between both their directors, the two 
companies began working on the project. This being a commercial enterprise, the BMVg 
810 AHD-MNE, PEA M641 Pr331, Telegram from the Portuguese Embassy in Bonn, 13.01.1970. 
811 Rogério Martins visited Daimler-Benz and MTU during his trip to West Germany, as described in 
chapter 3. 
812 BA-MA, BW1/66542, Studie zur Nutzung der von der BRD in Alverca/Portugal geplanten, erstellten 
und finanzierten Einrichtungen, 22.01.1970.  
813 AAPBD 1970, Doc. 554; Der Spiegel, 14.06.1971 (AHD-MNE, PEA M683 Pr331). 
814 BA-MA, BW1/66542, Minute of the meetings of Ernst Wirmer with Sousa Uva and with General-
Brigadier Fernandes (Director of the OGMA) in 06.01.1970. 
815 BA-MA, BW1/66544, Memo from the BMVg, 12.10.1971. 
816 BA-MA, BW1/66544, Minute of the meeting between Backes and Roboredo e Silva, 13.09.1971 
817 AAPBD 1973, Doc. 78. 
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did not take part in the deal, but it did act as intermediary. Furthermore, it provided the 
specific tools and required apparatus, which were property of the Luftwaffe yet stored at 
Dornier-Werke. The President of the Portuguese Delegation even asked for a free loan 
of this material, but, for budget reasons, the BMVg did not comply, choosing to sell it 
instead.818 The Auswärtiges Amt, usually concerned with avoiding links between West 
Germany and the Portuguese colonial wars, did not oppose the enterprise, because this 
type of aircraft, not being a combat aircraft, was not subjected to the War Weapons 
Control Law.819 However, in addition to assistance, reconnaissance and transport 
missions, the FAP did use the DO-27 for combat operations, equipping it with rockets 
under the wings.820 And, the federal authorities were aware of this through Luftwaffe 
reports821 and press articles.822 
Bonn was similarly ambiguous regarding Bonn’s ties to the Portuguese arms and 
munitions industry, an area of cooperation which had been highly dynamic since the 
early 1960s. The FRG had supported Lisbon’s efforts to reequip Portuguese military 
factories and technical personnel earlier in the decade in exchange for Portugal 
reserving a significant portion of its industrial capacity for West German orders of war 
materiel. The placement of these orders, therefore, had represented not only a direct 
profit for the Portuguese military industry, but also the assurance of West Germany’s 
contribution to the industry’s modernisation.823 Moreover, the FRG’s high number of 
orders had guaranteed the factories’ permanent activity. As Portugal had ventured into 
the colonial wars, its government only had to invest in production costs, not in the 
maintenance of the factories, making the production of armament and ammunition much 
cheaper for the Portuguese state.824 In particular, state factories Fábrica Nacional de 
Munições para Armas Ligeiras (FNMAL) and Fábrica Militar de Braço de Prata had 
largely benefitted from Bonn’s technical and financial support. The latter had begun 
producing and assembling the German-licensed G-3, the main automatic rifle used in 
                                                
818 BA-MA, BW1/66542, Memo of the ZdVP, 30.09.1970; It should be noted, however, that even though 
yearly reports from the BMVg (such as BA-MA, BW1/66544, Memo of the BMVg, 12.10.1971) state that 
Dornier-Werke and OGMA were indeed developing a version of the DO-27 together, there is no 
indication that the model actually made it to the production stage. 
819 BA-MA, BW1/66543, Memo from the BMVg, March 1971.  
820 Afonso/Gomes (2000), pp.363-364. 
821 Fonseca (2007), p.163. 
822 Air Pictorial, May 1968, p.170; Cockpit, March 1968; Frankfurter Rundschau, 28.10.1971, all in 
Bosgra/Krimpen (1972), p.18. 
823 Tavares (2005), p.55. 
824 Fonseca (2007), p.46. 
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the colonial wars. The metal-mechanic factory Fundição e Construção Mecânicas de 
Oeiras (FCMO) had also established a great number of deals with the BMVg.825 
This field was one of the most affected by the changing environment. The Grand 
Coalition had cancelled most of  its the orders with Portugal, claiming that, as a result of 
the new economic and strategic context, Bonn could no longer afford to purchase such 
high amounts of Portuguese manufactured munitions.826 In response, FNMAL 
repeatedly delayed the deadlines for its deliveries to the FRG, hoping to get new orders 
in the meantime and to benefit from Bonn’s extended technical support. By mutual 
agreement, an order of shells placed in 1963, initially to be delivered in 1967, was thus 
postponed to 1968 – only to be concluded in the summer of 1970.827 Yet the SPD-FDP 
government had from the start a clear policy of refusing new deals, even if it did allow 
the conclusion of previous contracts, namely the ones with FNMAL and with FCMO 
(for mortar ammunition and tank fist shells, concluded in 1972).828 In 1970, Bonn 
actually dropped an order for 16,168 shells for 105mm howitzer, but did so at the 
request of the Portuguese authorities, who needed those munitions for their own 
army.829 It was the end of an era: from 1959 until the end of 1970, the sales of the 
Portuguese arms industry to the Bundeswehr had reached DM 340 million.830 The 
Portuguese Delegation to the GPMMC complained that Portugal’s arms and munitions 
industry had grown specifically in order to accommodate West Germany’s requests; i.e. 
it was not self-sufficient.831 In fact, even Lisbon’s efforts to readapt and to find new 
international buyers required Bonn’s collaboration, since the agreement concerning the 
G-3 stated that Portugal’s export of this rifle required the approval of the federal 
government, as well as of Heckler & Koch, the patent holder.832 
 For all the commitment to stop importing Portuguese arms and munitions, the 
Brandt governments were not so strict when it came to West German exports aimed at 
the Portuguese military industry. In September 1971, Bonn allowed Dynamit-Nobel to 
export to the FNMAL know-how, machines and instruments for the manufacture of 
primers for munitions with calibres 7.62mm, 5.56mm and 9mm. The Auswärtiges Amt 
                                                
825 Tavares (2005), pp. 48-49,63-64. 
826 AHD-MNE, PEA M337-A) Pr332,30, Telegram from the Portuguese Embassy in Bonn, 16.08.1968.  
827 Tavares (2005), p.109. 
828 BA-MA, BW1/66542, Memo from the ZdVP, 16.10.1970. 
829 AHM, FO/007/B/41 c.365 doc.18, Memo of the Portuguese Delegation to the GPMMC, 09.04.1970. 
830 BA-MA, BW1/66543, Report from the BMVg, 12.03.1971. 
831 BA-MA, BW1/66544, Minute of the meeting between Backes and Roboredo e Silva, 13.09.1971. 




actually encouraged this licence, hoping that it would render further exports of primers 
to Portugal unnecessary.833 The underlying logic was that it was less damaging to 
provide the Portuguese with German machinery and means to produce munitions than it 
was to provide them with the same kind of munitions produced through the same kind 
of machinery and means in West Germany. This precedent soon came into play when 
Josef Meissner, a company based in Cologne, requested permission to export facility 
parts to the private Portuguese company Explosivos da Trafaria, which produced 
artillery munitions, grenades and bombs. On 29 March 1972, three months after the 
request, the Federal Office for Commerce (Bundesamt fuer gewerbliche Wirtschaft) 
approved the deal. The authorisation, after being prolonged in July, was valid until 29 
March 1973 and during that period Meissner fulfilled the order.834 This time the anti-
colonialist group AGM-Komitee picked up on the deal and it denounced it publicly, 
leading similar activist associations to write to the federal government in protest. MP 
Uwe Holtz (SPD) brought the Meissner case to the Bundestag in December 1973 and 
again in February 1974, asking if Bonn was ready to demand the return of the German 
equipment.835 The federal authorities refused to do so, stating that the deal had been 
consistent with Bonn’s policy, whose sole purpose was to prevent German material sold 
to Lisbon from being used in Africa. Because in this case the material was being used in 
a factory located on the Portuguese mainland, in Europe, the question of ‘final 
destination’, they argued, was not an issue.836 
 Bonn applied the same literal-minded interpretation to the issue of the special 
medical assistance granted to Portuguese soldiers since 1964 in agreement with the Beja 
negotiations.837 On 14 September 1973, when an SPD MP addressed this issue in the 
Bundestag, the AA’s Parliamentary State Secretary Karl Moersch denied knowledge of 
the situation.838 On 22 January 1974, a number of MPs wrote to Walter Scheel 
questioning him on the same topic. His answer stated that the Hamburg Military 
Hospital provided humanitarian assistance to patients who could not get the necessary 
medical care in their home countries, regardless of their race, religion or nationality. He 
                                                
833 BAK, B102/274672, Letter exchange between the Federal Office for Commerce and the Auswärtiges 
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834 BAK, B102/274672, Note for the Parliamentary State Secretary from the BMWi, February 1974 (the 
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837 AHD-MNE, PEA M337-A) Pr332,30, Dispatches from the Portuguese Ministry of the Army; Bild-
Zeitung, 10.08.1973 (in BA-MA, BW1/90837). 
838 Menar (1979), p.347. 
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claimed to see no reason to exclude the Portuguese from this policy.839 According to an 
article from the Deutsche Zeitung, until mid 1973, out of 441 patients from NATO-
states attended at Hamburg-Wandsbeck, 430 belonged to the Portuguese army.840  
Finally, one area which remained largely unsupervised was the cooperation 
between the two countries’ intelligence services. In September 1956, the Portuguese 
political police PIDE (later renamed DGS), had established an intelligence exchange 
protocol with the federal secret services BND.841 While the initial purpose of the 
exchange had concerned Portuguese citizens in West Germany and Soviet agents in the 
Portuguese colonies, as the dictatorship began its colonial wars, the exchange also came 
to include military matters. In the early 1970s, the BND provided training and 
intelligence to the DGS and it even occasionally collaborated in special missions in 
Africa.842 At the heart of this relationship between the two secret services was the 
connection between each organisation’s main rivals – i.e. between the liberation 
movements and the Soviet Bloc, including East Germany – which created the potential 




Willy Brandt’s governments, which inherited an elaborate framework of military 
cooperation with the Lisbon regime, sought to take advantage of the structures already 
in place and maintain the working relationship between the two states. This strategy, 
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841 IAN/TT/PIDE-DGS, Proc.6341/A, CI(2), Acordo com os Serviços Alemães (Gehlen) para troca de 
informações, PIDE Report, September 1956 (pp.5-16). 
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IAN/TT/PIDE-DGS, Proc.332-CI(2), Mísseis, 5, pp.36-37,63-86,103-122,130-139; Mateus, Dalila 
Cabrita. 2004. A PIDE/DGS na Guerra Colonial 1961-1974, Lisbon: Terramar, p.370. 
180 
 
however, was counterbalanced by general efforts to dissociate West German-Portuguese 
cooperation from the Portuguese colonial wars. 
A degree of disengagement – or discontinuity – in the field of military 
cooperation was the recent legacy of the Grand Coalition government. Under 
Chancellor Kiesiger, the government had already cancelled orders to the Portuguese 
military industry and had aborted or reduced the scope of the ambitious schemes laid 
out by Defence Minister Strauß in the early 1960s, such as the Beja airbase project. In 
part, those decisions had been pragmatic reactions to changing circumstances: the 
recession of 1966-1967 had tightened Bonn’s budget and NATO’s shift to a ‘flexible 
response’ strategy had challenged the conceptual basis of the original plans. The Beja 
project had been plagued by specific logistical problems as well, namely by the 
Bundeswehr’s dependence on unreliable Spanish and French over-flight rights. The 
moves to disengage also reflected the SPD’s concerns with Bonn’s entanglement with 
the Portuguese colonial wars, as evidenced by the AA’s comparatively less permissive 
stance on the export of military materiel during Willy Brandt’s tenure. 
After the SPD became the leading partner in the government coalition formed in 
1969, this last concern gained political weight. Not only did it respond to an ideological 
condemnation of the wars, the concern was also a reaction to African and domestic 
criticism, giving it a realist dimension which appealed to the now FDP-led Auswärtiges 
Amt. The parliamentary wing of the SPD played a particularly significant role by 
scrutinising and questioning many of the government’s potential links to the wars. 
Consequently, Bonn did not place any new orders to the Portuguese arms and munitions 
industry; it only allowed the completion of previously agreed deals. More importantly, 
the supply of military equipment grew increasingly precarious. This tendency 
culminated in the decision by the Federal Security Council in May 1971 to only allow 
further military exports to Portugal in exchange for an end-use clause explicitly 
exempting the hardware’s use in Africa. Lisbon’s initial refusal to comply led to a 
period of over two years during which almost no military sales took place. This 
represented a major departure from the past, and was by far the most serious setback in 
Portuguese relations with the FRG. 
 The other main factor which undermined West German-Portuguese individual 
cooperation was the dictatorship’s unreliability. The lack of Portuguese know-how, 
technical personnel and financial commitment prevented the activation of Project 
Triton. The poor coordination at the Alcochete shooting-range rendered the arrangement 
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with the Luftwaffe unsustainable. The successive delays in the negotiations regarding 
the new range near Beja – which Lisbon prolonged as a bargaining device for more 
military sales to Portugal – and the refusal to fulfil Bonn’s specific requests for the 
range ultimately compromised the appeal of Airbase No.11. The massive German 
divestment announced in 1973 was not a political statement, but the result of the 
dictatorship’s inability and unwillingness to satisfy the FRG’s military needs. 
 The fact that Bonn’s divestment was only announced in August 1973 – and even 
then it was not comprehensive – attests to the fact that overall the SPD-FDP 
governments were committed to securing the continuity of the FRG’s military 
cooperation with Portugal. Rather than squandering the vast contribution to that 
cooperation developed by previous governments, the federal authorities sought to make 
use of its potential, even if in a more cautious way than the one advocated by the 
CDU/CSU opposition. Cooperation expanded at the OGMA and, until 1973, at Airbase 
No.11, which had never seen so much activity. The case of Beja is particularly 
representative of the importance of legacy, since it had been an enormous investment, 
which had gained a connotation as a symbol of wastefulness; it dented the 
Bundeswehr’s prestige.  
Apart from the general policy of commitment to West German-Portuguese 
cooperation, many aspects of this cooperation were fuelled by the interests of specific 
agents. The BMVg lobbied for military sales – mostly aircraft – to Portugal as a way to 
support the West German military industry and the Federal Armed Forces, which could 
thus sell their surplus – and often outdated – materiel. The BMWi allowed sporadic 
deals which benefited German businesses, such as the sale of the three corvettes built by 
Blohm & Voss and of the explosives-making machinery by Josef Meissner. The BND 
trained military engineers and DGS operatives, and supplied the Portuguese forces with 
intelligence and equipment to combat the African liberation movements, in exchange 
for intelligence on Soviet armaments. 
By contrast, some important areas of West German-Portuguese military 
cooperation did not grow out of specific German interests, but were the result of linkage 
between those interests and Portuguese demands. An explicit example was the medical 
assistance regularly provided to wounded Portuguese troops at the Hamburg-
Wandsbeck Military Hospital, in exchange for the lease of Airbase No.11. In most 
cases, however, the linkage was not written down – Bonn simply took the initiative of 
furthering Lisbon’s interests in order to prove to the Portuguese its commitment to their 
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military relations. In this regard, the most prominent case was project Triton, which had 
been suspended and reopened in 1967 as a way to compensate for the divestment in 
other areas, and which remained open for years despite Bonn’s acknowledgement that it 
was neither necessary nor feasible.  
Naturally in most cases linkage was imposed, clearly or implicitly, by the 
Portuguese side, usually as a form of ‘quid pro quo’. After being practically abandoned 
for years, use of Airbase No.11 only became viable again in 1970 because of the 
promise to build a shooting-range near Beja, and, in the short-run, because of the 
authorisation for the German Air Force to use the Alcochete range. With these two 
offers, the dictatorship had opened up an exception to its initial accord with the FRG in 
authorising the West German troops to shoot in Portugal. Lisbon signalled that it 
expected similar flexibility on Bonn’s part. Moreover, the fact that the arrangement at 
Alcochete was so unstable and that the negotiations for the new range depended on 
Portuguese goodwill, gave Lisbon some leverage over its German partners. By keeping 
the federal authorities uncertain as to the future use of the Beja airbase, the dictatorship 
– much like it was doing with the Americans vis-à-vis the Lajes airbase – was able to 
obtain concessions on their strict control over the military exports to Portugal. 
Nevertheless, German willingness to pursue military cooperation with Portugal 
cannot be understood exclusively as the consequence of material interests. During the 
1960s the BMVg had lost control of this field to the Auswärtiges Amt and while Walter 
Scheel’s ministry was certainly not insensitive to the practical interests of BMVg 
colleagues, the AA was deeply conscious of the foreign policy implications that the 
FRG’s connotation as Portugal’s closest military ally carried. Yet equally, the AA had 
political reasons to remain a committed ally, namely the fear that if Lisbon ceased to 
have its military needs met by its NATO allies (at least to some degree), Portugal would 
leave the Atlantic Alliance, causing great disruption to the organisation and geopolitics. 
Consequently, the AA – and even the Chancellery – proved keener to publicly distance 
the FRG from Portuguese warfare than to effectively stop German involvement in the 
conflicts. This was demonstrated by Bonn’s continued supply of spare parts instead of 
full equipment, by the export of know-how and machinery to produce munitions instead 
of exporting the munitions themselves, and by Willy Brandt’s attempt to arrange a 
multilateralisation of NATO’s military assistance to Portugal. In this sense, the 1971 
BSR decision to reinforce the end-use clause should be seen less as an attempt to disturb 
West German-Portuguese relations, than as a way to preserve them. Its underlying 
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principle was that formally disentangling military cooperation from the colonial wars 
would enable the continuation of that cooperation between the two countries. 
 In conclusion, the Willy Brandt governments went farther than any of their 
predecessors in their effort to reduce the FRG’s ‘direct’ involvement with Portuguese 
colonial warfare. They did not, however, sever West German military ties to the 
dictatorship. By continuing to cooperate with Lisbon in a context of such strong military 
mobilisation, Bonn necessarily ended up contributing to the Portuguese war effort. It 
did so indirectly – for example, by developing Portuguese aeronautical technology – as 
well as directly – most notably through exceptions to its supply restrictions aimed at 
improving negotiations over Beja. Nevertheless, there was still friction between the two 
states as the gap between what Lisbon wanted and what Bonn was willing to provide 
gradually widened. The impact of this friction can only be measured by framing it in the 
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 Diplomacy brought together different dimensions of the West German-
Portuguese relationship, setting a general atmosphere for Bonn’s official overall 
approach to the Caetano regime. In order to assess the evolution of that approach, this 
chapter follows a chronological order. The first section concentrates on the late 1960s 
and explores how Bonn and Lisbon interpreted each other’s change in leadership. The 
second section looks at how throughout the year of 1970 the FRG’s Portugal-policy, 
pushed by the Chancellery as well as the AA, shifted from passivity to interventionism 
to resignation. A third section focuses on 1971 and 1972, when the AA was in relative 
control of this area of policy and reinstated a cooperative attitude. A fourth section 
deals with the accumulation of diplomatic crises caused by the inner circles of the SPD 
in 1973. Finally, a fifth section addresses the aftermath of those crises and Bonn’s 
responses to the increasing multilateralisation of the Portuguese problem. By outlining 
this evolution, the chapter sheds new light on the impact of the various aspects 




1. First impressions 
 The late 1960s witnessed unprecedented transformation at the top of the power 
chain of both the Portuguese dictatorship and the FRG, with the replacement of the 
leaderships which had headed each regime from its inception – Prime Minister António 
Salazar in Lisbon and the CDU/CSU sister-parties in Bonn. In the latter case, change 
had been foreshadowed in December 1966 by the formation of the Grand Coalition, 
which had first brought the SPD into the West German national circle of power. 
Despite this party’s markedly anti-colonialist and anti-fascist imprint, at the time the 
Portuguese Embassy in the FRG had not been overly concerned. By then, Portugal had 
already consolidated the trust of the federal authorities through its constant support 
regarding the ‘German question’ – although in this context Portuguese diplomacy had 
carefully avoided the term ‘self-determination’, for the sake of coherence with Lisbon’s 
rhetoric about its empire.844 In any case, Chancellor Kurt-Georg Kiesinger had been a 
conservative845 and had even told Portuguese Ambassador Homem de Mello in a letter 
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845 Kiesinger was even a former member of the Nazi Party. – Graf, William David. 1976. The German 
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that Lisbon could count on his support. Having feared an SPD victory in the 1965 
elections, Ambassador Homem de Mello had also begun establishing connections with 
the SPD, starting with Willy Brandt himself. The ambassador had shown confidence in 
these contacts gathering some goodwill, although he had not overestimated their 
potential, having told Lisbon that “we can expect a certain amount of sympathy 
[towards Portugal] on Willy Brandt’s part, but we should not have too many 
illusions”.846 
On the German side, Marcelo Caetano’s emergence as successor to the ill 
Salazar did not catch Bonn by surprise either. The federal authorities had considered 
Caetano a likely candidate at least since 1956 and they looked positively to his declared 
reformist views.847 When Caetano then came to power, German Ambassador Müller-
Rorschach reported to Bonn with a list of what he felt could be expected from the new 
prime minister. Caetano would – “step by step and surely with some resistance from the 
far-right and from the established circle of power” – finally uphold the (systematically 
disregarded) rights granted by the Portuguese Constitution of 1933, including civil 
liberties and free elections; turn Portuguese economy away from sate-corporatism and 
towards “free association corporatism”848; pay greater attention to the various social 
layers of the Portuguese population than Salazar – with his “conservative Maurras 
imprint” – ever had; grant the Catholic Church more freedom of conscience in social 
matters; and gradually release the press from its restrictions. In the foreign policy 
domain, Müller-Rorschach predicted no change either in Portugal’s friendly relations 
with the FRG or in the policy towards its non-European territories. Nevertheless, 
colonial administrative reforms were considered likely, with Lisbon aiming to speed up 
the cultural and social integration of the black population.849 The Auswärtiges Amt, 
however, was cautious in its hopes. In an internal AA memo it was claimed: “It is too 
soon to determine whether Caetano possesses enough authority […] to remain leader of 
the government for a considerable length of time or whether his tenure will only last for 
a more or less short transitional period.”850 
                                                                                                                                            
Left since 1945, Cambridge: The Oleander Press.p.96. 
846 AHD-MNE,PEA,M337-A),Pr332,30, Letter from Homem de Mello to Franco Nogueira,03.01.1967 
847 Fonseca (2007), p.222. 
848 Described as an updated version of the Pope Pius XI 1931 encyclical Quadragesimo Anno, which 
would include the workers’ right to free association and possibly even the right to strike. 
849 PAAA, B26/408, Telegram from the FRG’s Embassy in Lisbon,26.09.1968. 
850 PAAA, B26/409, Memo from the AA,30.09.1968. 
187 
 
In this era, the most symbolic moment for the German-Portuguese diplomatic 
relations came just one month after Caetano had stepped into office, as Chancellor 
Kiesinger visited Portugal, upon Salazar’s invitation, which had followed the 
chancellor’s award of an honorary degree earlier that year by the University of 
Coimbra. The trip had initially been scheduled for May851 and Kiesinger had already 
postponed it once.852 In September, the AA considered cancelling or postponing it again 
due to concerns over Salazar’s looming death and the uncertain longevity of Caetano’s 
government.853 Yet in the end Kiesinger chose to pursue the enterprise, visiting Lisbon 
and Coimbra from 24 to 28 October 1968, before heading to Madrid. It was the first trip 
to Portugal by a foreign leader since Salazar’s replacement. For the Portuguese 
authorities, it served as a way to strengthen both the country’s standing at a time of 
growing international isolation and Caetano’s own image as the new leader. In turn, it 
was the first time that a chancellor from the FRG visited the Iberian Peninsula.854 As 
Government Spokesman Günter Diehl explained in his memoirs, the popular belief was 
that “Franco’s and Salazar’s late-fascist governments were not a good company for the 
young democratic Germany”. Going against this view, Kiesinger argued already at the 
time that this initiative would in fact serve to bring Portugal and Spain closer to 
democratic Europe. Thus the chancellor met with Marcelo Caetano and President 
Américo Thomaz and even paid a visit to the hospital where Salazar was convalescing. 
Foreign Minister Willy Brandt, who did not wish to be directly associated with the 
initiative, sent in his place the Head of the AA’s Northern Mediterranean Department 
Niels Hansen and the AA’s Political Director Paul Frank.855 
The potential for a negative media spin was evidenced two days before the trip 
when the AA received the translation of an advance copy of Caetano’s speech for the 
welcoming ceremony. The speech began by stressing Portugal’s commitment to the 
question of German reunification and quickly shifted to the recent invasion of 
Czechoslovakia. If the growing Soviet threat called for greater solidarity among the 
western European states, that solidarity, as the prime minister put it, could not be 
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855 Diehl, Günter. 1994. Zwischen Politik und Presse: Bonner Erinnerungen 1949-1969, Leipzig; 
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restricted “to a few issues in our own continent”, because “the West is a bloc and on 
every occasion and in every place in the world where its values or interests are 
threatened, we have an obligation to defend them”. Predictably, the speech followed up 
on this idea by claiming that Portugal was doing its part by fighting to keep its 
territories in the Western Bloc and that, therefore, its African policy was in Europe’s 
best interest.856 Caetano would conclude by addressing the German-Portuguese 
relations: 
 
“The relations between our two countries, Mr. Chancellor, are excellent, whether in the 
area of politics, of culture or in the military sector with a defensive nature. The 
understanding and the wish of mutual help are always decisive. We have experienced 
good cooperation from the German side. I express my conviction that we ourselves have 
provided a useful contribution to the Federal Republic of Germany.” 857 
 
Despite the initial statements of Kiesinger and his entourage858 about a mission 
to bring Portugal and Europe closer together, Bonn ended up trying to downplay the 
political meaning of the visit.859 It was not an easy task, as the press immediately 
picked up on the implication of Caetano’s words, asking Kiesinger after the speech if 
the federal authorities would repay the Portuguese support for the ‘German question’ 
with similar support for the Portuguese colonial question. The chancellor replied that 
although he personally believed the time for colonialism was over he had not come to a 
country just to criticise that country’s policies. Both in his speech and in his answers to 
the press, Kiesinger talked about general solidarity towards Portugal but tactfully 
avoided an explicit commitment to the dictatorship’s African policy. Foreign Minister 
Franco Nogueira, in his own press conference, helpfully clarified that the Portuguese 
were not, in fact, requesting German support for their cause. Yet the Grand Coalition 
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had just found out what its successor government would come to experience in just the 
same way – that it was easier to be associated with Portugal’s negative image than to 
associate Portugal with the positive image of its allies. In the actual bilateral 
conversations, the rise of Soviet influence in the Mediterranean and the renegotiations 
of German-Portuguese military cooperation took centre stage over the chancellor’s 
stated goals of discussing Portugal’s place in Europe.860  
A shadow version of the event took place four months later, when Willy Brandt, 
at his own suggestion, discretely met with Franco Nogueira in Lisbon, during a stop-
over on his way to the USA.861 Brandt displayed personal sympathy for Nogueira, 
whom he came to call “the charming reactionary”.862 having first met him during 
Nogueira’s trip to West Germany in September 1966, when the Portuguese minister had 
complimented the then-Mayor of West Berlin Brandt during his speech in that city.863 
On 17 February 1969 they had a lengthy and friendly conversation about world 
affairs864, which gave Brandt close insight into what to expect from the dictatorship. 
Nogueira repeated in private that Lisbon was not looking for an endorsement of its 
African policy. At the same time, he warned that if Portuguese influence in Africa were 
to break down its place could be taken by powers which were less in sync with Europe, 
namely the UK or the USA. He asked Brandt to take this reasoning into account 
regarding the West German position towards Portugal’s African policy, stressing that 
the French had already done so.865 This confirmed Lisbon’s attitude towards Bonn and 
its western allies in general: it would not solicit direct support, but ‘understanding’ and 
‘solidarity’. 
In the autumn of 1969, the two countries had almost simultaneous legislative 
elections and the results were followed with interest by both sides. In the aftermath of 
the 26 October elections in Portugal, the German ambassador in Lisbon predicted 
hopefully that the newly elected ‘liberal’ MPs could prove instrumental in enabling 
Caetano’s reformist programme.866 In turn, the results of the FRG elections on 28 
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September and, particularly, the SPD-FDP coalition government empowered on 21 
October caused some apprehension in Lisbon, which was accustomed to dealing with a 
sympathetic conservative executive in Bonn.867 Yet Ambassador Homem de Mello 
downplayed the impact of the change of Bonn’s political landscape, having been 
reassured by the AA’s Political Director Hans Ruete that the new chancellor had great 
appreciation for Portugal and for its loyalty to the FRG.868 Between West German 
expectations of Caetano’s reformism and Portuguese expectations of Brandt’s 
pragmatism, both states still shared a benevolent outlook of their future together as they 
entered the new decade. 
 
 
2. The rise and fall of interventionism 
It is not surprising that the first impulses towards a new direction in the FRG’s 
policy towards Lisbon emerged from the Bundeskanzleramt. Willy Brandt’s 
Chancellery would come to take control of Bonn’s foreign policy, to the point of often 
blatantly bypassing Walter Scheel’s foreign office. Significantly, Brandt’s Chancellery 
consisted essentially of former members of the Auswärtiges Amt – including, notably, 
the chancellor himself, his undersecretary of state Egon Bahr and two close 
collaborators of Bahr in charge of foreign affairs, Carl Werner Sanne and Per Fischer  – 
who brought with them experience, ideas and relationships from their previous 
tenure.869 Imbued in the spirit of neue Ostpolitik, this was the team that wanted to take 
bold steps, away from traditional dogmas of West German foreign policy. In view of 
the Portuguese colonial system – as in the case of the similarly controversial regime in 
South Africa – the traditional line had been to avoid direct diplomatic intervention by 
evoking the doctrine of non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states.870  
The escalation of the African critique in early 1970, under the banner of the 
anti-Cahora Bassa campaign, opened the first fissures in this practice. The landmark 
memo of 8 May by Per Fischer reviewing the obstacles to the FRG’s Afrikapolitik 
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suggested a radical reassessment of the West German strategy in order to accommodate 
African demands. According to Fischer, not only should Bonn make its opposition to 
colonialism and racism much more explicit, it should also inform the authorities of 
Portugal and South Africa of its potential willingness to disrupt their political – and 
ultimately their economic – relations with the FRG unless steps towards decolonisation 
and end of apartheid would be taken. Fischer advised avoiding any sign of intimacy 
with those regimes, including refusal of mutual visits from ministers and heads-of-state. 
He suggested that the private nature of their trading relations should be stressed before 
the African public and attempts made to compensate the “negative effect” of private 
enterprises in the areas ruled by white minorities through the “positive effect” of 
development policies in the black-ruled African states. A further correction to Bonn’s 
behaviour should be persuading private corporations to reduce their businesses with 
“politically unpleasant” countries. Regarding the military exports, Fischer proposed that 
“we should, upon proving a clear breach by Portugal of the end-use clause, abandon the 
delivery of weapons to this country and secretly [unter der Hand] let the African states 
know it”. Finally, Per Fischer recommended that Bonn give humanitarian aid to the 
African liberation movements, just as it had been doing to Arab guerrilla organisations, 
including medicines, bandages and care for their wounded in Germany.871 
While the memo was clearly meant as the kick-off for a new age, Bonn’s initial 
inclination was to keep business as usual. As we have seen, for all of Brandt’s worries 
over the popular anti-Cahora Bassa mobilisation, the federal government did not 
disengage itself from the Portuguese dictatorship at this stage, neither militarily nor 
economically. In fact, Bonn even reasserted its commitment to Cahora Bassa that 
summer. It is in this context of determination to proceed with the traditional policy that 
Brandt asked Ministerpräsident of North Rhine-Westphalia Heinz Kühn (SPD) to 
deliver personally his answer to the appeal for a change in the West German policy 
towards Portugal made by Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda. Brandt’s letter and 
attached memorandum politely reiterated Bonn’s intention of essentially staying on the 
same course.872 
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Ironically, while Brandt was aiming to gather African tolerance for Bonn’s 
cooperation with Lisbon873, Heinz Kühn’s trip to Africa (15 August-1 September)874 
ended up becoming the first serious diplomatic incident in the West German-
Portuguese relations of this era. In his first declarations to the press during the trip, 
Kühn complied with the role of Brandt’s ambassador, explaining that Bonn would not 
go back on its decision to participate in the Cahora Bassa project. Yet in an interview 
with a reporter from Die Welt published on 29 August 1970 Kühn admitted that he 
regretted the federal government’s stance. This caused a great stir in the West German 
media. The most problematic incident, however, was Kühn’s public announcement that 
the SPD-associated Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FES), of which he was vice-president, 
intended to grant humanitarian relief to the liberation movements in the Portuguese 
colonies.875 More than contradict the government’s official position, this statement put 
the federal authorities on the spot, since the FES was partly subsidised by the 
government.  Kühn added to the commotion shortly after returning from his trip by 
embracing interventionist rhetoric in an interview to Der Spiegel:  
 
“[…] the federal government should, together with other European governments, 
influence its NATO-partner Portugal so that the Portuguese agree to gradually 
grant independence to their colonies, like Zambian President Kaunda called for. 
Otherwise Mozambique can become a new Biafra. […] In the long run Lisbon’s 
government could not ignore a certain pressure from the NATO Alliance.” 876 
  
Lisbon reacted with more concern than indignation. Foreign Minister Rui Patrício 
met with German Ambassador Schmidt-Horix and expressed his worry over the future 
of German-Portuguese relations and, in particular, his fears that the FRG would change 
its policy towards southern Africa by starting to fund the anti-colonialist rebels.877 In 
turn, the Portuguese embassy in Bonn approached the federal authorities in order to 
find out what kinds of relief those groups were going to be provided with by the FES. 
The embassy’s envoy underlined the political implications of this episode by stating 
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that Kühn’s statements had strengthened the anti-Cahora Bassa campaign and that 
“moral support for the liberation movements means support for the guerrilla war that is 
being conducted against NATO-partner Portugal in Africa”. The envoy argued that the 
provision of humanitarian relief to the rebels would allow them to save funds which 
they could then use to purchase weapons. He also noted that a “valorisation” of those 
organisations through external assistance would hinder the possibilities of any “friendly 
arrangement” between Portugal and Kaunda.878 Despite these observations, the 
Portuguese dictatorship did not defy the federal authorities. Instead, the biggest 
immediate consequence was psychological. For the first time, Lisbon seemed to 
seriously fear a change in Bonn’s policy of non-interference in the Portuguese affairs in 
Africa. 
 The federal government responded by dissociating itself from Heinz Kühn’s 
remarks. Ambassador Schmidt-Horix explained to Rui Patrício that Kühn had spoken 
as a member of the FES and not as a representative of the government, which would not 
change its foreign policy, as signalled by its continued commitment to Cahora Bassa.879 
When questioned in parliament by MP Walther Leisler Kiep (CDU), Willy Brandt gave 
the same answer. Kiep then asked if Bonn would consult with Portugal before 
supporting the liberation movements. Brandt replied that, since that support would not 
be coming from the federal government but from an independent foundation, there was 
no need for inter-governmental consultation.880 
 Despite Brandt’s claim to the contrary, the Chancellery did discuss the problem 
directly with the Portuguese leadership. Head of the Bundeskanzleramt Horst Ehmke, 
who was also federal minister for special affairs, travelled to Lisbon to meet with 
Caetano on 4 October 1970, in order to smooth out this political crisis. According to his 
initial instructions, Ehmke – who had met Caetano before as fellow jurist at an 
international congress in Santiago de Compostella881 – was to assure the Portuguese 
leader that the federal government had not been briefed about the FES’ intentions and 
therefore could not provide much information on this. He should also clarify that the 
Bonn government itself had no designs to give any kind of aid to the liberation 
                                                
878 BAK,B136/2992, Memo from the AA,18.09.1970. 
879 BAK,B136/2992, Telegram from the FRG’s Embassy in Lisbon,18.09.1970. 
880 BAK,B136/2992, Willy Brandt’s written answer to Walther Kiep’s question, 03.10.1970. 




movements.882 Nevertheless, on 25 September, the Head of the Bundeskanzleramt’s 
Section for Foreign Affairs Carl-Werner Sanne added an important point to Ehmke’s 
mission: “An issue which should be incorporated into your conversation with Caetano 
is Kaunda’s proposal to sit the Portuguese government and representatives of the 
liberation movements at the same table in order to usher a step-by-step liberation.” This 
addendum was prompted by the visit – scheduled for 15/16 October – of the OAU 
delegation led by Kaunda himself, who had recently become chairman of OAU and 
NAM. The Bundeskanzleramt hoped to turn the African perception of West Germany 
around by impressing the OAU delegates with new developments on the Portuguese 
colonial question.883  Success might mean turning Portugal from the main thorn in the 
FRG’s Afrikapolitik into a major asset of that policy. Both in its conception of a 
dialogue-based long-term transition and in its practical attempt to create a direct 
backchannel between the prime minister and the Chancellery, the initiative seemed like 
a deliberate effort to reproduce the conditions of Bonn’s successful neue Ostpolitik.884 
 By this time, African pressure was also pushing the Auswärtiges Amt to 
contemplate the adoption of a more active diplomacy regarding Portugal. On 16 
September, Ambassador Schmidt-Horix proposed to Bonn organising a collective 
demarche by the dictatorship’s Western partners to talk Lisbon into changing its 
African policy. The AA was cautious about the proposal, especially after having 
consulted the French Foreign Ministry, which disapproved of the idea.885 Nevertheless, 
it decided to consult the British about the possibility of using the NATO framework to 
arrange a settlement between Portugal and the African states, as well as to encourage a 
more open-minded African policy in Lisbon.886 In this regard, the AA’s Political 
Section regarded Ehmke’s planned meeting with Caetano as a possible test to see how 
vulnerable the Portuguese were.887 Paul Frank, who was now undersecretary of state in 
the AA, asked Ehmke to tell Caetano that the controversial status of Lisbon’s African 
policy – especially within West German society – made it complicated for Bonn to 
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remain neutral or to support the Portuguese position in future EEC negotiations.888 The 
meeting thus became a test tube for the strategies of both cabinets. 
 Horst Ehmke found it difficult to decipher Marcelo Caetano’s typically elusive 
rhetoric. Ehmke repeated the statement proposed by the AA as a prelude to asking 
Caetano about the chances of Lisbon negotiating with Kaunda. The prime minister in 
turn explained that he was preparing a constitutional revision which would grant more 
autonomy to the Portuguese territories but rejected any talk of decolonisation, since he 
did not even admit there was such a thing as Portuguese “colonialism”. Caetano added 
cryptically that even if one planned to grant the territories independence in the long run, 
one could not admit it loudly, since either the black Africans would rush the process or 
the white community might seize power, like it had happened in Rhodesia. Puzzled by 
this declaration, Ehmke could not decide whether or not it could be interpreted as a sign 
of “theoretical” disposition to eventually give independence to the colonies. Caetano 
told the minister that he had been approached by emissaries from Zambia a few times 
before and had shown openness to dialogue with them, but they had not followed 
through on his replies. Later, he explained that he was not mandated to negotiate with 
Kaunda about the Portuguese territories and so he could not do it.889 This, too, caused 
Ehmke some surprise, since he regarded the two statements as contradictory. Caetano 
then noted that in the past some talks with Zambian delegates had in fact taken place in 
the UN backstage and he indicated his willingness to reopen them in that forum. He 
assured Ehmke that he would welcome further exchange of ideas with the Germans and 
that he would promptly reply to related correspondence by Willy Brandt. Although the 
head of the Chancellery shared with Brandt his impression that Caetano viewed his own 
leeway regarding Portugal’s African policy as narrow within the strict confines of the 
regime, Ehmke still believed that he had made a breakthrough. He suggested to the 
chancellor informing Kaunda about the Portuguese leader’s flexible views on dialogue 
and following up this demarche with a personal letter.890 
 The AA had fewer illusions about their chances of success. Ambassador 
Schmidt-Horix, who served as translator during the conversation and was therefore its 
only other witness, displayed a more nuanced understanding of Caetano’s words. 
Contrary to Ehmke, Schmidt-Horix seemed to pick up that the prime minister 
                                                
888 PAAA, B26/398, Dispatch from Paul Frank to Horst Ehmke, 22.09.1970. 
889 Caetano displayed personal antipathy towards Kenneth Kaunda, but ignored Ehmke’s suggestion to 
ask Ugandan President Milton Obote to take his place. 
890 PAAA, B26/398, Dispatch from Horst Ehmke to Willy Brandt, 08.10.1970. 
196 
 
distinguished between holding talks to soften the tension with Zambia and actually 
discussing the status of the Portuguese territories. In fact, Schmidt-Horix’s report to 
Paul Frank was much clearer on the fact that Caetano had shown no interest in letting 
the Germans take any mediator role regarding Lisbon’s affairs, as evidenced by the 
preference for sorting those out through the UN backchannel.891 On 6 October, as the 
ambassador’s report was posted to Bonn, AA’s Undersecretary of State Sigismund von 
Braun talked to the British foreign office and learned that London, like Paris, was not 
inclined to give in to African pressure. Feeling a lack of support on all sides, the 
Auswärtiges Amt then tried to keep things in perspective. Invoking its allies’ 
pragmatism, the AA recommended to Brandt categorically reaffirming to the OAU 
delegation Bonn’s refusal to compromise any economic interests in southern Africa, 
including Cahora Bassa. The only practical concessions advised by the AA were a 
tighter control of the end-use clause and a disposition to talk to the Portuguese.892 
 Ehmke steadily proceeded with his plan. Having talked to Kaunda in Bonn, he 
commissioned a letter to be sent directly from Brandt to Caetano. The Chancellery’s 
Department for Foreign Affairs prepared a friendly letter explaining that “lately it has 
become increasingly harder, in the area of domestic and foreign politics, for the federal 
government to stay out of the discussion involving the Portuguese African policy”. The 
letter pointed out that the FRG’s participation in the Cahora Bassa project was under 
fire both domestically and internationally. It stressed, nonetheless, the importance Bonn 
placed on the cooperation with Portugal within NATO. Fearing that the two states’ 
“fortunately still good bilateral relations” should suffer because of the “conflict of 
opinions about the Portuguese African policy”, the letter asked for a way to spare both 
countries unwanted nuisances. Ultimately, it boiled down to two wishes: first, that 
Caetano would confide in Brandt the long-term objectives of Portugal’s African policy; 
and second, that he would follow through on the idea of engaging in talks with Zambia. 
The text, approved by the Auswärtiges Amt, intentionally avoided any indication of 
what measures Bonn would be willing to undertake in order to pressure Portugal. Head 
of Department Per Fischer proposed that initiatives such as a full weapons embargo 
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talk with Kaunda, 12.10.1970. 
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“should be included in a future letter [from Brandt] or, if possible, in a joint demarche 
with other allies”.893 Brandt signed and sent the letter, dated 31 October 1970.894 
Marcelo Caetano’s reply, dated 11 December895, was a textbook display of the 
dictatorship’s inflexible rhetoric. Caetano declared that “relations between our two 
countries have been very friendly and as far as I am concerned I only wish that that 
friendship continues and expands”, but he avoided the chancellor’s insinuation that a 
change in Lisbon’s African policy could safeguard their relationship. Instead, the prime 
minister delivered a brief lesson about the ‘originality’ of the Portuguese presence in 
Angola and Mozambique. Regarding the FRG’s domestic debate, Caetano lamented 
“the propaganda that is being made in the Federal Germany against my country because 
of the overseas problem and with the pretext” of Cahora Bassa. As for the international 
pressure, he proclaimed that the Afro-Asian group’s policy in the UN and the campaign 
against Cahora Bassa in particular had the “pure and simple” aim of expelling white 
people from Africa. According to Caetano, delivering “the rule of southern Africa to 
the African parties of revolutionary ideology would be the ruin of all the civilising 
work the Europeans have been able to achieve there”. Moreover, such a step would 
leave the region open to Soviet and Chinese penetration. He therefore described 
Kaunda as an “enemy of the West, all the more dangerous because he knows how to 
disguise his true feelings and manages to fool the people who listen to him”. Caetano 
did not even stray from Lisbon’s official denial of the recent Portuguese attack against 
Guinea-Conakry, making a point of denouncing the “speculation in the United Nations” 
surrounding those events with the aim of tarnishing “Portugal’s good name” and the 
“peaceful evolution of its policy”. The prime minister concluded that Lisbon would 
continue to unalterably follow the same path, which “deserves, I believe, [our] friends’ 
understanding.” Despite such intransigency, Caetano finished by remarking that he 
thought “this exchange of opinions and information” had been highly beneficial and 
that he was willing to further it.896 
 The letter was a serious blow to the Chancellery’s ambition of influencing the 
Portuguese government in this matter and particularly of mediating an understanding 
with Kaunda. Willy Brandt’s frustration would later echo in his memoirs: 
 
                                                
893 BAK,B136/3595, Memo from the Bundeskanzleramt,28.10.1970. 
894 PAAA,B26/445, Letter from Willy Brandt to Marcelo Caetano, 31.10.1970. 
895 Caetano claimed he had only received Brandt’s letter a few days before. 
896 BAK,B136/3595, Letter from Marcelo Caetano to Willy Brandt,11.12.1970. 
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“I also recall the stupidity we encountered in Lisbon in autumn 1970, when, after 
consultation with Kenneth Kaunda, we sounded on the possibility that Portugal’s 
possessions might be granted a change of status over the next ten to fifteen years. 
The Portuguese Government reacted negatively – so much so that a full 
transmission of their reply would have left the Zambian President with little more 
than a verbal kick in the pants.” 897 
 
 In January 1971, a discouraged Brandt admitted to French President Pompidou 
that he had no hope at all in Lisbon’s willingness to change the status of its African 
possessions.898 The dictatorship’s relatively tame reaction to Kühn’s statements had 
exposed the limits of Lisbon’s readiness to compromise German-Portuguese relations 
and had encouraged the Chancellery to push forth its agenda. Caetano’s letter, in turn, 
had painfully demonstrated the limits of Bonn’s ability to persuade Lisbon to give in on 
what was the cornerstone of the dictatorship’s policy. The Bundeskanzleramt never 
followed up with Fischer’s proposed ‘stricter’ letter. No arms embargo was ever 




3. The reinforcement of cooperation 
The western – particularly West German – diplomatic crisis caused by 
Portugal’s botched attempt to stage a coup in Conakry gave new sense of urgency to the 
AA’s compulsion to act, but its plans had grown less forceful. By February 1971, the 
ministry still wished to know how the British, French and even American authorities 
were planning to deal with the Portuguese problem, but for the moment it had decided 
to focus on bilateral action. Moreover, the AA no longer sought to use Bonn’s 
unavailability to cooperate in the EEC as leverage. Having perceived “Caetano’s highly 
limited leeway” regarding the colonial question, the Department for Sub-Saharan 
Africa postulated: “Although Caetano’s reform [is an] undeniable progress, we are 
concerned about further evolution [and] fundamentally committed to support all 
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liberalising tendencies in Portugal, as well as the country’s closer cooperation with 
Europe”. 899 
 The AA’s accommodating attitude was particularly noticeable in the way Bonn 
handled the Conakry episode. There were no direct consequences for the FRG’s 
bilateral relations with Portugal, even despite the fact that one of the victims on the 
night of the Portuguese raid had been a West German count.900 When talking to 
Ambassador Homem de Mello, Walter Scheel did no more than lament the situation. 
The minister recognised that the whole episode had temporarily compromised the 
policy of dialogue proposed by the moderate African governments, but he officially put 
the blame for this solely on Sékou Touré and East Berlin.901 Similarly, Bonn’s public 
‘white paper’ about the breakdown of West German-Guinean diplomatic relations 
carefully tiptoed around the Portuguese role in the invasion.902 One explanation for this 
tame diplomatic reaction was the fact that the embassy in Lisbon underestimated 
Caetano’s responsibility. Its diplomats had become strongly – and inaccurately – 
convinced that the DGS and the sections of the military supported by the ‘ultras’ had 
moved in Conakry against the prime minister’s will, in order to discredit his new 
African policy. Indeed, on 1 February 1971 the AA had been assured by the embassy 
that the ‘ultras’ were plotting a fierce opposition against Caetano’s policies of 
‘liberalisation’.903 
 It was in this atmosphere of conspiracy and uncertainty that in early February 
the new ambassador Ehrenfried von Holleben had arrived in Lisbon, only to become 
the main advocate for the theory of enhancing cooperation with Marcelo Caetano. Von 
Holleben was convinced that the prime minister was a tactician who was adopting a 
right-wing posture in order to appease his more conservative adversaries just so he 
could pass the constitutional revision. The ambassador claimed that once those texts 
were approved, Caetano could adopt measures which would profoundly change the 
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900 Count von Tiesenhausen had worked for a West Berlin firm which supplied equipment to the local 
military factories. Bonn’s report suggested that he was shot because he was driving a Volkswagen the 
same colour as those of the PAIGC, without explicitly acknowledging who killed him. – PAAA, B34/866, 
The Guinea Affair, p.6; see also Marinho, António Luís. 2006. Operação Mar Verde: Um Documento 
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901 AHD-MNE, PEA M683 Pr.331, Telegram from the Portuguese Embassy in Bonn, 21.04.1971. 
902 PAAA, B34/866, The Guinea Affair. 
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Caetano – unlike Rui Patrício – had been informed of the operation, even if only on 16 November. He had 
personally authorised it, under the condition that there would be no traces of Portuguese involvement. – 
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status of the overseas provinces.904 While single-mindedly repeating this premise to 
Bonn, von Holleben argued that Lisbon should be supported, rather than confronted: 
 
“For us in NATO or in the EEC Council of Ministers, the conclusion of 
[Caetano’s] Constitutional Reform should be a starting point for a reflection on 
how together we can take Portugal by the hand, help it slowly solve the dilemma 
of its attachment to Africa and bring it to a respectable place in the European 
integration.” 905 
 
 NATO’s 1971 spring ministerial meeting in Lisbon (3-4 June) put the AA’s 
stance to the test. On 27 May, Zambian authorities proposed to the local West German 
embassy that Bonn would issue an official clarification stating that the FRG’s 
partnership with Portugal in the Atlantic Alliance in no way implied an approval of 
Lisbon’s colonial policy. They suggested that the Western powers could actually use 
the NATO meeting to convince the Portuguese regime to change its policy. Switching 
to a more domestic problem, Lusaka also asked that Bonn persuade the Portuguese to 
lift the suffocating embargo imposed on Zambian goods in the ports of Beira 
(Mozambique) and Lobito (Angola).906 On the European front, Oslo sent a memo to the 
Auswärtiges Amt on 28 May explaining the Norwegian decision to address the 
Portuguese colonial policy at the NATO meeting.907 
 The AA held firm. Undersecretary of State Paul Frank explained to the 
Norwegian envoy that Bonn was quite familiar with the Portuguese problem, having 
been particularly affected by the Conakry episode. However, he expressed his doubts 
about whether the NATO Council was “a suitable panel in which to present complaints 
about the Portuguese policy ‘in coram publico’”. According to Frank, NATO ran the 
risk of disintegrating if it entangled itself too much with the inner affairs of Portugal – 
if nothing else that could feed similar controversies over Greece and Turkey. Frank 
summed up the AA’s new attitude: 
 
“NATO is exclusively a defence alliance, not a forum in which there must be a 
joint policy towards every issue. Besides, the federal government’s endeavour is to 
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influence Portugal in a rational way. Prime Minister Caetano is manifestly inclined 
to follow an evolutionary policy in Africa. His position will certainly not be 
strengthened if Portugal’s pride is challenged by, as host of the Council meeting, 
losing face in its own capital.” 908 
 
While the Auswärtiges Amt had not abandoned the idea of using the NATO 
framework to further its agenda, it was extremely wary of its partners’ overly 
confrontational attitude. Not only did the AA refuse to side with the critics of Lisbon, it 
instructed the German ambassador in Oslo to try to coordinate with the French 
ambassador a joint demarche in order to persuade the Norwegian foreign minister to put 
off his planned statement for the Lisbon meeting.909 In turn, true to the AA’s plan to 
establish a friendly and constructive dialog with the Portuguese, on the eve of the 
meeting Walter Scheel had a private conversation with Rui Patrício. Scheel expressed 
Bonn’s concerns over the rising tension between Portugal and the African states, 
particularly Zambia, and the wish to discuss related matters in greater detail. Patrício 
assured his German counterpart of Lisbon’s willingness to settle the disputes with 
Zambia, even disingenuously denying the existence of an actual embargo. According to 
the Portuguese minister, Lisbon was interested in securing a friendly coexistence 
between Zambia and Mozambique, which would be achieved as soon as Zambia 
stopped sheltering bases for the liberation movements. Patrício left a good impression. 
After this conversation, the AA decided against any official West German public 
declaration distancing the FRG from Portugal’s African policy, like the one Kaunda 
had proposed.910 
Inspired by the openness demonstrated by Walter Scheel, the Portuguese 
embassy suggested regular consultations between the two foreign ministers, an 
arrangement similar to the one the FRG already had with Spain. The embassy justified 
this proposal with Portugal’s general reinforcement of the connections with its closest 
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allies911, as well as with the wish of discussing bilateral questions such as the West 
German economic assistance to Portugal. The Portuguese diplomats also pointed out 
that Kiesinger’s visit in 1968 required a counter-visit, although they acknowledged that 
given the turbulent external environment it would be more convenient to invite the 
Portuguese foreign minister rather than the prime minister himself.912 
The Auswärtiges Amt’s initial reaction was positive. As late as November 1971, 
the AA still showed predisposition for a meeting between Walter Scheel and Rui 
Patrício, even if stressing that a “visit from the Portuguese foreign minister to Germany 
[…] should be as inconspicuous as possible”. For Bonn’s foreign office, it was an 
opportunity to tackle what it perceived to be a threat to the international state of affairs. 
The Portuguese wars were seen as “[undermining] our NATO-partner, [providing] the 
Soviet Union and Red China with a starting point for a stronger penetration in Africa 
and [hampering] our relations and the relations of the West in general with the African 
states”. The ideal scenario for the AA would be an “evolutionary solution” (in 
opposition to a ‘revolutionary’ one) for the colonial question, i.e. the colonies’ “gradual 
transition” towards independence managed from above. The Department for Sub-
Saharan Africa argued that this way would avoid a defeat of Lisbon with “far-reaching 
consequences for the situation in Portugal and in Africa”.913 Apart from that, the AA 
showed additional interest in using the meeting to discuss the expanding German-
Portuguese economic relations.914 
Despite this early enthusiasm, the AA ended up taking into greater consideration 
the damages that a close political association with Portugal would do to the FRG’s 
image in contrast to the little results it could produce. The AA recognised that “a 
meeting between Scheel and Patrício [would] expose us to further [propaganda] attacks 
from the communist side”. It feared in particular being accused of supporting the 
Portuguese in the wars and of forming a “Bonn-Lisbon-Pretoria axis”. Besides, even if 
the goal was to influence the Portuguese colonial policy, the federal authorities could 
not acknowledge it publicly. On the one hand, because there was little chance of 
success – “we should not overestimate our ability to persuade Portugal”. On the other 
hand, because Bonn’s “efforts towards a peaceful resolution of the overseas question 
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912 PAAA, B26/445, Memo from the AA, 03.01.1971. 
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203 
 
will only get us very limited sympathy in Africa”, since “most African states call for 
[…] the political, economic and military isolation of Portugal”. There was even the risk 
that the Portuguese would request that Bonn “support their position during the 
transitional period”. The idea of regular consultations would thus substantially reduce 
the leeway of Bonn’s policy. As for the FRG’s arrangement with Spain, it dated from 
years before, when the timing had been more appropriate. Furthermore, Portugal, unlike 
Spain, was a NATO member and all NATO foreign ministers got together twice a year, 
so Scheel and Patrício could contact each other without having to establish new 
protocols. For all these reasons, the AA ultimately rejected both the proposal for regular 
meetings and the suggestion for an official bilateral visit. In turn, Rui Patrício was 
invited to once again talk to his West German counterpart during the following NATO 
ministerial spring meeting.915 
This diplomatic back and forth encapsulated the ambiguous yet cordial modus 
vivendi of the West German-Portuguese relationship. As we have seen, ministers, 
undersecretaries of state and ambassadors met regularly with each other to discuss the 
very dynamic economic and military relations between their states; yet Bonn was not 
keen on the bad publicity which high-profile events could bring, even if it avoided 
explicitly telling that to the Portuguese.916 Lisbon was not, however, an exceptional 
case in West German foreign policy, which included relations with similarly 
controversial regimes such as Greece and South Africa.917 As Willy Brant explained to 
the Federal Foreign Affairs Committee on 16 March 1972, Bonn’s commitment to 
democracy and human rights did not interfere with its relations with dictatorships, so 
long as those relations furthered the three priorities of West German foreign policy: 
European integration, security and détente.918 This concept was, of course, at the very 
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foundation of neue Ostpolitik. While the Portuguese colonial situation did pose an 
original problem in comparison with other authoritarian regimes, in the end the same 
principles applied. Thus the federal government kept the relations with the NATO 
allied Caetano regime on a friendly level.919 From time to time, Foreign Minister 
Walter Scheel included lines in his speeches referring to Portugal’s future being in 
Europe rather than Africa, only to ultimately excise them from the final spoken 
version.920 
The Portuguese diplomats, who were well aware of Lisbon’s controversial 
image in West German society, did not ask for wholehearted political recognition of the 
two states’ friendship, but they did expect some protection against the opposition. 
Ambassadors and consuls complained about the sporadic acts of vandalism against their 
facilities921, asked the local authorities to pay the repair bills922 and even solicited from 
the police the restriction of leafleting on their street.923 The Portuguese authorities, who 
avoided any kind of relationship with the West German far-right despite their 
ideological affinity924, appealed to Bonn to prevent delegates of the liberation 
movements from visiting West Germany. Moreover, if it was difficult enough for the 
Lisbon dictatorship to accept the criticism enabled by the FRG’s free press, the hostile 
declarations coming from the ranks of the SPD – the main party in government – were 
particularly hard to swallow. Yet Undersecretary of State von Braun explained to 
Ambassador Homem de Mello that, given the political backlash for the decision to stick 
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to Cahora Bassa, Bonn had no option but to tolerate even such initiatives as the FES’ 
plan to give aid to the liberation movements.925 In a sense, this was the political price 
the dictatorship had to pay for its partner’s commitment to the Mozambican dam. 
Grudgingly accepting this, Portuguese diplomacy tactfully agreed to refrain from 
pointing out to its critics that the previous Bonn government – with Willy Brandt as 
foreign minister and vice-chancellor – had lobbied in favour of the adjudication of 
Cahora Bassa to the Zamco consortium.926  
Ultimately the dictatorship settled for ensuring the loyalty of the federal 
government itself. Although the Embassy showed that it trusted Willy Brandt’s and 
Walter Scheel’s goodwill, it repeatedly complained that Minister Erhard Eppler’s 
public condemnation of Lisbon’s African policy went against the good relations 
between the two states.927 Furthermore, responding to the creation of the anti-
colonialist activist group AGM-Komitte in 1971, which caused a stir in the Portuguese 
press928, the Embassy’s chargé d’affaires asked the AA to guarantee that the committee 
would not get public funds with which to support the liberation movements. He worried 
that the organisation might try to get state subsidies, since a number of its founders 
were SPD members of the Bundestag.929  
                                                
The AA and even the Chancellery pulled some weight to prevent the alienation 
of the Portuguese. The AA seemed to count on Horst Ehmke to use his clout to quiet the 
most prominent anti-colonialist voices in the SPD. On 22 April 1971, the day after one 
of Homem de Melo’s rants to Scheel about Eppler, Ehmke told the ambassador that he 
had had a long talk with the BMZ minister about his “attitude” towards Portugal.930 
Similarly, in January 1972, Walter Scheel asked Ehmke to persuade his SPD colleague 
Hans Matthöfer, who was at the head of the AGM-Komitee, to abandon the ‘Portugal-
Tribunal’ campaign. Scheel made the point that, as Ehmke himself had found out first-
hand, Bonn’s “attempt to influence the Portuguese overseas policy” could only be 
successful if the Bonn-Lisbon alliance consisted of “mutual trust”. He argued that the 
‘Portugal-Tribunal’ would shake the foundations of that trust.931 Indeed, for the AA, the 
planned propaganda offensive risked considerably straining West German relations 
925 AA, B26, IA446, Memo from the AA, 29.12.1970. 
926 AHD-MNE,PEA,M683,Pr.331, Telegram from the Portuguese Embassy in Bonn,21.04.1971. 
927 PAAA, B26/446, Memo from the AA,29.12.1970. 
928 PAAA, B26/444, Telegram from the German Embassy in Lisbon, 02.07.1971. 
929 PAAA, B26/444, Note from the AA, 21.06.1971. 
930 AHD-MNE, PEA,M683,Pr.331, Telegram from the Portuguese Embassy in Bonn,22.04.1971. 
931 PAAA, B26/445, Dispatch from Walter Scheel to Horst Ehmke, January 1972. 
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with Lisbon and thus reducing the “possibilities of influencing Portuguese policy in a 
positive way”.932 This fear justified the AA’s hostile behaviour towards the solidarity 
movement, although – as described in chapter 2 – said behaviour was also linked with 
other political concerns. Likewise, it was not necessarily merely out of worry over 
Lisbon’s feelings that Paul Frank instructed the FRG’s embassies in Oslo and 
Copenhagen to request the Norwegian and Danish authorities to refrain from further 
critiques against Portugal during the following NATO meeting (30-31 May 1972). 
Frank, who had been mandated by Willy Brandt, certainly had a particular interest in 
ensuring the smooth running of the meeting, since it was set to take place in Bonn. 
Regardless, for once the Scandinavians agreed not to address the colonial question, 
creating a propitious environment for Scheel’s second private rendezvous with Rui 
Patrício.933 
 Like the Chancellery, by then the AA had accepted that it could not persuade the 
dictatorship to decolonise through sheer reasoning. Walter Scheel’s notes two weeks 
before his talk with Patrício – which took place on 1 June 1972 – show that the 
Auswärtiges Amt changed the emphasis of its tactic in order to reinforce the idea of 
Portuguese rapprochement with Europe. The notes suggest that the conversation was to 
focus preferably on economic issues, particularly on Portugal’s increasing ties with the 
EEC, ties which would hopefully make it easier for the dictatorship to disconnect from 
Africa. It was not a new idea, but one that now took centre stage away from the colonial 
question. Nevertheless, if Patrício brought it up, Scheel was prepared to insist on 
Bonn’s evolutionary views, as well as to stress the need for more regulation over the 
military materiel that West Germany was providing Portugal with.934 The German-
Portuguese bilateral military cooperation ended up dominating the conversation, even if 
Scheel did manage to briefly slip in the EEC angle at the beginning of the meeting.935 
Although it was not making much visible progress, the AA’s cooperative policy 
had become institutionalised as Bonn’s default position, even if the conditions on the 
ground did not inspire much hope – marcelismo’s initial cycle of openness and reform 
had clearly drawn to a close by 1971/1972936 – and neither did the West German 
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Embassy. Von Holleben, who as late as September 1971 – looking back at Caetano’s 
first three years in power – had still argued that the expectations formulated by his 
predecessor Müller-Rorschach could be fulfilled937, was becoming less confident. In 
May 1972, he admitted to the AA that “in the three and half years since Caetano came 
to power, he has not managed to clarify, or he has not wished to clarify, in which 
direction he wants to lead Portugal” .938 The ambassador’s correspondence with the AA 
began displaying a greater awareness of Lisbon’s failure to deal with the mounting 
social and political crisis in Portugal and Africa; his tone grew not only more critical, 
but often sarcastic.939 Yet von Holleben’s disenchantment had little impact in the AA. 
For all the talk of change – in Bonn as well as in Lisbon – the priority was stability. The 
AA’s Political Director Günther van Well practically admitted as much in a long memo 
in January 1973, where he presented a balance sheet of Bonn’s Afrikapolitik in a 
changing world. Although predicting that “in the short-term the Portuguese overseas 
policy will remain the main problem of our African policy”, van Well argued that the 
federal government was irresistibly bound to the Lisbon regime by its NATO 
membership and by Bonn’s interests in Portugal, such as the Beja airbase. The FRG’s 
government therefore had no “realistic alternative” but to continue to live with its 
“typical dilemma” of professing ‘self-determination’ while at the same time 
maintaining its solid relations with Portugal.940 The events of the rest of the year gave 
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pours over the government. Every village worth its name – from the farthest bush in Guinea, Angola and 
Mozambique – welcomes enthusiastically the old man’s decision to remain president. The tone, the 
melody and the compass are given by Caetano, who on 3 July held another emission of his tv show 
Conversas em Família [Family Conversations]. Against general expectations, he did not mention 
Thomaz’ candidacy at the beginning of the broadcast, but only at the end, so his speech consisted of 10% 
of content and 90% of introduction. […]” – PAAA, B26/444, Dispatch of the FRG’s Embassy in Lisbon, 
10.07.1972. 
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4. The SPD offensive 
As the Heinz Kühn/FES controversy had demonstrated, the federal 
government’s ultimately rather gentle policy towards the Caetano regime was not 
embraced by all factions of the SPD. This discord had been manifest in the actions of 
SPD MPs both in the Bundestag and, via the AGM-Komitee, in non-parliamentary 
protest movements. It had even been institutionalised during the party’s annual 
congress in 1970 (Saarbrücken, 11-14 May), where a short resolution called for the 
Bonn government to cancel all arms sales contracts with Portugal and to refuse further 
contracts.941 By 1973, however, the phenomenon had reached a completely different 
scale, as the most dedicated anti-colonialist forces of the SPD pushed for a more 
aggressive stance against Lisbon. Regardless of its actual effect on policy, by itself this 
push was able to generate a series of diplomatic crises. 
The first incident, which occurred right at the beginning of the year, looked in 
hindsight like a small-scale rehearsal in view of the turbulence that lay ahead. The 
Dortmund Congress (13-14 January) organised by the solidarity movement had brought 
a number of representatives of the liberation movements to the FRG, much to Lisbon’s 
chagrin. In this context the AA had even agreed to refuse a visa to FRELIMO’s Vice-
President Marcelino dos Santos.942 However, the AA had to deal with dissent coming 
from within the government itself, where the solidarity movement had gained greater 
representation after the November 1972 elections, with the appointment of Hans 
Matthöfer – of the AGM-Komitee – to parliamentary state secretary of the BMZ. On 15 
January, the Frankfurter Rundschau reported that Matthöfer was going to receive 
Armando Panguene, a member of the FRELIMO Central Committee. Contacted by the 
Portuguese embassy in Bonn, Political Director van Well declared that the Auswärtiges 
Amt, after careful consideration, had recommended to all members of the federal 
government to refrain from meeting with representatives of the liberation movements 
from the Portuguese territories. The AA’s own Parliamentary State Secretary Karl 
Moersch (FDP) phoned during van Well’s talk to the ambassador to deny that 
Matthöfer had ever had any intention of receiving Panguene in the first place. However, 
the Portuguese authorities considered that the Frankfurter Rundschau’s story had 
probably originally been true, given Matthöfer’s “known hostility towards Portugal” 
                                                
941 Parteitag der SPD 1970, p.934. 
942 PAAA, Zwischenarchiv 101.435, Memos from the AA, 12.01.1973 and 15.01.1973. 
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and the AA’s exaggerated reaction.943 While apparently a minor episode, it signalled to 
the Embassy that it could rely on the AA to contain Bonn’s hostile impulses against 
Lisbon, 
 Yet the solidarity movement had not just penetrated the government, where it 
could be relatively supervised by the AA; it was working from within the SPD party 
structures as well. Notably, the party’s youth organisation Young Socialists (Jusos) 
joined the frontline of the anti-colonialist mobilisation in the aftermath of the Dortmund 
Congress.944 This group, which had been undergoing a process of intense radicalisation 
since the late 1960s, had great weight within the SPD and presented a vigorous political 
challenge to the party’s established elite. This challenge came into full swing during the 
1973 annual SPD congress, from 10 to 14 April, in Hanover.945 At this radically 
charged congress, the ranks of the SPD approved two resolutions aimed against the 
Lisbon regime. One of them stated that the SPD was “on the side of the peoples of the 
Third World” and it requested that the federal government use its influence in Europe 
to put an end to colonialism and to promote self-determination, including through the 
granting of humanitarian relief to the liberation movements. The other important 
resolution demanded that Bonn, independently from its alliances and obligations, cease 
any supply of weapons to dictatorships, namely Spain, Greece and Portugal.946  
 While these two incidents may have gone unnoticed among the general, less 
politically interested public, by the summer the SPD dissent reached greater visibility. 
Shortly after the British press released reports on the Wiriyamu massacre, causing 
international outrage against the Lisbon regime to reach its peak, Minister Erhard 
Eppler wrote an article for the SPD’s official newspaper Vorwärts, with the cover date 
26 July 1973. The minister attacked the dictatorship’s refusal to decolonise, which he 
saw as the main cause for the acts of “terrorism” perpetrated by both sides of the 
conflict. Contrasting the Portuguese case with the Vietnam War, Eppler condoned 
Bonn’s low-profile regarding the latter because it had been an American internal 
                                                
943 IAN/TT/PIDE-DGS,Proc.11,vol.11,CI(2), Serviços Alemães, Dispatch from the Portuguese Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs,20.02.1973. 
944 CIDAC, BAC0290A/a, Gruppenrundbrief 8, p.9. 
945 “SPD: Wir haben hart auf Bande gespielt”, Der Spiegel, 16.04.1973, pp.21-23. 
946 Parteitag der SPD 1973, pp.1103,1108. 
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matter947, but spoke of the need to raise international pressure regarding the former, 
which involved a European nation: 
 
“The Vietnam War was decided in the USA’s public opinion. Nowhere else. […] 
The duration of the Portuguese colonial wars will be decided in Europe’s public 
opinion, more precisely in the [EEC] Nine. We had to let Vietnam happen, we 
should not let a new Vietnam happen in Portuguese Africa. It is not just a matter of 
humanity or moral, nor of the right to self-determination. It is about our own 
interests. It cannot be true that a country like Portugal should be allowed to poison 
Europe’s relations with Africa. However one wishes to politically rate Portugal, it 
is not a world power, but a country at the edge of Europe with the quota of 
illiterates of a developing nation. Its future is in Europe, nowhere else.” 948 
 
The minister quoted the British newspaper The Observer of 15 July, which 
argued that Portugal would ultimately have to choose between association with the 
EEC and pursuing its wars in Africa. Eppler stated that Europe should present that 
dichotomy clearly, concluding that “even where one does not get many free elections, 
one must eventually make a choice”. 949 
Eppler’s article became the epicentre of the already ongoing discussion 
surrounding Portuguese colonialism, which reached its highest point that summer. The 
Portuguese Embassy in Bonn reacted immediately with a press release accusing Erhard 
Eppler of supporting his “already known personal view” with the “prophecy of a British 
weekly newspaper”. The Embassy also invited Eppler to visit the Portuguese territories 
in Africa in order to “get a clear picture of the actual situation”.950 The BMZ replied 
with its own press release, stating that “a visit to Mozambique could neither bring 
clarity about what is going on in the different parts of that vast territory, nor could it 
change the fact that every type of colonialism is an anachronism in our time”.951 The 
Auswärtiges Amt explicitly refused to take part in the controversy.952 Over the 
following weeks, Eppler’s remarks were the subject of several articles in the West 
                                                
947 “What would have gone differently in Vietnam, if the federal government – like the French and the 
Swedish – had strongly condemned the USA’s intervention? Probably nothing. The peace in Vietnam 
would not have been easier, but instead the peace policy in Europe would have been harder.” 
948 “Lissabon muß jetzt wählen”, Vorwärts, 26.07.1973. 
949 ibid 
950 Press release of the Portuguese Embassy in Bonn, 25.07.1973, in Materialien Nr.41, October 1973. 
951 Press release of the BMZ, 25.07.1973, in Materialien Nr.41, October 1973. 
952 Press release of the AA, 26.07.1973, in Materialien Nr.41, October 1973. 
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German and Portuguese press, with the latter exhibiting an atypically harsh tone.953 
Interviewed by the West German television programme Report, aired on 13 August 
1973, Foreign Minister Rui Patrício rejected Eppler’s notion of Lisbon having to 
choose between its African territories and its European economic cooperation. Patrício 
argued that the two were complementary and an intrinsic part of the Portuguese 
identity: “Portugal has been a European nation for eight centuries and an African nation 
for five”.954   
Erhard Eppler defended his views, even if he was evasive about their practical 
implications. On television – and also in the Bundestag on 19 September – he 
reaffirmed his position, although stressing that his article’s main idea was taken from 
The Observer and that he had merely underlined its arguments. Eppler avoided the 
question of European states’ right to interfere in the domestic affairs of the Portuguese 
state by talking about public opinion pressure instead of specific sanctions against 
Lisbon. Additionally, he wrote an open letter to Portuguese Ambassador João de Freitas 
Cruz, dated 29 August 1973, stating that he was ready to accept the invitation to visit 
Mozambique and Angola. Eppler added, however, that he would only do so after 
Lisbon had allowed for an independent international commission to investigate the 
reported Wiriyamu massacre.955 This was a diplomatic move: the Portuguese were 
clearly not willing to comply with such a condition, which created an impasse between 
the two parties.956 
In parallel with Eppler’s polemics, one of the most symbolic episodes to take 
place in the ‘hot’ summer of 1973 was the visit of a FRELIMO delegation to Bonn, at 
the invitation of the SPD’s Commission for International Relations. During this visit, 
which took place from 2 to 8 August, the Commission officially announced that the 
SPD was going to offer the FRELIMO political and humanitarian support. This caused 
a great stir among the Portuguese authorities, not to mention the Portuguese press.957 
Portugal’s Embassy in Bonn issued a public protest declaring that such type of 
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invitations hurt the chances of peace in Africa and that they fully dismissed “Portugal’s 
valid struggle for the political, economic and social progress of Mozambique”.958 In a 
telegram to Lisbon from 15 August, Ambassador Freitas Cruz wrote that “it is clear that 
the ‘lobby’ for the terrorist movements includes high-profile figures of the federal 
government”, referring not only to Erhard Eppler but also to Egon Bahr, who had 
recently replaced Ehmke as minister for special affairs. Nevertheless, Freitas Cruz 
acknowledged that the FRELIMO action had been a private initiative of the SPD, which 
he considered to be party-politically motivated in the desire to catch up with the 
positions of the Scandinavian and Dutch social-democrats.959 Just like the West 
Germans, the Portuguese had to learn to accept their partners’ idiosyncrasies in the 
name of the bigger picture. When he met with Walter Scheel on 29 August, Freitas 
Cruz admitted that the only real “thorn” in the bilateral relations between the two states 
were the difficulties in the supply of West German military materiel to Portugal.960 
Thus the main dispute related to the FRELIMO episode turned out not to be 
inter-governmental, but intra-governmental – indeed, it struck at the core of the 
coalition. The Auswärtiges Amt had not been informed, much less consulted, about 
either the SPD’s invitation or its decision to grant relief to the liberation movement. 
Foreign Minister Walter Scheel adopted a quiet and distant position, like the rest of the 
federal government, but he was very displeased. An article in Die Welt from 8 August 
1973 quoted him complaining that Bonn’s biggest party – which also happened to be 
the chancellor’s party – should not run a diplomatic agenda which contradicted the 
government’s line, at the risk of compromising West Germany’s outside image.961 On 
17 August, Scheel wrote to Willy Brandt about his reservations regarding the recent 
comments and actions of prominent SPD members. He warned Brandt that they could 
lead other countries – particularly in Africa, where the governmental power usually 
belonged to single parties, not to coalitions – to believe that the federal government as a 
whole had changed its policy towards southern Africa. The foreign minister stated that, 
because there was “no basic alternative” to Bonn’s current policy – which Brandt 
himself had helped shape during his tenure in the AA – it was not wise to give such an 
impression. While FRELIMO’s visit to the FRG might have invited a positive reaction 
                                                
958 Diário de Notícias, 07.08.1973, in IAN/TT/PIDE-DGS,CI(2),Pr.11,vol.11,Serviços Alemães. 
959 AHD-MNE,PEA,M756,Pr.331, Telegram from the Portuguese Embassy in Bonn,15.08.1973. 
960 AHD-MNE,PEA,M756,Pr.331, Telegram from the Portuguese Embassy in Bonn,30.08.1973. 
961 “Scheel war uber Frelimo-Aktivitat der SPD nicht unterrichtet”, Die Welt, 08.08.1973, in Materialien 
Nr.41, October 1973.  
213 
 
from the African states, Scheel pointed out its long-term effects. On the one hand, that 
initiative suggested that “all it took was some extra pressure against the federal 
government” to achieve a “spectacular turn in [Bonn’s] African policy”. On the other 
hand, as the government could not fulfil the expectations of change, disappointment 
would inevitably ensue.962  
The AA clearly had no intention of changing course. Asked to define the 
guidelines of Portugal-Politik, Political Director van Well produced a long memo 
which ultimately boiled down to the usual formula: proceed with cooperation while 
keeping a healthy diplomatic distance. Although justifying this position with the FRG’s 
immediate interests, van Well insisted that Bonn should remain a friendly partner with 
Lisbon because that would please the regime’s ‘liberals’ and “could also be helpful for 
the Portuguese leader”. By contrast, according to van Well, to isolate Portugal would 
merely strengthen its colonialist tendencies. Consequently, the AA’s consistently firm 
position was that the federal government should continue to avoid official contacts with 
– and support of – the liberation movements fighting against Portugal, as well as 
oppose any international sanctions on the Lisbon regime.963 The AA even wrote to the 
SPD’s International Department explaining that any short-term solutions for the 
Portuguese colonial rule in Mozambique – FRELIMO’s victory, with or without other 
African and Chinese troops, or even a Rhodesia-style takeover by the whites – were 
unlikely to work and the result would be “probably bloody”. For the AA, the only 
alternative would be a long-term transition based on the British and French models of 
decolonisation.964 
 As Scheel had predicted, ultimately the true centre of the controversy was not so 
much Erhard Eppler’s personal comments about Portuguese colonialism or even 
FRELIMO’s visit per se, but the question of whether those initiatives signalled a shift in 
Bonn’s policy towards Lisbon. This clarification became all the more necessary with 
the announcement in August 1973 that the FRG would be reducing its military 
investments in Portugal. In the Bundestag, MPs from CDU/CSU repeatedly demanded 
that the federal government define its position once and for all. They frequently alluded 
to neue Ostpolitik, asking if Lisbon would be allowed a better treatment if it were a 
Communist dictatorship. By contrast, the SPD faction requested a firm statement 
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against the Caetano regime. The Auswärtiges Amt acknowledged that, if the Wiriyamu 
reports were proven accurate, it would not hesitate to condemn the behaviour of a 
friendly ally.965  Yet the AA announced that Bonn had no intentions of changing its 
overall policy towards Lisbon.966 The BMVg issued a similar statement, explaining that, 
regardless of the military divestment, the West German-Portuguese relations would 
continue to be based on three core elements: loyal cooperation within NATO, a 
traditional good bilateral relationship and the efforts of the federal government to 
include Portugal in the process of European integration.967 On 13 September, Willy 
Brandt declared that the West German government could not identify “with the 
Portuguese point of view, according to which Angola and Mozambique are inseparable 
from Portugal”. Nevertheless, he added, that was “a domestic problem from our ally” 
and one which Bonn would not interfere with.968 In practice, the whole debacle 
demonstrated that, even if pushed, the government would not bulge. 
 
 
5. Coping with multilateralism 
The final challenge to Bonn’s policy in the convulsed year of 1973 did not come 
from the SPD. The FRG’s entry to the UN in September seemed set to further strain the 
West German-Portuguese relations by forcing Bonn to assume a clearer stance on 
Portuguese colonialism. After all, the FRG now had to take sides on the UN’s frequent 
disputes between Lisbon and the African Bloc. The voting policy on Portugal-related 
resolutions as conceived by Political Director van Well recommended that Bonn should 
lean in the same direction as its most important European partners. Such a guideline, 
however, was explicitly not meant to apply to any resolutions which might conflict with 
the Bonn’s national interests, namely NATO cohesion and European economic 
cooperation. Moreover, the Auswärtiges Amt rejected voting in favour of resolutions 
which had “a pure demagogic nature” or which might isolate Lisbon, since that would 
automatically prevent “all chances of success”.969 Yet van Well was also aware that, if 
Bonn’s voting policy was too prone to compromise with Portuguese interests, it would 
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necessarily gain little sympathy from the African states. Part of the problem was that 
East Berlin was bound to side with the Africans on the more radical anti-Portuguese 
resolutions and therefore it might get reciprocal support in any debates over German 
matters. This was no small predicament, since the African Bloc occupied a third of the 
seats in the UN General Assembly and was the most cohesive voting group.970 
Although probably not intentionally, both the Portuguese and the African 
discourses seemed designed to appeal to Bonn’s political profile. Rui Patrício, speaking 
at the General Assembly on 3 October 1973, claimed that African fanaticism was 
preventing peace in southern Africa. He said that Portugal was open to work out a 
reasonable détente policy with its African neighbours, not unlike the rapprochement 
which the FRG had undertaken vis-à-vis the Eastern European states.971 The following 
day, in the same forum, the Zambian mission pleaded for the recognition of Guinea-
Bissau, which had recently unilaterally proclaimed independence. In his speech, 
Zambia’s spokesman stressed that countries which gave Portugal military and 
economic assistance were “as responsible as Portugal for the atrocities committed 
against the indigenous peoples of Angola, Mozambique and the rest of Africa”.972  
Bonn faced its first big test on 9 October, when a member of the West German 
Delegation had to define before the UN Trusteeship Council the guidelines of the 
FRG’s policy towards the Portuguese colonies. According to his statement, West 
Germany believed in the right to self-determination, consolidated by a peaceful 
evolutionary process. It therefore supported the UN’s demand for Portugal to suspend 
the colonial wars and to negotiate with representatives of the local people. Moreover, 
Bonn’s government would not provide weapons for those wars, even though it would 
continue to cooperate militarily with Portugal, which was “necessary for our own 
personal security”. The FRG would also continue to trade with the Portuguese 
territories in Africa as long as the UN Security Council did not impose obligatory 
sanctions, such as it had done in the case of Rhodesia.973 Upon being informed of these 
statements, the Portuguese Foreign Ministry made a complaint to the West German 
embassy in Lisbon.974 Marcelo Caetano himself expressed his displeasure with Bonn’s 
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words. As the federal authorities recognised, however, none of the stated guidelines 
were new. It was mostly the way they had been formulated which had offended the 
Portuguese government.975  
In reality little changed in the position the FRG took regarding the Afro-
Portuguese clash. Bonn’s ambiguous stance, predictably, translated into ambiguous 
voting. West Germany did not recognise Guinea-Bissau’s independence and it 
abstained in UN resolutions directed against Lisbon’s interests.976 In early 1974, Walter 
Scheel explained to the new Ambassador Futscher Pereira that the FRG’s abstentions 
had not decisively altered any of the voting results. In fact, Scheel added, in some cases 
its moderate attitude had influenced other EEC states, more inclined to vote against 
Portugal, to abstain as well. As the minister himself apologetically acknowledged, this 
was the natural outcome of the federal government’s traditional dilemma regarding 
Africa and Portugal. 977 
The other multilateral forum where Bonn found itself forced to take a position 
on Portugal was the EEC itself. In February 1974, the Dutch pushed for the creation of 
a working group with the specific intention of coordinating action to press Portugal to 
decolonise. The Head of the AA’s East and Southern Africa Department Wolfgang Eger 
was appointed to chair the initiative.978 The following month, Eger confessed to the 
American Embassy in the FRG that the federal government was opposed to the idea of 
a common EEC demarche against Lisbon so he would not follow through on the Dutch 
plans. Nevertheless, according to Eger, Bonn would respect the wish of its EEC 
partners to approach the Portuguese on a bilateral basis, even if the West German 
authorities themselves were not planning any further demarches in the near future. 979 
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On 14 March 1974, unable to predict how close they were to the end of an era, 
Scheel sat down with the Portuguese ambassador and made a balance of the recent 
turbulence and vows for the future. The minister sensed that the anti-Portuguese trend 
of the West German press and of “certain political groups” had begun fading away and 
that the public’s attention was turning to other issues, such as the energy crisis or the 
Chilean coup against Salvador Allende. He even told the Portuguese diplomat not to 
feel discouraged by the campaigns raged by small radical segments of the public 
opinion. Scheel assured Futscher Pereira that in the Auswärtiges Amt and in the federal 
government – “whatever the exceptions” – Lisbon could still count on a large amount 
of “understanding and sympathy”. Futscher Pereira received Scheel’s personal 
guarantee that the federal government would never take any hostile action against 
Portugal or its African policy.980 Although shaken by the incidents of the previous year 
and the increased projection of the dictatorship, West German-Portuguese relations had 
held up, as both governments had decided they must. 
 
Conclusion 
The shifts in power in Portugal and West Germany in the late 1960s laid the 
groundwork for a new era in the relations between the two states. In the latter case, the 
emergence of the SPD – a party with a marked ideological aversion towards Lisbon’s 
type of regime – as a driving political force signalled the possibility of a significant 
transformation in Bonn’s policy towards the Portuguese dictatorship. 
Nevertheless, the initial push towards transformation – or discontinuity – did not 
come from the change in power, but from a change in external circumstances. African 
diplomatic lobbying combined with West German social movements – chiefly united 
under the banner of the anti-Cahora Bassa campaign – pressured the FRG’s government 
coalition to adopt a proactive attitude in terms of promoting Portuguese decolonisation. 
This pressure escalated throughout 1970 and Bonn, having disregarded it at first, 
succumbed to its force by the late summer/autumn of that year. The Chancellery, which 
had already theorised on a new policy but had refused to put it into practice, took the 
initiative of approaching Marcelo Caetano, timidly encouraging him to negotiate a 
long-term plan for decolonisation together with the African lobby headed by Kenneth 
Kaunda. This approach, which in practice was limited to a private conversation 
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between Caetano and Minister for Special Affairs Horst Ehmke as well as a polite letter 
from Chancellor Willy Brandt, was the closest Bonn came to shifting the direction of its 
policy, which had so far been characterised by non-interference in Portuguese affairs. 
During this period, the Auswärtiges Amt too flirted with the notion of interventionism, 
namely in the form of a joint demarche with Portugal’s other allies in order to convince 
Lisbon to engage in dialogue with the African community, if not the liberation 
movements themselves. This urge resulted in a series of consultations in late 1970 but it 
never left the exploratory stage. 
One external factor which exercised constant, yet indirect, pressure over the 
federal government was the East German propaganda offensive in Africa. While the 
weight of this aspect was not enough to promote a serious rupture in West German-
Portuguese relations, it did encourage the maintenance of a healthy perceptible distance 
between Bonn and Lisbon. The most patent impact of the concern with GDR 
propaganda was the AA’s reticence in developing too close of a close working 
relationship with its Portuguese counterpart. 
The full force of the SPD’s rejection of a passive policy towards the Portuguese 
dictatorship was only felt in the later part of the period in question. This factor certainly 
played a role before that – most notably with the diplomatic crisis provoked by the 
FES’ declared support for the liberation movements in 1970 – but only in 1973 did a 
systematic multifaceted SPD offensive take place. This offensive included lobbying the 
government through the party structure and parliamentary faction, a provocative public 
statement by Minister Erhard Eppler and the invitation of a FRELIMO delegation to 
visit Bonn in the summer. The projection of these initiatives was enhanced by the 
topicality of the condemnation of Portuguese colonialism in connection with the reports 
of the Wiriyamu massacre and consequent indignation in public opinion.  
 The SPD’s 1973 offensive was both proof that the federal government’s policy 
towards Lisbon had been generally committed to continuity and a test to that 
commitment. By protesting, demanding change and searching for alternative channels 
of policy, the SPD demonstrated how far the government had strayed from the party’s 
expectations of transformation in this field. As a result, it exposed the federal 
authorities’ dedication to relations with Portugal by providing a propitious atmosphere 
for change, forcing them to assume their option. A similar phenomenon occurred with 
the FRG’s entry to the UN in September 1973 and with the contemporary 
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multilateralisation of the campaign against the Portuguese dictatorship headed by Dutch 
diplomacy. 
 A factor that helped block Bonn’s earliest thrust to switch policy was Paris’ and 
London’s initial rejection of an interventionist strategy. The Auswärtiges Amt’s 
suggestion of a collective effort to address the Afro-Portuguese situation was met by 
these two powers with manifest lack of interest. This severely weakened the momentum 
of the AA’s transformative impulse in late 1970. 
 Yet the key international agent to undermine that momentum was Marcelo 
Caetano himself, paradoxically through both his intransigence and his self-proclaimed 
willingness to reform. The former tendency, embodied by Caetano’s replies to the 
Chancellery’s demarches, had a strong demoralising effect on Willy Brandt, who 
henceforth gave up on the intention of directly influencing Lisbon. By contrast, the AA 
– in line with the interpretation of Ambassador Ehrenfried von Holleben – came to 
defend a cooperative relationship with Lisbon, based on the theory that such behaviour 
would empower Caetano and the progressive forces of the regime, thus promoting 
liberalisation and eventual decolonisation. This option was facilitated by the fact that 
Caetano’s reform ideas appealed to Bonn’s own evolutionary perspective on change. 
 Although faith – or wishful thinking – in Caetano played a central role in the 
strategy devised by the AA, it was not necessarily the motor of that ministry’s policy 
towards Lisbon. In fact, the AA’s policy was significantly determined by a pragmatic 
resolve to safeguard objective national interests. One of those interests was the 
preservation of NATO cohesion and Western unity, which also appealed to Willy 
Brandt’s Chancellery. Thus not only did the Bundeskanzleramt acquiesce to the AA’s 
policy, it joined in the quest to mitigate the international pressure on Portugal. 
 In conclusion, just as Caetano failed to live up to the expectations that he would 
meaningfully reform the dictatorship, Willy Brandt’s SPD-FDP coalition did not live 
up to the expectations that it would enforce a substantially harsher policy towards 
Lisbon. While Bonn sough to keep some diplomatic distance from the dictatorship and 
it certainly did not openly condone Portuguese actions in Africa, it generally tolerated 
them, which was the main aim of Lisbon’s diplomacy. This does not mean that the SPD 
was not a productive force in the opposition against the Caetano regime. Yet, as we 











1. Cautious solidarity with the Portuguese opposition 





  Having examined the formal policy of the Bonn government towards the Caetano 
dictatorship, this thesis has repeatedly noted that the SPD as a party established its own 
alternative foreign policy regarding Portugal. Specifically, the German social-democrats 
developed important, if limited, ties with the opposition to the dictatorship. This chapter 
briefly examines these ties, emphasising the distinction between the SPD’s relations with 
the Portuguese opposition – most notably with the socialist movement – and its ties with 
the African liberation organisations fighting in the Portuguese colonies. The first section 
explains how the relationship with the Portuguese socialists was marked by a tension 
within the SPD between ideological solidarity with this group and scepticism over its 
chances of success. The second section demonstrates that the SPD was willing to invest 
greater financial and political capital in its relations with the liberation movements than in 
those forged with the Portuguese socialists, yet the former proved to be much more 
problematic, particularly the case of FRELIMO. Although the parallel policy pursued by 
the SPD remained largely autonomous from the federal government, this chapter explores 
its significance in the context of Bonn’s policy towards the Caetano regime. 
 
 
1. Cautious solidarity with the Portuguese opposition 
 For the SPD, the idea of pursuing relations with the Portuguese opposition gained 
increasing appeal in the mid-1960s, as Prime Minister António Salazar’s looming 
mortality signalled a possible political shift in Lisbon. A post-Salazar scenario could 
present specific challenges to West Germany, since traditionally the strongest opposition 
movement in Portugal was the clandestine Communist Party, which had forged positive 
relations with the GDR.981 Indeed, the communists were extremely critical of the FRG, 
which they denounced as a force of western imperialism, as well as a crucial backer of the 
Lisbon dictatorship.982 Ideologically, the SPD found a more natural partner in the pro-
western left-wing organisation Portuguese Socialist Action (Acção Socialista Portuguesa 
                                                
981 BAB, DY30/12959 and DY30/IV A2/20/528. 
982 Shortly after Chancellor Kiesinger’s trip to Portugal, the newspaper of the Portuguese Communist Party 
cited as evidence that Caetano was a fascist the fact that “Marcelo tightens the friendship with old hitlerian 
friends and Kiesinger’s visit accentuates the dependency with regard to the Federal Republic of Germany”. 
– “A verdadeira cara de Marcelo o «Liberalizante»”, Avante!, nr.397, December 1968, p.4; For other 
examples of this type of rhetoric, see BAB, DY30/IV A2/20/528, Memo from the SED’s International 
Department, 25.02.1965; Letter from the Central Committee of the Portuguese Communist Party to the 
Central Committee of the SED, 1966.  
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– ASP). Founded in 1964 by Mário Soares, Manuel Tito de Morais and Francisco Ramos 
da Costa, the ASP was a much smaller group than the Communist Party and it sought to 
make up for that by establishing links to like-minded European parties.983 The Portuguese 
socialists first contacted the West German social-democrats in late 1966. Shortly 
thereafter the SPD-associated Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FES) recommended that the 
SPD aid their organisation.984 
 Despite this encouraging background, Willy Brandt, during his tenure in the AA 
from December 1966 until October 1969, did not seem willing to strain Bonn’s relations 
with Lisbon by openly endorsing the ASP. Indeed, the SPD remained generally 
indifferent to the group’s appeals, especially in comparison to the openness displayed by 
other European social-democratic parties, including those in power at the time, such as 
the British Labour Party, the Swedish Socialdemokraterna and the Italian PSU.985 This 
behaviour also stood in contrast to the active collaboration between the German social-
democrats and the clandestine Spanish Socialist Worker’s Party PSOE at the time.986 
Nevertheless, with the acknowledgement of the AA, the SPD’s International Department – 
headed by Hans-Eberhard Dingels – expressed its solidarity with Mário Soares after the 
Portuguese authorities had him deported, in February 1968, to the island of São Tomé.987  
Although in June 1968 Dingels wrote to the Portuguese socialists stating his wish 
to finally cement the relations between the SPD and the ASP988, Salazar’s replacement by 
Marcelo Caetano in September reinforced the hesitations on the German side. On the one 
hand, under the new Portuguese leadership, which allowed Soares to return to Portugal, 
there appeared to be better circumstances than ever before for the ASP to grow as a 
                                                
983 For a detailed look at this strategy, see Martins Susana. 2005. Socialistas na Oposição ao Estado 
Novo, Cruz Quebrada: Casa das Letras/Editorial Notícias. pp.184-200. 
984 Soares and Ramos da Costa travelled to Bonn in September 1966 and directly asked the SPD to 
support the ASP (AdsD/SPD-PV, Internationale Abteilung III, 10513, Letter from Francisco Ramos Costa 
to Willy Brandt, 25.06.1968). Two months later a FES representative visited Lisbon and wrote a detailed 
report on the situation of the socialist group, a copy of which was sent to Willy Brandt. The report 
acknowledged the poor image of the FRG among the Portuguese opposition and strongly recommended 
complying with the ASP’s request for aid. (Sánchez, Antonio Muñoz.  2005. La Socialdemocracia 
Alemana y el Estado Novo (1961-1974). Portuguese Studies Review, Vol.13, pp.482,483) 
985 AdsD/SPD-PV, Internationale Abteilung III, 10513, Letter from Francisco Ramos Costa to Willy 
Brandt, 25.06.1968. 
986 Vargas, Bruno. 2004. Las Relaciones entre el PSOE y ala Fundación Fiedrich Ebert durante el 
Franquismo. 1967-1970. Hispania Nova, nr.4, [accessed through 
http://hispanianova.rediris.es/4/articulos/04_003d.htm on 18.09.2010].  
987 Following a unanimous decision within the Socialist International, Dingels sought to have the 
direction of his Party write to the Portuguese Ambassador expressing the SPD’s great concern over 
Soares’ situation – AdsD/WBA, A11.4, Mappe 31, Dispatch from the SPD’s International Department, 
18.04.1968. 
988 AdsD/SPD-PV, Internationale Abteilung III, 10513, Letter from Manuel Tito de Morais to Hans-
Eberhard Dingels, 15.07.1968. 
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serious opposition movement. However, SPD encouragement of the supposedly reformist 
Caetano and of the most liberal politicians within the regime seemed like a more 
constructive strategy than aiding the marginal ASP. Thus the SPD disregarded Soares’ 
emphatic pleas for support in the preparation for the October 1969 elections in Portugal, 
where the socialists were running as part of the non-communist opposition list CEUD 
(Comissão Eleitoral de Unidade Democrática). The SPD even refrained from 
participating in the initiative of the Socialist International (SI) to send a delegation to 
Portugal to observe the campaigns. Although Dingels told the SI that all the main SPD 
personalities were busy with their own electoral campaign in the FRG, he confessed to 
fellow SPD member Hans-Jürgen Wischnewski that he felt the SPD should distance itself 
from the initiative. He defended this position, “not just due to German foreign policy 
interests, but because of the effectiveness of such a delegation”, i.e. such a display of 
distrust from Europe would only serve to fuel the counter-reformist strands of the Lisbon 
dictatorship.989 When Soares – with the help of leading FES member Robert Lamberg – 
made it to the SPD’s Bonn headquarters in April, Dingels refused to let him see Willy 
Brandt.990 
The failure to get a single parliamentary representative elected in the – relatively 
more open, for the dictatorship’s standards – 1969 elections was a major blow to 
Portuguese opposition in general and particularly to the ASP. CEUD officially received 
1.5% of the votes, which was not only much less than the 87.7% of the dictatorship’s 
state-party União Nacional – which took every parliamentary seat, as usual – but also 
considerably less than the 10.7% of the communist-backed opposition list CDE.991 
Despite the opaque electoral process, on the surface the result seemed to support the 
notion that the socialists had little popular expression and therefore no leverage in 
Portugal’s political scene. ASP members – many of whom left the country after the 
elections – subsequently adopted a fully confrontational posture against the Lisbon 
regime, denouncing the dictatorship while striving for recognition on the outside.992 They 
found a useful ally in the Secretary General of the Socialist International, the Austrian 
Hans Janitschek, who devoted much of his tenure (1969-1977) to the build-up of similar 
                                                
989 AdsD/WBA, A11.4, Mappe 50, Dispatches from Dingels to Wischnewski, 09.10.1969 and 23.10.1969; 
Sánchez (2005), pp.487,488; The members of Socialist International’s delegation were arrested and 
expelled from the country on the third day of their visit – Janitschek, Hans. 1985. Mário Soares: Portrait 
of a Hero, London:Weidenfeld & Nicolson, pp.9-11. 
990 Sánchez (2005), p.497. 
991 PAAA, B26/399, Dispatch from the FRG’s Embassy in Lisbon, 05.11.1969. 
992 Sánchez (2005), pp.496-497. 
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movements around the world.993 Yet even the SI, which in June 1969 had passed a 
resolution appealing to all members to give their support to the Portuguese socialists 
whenever possible994 and, in September, had set apart £1,000 in funds to support the 
ASP995, proved vulnerable to the electoral debacle. In 1970, the organisation felt 
pressured to re-examine its ties to the unsuccessful ASP, due to concerns by those 
member parties which had governmental responsibilities, including the SPD.996 
While the SPD’s responsibility in government precluded a high-profile 
involvement with the Portuguese socialists, it did not prevent the Friedrich Ebert 
Foundation from discretely forging links with them. Foundations like the FES enjoy a 
special status in German politics. Although they are ‘close’ to certain political parties – as 
is the case with the FES and the SPD – by law they are not ‘party foundations’. This legal 
grey-zone provides them with a formal degree of autonomy from their respective parties 
and from the government.997 Safeguarded by this status, the FES agreed to grant five 
scholarships in West Germany in December 1969, and an extra one in March 1970, to 
Portuguese students proposed by Mário Soares. These students were not members of the 
ASP, but they needed to escape from the Portuguese dictatorship998 and Soares was 
helping them as a favour to a common acquaintance. Besides the grants, the foundation 
paid them trips to social-democratic seminars, as well as a lawyer999 when two of them 
came under investigation by the domestic intelligence agency Bundesamt für 
Verfassungsschutz because of left-wing social activism in the FRG.1000 Regardless of this 
support, the exiles remained very critical of the SPD-led government, due to its perceived 
complicity with the Lisbon regime.1001 Indeed, the FES’ relations with these students – 
and with the slightly larger group of Spanish students recommended by Spanish socialist 
                                                
993 Mateus, Rui. 1996. Contos Proibidos: Memórias de um PS Desconhecido, Lisbon: Publicações Dom 
Quixote, pp.27-28. 
994 Janitscheck (1985), p.32. 
995 AdsD/WBA, A11.4, Mappe 50, Dispatch from Hans-Eberhard Dingels, 16.09.1969. 
996 Mateus (1996), p.32. 
997 Erdmann, Gero. 2006. «Hesitant Bedfellows: The German Stiftungen and Party Aid in Africa». In 
Globalising Democracy: Party Politics in Emerging Democracies, Burnell, Peter J. (ed.). London: 
Routledge, pp.182-183. 
998 They were four male students on the verge of being drafted (Luis Leitão, Vasco Esteves and Jorge 
Veludo, who were being disciplined for their activities in the student union of the Instituto Superior 
Técnico, and Francisco Moita) and their two girlfriends (Elsa Pereira and Maria da Luz Moita). 
999 Klaus Croissant, the lawyer of the Rote Armee Fraktion who was later uncovered as an East German 
spy. 
1000 Esteves, Veludo and Luz Moita founded the immigrant support association Associação Operária 1º 
de Maio de Stuttgart and the immigrant newspaper A Batalha. 
1001 They complained, for example, that the German social-democrats lectured them about the lack of 
human rights in East Germany, but hypocritically kept quiet about the situation in Portugal. 
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Tierno Gálvan – were essentially financial, not political.1002 A final scholarship was 
granted in January 1971.1003 
 By this time, the struggle of the Portuguese opposition was gradually garnering a 
fair amount of sympathy within sectors of the SPD. This was partially inspired by several 
German social-democrats’ past personal experiences of political exile and by the activism 
of Portuguese immigrants in unions close to the SPD.1004 Also relevant was the close 
relationship established between the FES and Portuguese asylum seeker Eduardo de 
Sousa Ferreira, who had first obtained a scholarship from the foundation in the early 
1960s.1005 Although theoretically barred from political activism due to his asylum status, 
Ferreira became a prominent voice in Germany against the Lisbon dictatorship through 
writings which critically examined Portugal’s colonial system from a Marxist perspective. 
The FES commissioned him to write a study about the changes brought about by Marcelo 
Caetano, particularly to Lisbon’s African policy. In this study, written in early 1970, 
Ferreira argued that the planned institutional reforms sought only to preserve the essence 
of Portuguese colonialism. In doing so he clearly challenged the thesis that supporting 
Caetano would by itself ensure a positive change in Lisbon’s politics.1006 
 Against this background, the FES sought to tighten its contacts with the 
Portuguese opposition, even if the cooperation remained on a relatively small scale. The 
foundation occasionally funded trips by Portuguese socialists to relevant international 
meetings and it conducted seminars, for example about the organisational structure of 
political parties. Mário Soares was paid to write for the FES journal Nueva Sociedad and 
to tour Latin America to give a series of talks about European social-democracy. These 
various actions were coordinated by FES delegate Elke Sabiel de Esters, who forged 
close personal friendships with some members of the Portuguese socialist group. In line 
with the foundation’s particular legal status, the initiatives remained independent from the 
                                                
1002 Author’s interviews with Maria da Luz Moita, 11.09.2010, and Jorge Veludo, 14.09.2010. 
1003 Martins (2005), p.190. 
1004 Sablosky, Juliet Antunes. 2000. O PS e a Transição para a Democracia, Lisbon: Editorial Notícias. 
p.33. 
1005 Having fled Portugal for political reasons, in 1962 Ferreira arrived in West Germany, where he 
applied for funding to continue studying. The FES ended up funding Ferreira’s studies for 8 years, as well 
as his lawyer in the long process until obtaining political asylum in the FRG – the only Portuguese to do 
so. The FES was very supportive of Ferreira, even if his Maoist political leanings prevented him from 
being invited to join the organisation. 
1006 Author’s interview with Eduardo de Sousa Ferreira, 20.04.2010; According to Ferreira, the FES 
decided not to publish the piece out of concern for Lisbon’s reaction. It was later published in English, as 
part of Ferreira, Eduardo de Sousa. 1972. Portuguese Colonialism: from South Africa to Europe, 
Freiburg: Aktion Dritte Welt. 
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federal government and were not openly publicised.1007 Additionally, the FES continued 
to provide informal support to Eduardo de Sousa Ferreira.1008 
On a more official level, the SPD pursued contacts with the dictatorship’s ‘liberal 
wing’. In the early 1970s, the federal authorities regularly invited individual 
representatives of this wing to visit the FRG, allegedly to show them the workings of 
German economics and politics, but in practice in order to get information on the 
evolving situation in Portugal. Although perceived by the Germans as ‘opposition’ MPs, 
the ‘liberals’ actually displayed trust in the Marcelo Caetano government, pointing to the 
ultraconservative right as the true obstacle to democratisation. Their accounts thus 
reinforced the idea that it was wiser to empower the current government in Lisbon than to 
weaken it by endorsing the illegal opposition. 1009 This view, of course, stood in stark 
contrast to the writings of Ferreira1010 and Soares.1011 
 The SPD ended up playing both sides. At Janitschek’s insistence1012, Hans-
Eberhard Dingels agreed to meet with Mário Soares on 21 May 1970. During the 
meeting, Soares discussed the possibility of returning to Portugal. Dingels showed 
concern for his safety and made arrangements to inform the Portuguese Embassy in Bonn 
of the SPD’s interest in the well-being of the socialist leader.1013 Nevertheless, when 
addressing a Portuguese MP the following year, Dingels confessed that his party 
disapproved of Soares’ hostile statements against the Caetano government and had 
repeatedly recommended that he return to Portugal with a more moderate attitude. In the 
same conversation, Dingels expressed a personal admiration for Caetano’s evolutionary 
strategy, adding that if his reforms were to fail the result would necessarily be either 
                                                
1007 Author’s interviews with Elke Esters, 21.08.2010 (via e-mail) and Mário Soares, 15.09.2010; Avillez 
(1996), pp.241,242; Martins (2005), p.190; Mateus (1996), p.42; Mühlen, Patrick von zur. 2007. Die 
Internationale Arbeit der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Bonn: Verlag J.H.W. Dietz Nachf. GmbH,pp.201,202; 
Sablosky (2000), p.36. 
1008 For example, it paid him to tutor the Portuguese and Spanish-speaking students funded by the 
foundation. – Author’s interviews with Eduardo de Sousa Ferreira, 20.04.2010, and Jorge Veludo, 
14.09.2010. 
1009 IAN/TT/AMC, Cx.54, n.3, José da Silva’s report of his trip to the FRG from 31.10. to 10.11.1970; 
IAN/TT/AMC, Cx.37, n.23, Manuel José Archer Homem de Melo’s report of his trip to the FRG from 01. 
to 04.03.1971. Additionally, Francisco de Sá Carneiro also accepted Bonn’s invitation for a similar trip in 
May 1972 (PAAA, B26/444, Dispatch from the Federal Embassy in Lisbon, 08.05.1972). 
1010 Ferreira (1972). 
1011 Soares, Mário. 1973. Portugal: Rechtsdiktatur Zwischen Europa und Kolonialismus, Reinbek bei 
Hamburg: Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag. 
1012 Sánchez (2005), p.497. 




“fascist tragedy or communist dictatorship”.1014 While the SPD was willing to safeguard 
its discrete ties to the ASP, it remained cautious not to upset any possible progress which 
might come out of the Caetano regime. 
 Despite the lack of a full commitment on the SPD’s side, the German social-
democrats played a historical role in the development of the Portuguese socialist 
movement via FES. Indeed, while the overall level of success of the ASP’s international 
networking efforts remains the subject of some dispute1015, with the aid of the FES’ 
resources the Portuguese group did increase its reputation throughout this period, to the 
point that in June 1972 it was admitted as a full member of the Socialist International.1016 
Furthermore, on 16-19 April 1973, twenty seven members of the ASP discretely met in 
the FES-owned Kurt Schumacher Academy in Bad Münstereifel, where they founded the 
Portuguese Socialist Party. The trips and accommodations were paid for by the FES, 
although the foundation had no role in the agenda or in the dénouement of the event. The 
only Germans present were Elke Esters, the MP Holger Börner and, on the last day, 
Hans-Eberhard Dingels, neither of whom intervened in the congress.1017 Although 
relations were kept essentially at FES-level, Mário Soares, who displayed a pragmatic 
understanding for Bonn’s official relationship with Lisbon, still regarded Willy Brandt’s 
party as an important ally of the Portuguese socialists.1018 He nevertheless admitted that 
the SPD’s inner circles did not even seem to read the detailed reports he sent them 
requesting support for the Socialist Party’s planned actions.1019 
 In practice little had changed in the SPD’s posture, as the party’s International 
Department remained keen to preserve links with Lisbon. In the fall of 1973, the German 
social-democrats once again refused to participate in the SI delegation sent to monitor the 
Portuguese elections. Having established a backchannel to the Portuguese embassy in 
Bonn in March, Hans-Eberhard Dingels repeatedly provided Ambassador Freitas Cruz 
with information on the inner-party orientations regarding Portugal. Dingels, who 
                                                
1014 IAN/TT/AMC, Cx.37, n.23, Manuel José Archer Homem de Melo’s report of his trip to the FRG from 
01. to 04.03.1971. 
1015 Former ASP member Rui Mateus bitterly describes the group as lacking international credibility and 
proper official support from the European social-democratic parties, in Mateus (1996), pp.38-41. In 
contrast, scholar Juliet Sablosky paints a more positive picture of the cooperation with those 
organisations, in Sablosky (2000), pp.29-35. Naturally, this is a politically charged topic, as it involves 
giving a more humiliating or a more dignified take on the roots of one of Portugal’s largest parties. 
1016 Martins (2005), pp.198-199. 
1017 AdsD/SPD-PV, Internationale Abteilung III, 11159, Secret report of Wischnewski’s meeting with dos 
Santos, 24.07.1973; Author’s interviews with Mário Mesquita, 31.08.2008, and Mário Soares, 
15.09.2010; Mateus (1996), pp.42-43. 
1018 Author’s interview with Mário Soares, 15.09.2010. 
1019 Avillez, Maria João. 1996. Soares: Ditadura e Revolução, Lisbon: Público.p.257. 
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claimed to Freitas Cruz that Mário Soares was too “disconnected from the Portuguese 
reality”, explained to the ambassador that he personally opposed the “socialist romantic” 
view of the SPD sectors which pinned their hopes on Soares’ movement. Indeed, Dingels 
expressed his wish to go to Portugal and consult with representatives of the Lisbon 
government.1020 After Freitas Cruz’ replacement by Ambassador Futscher Pereira soon 
afterwards, Dingles was glad to see his personal backchannel to the embassy reopened in 
January 1974.1021 
By contrast, Soares’ efforts to reach the SPD faced substantial reluctance. Only 
after repeated requests by Soares did the SPD agree to receive a delegation from the 
Portuguese Socialist Party in Bonn in April 1974 – a year after its founding and after 
several European labour parties1022 had already done so.1023 Even then, as discussed 
internally by member of the International Department Veronika Isenberg, there was much 
worry about creating a political incident at a time when both the SPD and the Lisbon 
regime were facing serious internal crises. Thus, as late as 20 March, the International 
Department was unwilling to arrange meetings between Soares and high-level officials of 
the SPD and much less to satisfy the Portuguese socialist’s request for a Soares-Brandt 
meeting to take place, although the Department did raise the possibility of organising a 
more official event a couple of months later.1024 
Soares made some progress in the final weeks of the dictatorship. He managed to 
talk to Hans-Eberhard Dingels and Veronika Isenberg, first at an IS session in London on 
31 March 1974 and then in Cologne on 6 April. Soares told them that the Portuguese 
military had a plan to overthrow the regime and that the conspirators were considering 
three members of the Socialist Party for a post-coup government, including Soares as 
foreign minister.1025 Dingels sent Isenberg’s report about these talks to the 
Bundeskanzleramt with a note on the seriousness of the matter, suggesting that 
Washington should be informed.1026 The Chancellery acknowledged the relevance of the 
                                                
1020 AHD, PEA, M756, Pr331, Telegrams from the Portuguese Embassy in Bonn, 09.04.1973 and 
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news but it did not deem the issue a priority – a week passed before Willy Brandt asked 
Egon Bahr to inform the Americans about the alleged revolutionary plan.1027 
Nevertheless, between 23 and 25 April, Soares and three other representatives of his 
party1028 were discretely welcomed in Bonn, where they met informally with a few SPD 
personalities, including the BMZ’s Parliamentary State Secretary Hans Matthöfer and the 
BMVg Parliamentary State Secretary Willi Berkhan.1029 The latter secret arrangement had 
been organised by Dingles who, covering all the angles as usual, thought that Soares’ 
intelligence about the Portuguese military could be useful for the BMVg. Writing to 
Berkhan on 24 April, Dingels recognised the importance of maintaining good relations 
with the pro-Western Soares, whom he now described as “a very wise man, no doubt 
removed from false emotions”.1030  
The SPD remained sceptical until the end. In general, Soares was treated with a 
mix of sympathy and condescension, on the basis that the information gathered by 
NATO, the CIA, the German secret services and the German diplomats in Portugal all 
pointed against the possibility of an imminent end to the Caetano dictatorship. On the 
evening of 24 April, Willi Berkham1031 told Soares that he was bound to spend a long 
time in exile and explained to him the perspective of the German social-democrats. They 
believed that once Spanish dictator Francisco Franco died, Spain – with the support of the 
SPD – would find a democratic solution and Portugal would eventually follow. The 
process, however, was bound to take a few years. After this unproductive discussion, 
Soares sought to present his case to Willy Brandt, whom he hoped to finally be able to 
meet the following day. That meeting ended up not taking place, however, if nothing else 
because upon hearing about the Revolution in the morning Soares immediately flew back 
to his home in Paris and began preparing his return to Portugal.1032 
 
 
                                                
1027 As pointed out in Sánchez (2005), p.499. 
1028 Maria Barroso, Tito de Morais and Ramos da Costa. 
1029 AdsD/SPD-PV, Internationale Abteilung III, 11159, Programme for Soares’ trip to Bonn, 23-25 April 
1974; The AA’s Parliamentary State Secretary Hans Apel had agreed to have dinner with Soares as well 
(Dispatch from Dingels to Apel, 18.04.1974), but his name is crossed from the final programme, 
indicating that he did not make it in the end.  
1030 AdsD/SPD-PV, Internationale Abteilung III, 11159, Dispatch from Dingels to Berkhan, 24.04.1974 
1031 In his interview with the author, Mário Soares stated that he had this conversation with the federal 
finance minister (Helmut Schmidt, at the time). Soares described the same episode, in lesser detail, to 
Maria João Avillez in Avillez (1996), p.266, where he identified his interlocutor as the defence minister. 
The documents in AdsD/SPD-PV, Internationale Abteilung III, 11159 clearly indicate that it was Willi 
Berkham who had dinner with Soares that evening.  
1032 Author’s interview with Mário Soares, 15.09.2010. 
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2. Reaching out to the liberation movements 
Willy Brandt’s ascension to chancellor in late 1969 created a propitious 
environment for Bonn’s rapprochement with the most prominent liberation movements 
fighting against the Portuguese presence in Africa. The leaders of these movements, 
which by then had already lost their faith in Marcelo Caetano’s will to promote 
decolonisation1033, initially showed some hope in the new federal government. Agostinho 
Neto and Amílcar Cabral, leaders of Angola’s MPLA and of Guinea-Bissau’s and Cape 
Verde’s PAIGC, respectively, resented Bonn’s reluctance to confront Portugal, but they 
believed that the West German government was going to gradually loosen its ties with the 
Caetano dictatorship.1034 The most remarkable sign of faith in Brandt, however, came 
from Mozambique’s FRELIMO in the form of a letter specifically addressed to the 
chancellor in April 1970. The letter, which denounced West German participation in the 
Cahora Bassa project and the FRG’s military supplies to Portugal, passionately appealed 
for Willy Brandt to renounce cooperation with Lisbon in the name of his social-
democratic values. It ended on a poetic note: 
 
“It is past the time to put an end to the collusion between fascist Portugal and your 
country – a collusion which started when the Portuguese Government flew its flag at 
half-mast on the occasion of Hitler’s death. It is time for your country to cease to 
carry the tragic infamy of being the devoted supplier and the greedy investor in the 
minority racist regimes. It is time that the Deutsche Mark, which you have just 
revalued on the financial market, lose its tinge of blood and suffering.” 1035 
 
 While, as we have seen throughout the thesis, there was only so far the chancellor 
was willing to go on a governmental level, the SPD independently sought to reach out to 
the African movements. A leading personality behind this strategy was Hans-Jürgen 
Wischnewski, a committed anti-colonialist who as MP had founded the lobby group 
Angola-Komitee in 1964 with the purpose of promoting Portuguese decolonisation.1036 
Wischneski, who headed Bonn’s Ministry for Economic Cooperation from December 
1966 until October 1968, had even approached PAIGC’s charismatic leader Amílcar 
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Cabral during his time in office.1037 In 1970, Wischnewski joined the SPD’s National 
Executive (Bundesvorstand), where he remained very active in regard to Arab and 
African issues.1038 His arguments for supporting the liberation struggle were not 
restricted to solidarity; they had a strategic justification as well. During the French-
Algerian war, Wischnewski had arranged for the SPD to secretly support the Algerian 
liberation front FLN.1039 He seemed to proudly identify that effort as the basis for the 
good relationship that the FRG had forged with Algeria after its independence and 
therefore he sought to apply the same strategy to Portuguese Africa. Wischnewski argued 
pragmatically that if the SPD lent moral and practical support to the liberation 
movements, it could ensure positive relations with the eventual post-colonial regimes in 
those regions.1040 This motivation tied into the framework of inter-German competition 
because, unlike the Portuguese socialists, the African liberation movements were getting 
assistance from East Germany – in some cases as far back as 19671041 – and so were more 
likely to adopt a pro-GDR policy in the future. 
                                                
In line with Wischnewski’s ideas, on 30 April 1970 the Director of the SPD’s 
International Department Hans-Eberhard Dingels secretly received three delegates from 
the liberation movements in the SPD’s headquarters in Bonn, namely Luis d’Almeida 
(MPLA), Armando Panguene (FRELIMO) and Alcides Beito (PAIGC). Throughout the 
meetings, Dingels underlined the goodwill of his party towards their organisations. The 
guests took the opportunity to ask the SPD for material aid, complaining that the previous 
year they had supplied the FES with a list of requests but so far had received no positive 
reply.1042 In a report to Whischnewski, Dingels claimed that on the whole the 
conversations had been free from “negative emotions”, even despite some disagreement 
over the controversial topic of Cahora Bassa. According to Dingels, the recent West 
1037 Years before the breakdown of West German-Guinean relations, President Sékou Touré had helped 
Wischnewski meet with Cabral – whom he had first met years before – three times during a trip to 
Conakry in late April 1968. – PAAA, B26/408, Press release from the BMZ, 29.05.1968, Dispatch from 
the AA, 06.06.1968. 
1038 AAPBD 1973, Doc.209, Conversation between Chacellor Brandt and Head-of-State Ceauşescu, 
29.06.1973. 
1039 Leggewie, Claus. 1984. Kofferträger: das Algerien-Projekt der Linken in Adenauer-Deutschland, 
Berlin: Rotbuch-Verlag. 
1040 IAN/TT/PIDE-DGS,CI(2),Pr.11,vol.11,Serviços Alemães, Dispatch from the DGS Office in 
Mozambique, 06.09.1973. 
1041 Schleicher, Hans-Georg.  2008. «GDR solidarity: The German Democratic Republic and the South 
African Liberation Struggle». In The Road to Democracy in South Africa, vol.3: International Solidarity, 
South African Democracy Education Trust (ed.). Pretoria: Unisa Press, p.1128. 
1042 Dingel’s report mentions a request for the “expansion” (Ausweitung) of aid, so presumably the FES 
had already provided some amount of support before. 
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German talks with Kenneth Kaunda had caused a particularly good impression on the 
African delegates.1043 
The SPD’s International Department was keen to proceed with the backchannel, 
but it was careful not to cause problems with Lisbon by visibly compromising the whole 
party’s image and especially the government’s. Thus the SPD did not send any official 
delegate to the prominent anti-colonialist ‘International Conference in Support of the 
Peoples of the Portuguese Colonies’, which took place in Rome on 27-28 June 1970. 
Although Dingels did not oppose the presence of a FES observer at the event, he told the 
liberation movements that the SPD itself could not send any representative due to 
schedule incompatibilities. In reality, as he explained to Wischnewski, he felt that the 
party should keep its relations with the movements at a discrete bilateral level.1044 This 
double strategy was consistent with Dingel’s concern with keeping every channel open, 
as demonstrated in the case of the relations with the Portuguese socialists. 
 The SPD’s plan benefitted from the momentary goodwill of the Auswärtiges Amt, 
which was concerned with the FRG’s tainted image in Africa. In February 1970, an AA 
internal memo had already speculated that Wischnewski’s unofficial contacts with 
Amílcar Cabral would prove valuable if they could lead such a relevant personality as the 
charismatic Guinean leader to discontinue the denunciation of the FRG’s arms supplies to 
Portugal.1045 The BMZ served as bridge, which is not surprising since it was 
Wischnewski’s former ministry and one with a strong anti-colonialist imprint. Officials 
from the BMZ, the AA and the FES met on 3 July to discuss the possibility of aiding the 
liberation movements and on 13 August the AA approved the BMZ’s request to grant the 
FES budgetary funds – DM 205,000 in 1970 and DM 211,000 in 1971 – for that purpose. 
The only conditions were (a) that the funds should be used exclusively for humanitarian, 
educational and social relief and (b) that all kind of publicity should be avoided.1046 The 
choice to channel the funds through the FES was not uncommon – this kind of 
foundations often serve as a more or less independent tool of German foreign policy, able 
to operate in areas too sensitive for Bonn’s official diplomacy. Their international 
operations are funded by the BMZ and the Auswärtiges Amt, yet while the AA should 
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theoretically give its consent to their projects, it does not actually have a final say over 
them, giving the government some deniability.1047 
The latter characteristic soon proved useful as the AA’s second requirement fell 
through. During his famous trip to Africa in late August 1970, FES Vice-President Heinz 
Kühn took the initiative to publicly announce the foundation’s plans to aid the liberation 
movements.1048 This caused great controversy, not only vis-à-vis Portugal, but within 
West Germany itself. At a time when violent actions of the RAF had already made their 
first headlines, it was not easy to openly support Marxist-influenced guerrilla groups 
which were officially designated as ‘terrorists’ by the Portuguese authorities. Indeed, 
Kühn’s efforts to explain to the West German public the subjectivity of the term 
“terrorists” were not always successful.1049 The conservative press accused the FES of 
supporting armed struggle, to which Kühn responded that the foundation would not be 
supplying weapons, but “moral and material aid” aimed at promoting the self-
improvement and self-management of the colonised peoples.1050 
The social-democrats sought to contain the political effects of the episode by 
ostensibly dissociating the government from the FES’ activities. Chancellor Brandt 
assured the Bundestag1051, as well as his ministers1052 and the African leaders1053, that the 
foundation was financing the relief effort with its own funds and that the federal 
government had nothing to do with the matter. This position, markedly different from the 
self-publicised support to anti-colonialist organisations provided by the Scandinavian 
governments1054, safeguarded the initiative from critics both outside and within the SPD, 
where a more conservative wing had a sceptical view of the liberation movements.1055 
However, while the FES did maintain a high degree of autonomy, it consulted with the 
SPD’s International Relations Commission about its projects. Moreover, a forum 
informally known as the ‘Group of 6’ held regular discussion rounds about, among other 
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topics, the party’s African policy. Its participants were Willy Brandt, Minister Erhard 
Eppler, International Secretary Dingels, the foreign policy spokesman of the SPD’s 
parliamentary group, the head of the FES’ International Division Siegfried Bangert and, 
occasionally, the foundation’s Director Günter Grunwald.1056 
The FES thus acted out the SPD’s non-governmental African policy. Indeed, 
Siegfried Bangert, who had accompanied Kühn to Africa in August 19701057, came to 
earn the nickname of “secret foreign minister” of the FRG among the Zambian 
politicians.1058 The FES’ aid programme to the liberation movements included 
scholarships in African and German universities, aimed at training the members of the 
movements “in cooperative, trade union and administration matters” in order to help them 
prepare to administer their countries after gaining independence. To this educational aid, 
the FES added material relief in the form of medicines, children’s food and sewing 
machines, among other items.1059 It also funded a hospital in Zambia which provided care 
for the anti-colonialist groups.1060 These initiatives were organised through a series of 
secret backchannels. Building on the relationship between Hans-Jürgen Wischneswi and 
Cabral, the FES developed an arrangement to provide humanitarian aid to the PAIGC.1061 
After a long process of preliminary discussions with Agostinho Neto – partially mediated 
by the Yugoslav government1062 – in November/December 1970 the FES also began 
supplying the MPLA with food and medicines through Lusaka.1063 Presidents Kenneth 
Kaunda, from Zambia, and Julius Nyerere, from Tanzania, served as liaisons with the 
liberation movements from Angola and Mozambique, as well with similar movements in 
Namibia (SWAPO) and Rhodesia (ZANU). Kaunda and Nyerere agreed to secretly 
channel the German relief through their own governments’ institutions.1064 They 
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guaranteed that the aid would be given according to the criteria of the OAU and that local 
FES representatives could attend the relevant meetings.1065 Kaunda, who was a personal 
friend of Siegfried Bangert, played a particularly influential role in guiding the FES’ 
work in southern Africa.1066 
The case of FRELIMO was the least successful. Wischnewski had personally met 
the organisation’s first president Eduardo Mondlane1067, but Mondlane had been 
assassinated in 1969. During their trip to Africa in the summer of 1970, Heinz Kühn and 
Siegfried Bangert had managed to talk to delegates of a smaller Mozambican liberation 
movement, COREMO1068, but had had no luck in their efforts to meet with FRELIMO’s 
Vice-President and International Delegate Marcelino dos Santos.1069 FRELIMO did come 
to have contacts with the Jusos and with the representative of the FES in Dar es 
Salaam1070 and, in fact, two members of the movement discretely visited the FRG for a 
few days in late 1970.1071 Nevertheless, the SPD failed to establish an arrangement with 
FRELIMO similar to the ones it had with the other liberation movements.1072 On top of 
the disagreement over Cahora Bassa, the relations between the West Germans and the 
Mozambican nationalists were undermined by Marcelino dos Santos’ passionate anti-
Western attitude. He reacted to the FES’ public offer of aid by quipping that the FRG 
supplied the weapons used by the Portuguese and that the FES now wanted to help the 
Africans buy the coffins.1073 In a press release and in an interview to a Tanzanian 
newspaper in October 1970, dos Santos stated that FRELIMO would only accept relief 
from the FES if the foundation officially distanced itself from Bonn’s policies. Bangert 
came to perceive this behaviour as a reflection of the fact that FRELIMO was moving 
politically closer to the Eastern Bloc. FRELIMO received the bulk of its weapons and 
funding from the GDR and both the USSR and China sought to strengthen their own 
partnerships with the group. This was all the more problematic for the West German 
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intent of polishing Bonn’s image in Africa because FRELIMO was the most 
internationally renowned of the liberation movements from the Portuguese colonies.1074 
The truth is that the FES’ work was not enough to deter the movements from 
condemning the Western states’ perceived collusion with Portuguese actions in Africa. 
On 31 March 1971, FRELIMO wrote to UN Secretary General U Thant appealing to him 
to stop NATO’s upcoming ministerial meeting in Lisbon from taking place. The cable 
claimed that the liberation movements in the Portuguese colonies regarded the meeting as 
deliberate support by NATO member-countries for activities aimed at strengthening and 
financing Portugal’s war effort.1075 In February 1972, while speaking at a special UN 
Security Council meeting in Addis Ababa, Amílcar Cabral highlighted the centrality of 
the West’s role: 
 
“Who does not know that Portugal – an underdeveloped country and the most 
backward in Europe – would not be in a position to devote about 50 per cent of its 
annual budget to the colonial war and for years to wage three wars against the 
African peoples were it not for the aid of [its] allies? Who does not know that 
Portugal, which does not even manufacture toy aeroplanes for its children, uses 
against us airplanes, helicopters, and the most modern of weapons, furnished by its 
allies? […] Who in all honesty can believe that the Portuguese Government, which 
respects neither the rules nor the principles of NATO, would have been able to leave 
the arms and weapons received from that organisation to go rusty when it needs to 
repress our aspirations of freedom?” 1076 
 
 If all the movements criticised Lisbon’s Western allies, FRELIMO was the 
harshest when it came to singling out the FRG. In March 1972, its President Samora 
Machel explained to the Tanzanian newspaper Sunday-News that the West German 
government was linked with the Portuguese to the point that it simply could not stop its 
support to Lisbon. Even Bonn’s effort to restrict the military deliveries to the dictatorship 
served as no consolation. As Machel put it: “West Germans have advisers, they have 
officers, they manufacture weapons in Portugal. It is easier to make the weapons there 
than to transport them from West Germany”.1077 Machel’s tone contrasted, for example, 
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with the more positive words of the leader of the PAIGC in an interview with Der Spiegel 
a few months later: 
 
“I am glad that it was your Chancellor Willy Brandt who got the [1971] Nobel Peace 
Prize, since he is a socialist and a man of principles. This gives us the hope that, 
because of his socialist conscience and the moral weight of the Peace Prize, he may 
take decisive measures in order to put an end to the Federal Republic’s assistance to 
the Portuguese regime.” 1078 
 
 As mentioned in the previous chapter, by 1973 the SPD’s grassroots were 
themselves growing very critical of the colonial wars and of Bonn’s Portugal-policy. As a 
result, they became more supportive of the liberation movements. On 18 February, a sub-
district party congress (Unterbezirksparteitag) of the SPD requested that the party’s 
National Executive set up a fund for the support of the African groups fighting against 
Portuguese colonialism.1079 Two months later, the SPD party congress in Hannover 
passed the resolution stating that the party was going to “offer to the national liberation 
movements all our solidarity and our political and humanitarian support”.1080 The 
resolution obtained more than 90% of the votes.1081 What had started as a minority 
position was now embraced by the party’s mainstream. 
 It is against this background that the German social-democrats decided to increase 
their efforts to cooperate with FRELIMO. Siegfried Bangert was convinced that, as 
influential as Marcelino dos Santos was, his views were not necessarily widespread 
among the elite of the Mozambican group. Bangert told Hans-Jürgen Wischnewski that 
there was a rising trend within FRELIMO of disillusionment with the type of support 
provided by the Soviet Union and China – limited to weapons and money – as well as 
with the scope and ideological requirements of such support. Furthermore, according to 
Bangert, the SPD could count on Julius Nyerere to intercede on its behalf. Not only was 
the Tanzanian leader worried about FRELIMO’s dependency on the Eastern Bloc, he had 
little sympathy for the movement’s policy of straining the budget of the Tanzanian 
government while refusing aid from Nyerere’s political friends.1082 
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 Wischnewski, who had become chairman of the SPD’s International Relations 
Commission in July 19721083, went to great lengths in the quest to reach out to the 
Mozambican nationalists. On 17 July 1973, he invited FRELIMO to send a leading 
representative to Bonn in order to “pursue the mutual exchange of views” concerning the 
situation in Mozambique.1084 He received Marcelino dos Santos in the SPD headquarters 
on 23 and 24 July and tried to persuade FRELIMO’s sceptical vice-president of the 
goodwill of the German social-democrats.1085 To prove its resolution, the SPD’s 
International Relations Commission openly welcomed a delegation of FRELIMO1086 in 
Bonn between 2 and 8 August 1973. The programme included talks with members of the 
FES and the SPD, including Parliamentary State Secretary Hans Matthöfer in his role as 
member of the SPD’s National Executive and International Relations Commission. 1087 In 
stark contrast to the brief and surreptitious meetings of the past, this visit even included a 
joint press conference with the FRELIMO delegation and the SPD’s International 
Relations Commission. In the conference, both groups condemned Portuguese 
colonialism and any kind of military support to the Caetano regime. The German 
spokesmen announced the SPD’s will to aid FRELIMO’s public relations within the FRG 
and to promote, as soon as possible, a conference with all the social-democratic parties 
from NATO countries. According to the communiqué, such a conference should establish 
a joint policy to ensure that Portugal would stop the flagrant violation of the principles of 
the Atlantic Alliance.1088 
 Despite their efforts, the German social-democrats were not able to fully satisfy 
the African delegation. Against the delegation’s wishes, they refused to recognise the 
existence of an actual Mozambican government in exile. Furthermore, because the West 
German government itself was not involved in the visit, FRELIMO could get no official 
assurance that the FRG would adopt a strong position against Portugal in NATO or in the 
UN. As usual, Cahora Bassa was also a major point of friction. While FRELIMO saw the 
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project as an instrument of colonialism, the social-democrats claimed that the dam should 
be regarded as part of the modern infrastructure which would eventually be inherited by a 
liberated Mozambique.1089 The private talks with the FRELIMO representatives almost 
broke off because of the latter issue, which took up to ten hours of intense discussion.1090 
 The trip was steeped in controversy. As described in previous chapters, the SPD 
faced a political backlash from the Auswärtiges Amt and from the German conservative 
press and opposition. The event also put the party in the delicate position of having to 
justify to the German companies involved in Cahora Bassa – and to the wider public 
opinion – why it sought to support a guerrilla group which was threatening the safety of 
German workers.1091 On the international front, Dingels took care of the damage control 
with regard to Lisbon – he met with Ambassador Freitas Cruz to assure him that the 
government had played no part in FRELIMO’s visit, which had been exclusively an 
initiative of the inner-circles of the SPD.1092 Yet even in Africa the reactions were mixed. 
West German embassies in the continent reported that the joint SPD-FRELIMO press 
communiqué did not seem to have presented with sufficient clarity the SPD’s position 
regarding the military shipments to Portugal.1093 In fact, what goodwill the initiative 
garnered in Africa dissipated as soon as the Bonn government clarified that the FRG’s 
relations with Lisbon were to remain unchanged.1094 
 Most notably, the event also failed to achieve its central purpose, i.e. to 
consolidate relations with FRELIMO. On the day of his return to Africa, Marcelino dos 
Santos privately sent his German hosts a few kind words about the “progress which we 
could observe in our relationship”, yet he also made it clear that his group hoped that the 
FRG would soon take an official stand against Portuguese colonialism.1095 Weeks later, 
in the absence of such a stand, dos Santos publicly announced that FRELIMO was 
refusing any assistance from the West Germans. On 30 August, he told the Tanzanian 
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newspaper Daily News: “They wanted to give military help to Portugal and at the same 
time give medicines to us to treat our wounds. We considered this an immoral position.” 
Dos Santos complained that the SPD, despite being the main force in government, would 
only commit itself as a party – in his view, the SPD’s offer of solidarity was not enough if 
it would not stop the federal government from continuing to work with Lisbon. Dos 
Santos also described the attitude of the German social-democrats as paternalistic. He 
criticised the SPD’s insistence that its aid should be used exclusively for humanitarian 
purposes – unlike the unconditional aid provided, for example, by the Dutch – as well as 
the SPD’s view on Cahora Bassa: “How can we believe that a party really wants to 
cooperate with us when they want to decide what is good for our people?”.1096 The 
contacts between FRELIMO and the SPD were interrupted.1097 Frustrated, the German 
social-democrats even agreed to discretely talk to the leader of COREMO in January 
1974, even though they were aware of how less relevant that group was in comparison to 
FRELIMO.1098 Even if dos Santos’ attitude mostly reflected his personal and ideological 
leanings – particularly in comparison with the goodwill displayed by the pro-Western 
Mário Soares – the FRELIMO episode had exposed the limitations and contradictions of 




 In alternative to Bonn’s official Portugal-policy, the SPD established relations 
with the opposition to the Lisbon dictatorship and to its colonial rule. The main agent of 
these parallel relations was the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, which concerted its actions 
with the foreign policy organs of the SPD but retained a degree of independence. Given 
that the SPD was the leading party in the government, it is important to consider the 
significance of these initiatives. 
By their very nature, these initiatives represented a considerable rupture with 
Bonn’s cooperative posture vis-à-vis the Portuguese regime. The FES financed 
disenfranchised Portuguese students in West Germany, including exile Eduardo de Sousa 
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Ferreira, who conceptualised and articulated substantial criticism against the dictatorship. 
The foundation also supplied some support to the Portuguese socialist movement, 
including – in a major symbolic gesture – the funds and location for the founding 
congress of the Portuguese Socialist Party. By facilitating the circulation and networking 
of the Portuguese socialists and enhancing their reputation – for example, by aiding their 
integration in the Socialist International in 1972 – the German social-democrats furthered 
the international projection of one of the most emblematic forces of the political 
opposition to the Lisbon dictatorship. Moreover, the FES provided humanitarian relief to 
liberation movements in the Portuguese colonies, most notably the MPLA and the 
PAIGC. Finally, the SPD itself lent these movements some political support by publicly 
endorsing their anti-colonialist ideals. These initiatives were partially based on solidarity 
with the causes of those movements and individuals, even if Mário Soares’ socialist 
group ASP was the only one of them ideologically close to the SPD. A further, more 
practical, consideration was the need to cultivate positive relations with the successors of 
the ruling elite in Portugal as well as in the colonies. Such a need was enhanced by the 
fact that the African rebels had substantial material and ideological ties to East Germany, 
which increased the urgency of developing good relations with them.  
Naturally, most of these processes cannot be fully dissociated from the federal 
government itself. Chancellor Willy Brandt was aware of his party’s parallel policy, not 
the least because of his consultations with the implementers of that policy in the FES and 
SPD. As chairman of the SPD, he presumably would have been able to take steps against 
this policy, yet he accepted it, even if he chose to minimise his, and his government’s 
involvement. The state budget funded some of the humanitarian aid provided by the FES 
to the liberation movements. The latter decision was encouraged by the BMZ, which 
generally displayed a marked anti-colonialist predisposition. In 1970, this initiative also 
briefly gained the acquiescence of the AA, which hoped that by aiding the liberation 
movements these would adopt a less critical discourse towards the FRG and thus help 
clean up Bonn’s image in Africa. Parliamentary State Secretary Hans Matthöffer met with 
the delegations from FRELIMO and from the Socialist Party; in the latter case, so did his 
colleague Willi Berkham, although neither did it in an official capacity. Furthermore, as 
explained in the previous chapter, Bonn’s tolerance of the initiatives of the FES and SPD 
became the focus of occasional diplomatic friction with Lisbon. Thus it can be argued 
that this parallel policy represented a manifestation of discontinuity even in the formal 
West German policy towards Portugal. 
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Nevertheless, it is important to take into consideration the limitations of this 
parallel foreign policy. For example, the amount of practical support for the Portuguese 
socialists was very modest and low-profile. While the FES cooperated with the ASP, the 
SPD as a party adopted a more reserved position due to the conviction that Soares’ group 
stood little chance of coming to power any time soon. In part – and especially during the 
earlier years of this period – this view was tied to positive expectations regarding Marcelo 
Caetano and the dictatorship’s ‘liberal wing’, i.e. Soares’ illegal opposition had to 
compete with the liberals’ legal opposition for the face of the most credible agent of 
peaceful democratisation in Portugal. Mostly, however, Soares had to compete with the 
German conviction that change in Portugal would only occur in the long-run and that 
therefore there was no point in compromising the immediate relations with Lisbon in the 
name of the ASP, particularly at the risk of weakening Caetano’s stand against the 
ultraconservative faction of the Lisbon regime. Thus, the relations with the socialists were 
greatly shaped by the Germans’ perception of the evolving situation in Lisbon, as well as 
by the division between a more idealistic and a more pragmatic sector of the SPD. 
Regarding the support for the liberation movements, the West German case stood 
in contrast to its Dutch and Scandinavian neighbours, where the governments themselves 
adopted a more committed position. This proved to be particularly important because the 
SPD’s elites’ rejected a full departure from the government line, most notably regarding 
Cahora Bassa. Significantly, as Hans-Jürgen Wischnewski found in his contacts with 
FRELIMO, the SPD’s position could be interpreted as insufficiently counterbalancing 
Bonn’s policy with no guarantees of actual governmental change. The prevalence of 
continuity was thus evidenced by the fact that the German social-democrats found it 
easier to restrain Lisbon’s indignation over their small-scale cooperation with the 
liberation movements than to restrain the Mozambican group’s outrage over their large-
scale cooperation with Lisbon. 
In conclusion, the SPD’s parallel foreign relations served less as a disruptive force 
than as a vehicle to compensate for – and therefore safeguard – the official relationship 
between the FRG and Portugal. These relations confirmed the existence of a strand within 
the SPD and FES which was moved by solidarity with the resistance against the Lisbon 
regime and which created a space outside the government to act out its political ideals. 
However, by remaining essentially and admittedly non-governmental, these initiatives 
only ended up highlighting the government’s own ambiguous position towards the 
Portuguese dictatorship. In fact, in its most extreme case, this alternative foreign policy 
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was not only limited but undermined by its reluctance to compromise Bonn’s actual 













The defining feature of West German policy towards the Portuguese dictatorship 
during the governments headed by Willy Brandt and Marcelo Caetano was its 
ambiguity. The final chapter of this thesis draws together elements from across my 
research in order to analyse this ambiguous policy. A first section determines the 
practical dilemmas at the root of the policy, which reflected the influence of multiple 
factors coming both from within and outside of the SPD-FDP coalition in power. Some 
of these factors contributed to reinforce the FRG’s traditionally stable and friendly 
policy vis-à-vis the Lisbon regime, while others pressured Bonn into discontinuing 
areas of that policy and adopting a more confrontational stance. This section 
demonstrates that, as contradictory as the result of these various clashes was, there was 
a predominant strand: the government essentially carried out a policy of continuity, 
despite a few significant exceptions. The closing section delves into the wider historical 
implications of this policy option. It argues that the FRG helped sustain the Lisbon 
dictatorship and consequently the process of Portuguese resistance to decolonisation. 
This was not Bonn’s primary intention, but rather a by-product of contemporary West 
German priorities, namely the safeguarding of neue Ostpolitik and a preference for 
peaceful evolutionary solutions. Therefore this thesis concludes that the context of Cold 
War in Europe coupled with a flawed interpretation of Portuguese European and 
colonial reality posed a challenge to the dynamics of African emancipation. 
 
 
The dilemmas of Bonn’s policy towards the Caetano regime 
At the core of Bonn’s ambiguous policy towards the Caetano regime was the 
attempt to find a compromise solution for three interconnected dilemmas related to 
Lisbon’s resistance to decolonisation. The first of these dilemmas and the central one, 
from which the others derived, was the ‘Portugal vs Africa’ dilemma. On the one hand, 
the FRG, which was an ally of Portugal within the framework of NATO, had 
historically entangled itself with the Lisbon dictatorship, including, inevitably, its 
colonial dimension. On the other hand, the anti-colonialist African states were the 
largest voting group in the UN General Assembly and the FRG required their support 
for its bold foreign policy aimed at long-term German self-determination. Bonn’s 
reputation as an accomplice of Portuguese colonialism endangered this support, creating 
a serious conflict of interests. In this regard, the two most controversial aspects were the 
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West German-Portuguese military cooperation – which indirectly provided Portugal 
with equipment used in the colonial wars – and the West German participation in the 
Cahora Bassa dam project, in Mozambique. Notably, these issues were exploited by 
East German propaganda, which furthered the expansion of the GDR’s influence in 
Africa, thus undermining the advantageous position of the FRG in inter-German 
negotiations and competition. 
The Brandt governments tried to reconcile their relations with Lisbon and with 
its critics, often with incongruous results. At times, they agreed to supply the 
Portuguese with military materiel which they suspected might be used in the wars while 
also briefly supplying the liberation movements with humanitarian relief. Moreover, 
they resisted African demands to abandon the Cahora Bassa project, but they also 
rejected a request for further credit to cover the enterprise. Ultimately, the SPD-FDP 
coalition could not choose between Portugal and Africa or between NATO and the 
United Nations, no more than it could choose between national security and national 
self-determination, for the former preserved the federal state and the latter was the 
purpose that drove its foreign policy. Although this was hardly a new problem, it 
became more pressing during this era with the escalation and subsequent radicalisation 
of the African critique of the FRG’s ties to Portugal, which found a potent echo in the 
solidarity movement within West German society. In the autumn of 1970, Bonn sought 
to break away from this dilemma by encouraging a dialogue between Lisbon and the 
independent African states, taking advantage of the latter’s willingness to discuss a 
solution for the colonial conflict. Bonn’s effort proved unsuccessful due to the 
Portuguese dictatorship’s reluctance to negotiate with the African side. 
The need to promote Portuguese flexibility formed the basis for Bonn’s second 
policy dilemma, which concerned the best way to approach Lisbon: ‘cooperation vs 
confrontation’. According to one of the main advocates of cooperation, the German 
Ambassador in Lisbon Ehrenfried von Holleben, Portugal’s rapprochement with Europe 
and a conciliatory international attitude would legitimise the more progressive and pro-
European forces within the dictatorship, or at least prevent Lisbon’s drift towards 
isolationism. With this in mind, Bonn supported Portugal in the negotiations for the 
1972 trade agreement with the EEC and it lobbied against Scandinavian and Dutch 
efforts to marginalise the dictatorship internationally. By contrast, confrontational 
measures against Lisbon were suggested within and outside the government, including 
tougher diplomatic pressure, economic sanctions, a military embargo and a multilateral 
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demarche. Bonn did not fully embrace any of these measures, but it occasionally came 
close to adopting softer versions: the Chancellery’s shy attempt to directly engage with 
Caetano, the BMZ’s and BMWi’s reluctance to provide further development aid, the 
AA’s demand for stricter control over the final destination of military sales and its short-
lived attempt to coordinate a joint action with France and the UK. Nevertheless, because 
confrontational approaches increased the risk of alienating Lisbon, which would have 
meant picking a side in the ‘Portugal vs Africa’ dilemma, Bonn adopted cooperation as 
its default policy line. 
The cooperative stance propelled a third dilemma: ‘close collaboration vs 
diplomatic distance’. The cornerstone of Bonn’s official strategy was the idea of 
cooperating with Lisbon in order to shift Portugal’s interests towards Europe and to help 
it overcome its dependency on Africa. At the same time, however, the federal 
government did not want to be seen working too closely with such a controversial 
regime. In this regard, the East German propaganda offensive had a particularly 
paradoxical effect, indirectly promoting closer contact between the West German and 
Portuguese foreign ministers, but preventing their interaction from becoming more 
formalised. Careful to avoid guilt by association, Bonn maintained some distance from 
Lisbon on the surface while scrupulously preserving their amicable relationship.  
The policy approaches generated by these three dilemmas can be aggregated into 
two distinct strands. Approaches with a more pro-Portuguese, pro-cooperative and pro-
collaborative orientation placed the emphasis on the continuity of traditionally positive 
relations with Lisbon. In turn, approaches with a more pro-African, pro-confrontational 
or pro-distance orientation represented a discontinuity with traditional policy. The two 
strands competed, but they also occasionally complemented each other. For example, 
until 1973 the federal government’s approach to the issue of military cooperation with 
Portugal was admittedly one of continuity, as illustrated by the commitment to make 
use of the Beja airbase. In order to secure this cooperation in a sensitive international 
environment, however, Bonn sought to ostensibly dissociate military relations from the 
colonial wars. Thus in April 1971 Brandt attempted to replace the FRG’s direct bilateral 
supply of military aid to Lisbon with an indirect multilateral supply of aid through 
NATO. Shortly after the UK rejected this plan, the Bonn government changed strategy 
by enforcing a strict end-use clause attached to military sales to the dictatorship, which 
explicitly forbade the use of the acquired equipment outside of Europe. While both 
measures were aimed at enabling the continuity of cooperation, the latter ended up 
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creating a virtual impasse in the exports of West German military materiel to Portugal 
for two years, which was a clear element of discontinuity in the overall West German-
Portuguese relations. 
In part, Bonn’s various contradictory stances resulted from tension between 
interests and ideology, but it should be taken into account that both continuity and 
discontinuity were justified with materialist as well as ideological arguments. The case 
for continuity was based on economic, military and strategic interests. From an 
economic perspective, positive relations with Portugal promoted the FRG’s foreign 
trade and export of capital, while also giving West German companies the opportunity 
to participate in the economically appealing – if politically contaminated – Cahora 
Bassa project. Conversely, the idea of compromising economic interests for political 
reasons, as advocated by the anti-Cahora Bassa campaign, was seen as dangerously 
undermining the foundation of the FRG’s external economic relations. From a military 
perspective, the main benefit of an appeasing attitude was ensuring Lisbon’s goodwill in 
allowing the Luftwaffe’s use of the Alcochete range and the construction of a new range, 
which was necessary for the training programs at the Beja airbase. From a strategic 
perspective, a key concern was to prevent Portugal’s expulsion or voluntary withdrawal 
from NATO, which could have started an internal crisis in the Atlantic Alliance and 
would have cost the organisation the crucial Lajes airbase. Yet continuity also had an 
ideological reasoning, based on the theory that economic liberalisation and development 
in Portugal would lead to political liberalisation and decolonisation. Similarly, the 
advocates of discontinuity combined pragmatic and idealist counter-arguments. From a 
realist perspective, Bonn’s relationship with the unpopular Lisbon regime posed serious 
problems by inviting a domestic public opinion backlash, damaging the international 
prestige of the FRG and indirectly contributing to African radicalisation. Regardless of 
these practical considerations, the case for discontinuity often relied on genuine anti-
colonialist and anti-authoritarian values. 
The ambiguity of Bonn’s policy reflected the fact that both overriding strands 
were represented within the federal government. The most extreme cases were the 
Auswärtiges Amt, which mostly favoured continuity, and the BMZ, which often 
advocated discontinuity. At the top level, this divergence signalled the coalition’s 
ideological plurality. After all, the AA was headed by Walter Scheel, who was the 
chairman of the liberal FDP and who presented liberalism and moderate reform as the 
preferred path for social and political change. By contrast, the BMZ was headed by a 
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member of the left wing of the social-democratic SPD, Erhard Eppler, who envisioned a 
more active role in promoting change. The division did not run merely across party 
lines: for example, the BMVg often defended Portuguese interests, even though it was 
headed by Helmut Schmidt and later Georg Leber, two SPD politicians from a more 
conservative wing of the party. Yet policy orientations reflected not just each minister’s 
political inclination, but also the predisposition of the ministerial apparatus. The AA’s 
bureaucrats frequently defended continuity on the basis of Realpolitik, the generally 
leftist employees of the BMZ displayed less tolerance for the Lisbon right-wing 
dictatorship, the staff at the BMVg pushed for exceptions in the restriction of military 
exports to Portugal in line with the interests of the Armed Forces and of the industrial-
military complex. This is not to say that the ministries were fully consistent: despite its 
tendencies favourable to continuity, the AA was tough on arms’ supplies to Lisbon, 
which were a key target of African criticism. Similarly, under Karl Schiller (SPD) the 
BMWi encouraged investments in Portugal and Portuguese rapprochement with the 
EEC, but it was hesitant on the issue of economic aid for the Alqueva dam because of 
the possible negative effect on public opinion. Within the Chancellery, key actors 
related to foreign affairs such as Horst Ehmke, Carl-Werner Sanne, Per Fischer and 
possibly Egon Bahr were involved in the unsuccessful attempt to establish a productive 
backchannel to Marcelo Caetano in late 1970. As Chancellor Willy Brandt felt 
frustrated over the dictator’s intransigence, the Chancellery abandoned its plans for a 
more active diplomacy towards Lisbon. It essentially delegated this area of policy back 
to the AA, which determined Bonn’s official strategy regarding Portugal for the 
following years. 
Thus the SPD’s ideals of peace, democracy and self-determination ended up 
having a limited impact on the government’s policy towards the Portuguese 
dictatorship, the BMZ’s public defiance notwithstanding. This explains why the SPD 
ranks – in stark contrast to the support for continuity by the CDU/CSU – were at the 
forefront of the political opposition to this area of Bonn’s policy, both in parliament and 
in the activist campaigns, most notably through the AGM-Komitee. At an institutional 
level, a wing of the SPD’s party structure funnelled its opposition to Lisbon into non-
governmental channels, including the party’s International Department, its Commission 
for International Relations and the Friedrich Ebert Foundation. These institutions 
developed a parallel foreign policy, lending discrete support to the illegal Portuguese 
socialist opposition and reaching out to the African liberation movements. This process 
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reached a peak in 1973 with the foundation of the Portuguese Socialist Party in Bad 
Münstereifel and a visit from a FRELIMO delegation to the FRG. Both the SPD’s role 
as opposition and its urge to establish alternative foreign relations underline the gap 
between the party’s discourse and the government’s actual policy towards Lisbon. 
By weighing the behaviour of the Brandt governments in various fields this 
thesis has concluded that they continued to pursue an endemically lenient policy 
towards the Lisbon regime, with sporadic adjustments and concessions to critical forces. 
The only large-scale disengagement was the military divestment announced in the 
summer of 1973, near the end of this period and primarily motivated by logistical and 
financial concerns rather than political ones. This assessment challenges the impression 
conveyed by Portuguese research on the topic, which has emphasised the deterioration 
of West German-Portuguese relations during this era as a side effect of neue 
Ostpolitik.1099 The fact that the stance of the Brandt governments was comparatively 
less forthcoming than that of those in the early 1960s and the existence of specific 
elements of marked discontinuity should not override the prevalence of positive West 
German-Portuguese relations during marcelismo. Only by acknowledging Bonn’s 




The implications of Bonn’s policy towards the Caetano regime  
 Portugal, the poorest country in Western Europe with little perceived political 
weight outside of its borders, was deeply dependent on its Western allies for the pursuit 
of its policy of resistance to decolonisation. Given the material burden of three 
simultaneous wars in Africa, it is not surprising that said resistance would take the form 
of an invisible ‘team effort’ rather than an isolationist undertaking. This situation was 
not fully exceptional, as demonstrated by the key role of the USA in bankrolling 
Western European imperial projects in the 1950s, when the UK could no longer 
financially afford its empire1100 and France faced destabilising colonial wars in 
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Indochina and Algeria.1101 In fact, the prerequisite of international support to stall the 
African anti-colonialist momentum had been unmistakably acknowledged – although 
not admitted in public – by the Portuguese dictatorship even before the outbreak of the 
first large-scale armed conflict. As argued by António José Telo, it had been this very 
perception that had fuelled Lisbon’s rapprochement with Bonn in the late 1950s.1102 
However, not only material resources were at stake. In his analysis of the late stages of 
Portuguese colonial policy, Okon Udokang highlighted the importance of political 
complicity. According to Udokang, in the “existing international atmosphere of general 
revulsion against foreign domination”, imperial powers realised that their national 
policy was “more likely to succeed if pursued in collaboration with those sharing a 
commonality of values and interests”.1103 Indeed, Lisbon had from the onset appealed to 
its allies with a rhetoric based on the notions of European civilisation and 
anticommunism. Yet by the time Caetano came to power the dictatorship could not 
escape the Zeitgeist anymore than it could escape the African guerrillas and so it no 
longer expected an open endorsement. Unlike the Brandt governments, which 
successfully multilateralised their own national goals by framing them in the context of 
a wider European peace strategy, the Caetano regime did not strive for recognition of its 
international aims – it settled for agnostic tolerance and resentful acquiescence. 
The dictatorship found the latter in the West German government. Even if the 
passing sympathy for Lisbon’s regime of the Adenauer-Strauß years had given way to a 
more assuredly anti-colonialist identity in Bonn, Caetano did not face rupture with or 
consistent antagonism from West German diplomacy. After all, while Chancellor 
Brandt was clearly ideologically farther away from Portugal than his predecessors had 
been, the relationship between Bonn and Lisbon – as both would have gladly admitted – 
had never been grounded in common political values as much as in compatible goals of 
foreign policy. The SPD-FDP coalition governments were certainly not committed to 
defending the Portuguese colonial empire, but they had priorities other than its 
termination, namely, at the top of the list, East-West European rapprochement. As we 
have seen, Bonn’s policy towards the Caetano regime was the product of multiple 
conflicts between contradictory forces, most of which bore no discernible relation to 
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neue Ostpolitik. Yet the latter nonetheless ended up playing a key part, because 
whenever European détente was at stake in a conflict, the final balance would tip in 
favour of whichever position seemed more likely to safeguard it. Consequently, neue 
Ostpolitik contributed decisively to the final West German policy towards the 
Portuguese dictatorship on two levels: political and geo-strategic. 
On a purely political level, neue Ostpolitik reduced Bonn’s leeway to undermine 
its relationship with the Portuguese regime through a hostile strategy. As both the West 
German left and right pointed out, the idea of building bridges and cooperating with 
disreputable authoritarian regimes was at the basis of the new Eastern policy. If Bonn 
attacked Portugal for its cruel colonial practices while appeasing the GDR, this could 
signal to the German public that the Brandt government was more committed to 
combating the oppression of the Africans or the Portuguese than the oppression of the 
Germans in the neighbouring state. For various sections of the FRG society, the 
implication that their government would downplay the suffering in East Germany was 
very difficult to accept, especially for those who still had family on the other side of the 
border.  
 On a geo-strategic level, neue Ostpolitik was grounded on Bonn’s clear 
commitment to its Western allies. Brandt’s policy of reaching out to the East neither 
implied acceptance of the Soviet model nor the assumption that the East-West conflict 
was over – on the contrary, it rested on the notion of a strong and solid Western bloc. 
True to this principle, Bonn opposed the attempts to stigmatise the Portuguese 
dictatorship within NATO, fearing that the organisation might erode through in-
fighting. Even if one questions the personal devotion of Willy Brandt and especially 
Egon Bahr to the Atlantic Alliance and accepts their yearning to overcome it in the 
future1104, the short-term conditions – i.e. the need to secure the trust of European and 
American allies – reinforced the FRG’s need to display loyalty to its NATO partner 
Portugal. Contrary to the aforementioned interpretation by Portuguese historiography, 
the FRG’s new status quo with the authoritarian regimes of the East actually reduced its 
breathing space to act against the Portuguese dictatorship. 
Although neue Ostpolitik’s role in the context of Bonn’s Portugal-policy was 
chiefly as a factor blocking some of the impulses towards discontinuity, its presence 
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could also be felt among the forces pushing for continuity. The supporters of friendly 
relations with Lisbon – most notably those in the AA – presented their strategy as one 
based on realism and communication, i.e. on accepting the established reality of the 
dictatorship and trusting that contact with Portugal might lead to its penetration by 
Bonn’s ideas. This plan assumed that once Lisbon had lost the fear of being pushed out 
of Africa, it could enter into a process of increasing interaction with Western Europe. 
Rapprochement might then result in the transformation of Lisbon, albeit a gradual one: 
Portuguese rule in Africa was not to be abruptly abolished but changed over time. Such 
a theory rested on the notion that the African colonial question could only be solved 
through cooperation with Portugal and not through antagonistic behaviour. If we replace 
‘Africa’ by ‘Eastern Europe’ and ‘Portugal’ by ‘Soviet Union’, we come very close to 
the principles of neue Ostpolitik, as originally formulated by Egon Bahr.1105 
This is not to say that West German politicians necessarily regarded Bonn’s 
policy towards Portugal as a variation of their policy towards the East, even if the 
comparison was explicitly or implicitly made by several actors, as shown throughout the 
thesis. What the resemblances in the rhetoric of the two policies reflect is their common 
origin in the idea of phased long-term transformation within a framework of stability. 
This was the idea behind such neue Ostpolitik slogans as ‘change through 
rapprochement’ or ‘liberalisation through stabilisation’. In principle, Marcelo Caetano’s 
reformism was perfectly suited to Bonn’s views, as evidenced by his similar concepts of 
‘evolution within continuity’ in the regime and ‘progressive autonomy’ in the colonies. 
Such formulas served as groundwork for the AA’s policy of continuous positive 
relations with Lisbon, regardless of whether German political agents perceived them 
with genuine hope or cynicism – or whether, as it usually seems to be the case, they 
simply viewed Caetano as the lesser evil in comparison to the regime’s ‘ultra-right’ 
faction. As a result, the Portuguese dictatorship obtained diplomatic, economic and even 
military benefits through its relationship with the FRG which were devoid of any 
sustained pressure to make concessions on the democratic or colonial fronts.  
Bonn’s justification for its policy of continuity relied on the interrelated flawed 
assumptions that there could still be stable and peaceful evolution in Portugal and in the 
colonies. The idea that economic rapprochement with Europe would challenge the 
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dictatorship’s Africanist tendencies rested on a false dichotomy. The Portuguese 
economy had been steadily turning towards Europe since the early 1960s and that had 
not prevented the prolonged engagement in the colonial wars – in fact, the extraordinary 
economic growth had helped compensate for the state’s heavy military expenditure. The 
intense economic relations with Europe in the early 1970s confirmed that Lisbon’s 
attachment to Africa was primarily politically driven, not economically driven, and thus 
the solution to the colonial question had to be political as well. In fairness, the AA and 
even circles of the SPD presented the dictatorship’s ‘liberal wing’ – perceived as a 
version of Bonn’s own liberal-reformist posture – as the protagonists of a possible 
political solution, but this view overestimated that faction’s actual influence within 
Lisbon. Contrary to German wishful thinking, economic development did not translate 
into political power for the ‘liberals’. While the rapprochement with Europe had spurred 
an industrialist and political class willing to look beyond the empire-centred ideology, 
the regime itself was blocked and unable to change regardless of Caetano’s rhetoric – 
and without meaningful regime change there could not be transformation of the policy 
towards Africa. 
More importantly, the idea that, given time and propitious conditions, the 
dictatorship would come to its senses and decolonise presupposed that Lisbon was 
entitled to manage the dissolution of its empire, i.e. that the metropolis was – or should 
be – in full control of the decolonising process. Not only did this assumption accept the 
very principles of colonial rule which it sought to overcome, it disregarded the impact 
of the ongoing liberation struggle in the colonies. Indeed, the practicality of a slow 
evolution had already been compromised by the long duration of the process of 
Portuguese resistance to decolonisation. However, even after a decade of liberation 
struggle, the concern with stability and the insistence on an evolutionary solution led 
Bonn – the Chancellery as well as the AA – to defend a long-term (10 to 15 years) non-
revolutionary transition to independence.  
In the end, Bonn’s policy towards the Caetano regime did succeed in the 
priorities it had set for itself. It safeguarded German material interests. It kept Portugal 
in NATO, avoiding a crisis within the organisation. It secured the FRG’s pro-Western 
credentials. It effectively prevented the Afro-Portuguese colonial problem from 
disturbing neue Ostpolitik or the first stages of the CSCE. Ultimately it was not the 
Lisbon dictatorship but the West German government who chose Europe over Africa, 
by subordinating African aspirations to its European policy and by placing the onus of 
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decolonisation on European agency, i.e. on Portugal’s readiness. The paradox, of 
course, was that by enabling Lisbon’s colonialism, the federal government was denying 
to the Portuguese colonies the very right to self-determination which Bonn was striving 
to obtain for its own nation. 
The European focus of Bonn’s policy was reflected in the aftermath of the 
Carnation Revolution. The federal government’s former relations with the dictatorship 
did not prevent the FRG from maintaining its role as a close ally of Portugal. In this 
regard, the parallel foreign policy developed by the FES paid off, securing tight 
relations with the Portuguese Socialist Party, particularly important during the 
revolutionary period (1974-1975). Willy Brandt, no longer chancellor but still chairman 
of the SPD, became an active patron of the party’s efforts to establish a Western-style 
democracy in the country.1106 By contrast, Bonn’s relations with the former Portuguese 
colonies were a disaster, particularly in the case of Mozambique1107, even if, in a final 
twist, the FRELIMO leadership came to embrace the Cahora Bassa dam shortly after 
achieving independence1108, on 25 June 1975. While West Germany’s ties to Africa 
were not completely tarnished, the prestige of the FRG in the continent became 
seriously compromised in the second half of the decade, in stark contrast to East 
Germany’s.1109 Brandt, who after leaving his mark in East-West relations would come 
to focus on the North-South divide, most notably through his 1980 ‘Brandt Report’, 
timidly reassessed his governments’ position in his memoirs:  
 
“Portuguese colonial policy had caused me much concern as Foreign Minister and 
Chancellor. Although we insisted when supplying arms within the framework of 
the Alliance that all such equipment must remain in Portugal, it was inevitable 
that the African liberation movements should mistrust us. Our own attitude to 
them was unduly reserved. The Soviet commitment in Angola might never have 
happened if the West had evolved a consistent policy towards Africa.”1110 
                                                
1106 Fonseca, Ana Mónica. 2009. The Federal Republic of Germany and the Portuguese Transition to 
Democracy. Journal of European Integration History, vol.15, nr.1, pp.35-56; In one of the few reminders 
of the past, Brandt interceded with the Portuguese authorities for the release of the head of the ‘ultras’, his 
former counterpart Franco Nogueira. – Brandt, Willy. 1978. People and Politics: the Years 1960-1975, 
London: Collins, p.178. 
1107 “Two Germanys in Africa”, Africa Report, vol. 25, issue 4, July/August 1980, pp.13-15. 
1108 Middlemas, Kieth. 1975. Cabora Bassa – Engineering and Politics in Southern Africa, London: 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, p.339; HCB – Hidroeléctrica de Cahora Bassa. 2000. A nossa energia abraca 
Mocambique, Lisbon: Hidroeléctrica de Cahora Bassa, p.46; The Alqueva dam in Alentejo, on the other 
hand, would still take almost thirty years until completion. 
1109 “Two Germanys in Africa”, Africa Report, vol. 25, issue 4, July/August 1980, pp.13-15 
1110 Brandt (1978), p.488. 
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  In conclusion, the African and the West German ‘nationalist’, if 
internationalised, quests for self-determination became intertwined to the point of 
challenging each other. Willy Brandt’s SPD-FDP coalition gradually perceived a 
contradiction between its Northern and Southern policies and it ultimately chose the 
former. In doing so, it sacrificed its self-professed solidarity with African liberation in 
the name of European détente. Although Cold War competition was also a part of 
Bonn’s Afrikapolitik, this final choice represented a clear dominance of Cold War 
concerns over decolonisation politics. It should be noted, however, that while the Cold 
War framework may have enabled and encouraged Bonn’s compliance with 
colonialism, it did not necessarily force it. After all, it would be no more counterfactual 
to state that Bonn could have safeguarded its neue Ostpolitik goals with a different 
policy towards Lisbon than it would be to assume that there was no alternative. Only by 
acknowledging that the Cold War did not determine actions, but the perceptions which 
shaped those actions, can we begin to accurately evaluate its role in the history of 
colonial and postcolonial politics. 
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 Annex 1 
 
Hierarchy of the Federal Government 
 
1. Chancellor (Bundeskanzler) 
 
2. Federal Minister (Bundesminister) 
 
3. Parliamentary State Secretary (Parlamentarische Staatssekretäre) 
3. Head of the Chancellery (Chef des Bundeskanzleramtes) 
 
4. Undersecretary of State (Staatssekretär) 
 
5. Political Director (Ministerialdirektor) 
 
6. Head of Section (Ministerialdirigent) 
 
7. Head of Department (Vortragender Legationsrat Erster Klasse) 
7. Head of Department (Ministerialrat) 
 







FRG’s percentage in the Portuguese foreign trade (special trade): 1111 
Year Imports from the FRG Exports to the FRG 
1968 15,6% 5,7% 
1969 15,7% 6,4% 
1970 15,5% 6,3% 
1971 15,7% 6,2% 
1972 14,8% 7,2% 
1973 14,4% 7,5% 





FRG’s exports to Portugal and colonies in DM 1,000 (percentage of the total 
West German exports): 1112 











Angola 132,105 140,162 155,455 136,055 160,785 






5,067 6,271 6,022 5,145 4,980 
East Timor, 
Macau 











                                                
1111 Estatísticas do Comércio Externo (INE) 
1112 BAK,B128/000398–B128/000404, Statistisches Bundesamt Wiesbaden – Aussenhandel 1968-1974 
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 APPENDIX 3 
 
FRG’s imports from Portugal and colonies in DM 1,000 (percentage of the 
total West German imports): 1113 











Angola 158,602 133,897 79,400 100,448 142,585 






5,521 6,278 2,397 2,236 3,677 
East Timor, 
Macau 














                                                







Adenauer, Konrad (CDU) – Chancellor of West Germany (1949-1963) 
Bahr, Egon Karlheinz (SPD) – Undersecretary of State of the Chancellery 
(1969-1972), Federal Minister for Special Affairs (1972-1974) 
Becker, Herbert – President of the German Delegation to the GPMMC 
(1960- 1970) 
Berkhan, Willi (SPD) – Parliamentary State Secretary of the BMVg (1969-
1975) 
Börnstein, Ulrich (SPD) – Political Director of the BMZ (1968-1974) 
Bothmer, Lenelotte von (SPD) – Member of Parliament for the SPD 
(1969-1980), Member of the AGM-Komitee (1971-1975), Member of the 
Board of the German African Society (1972-1975) 
Brandt, Willy (SPD) – Chairman of SPD (1964-1987), Federal Minister for 
Foreign Affairs (1966-1969), Vice-Chancellor of West Germany (1966-
1969), Chancellor of West Germany (1969-1974) 
Braun, Sigismund von (FDP) – German Ambassador in France (1968-
1970, 1972-1976); Undersecretary of State of the AA (1970-1972) 
Caetano, Marcelo José das Neves Alves – President of the Council of 
Ministers (Prime-Minister) of Portugal (1968-1974), Minister for Foreign 
Affairs (1969-1970) 
Cruz, João Carlos Lopes Cardoso de Freitas – Portuguese Ambassador in 
the FRG (1971-1973) 
Cunha, Joaquim Moreira da Silva – Portuguese Minister for Overseas 
(1965-1973), Portuguese Minister for Defence (1973-1974) 
Diehl, Günter – Federal Government Spokesman (1966-1969) 
Dingels, Hans-Eberhard (SPD) – International Secretary of the SPD 
(1961-1995) 
Douglas-Home, Alec – British Foreign Minister (1970-1974) 
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Eger, Wolfgang – Head of the Sub-Saharan Africa Department1114 at the 
AA (1970-1975) 
Ehmke, Horst (SPD) – Federal Minister for Special Affairs (1969-1972), 
Head of the Chancellery (1969-1972) 
Eppler, Erhard (SPD) – Federal Minister for Economic Cooperation 
(1968-1974) 
Erhard, Ludwig (CDU) – Federal Minister for Economics (1957-1963), 
Vice-Chancellor of West Germany (1957-1963), Chancellor of West 
Germany (1963-1966) 
Fingerhut, Helmut – Undersecretary of State of the BMVg (1972-1978) 
Fischer, Per – Head of the Chancellery’s Department for Foreign Affairs 
(1969-1972), Head of the Chancellery’s Section for Foreign Affairs1115  
(1972-1974) 
Frank, Paul – Political Director of the AA (1968-1969), Undersecretary of 
State of the AA (1969-1973) 
Hansen, Niels – Head of the Northern Mediterranean Department at the AA 
(1968-1970) 
Hase, Karl-Günther von – Undersecretary of State of the BMVg (1967-
1969); German Ambassador in the UK (1970-1977) 
Heath, Edward – Prime-Minister of the United Kingdom (1970-1974) 
Holleben, Ehrenfried Anton Theodor Ludwig von – German Ambassador 
in Portugal (1971-1974) 
Kaunda, Kenneth – President of Zambia (1964-1991), Chairman of OAU 
(1970-1971), Secretary General of the Non-Aligned Movement (1970-1973) 
Kiesinger, Kurt Georg (CDU) – Chancellor of West Germany (1966-1969) 
Kühn, Heinz (SPD) – Minister-President of North Rhine-Westphalia (1966-
1978), Vice-President of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation (1970-1983) 
Leber, Georg (SPD) – Federal Minister for Defence (1972-1974) 
Leite, José Pedro Pinto (Count Olivaes) – President of CCILA (1969-
1970)  
Maier-Oswald, Peter – First Secretary of the Sub-Saharan Africa 
Department at the AA (1969-1972) 
                                                
1114 In 1972, the name changes into East and Southern Africa Department 
1115 Full title: Section for Foreign and Inter-German Relations, External Security 
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Martins, Rogério – Portuguese Undersecretary of State for Industry (1969-
1972) 
Matthöfer, Hans Hermann  (SPD) – Member of Parliament for the SPD 
(1961-1987), Member of the AGM-Komitee (1971-1975), Parliamentary 
State Secretary of the BMZ (1972-1974), Member of the SPD’s Executive 
(1973-1984) 
Mello, Manuel da Cunha Pimentel Homem de – Portuguese Ambassador 
in the FRG (1964-1971) 
Moersch, Karl  (FDP) – Parliamentary State Secretary of the AA (1970-
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Müller-Rorschach, Herbert – German Ambassador in Portugal (1966-
1969) 
Neves, Mário – Director-General of AIP (1948-1972) 
Nixon, Richard – President of the United States of America (1969-1974) 
Nogueira, Alberto Marciano Gorjão Franco – Portuguese Minister for 
Foreign Affairs (1961-1969) 
Nyerere, Julius – President of Tanzania (1961-1985) 
Patrício, Rui Manuel de Medeiros d’Espiney – Portuguese Minister for 
Foreign Affairs (1970-1974) 
Pereira, Vasco Luís Caldeira Futscher – Portuguese Ambassador in the 
FRG (1973-1974) 
Pintado, Valentim Xavier – Portuguese Undersecretary of State for 
Commerce (1969-1972) 
Pompidou, Georges – President of France (1969-1974) 
Rebelo, Horácio José de Sá Viana (General) – Portuguese Minister for 
Defence (1968-1973) 
Ruete, Hans Helmuth – Political Director of the AA (1967-1970); German 
Ambassador in France (1970-1972) 
Salazar, António de Oliveira – President of the Council of Ministers 
(Prime-Minister) of Portugal (1932-1968) 
Sanne, Carl-Werner – Head of Department at the Chancellery (1969-
1970); Head of Chancellery’s Section for Foreign Affairs (1970-1972); 
Political Director of the Chancellery (1973-1977) 
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Santos, António Augusto dos (General) – President of the Portuguese 
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